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The constitutio Antoniniana represents one of the most important legal 
documents of the Roman imperial period. By means of this edict, the emperor 
Caracalla enfranchised nearly every free person living within the borders of his empire. 
Despite its apparent significance, though, the constitutio remains a controversial 
document among modern scholars. Some consider it to be the logical conclusion to an 
evolutionary process in Roman citizenship that took over two centuries to achieve. 
Others, however, believe that it is a meaningless document given retrospective 
importance, changing little in the daily lives of the empire’s population and 
representing nothing more than a superficial initiative brought forth by an absolute 
monarch.  
 
The primary focus of this thesis concerns the various reasons that Caracalla 
might have had for passing the constitutio Antoniniana in the opening half of AD 212. 
By considering elements such as the emperor’s fascination with Alexander the Great 
and religious perspective, as well as issues surrounding the Roman imperial economy 
and army, I will construct an image of the constitutio that is more multi-faceted than 
has been presented in the past. The common thread running through these chapters, 
however, is that Caracalla employed his edict as a tool in a programme of refashioning 
the Severan dynasty – a programme that he found himself compelled to undertake in 
the aftermath of the murder of his brother and co-emperor, Geta. I will also argue that 
modern scholars have been wrong to dismiss the testimony offered by Cassius Dio, in 
which the senator claimed that a fiscal rationale underlay the legislation. Whilst the 
detail of Dio’s argument is undoubtedly questionable, this thesis will demonstrate that, 
on a basic level, the senator was correct to identify a fiscal initiative contained within 
the terms of the constitutio text.  
 
The final chapter of the thesis will form a case study of Caracalla’s imperial 
visit to Alexandria in AD 215/6. This is a challenging episode to analyse, since the 
hostile literary tradition appears content to label the violence which marked the 
emperor’s stay in the city as the result of a merciless massacre ordered by Caracalla in 
revenge for an assortment of minor slights and insults. This chapter will re-assess the 
events of the imperial visit and argue that the disturbances were not the result of the 
emperor’s uncontrollable temper, but rather that they resulted from riots among the 
local population that the local authorities were unable to control. Following this 
hypothesis, I will examine to what extent the effects and implications of the constitutio 
Antoniniana had a bearing on the disturbances in Alexandria. I contend that, although 
it is obviously impossible to draw a direct link between the edict and the unrest, it is 
possible to see that the social and fiscal implications of the legislation would have 




This work will represent one of the largest studies of Caracalla’s constitutio 
undertaken in the English language to date. The aim of my study is not to function as 
an apology for the emperor, but it is an attempt to view the constitutio Antoniniana in 
a more rational way. My thesis thus acknowledges that the context in which the 
legislation was passed is of critical importance not only to our understanding of the 
constitutio as a document, but also to our assessment of Caracalla’s actions following 
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 In AD 212, the emperor M. Aurelius Severus Antoninus Pius, better known 
simply as Caracalla, fundamentally changed the nature of Roman citizenship. In one 
proclamation, he extended the previously exclusive rights of civitas to nearly every 
free person in his empire. Following the discovery of a papyrus containing a copy of 
this edict, over a century ago, Caracalla’s constitutio Antoniniana has proven to be one 
of the most perplexing and controversial artefacts to survive from the Roman imperial 
period. It has piqued the interest of historians of antiquity and law, as well as dedicated 
Greek linguists and papyrologists, provoking a profusion of publications across every 
decade of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first.1 This academic interest has 
been rekindled and intensified in recent years with the 1800th anniversary of the edict’s 
promulgation falling in 2012, a milestone that was commemorated through a variety 
of exhibitions, symposia and conferences occurring worldwide.2 
 
Despite such a consistent and significant level of interest in the Antonine 
Constitution, however, there are still remarkably few areas in which consensus has 
been reached regarding the legislation. In fact, it is clear that nearly every aspect of the 
constitutio has been divisive, eliciting a variety of scholarly reactions and creating a 
long and convoluted historiography in which even the fundamental significance of the 
edict remains disputed.3 It is the object of this thesis to consider Caracalla’s rationale 
for introducing the legislation in AD 212. In the past, studies have been conducted that 
assess the constitutio against individual motivating factors, but this dissertation takes 
the unprecedented step of gathering the various potential prompts for the edict and 
combining them in one study. The purpose of this exercise is to offer a comprehensive 
assessment of the emperor’s reasons for extending the franchise. By examining the 
numerous factors motivating Caracalla collectively, this thesis avoids affording an 
                                                 
1 The figure had surpassed ninety major publications by the time Sasse (1962) published his literature 
review on the edict. 
2 I was fortunate to be invited to speak at a symposium organised in November 2012 by the Universidad 
Nacional Mayor de San Marcos in Lima, Peru. I am grateful to Héctor Maldonado (UNMSM) for the 
opportunity to participate and to collaborate with his colleagues and students. 
3 Tuori (2007) 42. For examples of a positive reading, in which the constitutio is seen as an enlightened 
and logical conclusion to centuries of expansion in the franchise, see Kemezis (2014) 30; Ando (2011) 
19; Honoré (2004) 114-15. For a negative reading in which the legislation is branded an ‘accident of 
history’, see Garnsey (2004) 133, (1970) 270-80, and Sherwin-White (1973a) 281. 
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exaggerated importance to any one, individual element and, furthermore, provides an 
image of the constitutio that reflects the complex and precarious political reality facing 
the young emperor in 212. Indeed, one can only make sense of the constitutio 
Antoniniana in a properly embedded context. 
 
 It is first necessary to consider briefly the nature of pre-existing scholarship on 
Caracalla’s edict. The divided nature of modern scholarly attitudes on the constitutio 
is driven to a large extent by a dearth of ancient material relating to the legislation. In 
fact, one of the few areas of agreement that can be found in connection with the 
Antonine Constitution is a shared disbelief regarding how little direct evidence 
survives which relates to it.4 Apart from the famous Giessen papyrus, the only other 
contemporary references to the edict are brief mentions in Cassius Dio and the legal 
writings of Ulpian, now preserved in the Digest of Justinian.5 Given this meagre 
selection, it is hardly surprising that scholars still regard the constitutio to be ‘shrouded 
in mystery’, possessing a suspiciously small historical echo.6 While the lack of any 
sizeable corpus of evidence is an undeniable frustration, this should not lead us to the 
conclusion that the edict was somehow meaningless or insignificant: absence of 
evidence is not evidence of absence, after all.7 Indeed, it is precisely the enigmatic 
nature of the constitutio Antoniniana which still draws academics to study the 
legislation.8  
 
 Research on Caracalla’s edict can be roughly divided into three areas of 
primary focus: the study of the text surviving on the Giessen papyrus; the implications 
and historical consequences of the legislation in practice and, finally, the emperor’s 
rationale and motivation for introducing the edict. Each of these elements contain 
different controversies that have provoked fierce debate among scholars. As I noted 
above, it is the question of why Caracalla decided to extend the franchise that will form 
                                                 
4 De Blois (2014) 1014; Hekster (2008) 45; Buraselis (2007) 1-3. 
5 P. Giss. 40 I; Dio 78.9.5; Dig. 1.5.17. The papyrus is housed in the Special Collections department of 
the Universitätsbibliothek Gießen, and will be referred to henceforth as either Papyrus Gissensis, the 
Giessen papyrus, or by its catalogue number, P. Giss. 40. All of the sources mentioned here, however, 
will be considered further in the contextualisation of the constitutio offered in the next chapter. 
6 Ando (2012) 52. Also see Buraselis (2007) 2-3. 
7 Hekster (2008) 55. 
8 De Blois (2014) 1014; Ando (2012) 93-99; Garnsey (2004) 135; Honoré (2004) 114-16. 
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the primary emphasis for this thesis, since the answer to this question is key to a greater 
appreciation of the constitutio in its own context. Despite this focus, however, it is 
essential to be aware of the different ways in which this important initiative has been 
approached in the past. 
 
 Given its significance as the only surviving copy of the edict’s text, it is 
unsurprising that the majority of scholarly attention has been devoted to Papyrus 
Gissensis 40.9 Historically, scholars of the Giessen text have been faced with the 
immediate problem of the artefact’s highly fragmentary state. This has caused 
disagreement regarding how best to reconstruct the original script which, in turn, has 
resulted in subsequent attempts to assess the edict’s significance becoming ‘enmeshed 
in papyrological and epigraphic debates.’10 Early attempts to restore the text have 
proven to be problematic, inasmuch as they often contain extensive, conjectural 
reconstructions which, while eloquent, are based on the survival of isolated characters 
and contain little acknowledgement of the precariousness of such restorations.11 
 
 Such a cavalier approach towards P. Giss. 40 was eventually challenged, 
particularly in the 1970s, but resulted in a strikingly negative assessment of the 
evidence. In fact, far from posing conjectural or hypothetical explanations, some began 
to voice doubt regarding how far the Giessen papyrus could even be associated with 
the constitutio Antoniniana.12 This nihilistic trend is best seen in Wolff’s assessment, 
which distanced the artefact from the study of the Antonine Constitution completely, 
paraphrased here by Millar: ‘we cannot use P. Giss. 40, which cannot be proven to be 
or to refer to the Constitutio, or even to have come from Caracalla.’13 Only in more 
recent years has a moderate position been achieved. While scholars remain divided 
over many points of detail concerning the edict, most now agree that the Giessen 
papyrus can be reconstructed to make reference to Caracalla’s extension of civitas 
                                                 
9 Sasse (1962). For a detailed examination of the papyrus, with an accompanying apparatus, see 
Appendix I. 
10 Tuori (2007) 42. 
11 For selected examples, see Laqueur (1927) 15-20, and Heichelheim (1941) 10-22. For more detail on 
the nature of the grammatical and palaeographical problems found in these early works, see 
Lukaszewicz (1990a). 
12 Sherwin-White (1973a) 380-81. 
13 Millar (1979) 235; Wolff (1977) 193-209. 
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across the Roman empire, meaning that it is probable that the artefact contains a copy 
of at least part of the original Antonine Constitution.14  
 
 Alongside the myriad attempts to interpret P. Giss. 40, another aspect of the 
constitutio Antoniniana which has captivated scholars is the matter of the edict’s 
implementation, the legal and social consequences of the legislation in the post-212 
era.15 This area of study has proven popular owing to both the greater availability of 
supporting evidence and the ability to identify developments in the fundamental 
concept of citizenship which have implications and effects that can be found 
throughout later European history, even until the modern day.16 The currently 
prevailing opinion on the impact of the constitutio is the result of an evolutionary 
process. Early attempts to investigate the consequences of the Antonine Constitution 
were influenced by the notion of an orderly Roman Rechtsstaat being imposed across 
the empire in its entirety.17 More recent assessments of the edict have questioned the 
extent to which such a system was likely in antiquity or, indeed, was even 
enforceable.18 Indeed, it has become clear that while it is possible to hypothesise in 
broad strokes regarding the impact of the constitutio Antoniniana in the long term, the 
immediate consequences of the edict are more difficult to assess, the situation being 
more complex and nuanced than previously acknowledged.19 
 
 While the restoration of P. Giss. 40 and the consequences of the Antonine 
Constitution form the focus of many studies, it is the question of Caracalla’s 
motivation in promulgating his constitutio that is the most controversial aspect of 
modern scholarship on the legislation. Initial examination of recent historiography 
reveals that the first area of disagreement concerns whether or not the emperor actually 
                                                 
14 Kuhlmann (2012) 51-52, (1994) 215-56; Torrent (2011) 11-20; Rocco (2010) 131-35; Hekster (2008) 
45; Oliver (1989) 500-5. 
15 Sherwin-White (1973a: 386) argued, for example, that the tangible effects of the constitutio were far 
more important than the detail of its terminology.  
16 This phenomenon is well seen, for example, among the various colloquia held during the anniversary 
year of the constitutio in 2012. For an example, see: The Antonine Constitution after 1800 years: 
Citizenship and empire in Europe, AD 200-1900 [Rome, 20-22 September 2012]. 
17 Tuori (2007) 39; Meyer (2004) 2-3. 
18 Garnsey (2004: 143), for example, correctly questions how many people would have been truly 
affected by the constitutio, and how many were permitted to ‘slip through the net’. 
19 For a further consideration of the impact of the constitutio, in connection with the Giessen papyrus, 
see Chapter One. 
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had a clear-cut reason for introducing his edict at all. It has been argued, for example, 
that the constitutio was the result of nothing more than an unpredictable whim on 
Caracalla’s part, an impulsive act that was poorly conceived: ‘the edict of Caracalla 
came out of the blue. No one had anticipated it, least of all his provincial subjects. It 
was an act neither of necessity nor, if we follow Dio, of statesmanship.’20 This 
dismissive analysis of the Antonine Constitution has been countered by others who 
view the legislation as the logical culmination of an evolutionary process in which 
civitas was gradually extended from the imperial heartland to the peripheries.21 A key 
component of this argument is that the constitutio was an initiative which was 
completely germane to the opening of the third century, fitting the zeitgeist of an age 
in which imperial power resided with the emperor himself, rather than the city of 
Rome.22 Far from being introduced spontaneously, then, it has been argued that 
Caracalla’s edict was an end point to a procedure which had been underway prior even 
to the foundation of the Principate.  
 
Both of these approaches are flawed, to an extent. On one hand, the notion that 
the constitutio was the result of little more than a passing whim is an unusually 
absolute position which not only ignores other contextual factors that might have 
prompted the emperor, but also allows the notion of Caracalla’s volatile temperament 
(itself the result of a hostile source tradition) to dominate the question.23 On the other 
hand, however, while it is evident that the franchise was gradually expanding into the 
provinces as the imperial period progressed, the conclusion that Caracalla was merely 
adding a final flourish to a pre-existing process does not reflect the reality that citizens 
still represented a distinct minority of the empire’s population in AD 212.24 It is clear 
that the Antonine Constitution was neither a foregone conclusion, nor the mere result 
                                                 
20 Garnsey (2004) 137. For more on the notion of Caracallan impulsiveness, see Garnsey (2004) 134-
35. 
21 Nicolet (1980) 17. For more on the gradual expansion of the franchise, see Sherwin-White (1973a), 
whose magisterial work on Roman citizenship still remains relevant. 
22 Honoré (2004) 114-15. 
23 It should be noted that Garnsey is not the only scholar who has allowed the notion of Caracalla’s 
volatile temper to bear heavily on this question. Even more positive assessments of the Antonine 
Constitution have remarked that it is either uncharacteristic of such an emperor as Caracalla, or the 
result of a ruler obsessed with achieving greatness. For examples of this phenomenon, see Kemezis 
(2014) 30; García (2009) 100-2; Honoré (2002) 85; Sherwin-White (1973a) 287. 
24 Garnsey (2004) 135. 
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of youthful impetuosity. The reality is ultimately more complex and potentially 
dependent on a multitude of contextual factors. 
 
 Further attempts to explain the introduction of the constitutio Antoniniana have 
been made by scholars who have sought to analyse the edict through the lens of 
individual subjects. This trend can be seen most visibly in earlier studies, in which the 
veracity of Dio’s fiscal explanation for the legislation has been assessed.25 Scholars 
examining the potentially economic explanation for the Antonine Constitution are not 
alone in attempting to attribute a single motivating factor to the legislation, however, 
with others drawing attention to the potential links between the edict and Caracalla’s 
hero-worship of Alexander the Great or, alternatively, his militaristic ambitions.26 
Nevertheless, this methodology remains problematic. The risk inherent with this 
approach is that it could very easily result in an exaggerated importance on the 
individual element being assessed which, in turn, could lead to an unrepresentative 
view of the legislation that is largely detached from other contextual factors.  
 
 The situation has improved in more recent years, as scholars acknowledge that 
it is unlikely that Caracalla was moved to promulgate the Antonine Constitution on the 
basis of a single issue. Indeed, there were a variety of major and minor pressures and 
inspirations which motivated the emperor to legislate and, moreover, none of these 
need necessarily be mutually exclusive.27 The most comprehensive recent study in this 
regard is that of Buraselis, who sought to interpret the constitutio within the wider 
political philosophy of the Severan era.28 In fact, his work remains authoritative in 
many ways, providing a new base from which to approach Caracalla’s edict, finally 
detached from the inflammatory rhetoric of Cassius Dio.29  
                                                 
25 Dio (78.9.5) claimed that the edict was the result of Caracalla’s desire to reap a vastly increased tax 
yield, a claim that will be considered in greater detail in Chapter Four. For early examples of scholars 
accepting Dio’s authority, see Jones (1974) 194; Gilliam (1952) 405; Bell (1947) 17-23; Sherman 
(1928) 33-47. Also see Ando (2000: 395, n.275) for a fierce criticism of past scholars’ willingness to 
accept Dio’s testimony on the basis of his being a contemporary source alone. 
26 For more on the potential link with Alexander the Great, see Chapter Two. For the military 
explanation of the Antonine Constitution, discussed in Chapter Five, see Rocco (2010) 131-55. 
27 Hekster (2008) 50. 
28 Buraselis (2007). 
29 Buraselis (2007) 14-87. I will consider Buraselis’ conclusions on the religious and economic 




 While scholarship on the constitutio Antoniniana has become increasingly 
nuanced and sophisticated, there remain fundamental problems that restrict the extent 
to which we can achieve a properly holistic impression of the edict and the 
circumstances surrounding its introduction. The myriad studies regarding the Giessen 
papyrus are invaluable to any modern analysis of the edict, but the nature of the 
reconstruction required means that the historical role and importance of the constitutio 
is often lost among the artefact’s linguistic controversies.30 Attempts to view the 
legacy of Caracalla’s edict in later history can provide a number of interesting 
observations regarding how the constitutio eventually functioned and set a process in 
motion which would have lasting implications across Western Europe, in particular. 
The obvious problem with these studies, however, is that the constitutio itself rarely 
forms the primary focus of the study, meaning that little can be discovered regarding 
its importance to its own era. Finally, the attempts to interpret the Antonine 
Constitution through individual lenses are often as problematic as they can be 
illuminating. In addition to the problem of inflating the importance of the individual 
factor being studied, they inevitably remove the constitutio from its wider context, 
forcing an artificial comparison between factors that cannot realistically be extricated 
from the wider historical milieu.  
 
To date, there has never been an attempt to consider the various possible 
motivations for the legislation together in one study, and yet it is only when the edict 
is analysed within a fully embedded context that the relationship between the different 
motivations and pressures bearing on Caracalla in AD 212 can be seen properly. This 
thesis attempts, then, to build upon the existing scholarship relating to the Antonine 
Constitution, and to add a new layer of interpretation to the discussion. It represents 
the first study of its kind, the fundamental purpose of which is to bring together the 
major elements that potentially served to prompt the emperor to introduce his edict. 
Throughout the course of this investigation, I will offer a more grounded and cohesive 
image of the constitutio, demonstrating that it was an important political initiative, 
                                                 
30 Sherwin-White (1973a: 381) complained that the fierce debate regarding the papyrus has added 
‘singularly little’ to historical knowledge. 
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combining practical and propagandistic values at a crucial point in Caracalla’s 
fledgling sole reign.  
 
It is necessary at the outset to consider the extent to which it is correct to label 
the Antonine Constitution as a vehicle of imperial propaganda. This function of the 
constitutio Antoniniana will be a feature repeatedly considered throughout this study, 
particularly in discussion relating to the emperor’s exploitation of the Alexander 
mythos, and the role of the edict in legitimising his position as the sole ruler of the 
empire, following the murder of Geta. The connection of the label of ‘propaganda’ to 
ancient evidence, particularly media released by the imperial household, has proven 
contentious, though. Historically, the objection to any use of ‘propaganda’ is based 
upon the absence of an equivalent term in Latin, and the view that the term has 
absorbed inappropriate undertones which are specifically associated with the Fascist 
and National Socialist regimes of the 1930s and 1940s. Burnett, for example, when 
addressing the debate in connection to imperial coinage, has claimed that for the label 
of propaganda to become acceptable, it must first be stripped of two elements, namely 
the idea of deliberate falsehood and a systematic orchestration of public opinion.31 
Sensitivity regarding the use of this term is not unique to Burnett, and has resulted in 
others offering alternative descriptions of the process, preferring, for example, to 
discuss imperial coinage in terminology connected to modern brand marketing.32  
 
This is a problem which is more apparent than real. It is self-evident that the 
precise nature and expression of propagandistic programmes would differ between the 
ancient and modern eras, but this does not necessarily preclude Roman imperial 
initiatives from containing a propagandistic significance. Furthermore, the fact that the 
Romans lacked a comparable term for the phenomenon hardly confirms that the 
process itself was non-existent.33 In fact, the value of the constitutio Antoniniana in 
promoting both Caracalla’s personal pietas and an official narrative of the violence 
which surrounded Geta’s assassination can be seen to fit even the most contentious 
definition of propaganda, in that it represents a clear example of an emperor attempting 
                                                 
31 Burnett (1987) 66. 
32 Hekster (2003) 25. 
33 Hannestad (1984) 9. 
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to engineer a positive response to his regime among the populace and impart a 
moralising quality to the death of the younger Augustus.34 While it is true that a direct 
comparison between the Roman Empire and the totalitarian powers of the modern era 
is inappropriate, we must be careful not to sanitise the imperial regime and deny its 
autocratic and dictatorial character, of which state propaganda is an obvious element. 
In this study, then, the term ‘propaganda’ is taken to mean a deliberate initiative 
undertaken by the imperial household, designed to orchestrate public opinion, and to 
achieve a definite political objective.  
 
 The nature of this investigation means that it is necessary to approach the 
Antonine Constitution from a number of angles. As a consequence, the various 
chapters of this thesis will be devoted to the different potential motivations affecting 
Caracalla, demonstrating the complexity in attributing factors to his decision to extend 
the franchise. The first chapter will present a contextualisation of the constitutio 
Antoniniana. The surviving evidence for the edict will be considered, particularly the 
Giessen papyrus. Owing to the controversy surrounding the artefact, I have compiled 
my own edition of the text, formed by comparing and contrasting previous attempts to 
restore the fragmentary document. The result of this is an edition which, while heavily 
embedded within pre-existing textual scholarship, is not overly reliant on any one 
previous reconstruction.35 Moreover, the content of P. Giss. 40 will be analysed in an 
attempt to conclude whether Caracalla, rather than his jurists, should be regarded as 
the architect of the legislation.  
 
 Building upon the issues outlined in Chapter One, the following four chapters 
will address the elements which could have motivated the emperor to introduce the 
legislation. The second chapter will consider to what extent the emperor’s admiration 
for Alexander the Great might have prompted him to introduce the constitutio. I will 
examine whether Caracalla’s imitation of Alexander was really an unusual 
phenomenon, since it is clear that he was not the only emperor to invoke the legacy of 
the conqueror. This will set any notion of Caracalla’s hero worship against the wider 
                                                 
34 See Chapter Three for more on this simultaneous self-promotion and denigration of a political enemy. 




political application of the Alexander mythos during the Principate. Rather than 
seeking to forge a link between Caracalla and the historical Alexander, this discussion 
will also focus on the extent to which the emperor was inspired by the literary 
presentation of Alexander the Great in later literary works, such as that of Plutarch, 
and will show that the Caracalla’s ‘Alexander-mania’ formed one facet of a change in 
the emperor’s self-representation occurring from 212 onwards.  
 
 Moving forward from this ideological rationale, other motives for the edict will 
be considered in the third chapter. I will examine the credibility of the religious basis 
for the legislation, since this was actively promoted by Caracalla himself in the 
opening lines of the constitutio preserved on the Giessen papyrus, itself mirroring a 
similar drive to promote the emperor as pious and favoured by the gods found in other 
media, such as numismatic iconography.36 I will, furthermore, set this against the 
general Roman drive for religious consensus between the emperors and their populace, 
placing the religious dimension of the edict into a wider context.37  
 
The importance of the constitutio Antoniniana to the political situation facing 
Caracalla in AD 212 will also be examined in the third chapter. The events surrounding 
the rise of the Severan dynasty to power had resulted in a process of social levelling 
between the equestrian and senatorial orders, in terms of their relationship with the 
imperial household. The levelling tendency apparent within the Antonine Constitution 
will be discussed against this backdrop, as well as the internecine violence which 
heralded the shift from a shared principate between the sons of Septimius Severus to 
Caracalla as the only Augustus by the end of 211. The evidence suggests that the 
emperor was mindful of his position in the opening half of 212, taking a variety of 
actions to consolidate his position and legitimise it, effectively redefining the Severan 
dynasty around his persona alone. With this in mind, I will consider the constitutio as 
an act of political expediency on Caracalla’s part, a powerful tool in binding his 
populace to him, at the moment when his principate seemed at its most vulnerable. 
 
                                                 
36 Buraselis (2007) 36-47. 
37 Ando (2000) 73-205. 
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 The following two chapters will develop the hypothesis that practical motives 
also underlie the Antonine Constitution. The economic application of the edict will be 
analysed in Chapter Four. This is a problematic issue since, on the one hand, it is the 
only rationale offered for the legislation by a contemporary source but, on the other 
hand, the claim derives from Cassius Dio and must, therefore, be treated with careful 
scrutiny. I will argue that if the constitutio is set against the wider economic context 
of Caracalla’s reign, then it becomes possible to identify a fiscal rationale for the 
legislation. This hypothesis will be supported with a close reading of the Giessen 
papyrus, demonstrating that the portion of text formerly thought to refer to the dediticii 
makes greater sense if restored to make reference to assorted privileges being denied 
by the emperor at the same time as the franchise was extended. The fifth chapter forms 
a continuation of the economic conclusion outlined in the preceding section. One of 
the problems in accepting that Caracalla was engaged in a large scale programme to 
augment the imperial coffers is that there is little sign that the empire was in the dire 
financial straits that it would later suffer during the military crisis of the third century. 
If a fiscal motivation for the constitutio is accepted, then the question of its ultimate 
purpose must also be addressed. 
 
I will argue that the answer here lies largely in the emperor’s military reform 
and expenditure, particularly in the prelude to his Parthian expedition. Moreover, it 
will be shown that the immediate effects of the Antonine Constitution also lend 
credence to the theory that Caracalla intended to increase the pool of available 
manpower in order to support his legionary levies. The combination of these factors 
with the economic dimension will serve to ground the edict in the immediate context 
of Caracalla’s reign and, furthermore, will offer a more rational analysis of the fiscal 
dimension of the constitutio, separate from Dio’s inflammatory rhetoric. 
 
 The final chapter of this study shifts the focus from the preceding sections, 
attempting to identify a link between the Antonine Constitution and another 
controversial episode from the reign of Caracalla, the emperor’s visit to the city of 
Alexandria in AD 215-16, an event which was to result in bloodshed on a shocking 
scale. Although it is now impossible to identify conclusively the events which 
12 
 
provoked the final, fatal acts of violence within the city, I will argue that a potential 
explanation for the tense atmosphere in Alexandria at the time of Caracalla’s visit can 
be derived from the constitutio Antoniniana. Using papyrological evidence, I will 
demonstrate that the fiscal implications of the edict probably exacerbated and 
perpetuated the perennial problem of anachoresis, in which individuals fled from their 
homes in avoidance of taxation and liturgical duties.38 The evidence here serves a dual 
purpose. In one respect, it confirms that the constitutio had a fiscal effect in real terms. 
In another way, though, it shows that the Antonine Constitution can also be employed 
to shed light on one of the more troublesome moments of Caracalla’s principate, a 
factor which further emphasises the importance of the legislation to the period in which 
it was promulgated.  
 
 The paucity of the ancient evidence means that, in many ways, the constitutio 
Antoniniana remains an enigmatic document. Nevertheless, despite its many 
controversies, it is now possible to assess the legislation from a number of perspectives 
and to consider the emperor’s intentions in promulgating it. To understand the purpose 
of the edict and make sense of Caracalla’s motivation for its introduction, however, it 
is crucial that the Antonine Constitution is considered within a properly embedded 
context. Through this approach, the constitutio can be identified as a multi-faceted 
initiative, addressing the emperor’s military and economic concerns, in addition to 
functioning as a powerful example of Caracallan propaganda, in which an official 
narrative of the emperor’s conflict with Geta was broadcast, and Caracalla’s own 
position legitimised. 
  
                                                 




Contextualising the constitutio Antoniniana 
 
The Antonine Constitution, in many ways, represents a turning point in 
imperial history. Promulgated by Caracalla in AD 212, the introduction of the edict 
was a defining moment in the life of the young emperor. By means of this legislation, 
he had granted the rights of Roman citizenship to nearly all free inhabitants of his 
empire, a move which ostensibly revolutionised the constitutional complexion of the 
Roman state, with civitas forming the norm, rather than the preserve of an exclusive 
minority.39 It is well established that the edict’s introduction formed a major step 
towards political homogenisation within the empire, and resulted in an increasing 
sense of Romanitas among formerly peregrine or barbarian communities that should 
not be underestimated in the increasingly turbulent context of the later Roman 
Empire.40 The situation is made more complex, however, when the paucity of the 
evidence relating directly to the constitutio is taken into consideration. The striking 
dearth of extant sources referring to Caracalla’s edict suggests that it was not 
considered by ancient authors to represent the ideological watershed that some modern 
readers are tempted to see.41 In fact, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the sheer 
lack of ancient source material relating to the Antonine Constitution has been largely 
responsible for its persistent controversy within the scholarship of the past century.42  
 
In the introduction to this study, I emphasised how vital it is that the constitutio 
Antoniniana is viewed within its own milieu if the legislation and Caracalla’s 
reasoning for it are to be better understood. This chapter will therefore offer a 
contextualisation of the edict, comprising of two parts. First, the references to the 
constitutio found among the literary sources and their individual limitations will be 
considered. I will then move the focus to the Giessen papyrus since, in addition to 
representing the most comprehensive extant source recording the Antonine 
                                                 
39 Buraselis (2013) 1747-48; Garnsey (2004) 135. 
40 Mathisen (2006) 1015-18; Sherwin-White (1973a) 282-83. Also see Buraselis (2013) 1748; Hekster 
(2008) 45. 
41 Ando (2012) 77. 
42 Buraselis (2007) 2. 
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Constitution, it raises a number of issues which must be highlighted before the analysis 
of the various potential motivations underlying the edict can begin.43   
 
The constitutio in the Literary Sources  
The constitutio Antoniniana appears infrequently in the literary sources. In 
fact, the majority of extant references to the edict can only be found in sources written 
long after its introduction, in the fourth and fifth centuries. These allusions are all 
relatively brief, and some display a level of confusion regarding the provenance of the 
legislation. The edict is mentioned in passing, for example, in the biography of 
Septimius Severus in the Historia Augusta, in which the author simply states that the 
constitutio was introduced and that universal enfranchisement was the result.44 A 
similarly concise description of the edict can be found in the writing of Sidonius 
Apollinaris, in which the author declared that only slaves and barbarians did not 
possess the rights of civitas.45 Nevertheless, given the amount of time that had elapsed 
between the introduction of the constitutio and the authors’ writing, as well as their 
different purposes, it is understandable that we find the Antonine Constitution referred 
to in such a superficial way.  
 
More surprising, however, is the level of confusion apparent among other 
sources of the same period regarding the provenance of the legislation. Aurelius Victor 
mistakenly credits Marcus Aurelius with the initiative while, in the Justinianic 
Novellae, the constitutio is erroneously attributed to Antoninus Pius.46 On the one 
hand, this might seem a reasonable mistake to make, owing to the similarity in 
nomenclature between the emperors.47 On the other hand, however, the level of 
uncertainty regarding the provenance of such a supposedly well-known edict raises a 
question regarding the source tradition relating to it. While it is tempting to interpret 
the paltry number of extant ancient writers who refer to the constitutio as the result of 
a high attrition rate among the ancient sources, the fundamental misunderstanding 
                                                 
43 Also see Appendix I. 
44 HA Sev. 1.1-2. 
45 Sid. Apol. Ep. 6.2. 
46 Aur. Vict. Caes. 16.12; Novellae 78.5. 
47 For a breakdown of Caracalla’s titulature, see Kienast (2011) 162-64. 
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concerning the source of the legislation makes it more likely that there were simply 
few authors who devoted attention to the legislation following its introduction.  
 
 The apparent lack of literary interest in the Antonine Constitution ultimately 
raises the question of how revolutionary in character the edict actually was. Did the 
constitutio represent a fundamental constitutional change, or was it merely extending 
a status marker that carried less relevance than it once had? The relative value of the 
franchise and its importance compared to other societal distinctions, such as the divide 
between the honestiores and humiliores, has been a persistent feature of debate 
regarding the edict’s wider significance.48 The reason underlying the dearth of literary 
evidence following the promulgation of the constitutio remains one of the most 
puzzling aspects of the document’s history, with potential repercussions regarding how 
the ancients perceived its consequences in effect. Caution is needed, however, not to 
dismiss the edict’s importance on the basis of this point alone.49 Furthermore, we must 
also acknowledge that it is unfair to assume that Caracalla would have contemplated 
all of the edict’s consequences prior to its introduction.50 Owing to the focus of this 
study on the emperor’s rationale underlying the promulgation of the constitutio, 
however, any additional investigation of this literary silence is currently beyond the 
scope of this study.  
 
 If the subsequent literary record for the Antonine Constitution is problematic, 
the contemporary evidence is arguably more so. In fact, apart from the Giessen 
papyrus, the only surviving literary source from the period itself which make reference 
to the edict being introduced is that of the senator and historian Cassius Dio.51 On first 
examination, he would appear ideally suited to offer an explanation of the constitutio 
Antoniniana, given his close association with the imperial court during the majority of 
the Severan era.52 Unfortunately, the senator’s description of the constitutio is a brief 
                                                 
48 Garnsey (2004) 134-40, 155 and (1970) 266; Honoré (2004) 114-15; Hope (2000) 133-50; Nicolet 
(1980) 20-21. For more on the honestiores-humiliores divide, see Rilinger (1984). 
49 Hekster (2008) 55. 
50 Ando (2012) 56-57; Honoré (2002) 85. 
51 De Blois (2014) 1014. Even Herodian, whose similarly contemporary history recounts the Severan 
era, omits any mention of the legislation. 
52 Davenport (2012: 797) claims that Dio was ‘well placed to record the vicissitudes of political life.’ 
For more on the senator’s work, see Kemezis (2014) 90-149. Dio himself provides evidence concerning 
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one. The only mention of the legislation in the extant Roman History is included in a 
more general critique of Caracalla’s fiscal policies and imperial expenditure. Dio 
claims that the emperor engaged in an astonishing level of imperial spending and, 
consequently, required a similarly extraordinary tax yield to support it, an obligation 
which prompted the decision to extend the franchise: 
 
Οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ Ῥωμαίους πάντας τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ αὐτοῦ, λόγῳ μὲν τιμῶν, ἔργῳ 
δὲ ὅπως πλείω αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου προσίῃ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ξένους τὰ πολλὰ 
αὐτῶν μὴ συντελεῖν, ἀπέδειξεν.  
 
This was the reason why he made everyone in his realm Romans, he was 
ostensibly honouring them, but his real purpose was to increase his revenues 
by this means, since peregrines were not required to pay the majority of these 
taxes.53  
 
The brevity of the account is the least controversial aspect of Dio’s work, 
though. This section of the Roman History is troublesome owing to the poor state of 
its survival, being largely dependent on an eleventh century epitome by Xiphilinus, 
who is thought to provide ‘not so much a précis of Dio as a rather erratic selection 
from his material.’54 The main problem surrounding the senator’s account of the 
Antonine Constitution, however, relates to his open loathing of Caracalla. Dio makes 
several withering criticisms of the emperor, characterising him as one of the worst 
individuals to hold imperial power.55 This unrelenting denigration has led Millar to 
describe the senator writing with an ‘unabashed hatred’ towards his bête-noir.56  
 
 Dio’s unapologetic denigration of Caracalla therefore results in an obvious 
question surrounding the reliability of his account of the latter’s reign, including his 
assessment of the constitutio Antoniniana. How far can Dio’s testimony regarding the 
                                                 
his career. He describes, for example, his writing of treatise on Septimius Severus’ dreams and the 
portents which presaged Severan victory in the civil wars of AD 193-97 (73.23.1-3); he describes his 
time as a comes attached to the Caracallan court (78.17.3) and, later, the circumstances of his consulship 
under Alexander Severus (80.5.1-3). 
53 Dio 78.9.5. 
54 Millar (1964) 2. Also see Davenport (2012) 796, who has argued that, despite the obvious issues that 
this problem raises, we can be relatively confident that the surviving portions of text presented are Dio’s 
words, rather than those of Xiphilinus. 
55 For examples, see Dio 78.6.1a; 78.7-8; 79.9.3. 
56 Millar (1964) 150. 
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legislation be trusted? In his analysis of the senator’s description of the edict and its 
motivation, Ando complained that ‘Dio’s authority as a contemporary witness has 
blinded many to the extreme idiocy of his argument’.57 In fact, Dio’s hatred of 
Caracalla has led to his fiscal explanation being dismissed or diminished in modern 
scholarship, considered a motive of secondary importance at best.58 This is an unfairly 
absolute position, though.  
 
That the Roman History is affected by Dio’s anti-Caracallan predisposition is 
often patently obvious. The fact that he is an unsympathetic source for the regime does 
not mean, however, that his claims are entirely without basis or merit. In fact, just as 
Ando is correct that we cannot permit Dio’s position as an eyewitness to mean that we 
accept his claims uncritically, the hostility of his account should not blind us to the 
value which often underlies the author’s testimony. Rather than dismissing the senator 
carelessly, Dio’s account must be set against the wider context of the time, and will 
thus be considered more thoroughly later in this study.59 
 
The constitutio and the Role of the Jurists  
 Dio represents the only surviving contemporary literary account of the 
Antonine Constitution, but his is not the only contemporaneous reference to the 
legislation. Indeed, another mention of the edict, albeit a brief one, can be found in the 
legal writing of the jurist Ulpian, whose work was later compiled within the Justinianic 
Digest.60 His allusion to the constitutio is predictably concise, given the juristic 
medium, and simply states that by virtue of Caracalla’s constitution, all persons living 
within the Roman empire were given the rights of citizenship.61 This extract is 
supported to an extent by a sentence preserved from the work of Modestinus, another 
contemporary, who claimed that Rome represented a common patria for everyone.62 
As De Blois has remarked, though, this sentence is preserved in isolation and is 
                                                 
57 Ando (2000) 375 n.275. 
58 Buraselis (2007) 1-3; Williams (1979) 72. 
59 For a more detailed consideration of Dio’s account and the potentially economic basis to the 
constitutio, see Chapter Four. 
60 De Blois (2014) 1014. 
61 Dig. 1.5.17: In orbe romano qui sunt ex constitutione imperatori Antonini cives Romani effecti sunt. 
62 Dig. 50.1.33. 
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therefore indeterminate in nature.63 While the extant evidence for the constitutio 
Antoniniana offered by the jurists is sparse, it nevertheless alludes to the involvement 
of these intellectuals within the imperial regime of the period.  
 
The Severan era in general is regarded as something of a golden age for 
jurists.64 Indeed, during the period between the death of Commodus and the accession 
of Maximinus Thrax, judicially trained civil servants reached an unprecedented degree 
of prominence within the imperial regime, a number even rising to the praetorian 
prefecture.65 Of these individuals, Ulpian has received some of the highest plaudits 
among scholars, hailed as a leading intellectual and ‘the most influential writer of the 
time’ by Honoré, for example.66 Much has been written regarding Ulpian’s legal 
philosophy, particularly his apparent desire to set Roman law into a wider conceptual 
frame, ‘demonstrating how the principles and enactments of Roman law can be 
justified on universal, not just parochial considerations of utility and equity.’67 In fact, 
this has been taken even further by Honoré, who sees in Ulpian a pioneer of human 
rights who expounded Roman law ‘as a law based on the view that all people are born 
free and equal, and that all possess dignity.’68 The result of this has been a suggestion 
that Ulpian himself may have been instrumental in the promulgation of the constitutio, 
maybe even suggesting its creation in the first instance, though this hypothesis remains 
conjectural.69  
 
While the precise relationship between Ulpian and the introduction of the 
Antonine Constitution is difficult to identify, the wider role of the jurists in the process 
must be considered nevertheless, since the legislation was introduced during the 
heyday of this legal intelligentsia.70 At the heart of the matter here is a question 
regarding the fundamental authorship of the constitutio: that is to say to what extent 
                                                 
63 De Blois (2014) 1014. 
64 Potter (2014) 157-61; Hekster (2008) 46; Trapp (2007) 481-82 
65 Du Plessis (2010) 43-44; De Blois (2001) 136. For information on a number of the jurists, see Kalb 
(1975). For more on the praetorian prefects, see Howe (1966). 
66 Honoré (2002) 1. 
67 Trapp (2007) 482. 
68 Honoré (2002) 80-81. 
69 Honoré (2002) 85; Birley (1988) 190. 
70 Hekster (2008) 46; Trapp (2007) 481. 
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the edict should be viewed as a product of juristic influence, rather than the creation 
of the emperor himself. This is an important element to the legislation, since any 
conclusions drawn here have an inevitable bearing on how we interpret the nature of 
the constitutio and its underlying motivations. 
 
 The question of the emperor’s role in formulating legal materials remains 
complex. It is clear that, despite their theoretical freedom to legislate and dispense 
justice as they pleased, the emperors were at least expected to defer to the advice and 
guidance of legal experts: they were entitled to make law, but the extent to which they 
commonly did so remains a matter of debate.71 Given this traditional reliance on 
judicially trained civil servants throughout the Principate, then, the assumption that 
Ulpian and others were the true architects of the constitutio Antoniniana is a logical 
one, since it would seem inconceivable that the emperor would not seek their counsel 
during the zenith of the jurists’ influence within the imperial regime.  
 
 This interpretation of the constitutio effectively distances the figure of 
Caracalla from the edict and makes any attempt to investigate the rationale for its 
introduction more difficult as a consequence. Other factors must be considered, 
though. Just as it is unlikely that the imperial household would not have sought advice 
from the top ranking jurists, it is similarly implausible that the emperor himself would 
have had no input or, even if civil servants were responsible for officially drafting the 
document, that the jurists were working independently instead of following a well-
known imperial directive.72 In the case of Caracalla specifically, I would argue, 
moreover, that the extant evidence actually provides an image of the emperor as a more 
independently minded ruler than his predecessors in connection to the law, a feature 
which ultimately suggests that the decision to introduce the constitutio Antoniniana, 
and the responsibility for its fundamental content, lay with Caracalla personally.  
 
                                                 
71 Honoré (1994) 3, 29-30.  
72 This debate is prevalent in discussions regarding how far the emperor had a direct input in imperial 
media such as coinage, where Howgego (1995: 70-71) has argued that it is unthinkable that any civil 




 The image of Caracalla’s approach to legal affairs varies, depending on the 
source which records it. In the literary sources, the emperor appears disinterested and 
quickly bored by matters of jurisprudence and legal procedure.73 Dio is predictably 
hostile, complaining that the emperor rarely arbitrated in court and, furthermore, that 
he treated his council with contempt, often summoning them, only to have them wait 
for hours to see him.74 Herodian is less vitriolic in his account, claiming that while 
Caracalla spent little time in court, his decisions were swiftly made and incisive.75 
Such depictions, however, appear to result more from the authors’ hostility towards 
the emperor rather than forming a reflection of Caracallan disinterest in legal process. 
The contemptuous portrait of the emperor found in some of the ancient literature is in 
marked contrast to the more attentive impression which can be derived from epigraphic 
sources. Minutes from civil actions found at Dmeir, for example, portray Caracalla in 
a more positive light.76 The emperor is depicted as a more attentive arbitrator, actively 
engaging with the participants in his role as the judge.77 It is possible, then, to identify 
an image of Caracalla as an emperor took an active interest in judicial matters, even if 
his behaviour was arguably unorthodox, on occasion.  
 
 Another important aspect of Caracalla’s relationship with Roman law is his 
proclivity to form decisions which deviated from pre-existing statute. In fact, the extant 
evidence suggests that, of all the third century emperors, Caracalla was the most likely 
to derogate from written law.78 Honoré has identified a number of cases in which the 
emperor’s rulings seem motivated more by personal opinion than legal precedent. 
There are rescripts, for example, which appear to show Caracalla giving excessive 
favour to soldiers.79 In another case, the emperor excused an individual from 
responsibilities relating to tax collection, on the grounds that the claimant approached 
him personally, rather than any legal basis.80 Finally, there is an example from the 
                                                 
73 Potter (2014) 161. 
74 Dio 78.17.3-4. Also see Honoré (1994) 25. 
75 Hdn 4.7.2. 
76 For more on the detail of the inscription, see Oliver (1974) 289-94. 
77 Connolly (2010) 110; Honoré (1994) 25; Williams (1979) 666; Crook (1955) 142-43. Williams (1974: 
665) further suggested that Caracalla might have selected the counsel for both prosecution and defence 
in this case, finding their sophistic and rhetorical abilities entertaining. 
78 Honoré (1994) 26. 
79 Dig. 48.22.16; CJ 1.18.1; 5.16.2. 
80 CJ 5.41.1.1. 
21 
 
Justinianic Codex in which the emperor ruled explicitly contrary to legal advice in a 
case regarding inheritance.81  
 
The surviving evidence thus provides an indication of Caracalla’s 
independence in legal matters. In fact, even in the most hostile of sources, material can 
be found which proves valuable in analysing Caracalla’s administration of Roman law. 
In the midst of Dio’s attack on the emperor for his obsession with Alexander the Great, 
the senator claims that Caracalla became enraged with a lawyer prosecuting a trial 
against a defendant named Alexander, owing to the way in which the orator referred 
to ‘the bloodthirsty Alexander, the god-detested Alexander’.82 The emperor 
reprimanded the lawyer and threatened him with dismissal. It is clear that the purpose 
of this passage was to highlight Caracalla’s hero-worship of the Alexander the Great, 
but Dio’s account nonetheless provides another example of the emperor actively 
engaged in dispensing Roman law.   
 
While it is possible that these cases reflect the influence of the jurist Arrius 
Menander, since Honoré has shown that many of the more unorthodox rulings can be 
identified to his tenure as secretary of the petitions, the fact that the emperor was 
evidently willing to rule outside of the legally accepted framework on multiple 
occasions suggests that he was prepared to ignore accepted statute or interpret it in an 
unconventional way in order to suit his own agenda.83 With this in mind, although it 
is inconceivable that Caracalla would have promulgated the constitutio Antoniniana 
without consulting any legal counsel, the hypothesis that the legislation was his own 
creation (rather than that of the jurists) is convincing. 
 
Positioning of the emperor, rather than his legal experts, behind the constitutio 
Antoniniana has an important implication for this study of the edict’s rationale. On this 
basis, when the potential motives for the legislation are considered in this 
investigation, they will be viewed through the lens of the emperor’s own concerns and 
desires, rather than through that of the jurists. Caracalla may not have formulated the 
                                                 
81 CJ 9.23.1. 
82 Dio 78.8.3. 
83 Honoré (1994) 25-26. 
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final draft of the edict alone, but it is probable that he constituted its driving force, and 
that it was therefore composed and structured to his personal preference.84 
 
The constitutio Antoniniana and P. Giss. 40 
 Given the dearth of surviving evidence described above, P. Giss. 40 is of 
inestimable importance to any study of the Antonine Constitution. Discovered in the 
opening years of the twentieth century, the Giessen papyrus represents the only 
surviving document thought to contain a copy of the original constitutio.85 
Nevertheless, despite its importance, P. Giss. 40 is also a controversial source which, 
as noted in the introduction, has prompted a wealth of debate among modern 
scholars.86 Much of the discussion surrounding the Giessen papyrus stems from the 
severely damaged and fragmentary state of the document in the area containing the 
text of the edict.  
 
 The surviving papyrus measures 27cm x 46cm, and contains the texts of at least 
three imperial proclamations deriving from the reign of Caracalla.87 A cursory glance 
reveals that P. Giss. 40 has suffered extensive wear and damage, most notably to the 
left-hand side of the document, which is unfortunately where the text of the constitutio 
is written. In fact, by comparing the left and (largely complete) right sides of the 
papyrus, it can be estimated that around one third of the upper left side of the document 
is missing. The damage in this area is compounded by a large vertical tear in the middle 
of the surviving papyrus which has obliterated yet more script.  
 
The lower left-hand section of P. Giss. 40 is in an even more damaged state. 
The large tear that has destroyed some of the upper left side extends further into the 
papyrus and has left only around thirty characters of text remaining. Smaller localised 
tears and holes in areas suggest that the papyrus has suffered worm-damage, while 
areas where the top-layer of the document is damaged (more visible on the right side 
                                                 
84 The question of how far the emperor’s hand is visible in the surviving copy of the edict found on the 
Giessen papyrus will be considered below. 
85 For more information on its discovery and provenance, see Kuhlmann (1994) 1-2; Oliver (1989) 495; 
Meyer (1910) 25-33. 
86 For a brief consideration of the scholarly reactions to the papyrus, see the previous chapter. 
87 Heichelheim (1941) 10-22. 
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of the papyrus) are the result of damage sustained in the document’s afterlife when the 
museum attempted to glaze it.88 Finally, there are also a number of dark patches spread 
over the surface of the papyrus, especially in the upper-right quadrant. This is 
indicative of water damage sustained in February 1945, when the papyrus was being 
held in the safe of the Dresdner Bank: the latest tests on this mould, however, have 
proven that it has become inert, posing no further risk to the artefact.89  
 
 Despite this severe damage, however, the availability of high-resolution 
photographs of the papyrus from the Giessener Papyri- und Ostraka-Datenbank has 
facilitated a far more detailed analysis of the text than was ever possible in the past. 
The text of P. Giss. 40 is presented in a legible, cursive script of Koine Greek. Meyer 
claimed that the text was of a ‘careful, clerical’ nature, while Kuhlmann has concluded 
that the papyrus is business-like in appearance and that the script is ‘regular and 
aesthetic’.90 The characters are clear and of a regular size, 0.3-0.4cm wide in the 
majority of cases, often using capitalised versions of characters and lunate sigmas (c).  
 
In the course of the text, there are larger spaces between the different sections 
of the documents to allow ease of legibility.91 This feature permits a more confident 
estimate regarding the number of missing letters in the various lacunae, while the 
stylistic features of the script allow the papyrus to be dated to the early third century, 
possibly even during Caracalla’s reign itself.92 Combining study of previous editions 
with my own examination of the artefact, then, I have restored the Giessen text in the 
following manner:93 
  
                                                 
88 Kuhlmann (1994) 1. 
89 I am grateful to Dr Olaf Schneider and the staff of the Universitätsbibliothek Gießen Special 
Collections department for their assistance in arranging a visit for me to view the papyrus and sharing 
their knowledge regarding the storage and recent history of the artefact. This has proven invaluable to 
my appreciation of the problems inherent when studying this document. 
90 Meyer (1910) 25; Kuhlmann (1994) 8-9. 
91 P. Giss. 40 I, l.7 for example.  Also see Kuhlmann (1994) 216. 
92 Cavallo and Maehler (2008) 131-32; Kuhlmann (1994) 215-16.  
93 For a full commentary and apparatus criticus of this edition, see Appendix I. 
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1) [Αὐτοκράτωρ Καῖσαρ Μά]ρκο[ς Α]ὐρή[λιος Σεουῆρος Ἀ]ντωνῖνο[ς] Ε[ὐσεβὴ]ς 
λέγει 
[πάντως εἰς τὸ θεῖον χρὴ] μᾶλλον ἀν[αφέρειν καὶ τὰ]ς αἰτίας κ[α]ὶ [λογι]σμοὺς 
[δικαίως δ’ἄν κἀγὼ τοῖς θ]εοῖς τ[οῖ]ς ἀθ[αν]άτοις εὐχαριστήσα[ι]μι ὅτι τὴς 
τοιαύτη[ς] 
[ἐπιβουλῆς γενομένης σῷο]ν ἐμὲ συν[ετ]ήρησαν τοιγαροῦν νομίζω [ο]ὕτω με–  
5) [γαλοπρεπῶς καὶ εὐσεβ]ῶς δύ[να]σθαι τῇ μεγαλειότητι αὐτῶν το ἱκανὸν ποι– 
[εῖν, εἰ τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ὁσ]άκις ἐὰν ὑ[πε]ισέλθ[ωσ]ιν εἰς τοὺς ἐμοὺς ἀν[θρ]ώπους 
[ὡς Ῥωμαίους εὶς τὰ ἱερὰ τῶν] θεῶν συνει[σ]ενέγ[κοιμ]ι    Δίδω[μ]ι τοί[ν]υν ἅπα– 
 [σι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ῥωμαϊκ]ὴν οἰκουμένην π[ολειτ]είαν Ῥωμ[αί]ων [μ]ένοντος  
 [τοῦ δικαίου τῶν πολιτευμ]άτων χωρ[ὶς] τῶν [ἀδδ]ειτικίων     Ὀ[φ]είλει [γ]ὰρ τὸ  
10) [πλῆθος οὐ μόνον τἄλλα συνυπομέ]νειν πάντα ἀ[λλ]ὰ ἤδη κ[α]ὶ τῇ νίκῃ ἐνπεριει–  
[λῆφθαι     Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ διάτ]αγμα ἐ[ξαπ]λώσει [τὴν] μεγαλειότητα [το]ῦ Ῥωμα[ί] 
[ων δήμου συμβαίνει γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴ]ν περὶ τοῦς [ἄλλο]υς γεγενῆσθα[ι] ᾗπερ δ[ι]α– 
[πρέπουσιν ἀνέκαθεν Ῥωμαῖοι τιμῇ κα]ταλειφ[θέντων μηδέν]ων τῶ[ν] ἑκάστης 
[χώρας ἐν οἰκουμένῃ ἀπολιτεύτων ἢ ἀτιμ]ήτω[ν    Ἂπο δὲ τῶν] π[ρ]οσ[όδων τῶν 
νῦν] 
15) [ὑπερχουσῶν συντελούντων, ἅπερ ἐκελεύσ]θη [παρὰ Ῥωμαίων ἀπὸ τοῦ κα 
ἔτους,] 
 [ὡς δίκαιον ἐκ τῶν διαταγμάτων καὶ ἐπιστολ]ῶ[ν, ἅ ἐξεδόθη ὑφ’ ἡμῶν τε] 
 [καὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων προγόνων   Προετέθη . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .] 
 
The Emperor Caesar Marcus Aurelius Severus Antoninus Pius decrees: 
It is altogether necessary to attribute the causes and reasons [of recent events] 
to the divine. I, personally, would rightly thank the immortal gods, since 
although such a conspiracy [as that of Geta] has occurred, they have watched 
over me and protected me. I think that I am able, both magnificently and 
piously, to do something fitting to the gods’ majesty, if I manage to bring [all] 
those in the empire, who constitute my people, to the temples of the gods as 
Romans. I therefore give everyone in the Roman world the Roman citizenship: 
preserving customary law, without additional privileges. It is necessary for the 
masses not only to share in our burden, but also to be included in victory. This 
decree will spread the magnificence of the Roman people. For it now happens 
that the same greatness has occurred for everyone, by the honour in which the 
Romans have been preeminent since time immemorial, with no-one from any 
country in the world being left stateless or without honour. Referring to the 
taxes that exist at present, all are due to pay those that have been imposed upon 
the Romans from the beginning of their twenty-first year [of age], as it is the 
law, according to the edicts and rescripts issued by us and our ancestors.  
Displayed publically…  
 
 Restoring the text of P. Giss. 40 represents only one part of the puzzle posed 
by the Antonine Constitution, though. The Giessen papyrus also raises a number of 
questions, the conclusions on which have an impact on our understanding of the edict. 
Similar to the controversies in the modern scholarly tradition, these points must be 





 The first of these concerns the precise authorship of the edict. I have argued 
above that the evidence supports the hypothesis that Caracalla was the guiding 
architect of the Antonine Constitution, but the issue of how far the emperor can be 
found in the extant text remains open. This is a matter which is confounded by 
ambiguity surrounding why the Giessen papyrus itself was compiled. In addition to 
the constitutio, Caracalla’s recall of exiles and his later expulsion of ethnic Egyptians 
from Alexandria are also preserved on the papyrus.94 It seems probable that the artefact 
is a copy of official legislation, possibly compiled in advance of a private suit, rather 
than for archival purposes.95 To date, however, no one has been able to provide a 
persuasive explanation for this combination of edicts appearing on the same source.  
 
Such a problem with the Giessen papyrus obviously gives rise to a concern 
regarding how far we can trust that the text preserved is a faithful copy of the official 
legislation, be that translated from the original Latin, or simply replicated from a pre-
existing Greek copy in Egypt. A way of overcoming some of this doubt, to an extent, 
can be found in stylistic analysis. Identifying the ‘hand’ of the emperor in drafting 
legislation is a notoriously difficult task but, if restricted to general terms, then it is 
acceptable to suggest that ‘the individual personalities of each emperor are revealed in 
some at least of their official pronouncements.’96 In the case of the constitutio 
Antoniniana, attention has been devoted to elements of the language and tone 
employed by the author to argue that the text preserved on the Giessen papyrus is a 
record of Caracalla’s wording.  
 
In the constitutio, it is true that much of the language in the text emphasises the 
grandeur and universality of the edict being introduced, a feature which melds not only 
with other legal documents deriving from the same era, but also with the emperor’s 
well-documented ‘passion for vastness’ in relation to his building projects and 
                                                 
94 Heichelheim (1941) 10-22. 
95 The script of the papyrus is regular, but does not exhibit the elongated chancery style of the same 
period. For more on this, see Cavallo and Maehler (2008) 123. 
96 Williams (1979) 67. 
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admiration towards Alexander the Great, for example.97 While this alone does not 
necessarily preclude another individual composing the edict, further suggestion of 
Caracalla’s involvement can be found if the general tone of the legislation is 
considered. Rather than a detailed juristic account defining the new edict and its 
fundamental consequences, as one might expect from a civil servant, the actual terms 
of the constitutio are mentioned only briefly, with more attention devoted to explaining 
the circumstances which prompted the creation of the edict and its underlying purpose. 
This feature has led Sherwin-White to declare the Giessen text a ‘proclamation of 
policy’, rather than a technical instruction, though how far this distinction can be 
thought to represent a genuine difference, at least in the eyes of the emperor, is 
debatable.98 
 
 However the Giessen papyrus is restored, the reasons offered for the edict in 
the text all arise from the emperor’s personal experience and an unidentified threat 
from which the gods had preserved him.99 From the combination of this focus on 
Caracalla’s person, combined with the personal tone of the edict and the characteristic 
use of language emphasising the scale and majesty of his enactment, Williams has 
concluded that the Latin original of the constitutio Antoniniana was personally 
composed by the emperor on a rapid timescale, probably dictated for immediate 
publication.100 While I would argue that this is an overstatement, once again 
caricaturing Caracalla as an impulsive and irrational ruler, the idea that the emperor 
took a personal interest in the text of his great edict remains persuasive.101 Regardless, 
then, if the text found on the Giessen papyrus is a complete or abridged copy of the 
original legislation, the stylistic elements of the decree, paired with the other extant 
evidence relating to the emperor’s administration of Roman law, noted above, suggest 
                                                 
97 Williams (1979) has identified a number of other edicts preserved on papyri which contain highly 
similar modes of expression. Also see Sherwin-White (1973a) 282-83. 
98 Williams (1979) 71-72; Sherwin-White (1973a) 283. For a commentary of P. Giss. 40 I, see Appendix 
I. 
99 Williams (1979) 71. The nature of the difficulty which Caracalla claimed the gods had preserved him 
from will be discussed below. 
100 Williams (1979) 72, 88. 
101 Williams (1979: 72) has suggested, similar to Garnsey (2004: 134-35), that the constitutio should be 
regarded more as a whim of the emperor than a carefully planned policy decision.  
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that Caracalla himself was the ultimate author of the Antonine Constitution and did 
not, in this case, defer completely to his jurist counsellors.  
 
 If the personal focus of the constitutio is one of its defining features, it also 
raises one of its most significant uncertainties, namely concerning the nature of the 
events that the emperor was responding to in enacting his reform. In the opening lines 
of P. Giss. 40, the emperor claimed that ‘it is altogether necessary to attribute the 
causes and reasons [of recent events] to the divine.’102 The events referred to here are 
never made explicit, though. In fact, Caracalla’s explanation of the events is equally 
enigmatic, with the emperor claiming divine protection from an unnamed danger. The 
immediate question which must be considered, then, is what was Caracalla claiming 
that the gods had saved him from?  
 
 In typically frustrating fashion, the crucial section of the Giessen papyrus 
detailing the threat is lost.103 In response, there have been two restorations of the text 
offered by scholars. One, proposed by Bickermann, refers to a general misfortune 
(συμφορά) befalling the emperor.104 The more widely accepted reconstruction of the 
lacuna, however, is the more pointed ἐπιβουλή, which has a clear inference of a 
conspiracy and clandestine activity being raised against the emperor.105 Indeed, the 
lack of detail in the constitutio itself regarding the events prompting it has led to a 
number of alternative explanations of the events which motivated Caracalla to 
advertise his legislation as a grand act of thanksgiving to the gods. It has been 
suggested, for example, that the emperor made reference to an occasion during which 
he escaped death or injury during his travels and campaigns: either his near-death in a 
battle with the Alamanni or his surviving a shipwreck crossing the Hellespont.106 
Neither of these explanations are particularly convincing, however, owing to their 
impact on the dating of the edict’s introduction. The battle in question took place in 
                                                 
102 P. Giss. 40 I, ll. 2-3. 
103 P. Giss. 40 I, l. 4. 
104 Bickermann (1926). 
105 See Appendix I. 
106 Millar (1962) 124-31; Letta (1994) 188-90. For an account of the battle in question, see Dio 78.13.6. 
For more on the alleged shipwreck, which appears to have been exaggerated by the author of the 
Historia Augusta, see Dio 78.16.7; HA Car. 5.8. 
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AD 213, while the emperor’s seaborne difficulties took place the year after, in the 
context of his entering Asia Minor on his imperial tour. These simply cannot be the 
events referred to in the course of the constitutio Antoniniana, since, as Barnes has 
shown, there is evidence demonstrating that the edict had already spread to Lydia by 
March 213, suggesting that the legislation must have been introduced in the middle of 
212 at the latest.107 With the date of the edict’s introduction effectively irrefutable, 
there remains only one viable explanation for the ‘conspiracy’ referred to in the course 
of the edict preserved on the Giessen papyrus, the murder of Geta at the close of AD 
211.  
 
From 209 to 211, Caracalla shared the mantle of imperial power with both his 
father, Septimius Severus, and his younger brother. The rivalry between the sons of 
Severus was notorious, however, and only intensified as time drew on.108 This fraught 
arrangement was not to endure for long after the death of the dynasty’s patriarch, with 
the conflict between the two surviving emperors adopting an increasingly violent 
nature as both men vied for control.109 Despite the efforts of some within the imperial 
court to calm the situation, the conflict between the emperors further intensified until 
Geta was finally assassinated at the close of the year, either by Caracalla himself, or 
by soldiers under his instruction.110 With Severus and Geta dead, AD 212 thus began 
with Caracalla alone holding the reins of imperial power, the first time that one 
individual had occupied the position since the principate of Antoninus Pius.  
 
 In the aftermath of Geta’s assassination, Caracalla moved swiftly to accuse his 
dead brother of acting treacherously against him, claiming that he was the intended 
target of a palace coup. It is noteworthy that, in the course of Dio’s account of the night 
of the murder, the author also employed ἐπιβουλή in reference to the alleged actions 
of Geta:  
                                                 
107 Barnes (2012) 51-52. For a more detailed analysis of this issue, see Hermann (1972) 519-30. 
108 There are a number of references to the enmity in our main sources for the period. For an overview 
of this phenomenon in the literature, see Weisser (2011). 
109 Dio 78.2.1-2; Hdn 4.1.5. 
110 For more on Julia Domna’s role as a peacekeeper, in particular, see Levick (2007) 88-89; Imrie 
(2014) 312-14. For the murder of Geta, see Dio 78.2.2-4; Hdn 4.4.2-4. 
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ὁ δ’ Ἀντωνῖνος καίπερ ἑσπέσας οὔσης τὰ στρατόπεδα κατέλαβε, διὰ πάσης τῆς 
ὁδοῦ κεκραγὼς ὡς ἐπιβεβουλευμένος καὶ κινδυνεύων.  
 
Antoninus, although it was evening, took possession of the legions, after crying 
out the whole way, as if he had been the object of a plot and his life were in 
danger.111 
 
 While we must exercise caution to prevent Dio’s prose from influencing our 
reconstruction of P. Giss. 40 excessively, it is tempting to imagine that the senator was 
using language reminiscent of that employed by the emperor when constructing his 
account. The function and importance of the constitutio Antoniniana to Caracalla’s 
regime in AD 212 will be considered in detail later in this thesis, but it remains worth 
reiterating here that the text of the edict preserved on the Giessen papyrus only really 
makes sense in connection with the fraternal discord between Caracalla and Geta rather 
than any other potential misfortune suffered by the emperor.112 
 
 In addition to the debate regarding the nature of the threat overcome by 
Caracalla, two other major questions are raised by the constitutio as preserved in the 
Giessen papyrus, both of which derive from the actual gift of civitas proclaimed by the 
emperor between the seventh and ninth lines of the text. The first concerns the impact 
of the legislation on the legal complexion of the empire. In the course of the constitutio 
text in P. Giss. 40, Caracalla declared that his edict extended the franchise to every 
person living in the Roman realm.113 Did the Antonine Constitution really herald a 
significant change in the practical relationship between the Roman state and its 
subjects, though?  
 
In former years, there was a sense that the introduction of Caracalla’s edict 
resulted in an absolute imposition of the Roman ius civile across the empire, leading 
to a rapid equalisation between Greek East and Latin West. This is an attitude 
exemplified by Sohm, for example, who argued that the constitutio resulted in (and 
was ultimately designed to facilitate) the arrangement of ‘one emperor, one state, one 
                                                 
111 Dio 78.3.1. 
112 For a consideration on the political cachet of the Antonine Constitution, see Chapter Three.  
113 P. Giss. 40 I, ll. 7-8: Δίδωμι τοίνυν ἅπασι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ῥωμαϊκὴν οἰκουμένην. 
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law’.114 The fact remains, however, that this hypothesis is based on an erroneously 
unitary model of Roman imperial administration, in which the ius civile was applied 
uniformly across the provinces, for which there is no supporting evidence.115 
 
 It is apparent that there has been a disconnect in the past between the 
consideration of the theoretical implications of the constitutio, and the practicalities of 
its implementation. It is fair to conclude, for example, that the introduction of a 
common legal system would hypothetically result in the simplification and 
rationalisation of imperial bureaucracy, in which lawyers would no longer be required 
to navigate ‘the differentiations between citizens and many categories of provincial 
noncitizens that before 212 CE had made lawsuits, inheritances, property transfers, 
and contracts a nightmare.’116 Nevertheless, the extant evidence also clearly shows that 
the imperial regime continued to recognise the ius gentium in the period following AD 
212. Caracalla himself declared his respect for customary law; further recognition of 
its continued relevance can also be found in the legal texts of Ulpian and 
Modestinus.117 There is also evidence of emperors beyond the Severan period 
acknowledging the existence of customary law, such as Diocletian, who appears, in 
fact, to have legislated to weaken it in relation to the Roman system.118 
 
 This ambiguity is in contrast to the more obvious process of transformation 
that has been identified in social terms, particularly in relation to individual self-
representation. It is clear, for example, that a vast number of people adopted the 
imperial name Aurelius as their nomen gentile, enthusiastically embracing their new 
citizen identity and following the tradition of including the name of the individual 
                                                 
114 Sohm (1911) 130: Ein Kaiser, ein Reich, ein Recht. Also see Hekster (2008) 47; Honoré (2004) 113. 
115 Ando (2012) 85-99, (2011) 28; Tuori (2007) 39.  
116 Mathisen (2006) 1015. See also Honoré (2002) 84-86; Millar (1977) 481. This notion would appear 
to be strengthened by the writing of Menander Rhetor (Treatise I.3.363, ll. 7-14), in which the author 
claimed that it was impossible to praise cities on the basis of their law, in epideictic literature, since they 
had all become subject to the Roman framework. Both the later date of his work and his rhetorical 
objective should be borne in mind, though. 
117 P. Giss. 40 I, ll. 8-9; Dig. 1.3.33; 1.3.40. See also Hekster (2008) 52. 
118 For more information on the later emperors’ responses to customary law, see Amelotti (1995) 211-
15; Rees (2007) 105-24. 
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responsible for one’s enfranchisement with their own.119 A similar change can be 
observed in other media, such as sculptural and numismatic evidence.120 It becomes 
apparent, then, that the Antonine Constitution can be recognised to have had a lasting 
effect on many of the empire’s inhabitants, but that these phenomena can only be 
identified through a variety of both direct and indirect sources and across a long 
chronological period.121 
 
Part of the problem in assessing the legal consequences of the Antonine 
Constitution is that Roman law itself was a fluid entity, presenting a ‘moving target’ 
in which doctrine and procedure underwent continual revision and change, a problem 
compounded by the dearth of contemporary evidence for the edict, mentioned 
above.122 Moreover, it is clear that it took time for the constitutio to be disseminated 
across the empire, let alone implemented in any meaningful way.123 With this in mind, 
the scholarly emphasis on the long term effects of the legislation into late antiquity and 
beyond, identified in the introduction to this study, is understandable.124 Further study 
of the short-term consequences of the constitutio is an area in which further research 
is warranted, but is largely beyond the scope of this thesis.125 
 
The most controversial debate surrounding the Giessen papyrus, and one which 
does have a direct impact on any consideration of Caracalla’s motivation for 
promulgating the edict, concerns a lacuna in the ninth line of the text. After announcing 
his extension of the franchise, the emperor made two qualifications to the award. The 
first of these stated that, while the rights of civitas had been bestowed, systems of 
                                                 
119 Ando (2012) 57; Hekster (2008) 50; Buraselis (2007) 94-120. This is most easily observed in military 
epigraphy, with the Dura rosters and the register of praetorians both displaying a rapid increase in 
Aurelii. For more on this, see P. Dura 98; CIL VI 1058 and 2799; Hekster (2008) 50. 
120 The appearance of togate provincial portraits suggests an increasing sense of Romanitas even at the 
peripheries of the empire. See Hekster (2008) 51, 146-47; Simon (1995) 249-50. For more on the 
numismatic evidence, which includes the famous tri-lingual Tyrian coin, dating to reign of Gordian III, 
see Howgego (2007) 14. 
121 Hekster (2008) 55. 
122 Ando (2011) 19. 
123 Barnes (2012) 52; Mathisen (2006) 1016; Gilliam (1965) 86-92. 
124 Ando (2012) 93-97; Buraselis (2007) 120-57; Tuori (2007) 43. 
125 Some of the immediate implications of the legislation will be examined in the case study of Roman 
Alexandria presented in Chapter Six. 
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customary law would remain in force.126 The second of these appears to form an 
exclusionary clause in the legislation, indicated by the prepositional phrase of χωρίς 
accompanied by a genitive.127 Unfortunately, the genitive in question survives only 
partially, obfuscated by a hole in the papyrus. The surviving portion, [...]δειτικιών, has 
prompted two alternative reconstructions. 
 
In the editio princeps of the papyrus, Meyer restored this word as the 
Hellenised version of the Latin dediticii, referring to a population group who were 
subject to Roman authority following an act of official surrender.128 Such a 
reconstruction would mean that the emperor had decided that his legislation should not 
extend to every free person, in reality, and that the dediticii were denied the social 
promotion afforded to the rest of the populace. This was the generally accepted 
reconstruction for decades, prompting scholars to debate the extent to which the 
dediticii were excluded from Caracalla’s comprehensive extension of civitas.129 The 
fact remains, however, that the transliteration represents a hapax legomenon and has 
never been an entirely accepted hypothesis. Sasse, for example, acknowledged the 
controversy accompanying the dediticii by his decision to avoid any discussion of the 
subject in his monograph on the constitutio.130 The linguistic difficulties that the 
dediticii present have resulted in confusion, leading to an increasing sense that the 
reconstruction is ultimately unlikely.131  
 
 The current consensus, with which this thesis concurs, has been spearheaded 
by Kuhlmann, who suggests that the Giessen papyrus makes more sense if interpreted 
as denying the newly enfranchised any additional honours previously associated with 
                                                 
126 P. Giss. 40 I, ll. 8-9: μένοντος τοῦ δικαίου τῶν πολιτευμάτων. The similarity of this construction to 
the Latin legal formula salvo iure gentis will be considered in the fourth chapter. 
127 P. Giss. 40 I, l. 9. 
128 Meyer (1910). For an ancient legal definition of this group, however, which could also potentially 
refer to freedmen convicted of crimes during their enslavement, see Gaius, Inst. 1.14. The dediticii are 
considered in more detail in Chapter Four. 
129 Buraselis (2007) 6-7; Tuori (2007) 42; Zingale (1999) 81; Lukaszewicz (1990a) 97-99; Wolff (1977) 
210-38; Sherwin-White (1973a) 382-83, (1973b) 95-97; Oliver (1955) 279-97; Benario (1954) 188-96; 
Bell (1947) 17-18; Jones (1936) 228-31. 
130 Sasse (1958) 17. See also Tuori (2007) 42. 
131 Kuhlmann (2012) 48-49; Lukaszewicz (1990a) 97-99. It should be noted, however, that there remain 
a small number who continue to argue that the text of the Giessen papyrus makes reference to the 
dediticii. For examples, see Torrent (2012) 141-52; Rocco (2010) 135-35; Hekster (2008) 47. 
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the bestowal of civitas. In this version, the problematic lacuna is restored as a 
transliteration of the Latin additicia, an adjectival noun referring to general 
privileges.132 The implications of this alternative reconstruction will be considered in 
connection with the emperor’s fiscal and economic agenda, discussed in Chapter Four 
of this thesis, but it is important to recognise that any conclusions drawn regarding this 
troublesome passage have a direct impact upon our collective understanding of the 
effects and consequences of the edict as a whole.  
 
 In the absence of further evidence to support the Giessen papyrus and other 
scanty mentions of the legislation, the constitutio Antoniniana will remain a 
mysterious and divisive edict in many ways. While not all of the myriad questions 
surrounding the edict and its evidence can be answered, we are in a position now to 
investigate the purpose of the legislation, its function within the Caracallan Empire, 
and the factors motivating its introduction. I have argued that, while it is difficult to 
identify the extent to which the emperor personally composed the proclamation, the 
surviving evidence suggests that Caracalla possessed an independent mind in 
connection with Roman statute and its application, and so undoubtedly took a leading 
role in the drafting of the Antonine Constitution. 
 
The evidence supports the hypothesis that the legislation was promulgated 
following the assassination of Geta, with the text of the edict making reference to the 
violence and presenting the constitutio as an act of religious thanksgiving for divine 
intervention. It was introduced at a critical point in the reign of Caracalla, a factor 
which must always be borne in mind when assessing its purpose. In 212, he faced the 
prospect of ruling alone for the first time in his life. The Antonine Constitution can 
thus be seen as a reflection of both his short term concerns, regarding his dynastic 
legitimacy, and his medium to long term military aspirations to expand the empire. 
The various ways in which these elements are manifest in the constitutio will now be 
considered. 
  
                                                 
132 Kuhlmann (2012) 48-50, (1994) 236-37; Oliver (1989) 504. For a more detailed explanation of why 





The constitutio Antoniniana as an Act of Alexander imitatio 
 
 When Caracalla was assassinated in AD 217, he was in the process of leading 
a Roman army on campaign against the Parthian Empire.133 Dio recounts that war had 
been declared following the Parthian king’s refusal to allow Caracalla to marry his 
daughter, though the author regarded the proposal as a ruse on the part of the emperor 
to swiftly annex his enemy’s territory.134 Regardless of the historicity of the alleged 
events that prefigured the campaign, one constant feature of this episode is that the ill-
fated offensive has been interpreted as a final attempt by Caracalla to mimic his 
lifelong idol, Alexander the Great.135 Even a cursory glance at the ancient literature 
shows that Caracalla was believed to have harboured a veritable mania for anything 
relating to the Macedonian king.136 This is an image that has endured into the modern 
era, with Birley, for example, classing the emperor’s interest as a pathological 
obsession, while Barahal has declared that ‘no one questions the fact that Caracalla 
modelled his day-to-day conduct and actions on those of Alexander’.137 More recently, 
however, it has been claimed that there was more to the emperor’s admiration of the 
conqueror than superficial affectations, and that he actually fostered a public 
connection with Alexander for political effect.138  
 
 This chapter will consider the extent to which the constitutio Antoniniana 
functioned as an ideological grant promoting an association between Caracalla and 
Alexander the Great, and whether the edict should be viewed as a politically astute 
initiative that exploited Alexandrian rhetoric and imagery, or rather as a simple act of 
imitatio. I will begin by examining the text of the Giessen papyrus and setting it against 
literary evidence for the king’s attitude towards his imperial subjects, noting the 
argument advanced by Baharal that the constitutio was inspired by an Alexandrian 
attempt to achieve universal harmony amongst his peoples.139 This is a difficult 
                                                 
133 Cowan (2002) 154-55. 
134 Dio 79.1.1. Also see Hdn 4.10.1-2. 
135 Sheldon (2010) 171. 
136 For a summary of his obsession, see Dio 78.7.1. 
137 Birley (1988) 194; Baharal (2003) 27. 
138 Buraselis (2007) 33; Rowan (2012) 152. 
139 Baharal (1996) 70. 
35 
 
hypothesis to assess, owing to the problem of establishing the intentions of Alexander 
himself from the surviving authors. By examining the text of Papyrus Gissensis in 
conjunction with other literary sources, then, I will argue that while there is a link to 
be made between Caracalla and Alexander through the Antonine Constitution, the 
relationship is not as pronounced as some might suggest. In fact, I will show that it is 
impossible to link the historical Alexander with the constitutio. If the scope and 
terminology of the Giessen text are examined closely, however, it does become 
possible to identify a potentially Alexandrian inspiration among the words of 
Caracalla’s edict.  
 
It will be argued that the emperor’s tone and expression in the constitutio was 
inspired by the romanticised, legendary image of the king relayed through later writers, 
such as Plutarch, with whose work it seems clear that the emperor came into contact. 
The chapter will conclude by considering to what extent this phenomenon was the 
result of Caracalla’s well-attested hero worship of Alexander, or was a connection that 
was deliberately engineered for political effect. In this question, we are plagued by the 
often dubious reliability of the evidence relating to Caracalla offered by the main 
literary sources but, if the text of the Antonine Constitution is combined with other 
bodies of literary and material evidence, then it becomes possible to see that Alexander 
imagery formed one facet of a wider revolution in Caracalla’s imperial self-image that 
occurred from the outset of his sole principate. 
 
The Alexandrian Influence behind the constitutio Antoniniana  
 The theory that Caracalla was attempting to forge ‘universal harmony’ by 
extending the franchise to all corners of the empire seems to have some basis if the 
text of the Giessen papyrus is studied closely.140 In addition to the fundamental act of 
inducting nearly every free person to the rights of civitas, the emperor’s statements 
following the announcement of the grant appear to promote social inclusion at all 
levels of society: ‘it is necessary for the masses not only to share in our burden, but 
also to be included in victory.’141 On initial examination, this rhetoric would appear to 
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bear a degree of similarity to the banquet held by Alexander at Opis, in which he 
espoused a similar sentiment:  
 
Then Alexander, interrupting him, said: “But all of you without exception I 
consider my kinsmen, and so from this time I shall call you.”142 
 
 This has led, in the past, to a discussion of Alexander’s desire for a brotherhood 
of man, in which the king would unite all of the races of mankind into a single empire, 
whose inhabitants would be partners, rather than simply subject peoples.143 It is clear 
that this is where Baharal gleans her evidence for Caracalla’s later plan to achieve a 
single, united world empire. There are fundamental problems in reaching such a 
conclusion, though. Much of the concept of Alexander’s brotherhood of man derives 
from the work of one scholar, and his interpretation of the events at Opis. Tarn 
considered the banquet scene to represent the conclusion of a peace following the de 
facto mutiny of Alexander’s Macedonian troops, claiming that Alexander shared wine 
with everybody from his krater in a symbolic gesture showing his commitment to 
universal harmony.144 The problem with this hypothesis is that even a cursory 
examination of the Anabasis shows that Tarn has misread the content of the episode 
entirely.145 In fact, there is no real evidence that Alexander ever desired a brotherhood 
of man, leading to Tarn’s hypothesis being discredited completely.146 This does not 
mean, however, that it is impossible to observe an Alexandrian inspiration within the 
text of the constitutio in another way. Rather than trying to identify a link between 
Caracalla and the historical Alexander, it is more profitable to examine the literary 
presentation of the king. If we analyse the tone of the Antonine Constitution further, I 
would argue that the evidence supports the hypothesis that Caracalla was influenced 
by the heroic image of Alexander presented by later authors, particularly Plutarch.  
                                                 
142 Arr. Anab. 7.11 (tr. Chinnock). 
143 Tarn (1948); Badian (1958); Brunt (1965); Bosworth (1980). 
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Of particular interest here is a section of Plutarch’s De Fortuna Alexandri 
located in the course of the Moralia. In this text, the author contemplates what might 
have been realised if Alexander had lived for longer and been able to accomplish his 
imperial ambitions. Rather than an empire unified on the basis of a homogenous race 
or culture, there is a clear inference that the Plutarchan Alexander would have achieved 
unity through the imposition of a common system of law and justice: 
 
ἀλλ᾽ ἑνὸς ὑπήκοα λόγου τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ μιᾶς πολιτείας, ἕνα δῆμον ἀνθρώπους 
ἅπαντας ἀποφῆναι βουλόμενος, οὕτως ἑαυτὸν ἐσχημάτιζεν: εἰ δὲ μὴ ταχέως ὁ 
δεῦρο καταπέμψας τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου ψυχὴν ἀνεκαλέσατο δαίμων, εἷς: ἂν νόμος 
ἅπαντας ἀνθρώπους διῳκεῖτο καὶ πρὸς ἓν δίκαιον ὡς πρὸς κοινὸν ἐπέβλεπον 
φῶς. νῦν δὲ τῆς γῆς ἀνήλιον μέρος ἔμεινεν, ὅσον Ἀλέξανδρον οὐκ εἶδεν.  
 
But Alexander desired to render all upon earth subject to one law of reason and 
one form of government and to reveal all men as one people, and to this purpose 
he made himself conform. But if the deity that sent down Alexander's soul into 
this world of ours had not recalled him quickly, one law would govern all 
mankind, and they all would look toward one rule of justice as though toward 
a common source of light. But as it is, that part of the world which has not 
looked upon Alexander has remained without sunlight.147  
 
 Unlike the problematic notion of an appeal to universal harmony, the concept 
of an empire united by its legal system can clearly be recognised in the text of the 
Antonine Constitution. While the guarantee, preserved in the Giessen text, that 
customary law was to be respected might appear contrary to this notion, the very 
inclusion of the clause in the text only draws attention to the fact that local systems 
were, in reality, being superseded by the Roman one, as Ando notes: ‘it is important 
to recognize that the Antonine Constitution had foreclosed the very means for 
validating local practice… For the extension of Roman citizenship – and the 
eradication of alien communities as autonomous political entities – had necessarily 
also invalidated local codes of law.’148 The assimilation and homogenisation of the 
empire’s myriad population groups is further emphasised towards the end of the 
                                                 
147 Plut. Moralia 330d-e (tr. Babbit). 
148 Ando (2012) 98 passim. Also see Ando (2011) 19-27. For the section of the constitutio addressing 
customary law, see P. Giss. 40 I, ll. 8-9. 
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Giessen text, where Caracalla declared that by the terms of his edict, no one would be 
left without state and everyone would share in the glory of Rome:  
 
Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ διάταγμα ἐξαπλώσει τὴν μεγαλειότητα τοῦ Ῥωμαίων δήμου 
συμβαίνει γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν περὶ τοῦς ἄλλους γεγενῆσθαι ᾗπερ διαπρέπουσιν 
ἀνέκαθεν Ῥωμαῖοι τιμῇ καταλειφθέντων μηδένων τῶν ἑκάστης χώρας ἐν 
οἰκουμένῃ ἀπολιτεύτων ἢ ἀτιμήτων.     
 
This decree will spread the magnificence of the Roman people. For it now 
happens that the same greatness has occurred for everyone, by the honour in 
which the Romans have been preeminent since time immemorial, with no-one 
from any country in the world being left stateless or without honour.149 
 
 If the legal dimension of the constitutio Antoniniana is compared to the 
unrealised promise of Alexander presented by Plutarch, an association between the 
two leaders can be drawn. When seeking to gauge the influence of Alexander the Great 
on the terms of the edict, then, I would argue that it is necessary to concentrate on the 
literary, rather than historical Alexander. Indeed, this emphasis has already been made 
in the past, with Brunt arguing that the idealised king presented in such works 
presented an inspiration to Roman leaders who were themselves eager to construct an 
expansive and enduring empire: 
 
Neither Alexander nor anyone else realized the objective [of a completely 
unified empire spanning east and west], and it may be doubted if in his own 
mind it was so clearly defined as in Plutarch’s ideal description.  But his work 
tended in this direction and helped to inspire not only perhaps Stoic 
philosophers but the Romans, who were also to transcend national differences 
and to conceive that Italy had been marked out to unite scattered empires.150  
 
We know that legendary figures such as Alexander the Great probably featured 
prominently in the education of elite young Romans, in the form of historical exempla 
in the study of both history and rhetoric.151 There is further evidence to support the 
hypothesis that the idealised image of Rome representing a common fatherland for the 
empire and beyond had infiltrated into the elite mind-set, with Pliny the Elder claiming 
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150 Brunt (1965) 215.  
151 Bonner (1977) 67-75. Also see Baharal (2003) 31. 
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that Italy was the ‘fatherland for all the nations of the world.’152 Given this cultural 
and educational context, I would argue that it is to be expected that the Augusti, 
including Caracalla, would be familiar with the example of Alexander’s kingdom 
presented by later authors, and that it is plausible that this influenced their perception 
of the Empire and, indeed, how they then interpreted and presented their own imperial 
power through official documents, such as the constitutio Antoniniana. 
 
Returning to Caracalla, then, we are faced with the question of why the 
emperor chose to employ rhetoric reminiscent of Alexander the Great in the course of 
the Antonine Constitution. I would argue that there are two potential explanations. The 
first is based upon the overwhelming volume of ancient evidence which suggests that 
the emperor was an obsessive admirer of Alexander, and that he was therefore simply 
inspired to emulate the grandeur that he associated with the king. The alternative 
explanation depicts Caracalla in a more rational light. Far from mimicking Alexander 
to indulge in an irrational fantasy, I would argue that there is sufficient evidence to 
suggest that the emperor opted to promote an association with the conqueror in 
particular ways for political gain, but that this process was only one facet of a wider 
shift in his self-representation that was to occur from the outset of AD 212 onwards. 
 
The Prominence of Alexander Iconography in Caracalla’s Principate 
 When describing Caracalla’s adoration for Alexander the Great, the author of 
the Historia Augusta claimed that the emperor rarely ceased referring to his idol, and 
suggested that Caracalla might have felt an irrational compulsion to behave like the 
king.153 While these accusations might seem innocuous, they are nonetheless 
indicative of a significant problem we face when attempting to assess the extent to 
which the emperor was inspired by the legend of Alexander. Even a cursory glance at 
our main literary sources for the period reveals that they are littered with a variety of 
unusual anecdotes regarding the ways in which Caracalla is alleged to have exhibited 
his admiration for the king. These range from the relatively innocent, if eccentric, such 
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as dressing in the Macedonian style, through to the more serious accusation that the 
emperor believed himself to be Alexander reborn.154  
 
An obvious problem encountered when considering these myriad allegations, 
however, is that they derive from an overwhelmingly hostile literary tradition, in which 
the authors, particularly Dio, were eager to denigrate the emperor. This can be seen, 
for example, in the author’s claim that Caracalla was obsessed with acquiring and 
using items believed to have once belonged to the king.155 Dio’s image of the emperor 
is immediately reminiscent of Caligula’s alleged proclivity for wearing a breastplate 
that he had previously removed from the tomb of the king, a comparison that can only 
have reflected badly on Caracalla.156 The result of this is that it becomes difficult to 
separate the genuine examples of Alexander imitatio performed by the emperor from 
the hyperbolic or even fictitious creations of the ancient authors. This becomes even 
more problematic when it is noted that the literary 
image of Caracalla obsessing over the king is not 
supported by evidence produced through official 
media of the period.  
 
For an emperor so apparently obsessed with 
Alexander the Great, there is a surprising dearth of 
Alexandrian iconography to be found in Caracalla’s 
sculpture, inscriptions and coinage. Baharal has 
conducted a study of imperial portraiture and 
concluded that, far from any notion that the emperor 
sought to forge an artistic assimilation between 
himself and his idol, there is actually a significant 
degree of divergence in Caracallan sculpture from 
anything that could be considered Alexandrian.157 
The emperor’s portraits are not executed in an 
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Fig. 1: 'Caracalla as Sol', North 
Carolina Museum of Art (Image 




idealised, Hellenistic style; they often depict considerable detail of his facial features, 
for example, including his famed furrowed brow.158 The gaze of the statuary, 
furthermore, fails to conform to the Alexandrian style, exhibiting a downward glance 
towards the viewer, rather than the gaze into infinity. Even the emperor’s hairstyle is 
different, Caracalla’s close-cut military hairstyle presenting a stark contrast to the 
flowing, leonine hair of his idol. In fact, only one statue has ever been found which 
might depict Caracalla with Alexandrian features (see Fig. 1), although the 
identification of the figure remains in doubt.159   
 
Similarly problematic is the fact that there is a notable absence of any reference 
to Caracalla as Alexander found in the epigraphic sources. This can hardly be blamed 
upon a lack of sufficient source material since the early third century AD has been 
shown to represent a peak in the Roman epigraphic habit for the imperial period.160 
This suggests that, rather than associating himself with Alexander through this 
medium, the emperor focused more on promoting traditional themes and virtues.161 
The numismatic corpus provides equally little evidence of Caracalla exploiting the 
memory of Alexander the Great for propagandistic effect. While there is a small 
selection of coin types which initially appear to refer to Alexander, each of these 
specimens can be questioned or explained in alternative terms, upon closer 
examination. It is tempting, for example, to connect appearances of Hercules on 
coinage of the period with the emperor’s fascination, since Alexander was reputed to 
have been able to trace his ancestry back to the demigod.162 Reverse iconography 
depicting Hercules can be found among the variety of deities struck on Caracallan 
coinage during the 212-17 period.163 The precise purpose of this imagery, however, is 
far less distinct. Hercules was commonly revered throughout the imperial period, 
proving particularly popular with Commodus, for example.164 He was also closely 
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associated with the Severan dynasty as a whole, owing to his role as the patron deity 
to the family’s patria of Lepcis Magna.165 Indeed, Hercules played an important 
iconographic role in Severus’ propaganda during the civil war period and its immediate 
aftermath.166 
 
There is, in fact, only one coin type that has been linked to Caracalla’s reign 
which makes a direct reference to Alexander the Great and that cannot be interpreted 
in a more general manner. The coin is a small golden type, referred to simply as one 
of Caracalla’s bracteates by Mattingly.167 It has been attributed to Caracalla’s period 
of sole rule, but this link is highly tenuous and the reason for its original attribution 
remains unclear. The coin depicts a right facing bust of Alexander in a typical style, 
with flowing hair and wearing a diadem. There is no accompanying legend, however, 
to further explain the nature or purpose of this type. I would argue that the absence of 
such crucial supporting data, paired with the enormous stylistic difference between the 
depiction of Alexander’s coin portrait with that of the emperor, whose obverse busts 
follow the more severe style of portraiture observed in his statuary, means that the coin 
simply cannot be dated with any confidence or even associated with Caracalla with 
any degree of certainty.168  
 
The Political Significance of Alexander Iconography  
With this absence of imperial evidence to suggest that Caracalla publically 
linked himself with Alexander the Great, we might be forgiven for assuming that the 
obsession alleged of the emperor by our ancient authors is the result of literary 
hyperbole at best, complete fiction at worst. Despite the disappointing lack of evidence 
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for Caracalla’s Alexander-mania through official media, though, there are other 
phenomena which suggest that the emperor’s fascination was a public one and did 
contain a political dimension. In fact, I would argue that evidence found dating to after 
Caracalla’s assassination proves that the emperor’s association with Alexander the 
Great was an important aspect of Caracallan self-representation and, furthermore, 
carried a political significance.  
 
 During the 220s AD, there was an increase in Macedonian coinage bearing 
Alexandrian motifs; there is furthermore an increase in epigraphic attestations to 
games being held in the hero’s honour, the Alexandreia, although it seems clear that 
the games themselves probably started under Caracalla himself.169 Dahmen has 
attributed this upsurge in Alexander iconography to the reign of Elagabalus, under 
whom the images begin to appear on Macedonian koina.170 Given the lengths that the 
Severan faction went to, to ensure that Elagabalus was accepted as the legitimate heir 
to Caracalla during the war against Macrinus, it is logical to conclude that this 
promotion of Alexandrian themes was chosen owing to its well-known link to 
Caracalla.171 The political element to this process of veneratio was even more assertive 
under the final Severan emperor, whose imperial name was chosen to evoke a link to 
Caracalla via the Macedonian.172 Under Alexander Severus, further games were held 
in the name of Alexander the Great.173 Furthermore, in the young emperor’s 
commemorative series of coinage, Caracalla was assigned the epithet magnus.174 The 
repetition of Alexandrian iconography during a time at which the emperor’s legitimacy 
was most uncertain (both Elagabalus and Alexander Severus rose to power through the 
murder of their predecessor) suggests not only the inherent potency of Alexander the 
Great’s legacy as a propagandistic image, but also that it was widely associated with 
the sole reign of Caracalla.  
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Similar to the later numismatic evidence, there are clear examples of coins 
bearing Alexandrian iconography among the civic coinage struck by eastern cities 
during the reign of Caracalla. Specimens from a number of cities in the provinces have 
been identified: Alexandria at the Issus; Gerasa; Caesarea in Cappadocia and 
Heliopolis in Syria, to give some examples.175 The exact purpose of this output has 
been debated, with Dahmen asserting that the coins represent an attempt by the 
communities in question to stress their fidelity to the emperor, while Noreña has 
argued that they form evidence of the cities attempting to secure imperial patronage 
or, alternatively, expressing their thanks for it.176 Whatever the rationale for the 
provincial coinage, and there is no reason why it cannot be a synthesis of the 
aforementioned ideas, the fact remains that this iconography would only have made 





Fig. 2: Caracalla, AE Koinon, Philippopolis, c.AD 211-17 (GIC III 1474).178 
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178 ΑΝΤ ΚΜ ΑΥΡ ΣΕΥ ΑΝΤΩΝΕΙΝΟΣ, draped and laureate bust right / ΚΟΙΝΟΝ ΘΡΑΚΩΝ ΑΛΕΖΑΝΔΡΙΑ ΕΝ 
ΦΙΛΙΠΠΟΠΟ ΛΙ, Hygieia left, feeding a snake and Aesculapius right with caduceus, Telesphorus in centre. 
ΠΥΘΙΑ in central field. 37.03g. Image courtesy of Gorny und Mosch, Giessener Münzhandlung GmbH: 
Auction 215, Lot 954, 14th October 2013. 
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A good example of an attempt by a provincial community to simultaneously 
impress Caracalla and also exploit Alexander iconography for the city’s own benefit 
can be found in the case of Philippopolis in Thrace. Amongst the wider numismatic 
output for this city, there are coins struck in commemoration of the Pythian Games 
held there during Caracalla’s sole reign.179 As Rowan has noted, there are two factors 
that are particularly significant in analysing this coinage. Firstly, Philippopolis could 
only have staged the games on the permission of the emperor himself, meaning that 
the city either petitioned Caracalla or received them as an imperial benefaction.180 
Secondly, the games were traditionally named after the emperor or deity responsible 
for the grant to hold them.181 Since Alexander was not a name that featured in 
Caracalla’s imperial nomenclature, this ultimately raises the question of what the 
inhabitants of Philippopolis were trying to achieve by labelling their Pythian Games 
as Alexandreia. Rowan argues that it is unclear whether the city was directly honouring 
the emperor, the king or a ‘happy confusion’ of the pair.182 While she is correct that 
the lack of any definitive information regarding the content of the games prevents an 
absolute conclusion from being drawn, I would argue that this phenomenon fits easily 
into the wider trend of cities reflecting the emperor’s public association of Alexander 
the Great.  
 
 With this evidence in mind, we must move away from the superficial 
connections between Caracalla and Alexander and consider how the emperor might 
have exploited an association with the king for political gain. As I noted at the outset 
of this chapter, this has become the accepted hypothesis regarding the relationship 
between the two men, with Buraselis arguing that Caracalla’s identification with 
Alexander represents ‘nothing less than the assumption of a wholly political 
ideology.’183 While the connection need not be quite as absolute as Buraselis claims, 
it is important to note that there is substantial evidence to suggest that Caracalla’s 
                                                 
179 For an example, see Fig. 2, above. 
180 Rowan (2012) 154. 
181 Rowan (2012) 156. 
182 Rowan (2012) 157. 
183 Buraselis (2007) 33. Also see Rowan (2012: 152), who claims that Caracalla ‘cultivated an 
alignment’ with the king. 
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exploitation of the king’s mythos was not without precedent. In fact, association with 
Alexander appears to have been an accepted practice for Roman emperors.  
 
From Augustus through to Julian, a variety of Roman rulers attempted to 
promote a connection between themselves and Alexander, showing themselves eager 
to replicate his considerable military success.184 If viewed within the wider context of 
the Principate, then, it is evident that much of the alleged veneratio and imitatio alleged 
of Caracalla was far from exceptional. A number of emperors visited the tomb of 
Alexander and honoured his corpse.185 Augustus was said to have sealed his official 
communications with a stamp bearing a bust of Alexander.186 Trajan made reference 
to the luck of Alexander in being able to explore India during his own war against 
Parthia. According to Dio, the emperor then falsely claimed that he had, in fact, 
exceeded Alexander’s empire in his campaign of expansion.187 Even Caracalla’s 
alleged levying of a military unit inspired by Alexander has a Neronian precedent.188 
The trend of imperial identification with the Macedonian appears most commonly in 
connection with the eastern empire, or in the context of war with Parthia (or later 
Sassanid Persia).189 This is certainly the case with Caracalla’s advance, since it appears 
that the route of his travel throughout the eastern empire and eventual offensive against 
                                                 
184 Spencer (2002) 41. The act of engaging with, or even appropriating, the image of Alexander became 
a powerful tool of kingship from almost immediately after the monarch’s death in 323 BC. Many 
Hellenistic rulers, including the diadochoi themselves, sought to associate themselves with Alexander 
or even to assume facets of his identity in an attempt to strengthen and legitimise their positions of 
power within the network of successor kingdoms. The relationship between Alexander and the Roman 
audience in the context of the late Republic was understandably more problematic, given the 
Macedonian’s absolute monarchy, with sources such as Livy using the character of the king as a vehicle 
for a discussion on the nature of the newly founded Principate. For more on the Hellenistic exploitation 
of Alexander’s likeness, see Stewart (1993). For more on the relationship between republican Rome 
and the conqueror, see Livy 9.18.1-7; Spencer (2002) 39-82. 
185 Spencer (2002) 41; Athanassiadi (1992) 193-94. 
186 Suet. Aug. 50.1 
187 For more on the luck of Alexander, see Dio 68.29.1. For Trajan’s imperial expansion, see Dio 
68.29.2.  The emperor is also placed by Dio (68.30.1) in Babylon during this period, stemming from a 
desire by Trajan to sacrifice at the deathbed of the king. 
188 For Caracalla’s phalanx named in honour of Alexander, see Dio 78.7.1-2. For more on Nero’s 
military homage to the king, see Suet. Nero. 19. 
189 Athanassiadi (1992: 193) claims that ‘any expansion eastwards in which political motives were 
mingled with civilising pretensions was bound to be conceived in terms of the heroic exploits of 
Alexander the Great, whose life-story had already passed into the realm of folklore.’ 
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Parthia were modelled extensively on that taken by Alexander, even including a visit 
to Ilium.190 
 
Based on the evidence, then, I would argue that, in addition to reflecting the 
idealised image of Alexander found in the ancient literature, Caracalla’s use of 
imagery associating him with Alexander was part of a generally accepted topos 
inferring military strength and virtus, with a particular emphasis on being the 
champion of the east. A final observation must be made, however, in reference to 
Caracalla’s own relationship with the king and his legacy. The Alexander legend 
played a prominent role in the civil war between Septimius Severus and Pescennius 
Niger, with the pretender to the throne accepting the epithet of a ‘new Alexander’ from 
his supporters in the eastern provinces.191 In the aftermath of the Wars of Succession, 
Septimius Severus visited Alexandria with his family as part of their imperial tour.192 
During his time in the city, the emperor took the unusual move of closing the tomb of 
Alexander and removing some of its contents, so that ‘no one in future should either 
view Alexander’s body or read what was written in the above mentioned books [tomes 
reputedly containing secret lore].’193 Severus had appreciated the propagandistic value 
that the legend of Alexander could generate. By closing the tomb and preventing any 
access, the emperor must have hoped to reduce the opportunity for any others to claim 
that they were the successors to the king’s legacy in a similar fashion to Pescennius 
Niger.194 In Caracalla’s youth, then, even before he rose to share the mantle of power 
with his father, he would have been able to witness to the significant political power 
connected to the mythos surrounding Alexander. 
 
In summary, then, even accounting for the hostile literary source tradition 
criticising the emperor, it is clear that the imagery and legacy of Alexander the Great 
had a considerable bearing on elements of Caracalla’s life and rule. I have argued that 
it would be incorrect to accept that this was a simple case of obsessive hero worship, 
                                                 
190 For studies devoted to Caracalla’s circuitous route of travel and its similarity to that taken by his 
idol, see Boteva (1999) 181-88; Johnston (1983) 58-76, and Levick (1969) 426-46. 
191 Dio 75.6.2a; Buraselis (2007) 28; Birley (1988) 135-36. 
192 Dio 76.18; Birley (1988) 136. 
193 Dio 76.13.2: ἵνα μηδεὶς ἔτι μήτε τὸ τούτου σῶμα ἴδῃ μήτε τὰ ἐν ἐκείνοις γεγραμμένα ἀναλέξηται. 
194 Buraselis (2007) 29. 
48 
 
however, and that the evidence suggests that emperor was acting within a pre-
established tradition of Augusti invoking the memory of the conqueror for their own 
political agenda, specifically promoting military virtue and success. It is within this 
context of imperial propaganda that we must interpret the Antonine Constitution. I 
have shown that while the tone and rhetoric of the edict cannot be linked conclusively 
to the historical Alexander, since the source tradition is too unreliable, it is possible to 
identify a similarity between the text and the idealised version of the king presented in 
Plutarch’s De Fortuna Alexandri. The extent to which Caracalla would have drawn 
such a distinction, however, is debatable. That Caracalla was potentially emulating 
Alexander the Great through his expression in the Antonine Constitution seems 
plausible. There is no suggestion, however, that this was the primary intention of the 
emperor in introducing the edict. In fact, if other evidence for Caracalla’s reign is 
considered, it is patently evident that his use of Alexander iconography formed only 
one facet of a wider propagandistic revolution, in which Caracalla sought to redefine 
the character of the Severan dynasty, following the murder of his brother Geta.  It is 
necessary, then, to move beyond the emperor’s exploitation of Alexandrian imagery 
and to focus on the wider context of Caracalla’s sole rule. By examining the different 
ways in which Caracalla sought to consolidate his position as emperor, I will show in 
the next chapter how the Antonine Constitution was of critical importance to the 





The Political Expediency of the constitutio Antoniniana 
 
 The transition from a principate shared between the sons of Severus in early 
AD 211 to the sole rule of Caracalla by the close of the same year, had been marked 
by some of the worst internecine violence to be witnessed within the imperial 
household since the Julio-Claudian period. Our main literary sources for the period, 
Dio and Herodian, differ in points of detail regarding the ways in which the rivalry 
between Caracalla and Geta was made manifest, but they agree that the final clash 
between the Augusti was brutal, the younger brother stabbed to death while clinging 
to his mother.195 While the enmity between both men appears to have been public 
knowledge, the death of Geta represented a watershed moment in the history of the 
Empire, nonetheless; emperors had been murdered in the past, but never before had 
their assassin been someone who already possessed a share of the imperial throne.196 
After eliminating his co-emperor in such an open and ferocious manner, the extant 
evidence suggests that Caracalla felt vulnerable and was concerned about the public 
perception regarding the legitimacy of his principate.197 Indeed, given Severus’ nearly 
continual promotion of his sons as a guarantee of imperial harmony and continuity, 
Caracalla’s position at the outset of AD 212 must have seemed increasingly 
precarious.198  
 
 It has been suggested that, from the moment of Geta’s death, Caracalla was 
compelled to offer a public re-evaluation of recent events, including the assassination 
of his brother.199 It has already been noted that the emperor made reference to the 
murder of Geta in the course of the Antonine Constitution, and so it is imperative that 
the edict is considered as a component part of this wider process. In this chapter, then, 
I will assess the political significance of the constitutio Antoniniana in consolidating 
Caracalla’s position as the sole emperor at a time when his rule seemed fragile. The 
                                                 
195 Dio 78.2.3; Hdn 4.1.3. 
196 Dio (78.1.4) comments, for example, that everyone feared that something terrible was bound to 
happen, owing to the diametrically opposed personalities of the brothers.  
197 The large donatives paid to the soldiery, for example, in the aftermath of Geta’s murder are 
considered in Chapter Five. 
198 Rowan (2012) 93. 
199 Kemezis (2014) 31-32. 
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chapter will begin with a consideration of the aequitas promoted in the Giessen text, 
noting that, while scholars such as Mennen and Honoré are partially correct to view 
the legislation in the context of a wider social change, the social levelling embodied in 
the edict also contains a more immediate political application when set against the 
background of a strained relationship between the imperial household and senatorial 
elite.200  
 
Following this, I will then outline how the Antonine Constitution can be seen 
to promote and consolidate the Caracallan regime in three distinct ways. Firstly, the 
religious ideology present in the text will be examined, since this served the dual 
purpose of promoting an image of personal piety on the part of the emperor, while also 
allowing him to control the narrative of the events surrounding Geta’s demise. 
Secondly, Caracalla’s promotion of his own imperial indulgentia will be discussed. 
The general importance of the virtue to the Augusti will be observed briefly, since the 
promotion of generosity was far from unique to Caracalla, before the value of such a 
display in the context of AD 212 is noted. Finally, the extent to which the constitutio 
can be deemed a social contract between the emperor and his citizens will be 
considered. I will argue that if the legislation is examined through the lens of the 
patron-client relationship, a theory that Caracalla was attempting to forge a personal 
tie of loyalty between himself and the new cives becomes persuasive. The combination 
of factors offered in this chapter ultimately supports the hypothesis that the constitutio 
Antoniniana was a key element of Caracallan propaganda in the aftermath of Geta’s 
assassination, in which the emperor endeavoured to redefine the character of the 
Severan dynasty.  
 
The constitutio Antoniniana and the Promotion of Aequitas  
 The jurist Paul, a contemporary of the Severi, recorded the general principle 
that ‘in all matters, especially the law, equity (aequitas) must be considered.’201 The 
drive for equity appears to have been an ideological concern which occupied the earlier 
Severan emperors. Both Septimius Severus and Caracalla can be observed arbitrating 
                                                 
200 Mennen (2011) 22-23; Honoré (2004) 114. 
201 Dig. 50.17.90: in omnibus quidem, maxime tamen in iurem aequitas spectanda est (emphasis added). 
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cases, for example, and emphasising how their perception of aequitas had moved them 
to reach their final conclusions and judgments.202 It is tempting to view this 
phenomenon in the context of a changing philosophy of imperial government, in which 
there was a growing belief that the Principate should be concerned with the benefit of 
its people, rather than the personal gain of the emperors themselves. This attitude is 
found in a selection of documents from the period, including the Meditations of 
Marcus Aurelius, and in the decree of Alexander Severus cancelling the demands of 
the aurum coronarium.203 On first examination, the constitutio Antoniniana can be 
interpreted as a significant piece of legislation in this vein. Indeed, if the Giessen text 
is examined, there would appear to be hints that Caracalla adhered to this ideology, 
prompting him to enact a benevolent and inclusive initiative:  
 
Ὀφείλει γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος οὐ μόνον τἄλλα συνυπομένειν πάντα ἀλλὰ ἤδη καὶ τῇ 
νίκῃ ἐνπεριειλῆφθαι. Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ διάτ]αγμα ἐξαπλώσει τὴν μεγαλειότητα τοῦ 
Ῥωμαὶων δήμου συμβαίνει γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν περὶ τοῦς ἂλλους γεγενῆσθαι ᾗπερ 
διὰπρέπουσιν ἀνέκαθεν Ῥωμαῖοι τιμῇ καταλειφθέντων μηδένων τῶν ἑκάστης 
χώρας ἐν οἰκουμένῃ ἀπολιτεύτων ἢ ἀτιμήτων. 
 
It is necessary for the masses not only to share in our burden, but also to be 
included in victory. This decree will spread the magnificence of the Roman 
people. For it now happens that the same greatness has transpired for everyone, 
by the honour in which the Romans have been preeminent since time 
immemorial, with no-one from any country in the world being left stateless or 
without honour.204  
 
 By advancing nearly every free person in his empire to the rights of civitas, 
Caracalla thus assured that they would have enjoyed legal parity, to the extent that they 
all had access to the Roman legal system.205 In this context, Buraselis has argued that 
the Antonine Constitution should be viewed as a step in a larger process of legal and 
social levelling occurring during the imperial period, one in which provincial subjects 
                                                 
202 For an example of this under Septimius Severus, see Dig. 36(34).1.76.1. For an example from the 
reign of Caracalla, see CJ 2.1.4. It should be noted, however, that this was not a guarantee of complete 
legal equality (social distinctions were maintained, for example), but rather an assurance of equitable 
treatment in the spirit of the written law. For more on this, see Buraselis (2007) 60-65. 
203 M. Aur. Meditations 1.14; Oliver 275 (= P. Fay. 20). For more detail on Alexander Severus’ decree, 
see Oliver (1978) 474-85; Buraselis (2007) 22-23. 
204 P. Giss. 40 I, ll. 9-14. 
205 As noted in Chapter One, however, other social distinctions, such as the divide between the 
honestiores and humiliores remained. For more, see Rilinger (1988) 13-33; Garnsey (1970) 261-80. 
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were viewed as active participants in the empire, rather than simply tributaries for the 
Italian heartland.206 I would argue, however, that this is too simplistic an impression 
of the phenomenon, and that other factors must also be taken into consideration. 
Firstly, the process of social levelling was, to an extent, the natural result of a 
development in which there was a general shift in power from the imperial centre to 
the provinces.207 At its most basic, this can be seen in the gradual extension of civitas 
and other lesser rights that occurred in the pre-212 era.208 This development can also 
be observed in the increasing prominence awarded to individuals of equestrian status 
over those of the ordo senatorius. It is difficult to identify a ‘full-scope’ rise in the 
ordo equester, since it was far from a homogenous group, but a number of individual 
advances can nevertheless be identified in relation to provincial governorships, the 
military and the imperial bureaucracy.209  
 
 The Severan period forms a high watermark in relation to this process, with a 
high number of equestrians serving across the civil service and the military, not to 
mention the rise of the jurists that were to flourish until the military crisis of the third 
century.210 As above, this can be explained by a natural shift in the priorities of 
government. With an expanding bureaucracy and an increasing dependence on the 
army, it is natural that the Roman state would rely upon, and promote, capable 
equestrians rather than selecting officials from the traditional elite only.211 Another 
factor that must be considered, however, is the political friction between the senatorial 
order and the Severan emperors. It is clear from our literary sources, for example, that 
Septimius Severus was not the senate’s preferred choice to succeed Didius Julianus. 
Dio alleged that the senators harboured secret hopes against Severus in in the war 
against Clodius Albinus, while Herodian claimed that some actively encouraged and 
                                                 
206 Buraselis (2007) 12, 86. 
207 Mennen (2011) 40. 
208 For more on the extension of the franchise in the period before AD 212, see Sherwin-White (1973a). 
209 Mennen (2011) 135. 
210 Mennen (2011) 151-56; Buraselis (2007) 55-57. For more on the rise of the jurists, see Chapter One. 
This trend can be seen most markedly in connection with the army. Mennen (2011: 193-240) has shown 
that, while Septimius Severus maintained a senatorial presence in his officer corps, this diminished 
rapidly under Caracalla and had all but disappeared by the reign of Gallienus. 
211 Mennen (2011) 44. 
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supported the governor of Britannia to march on Rome while the Severan armies were 
engaged against Pescennius Niger:  
 
πολλούς τε, μάλιστα τοὺς ἐξέχοντας τῆς συγκλήτου βουλῆς, ἰδίᾳ καὶ κρύβδην 
ἐπιστέλλοντας αὐτῷ, ἔς τε τὴν Ῥώμην ἐλθεῖν πείθοντας ἀπόντος καὶ 
ἀσχολουμένου τοῦ Σεβήρου. ᾑροῦντο γὰρ οἱ εὐπατρίδαι ἐκεῖνον μᾶλλον 
ἄρχοντα, ἅτε ἐκ προγόνων εὖ γεγονότα καὶ χρηστὸν τὸ ἦθος εἶναι λεγόμενον.  
 
Many people, particularly the more distinguished senators, were sending 
personal, private letters urging him to come to Rome while Severus was 
occupied in the East. The nobles preferred to have him as emperor because he 
traced his noble birth back to a long line of ancestors and was said to be good 
natured.212 
 
 The resulting acrimony resulted in the emperor punishing a number of senators 
for their actions during the war and, I would argue, leads to another possible 
interpretation of the levelling tendency that accelerated throughout the same period.213 
While the drive for aequitas does seem to have had a philosophical basis during the 
Antonine and Severan periods, it can also be argued that Severus facilitated or 
exploited this process in order to stabilise his dynasty’s grip on power.214 The same 
theory can also be applied to the sole reign of Caracalla since, according to Dio and 
Herodian, the emperor’s relationship with the senate was far from cordial.215 This 
conclusion has serious implications for the way in which we perceive the purpose of 
the constitutio Antoniniana, specifically that it was a politicised initiative designed to 
garner a large support base for the emperor at a time when he was mistrustful of many 
among the senatorial elite.216 
  
                                                 
212 Hdn 3.5.2 (tr. Whittaker). For Dio’s claims, see 76.4.2. 
213 Dio 76.8.4; Hdn 3.8.2-7. For more on the question of senators supporting Albinus and the atmosphere 
of tension in Rome following the Severan victory, see Daguet-Gagey (2006) 76. 
214 Mennen (2011) 136-38. 
215 Dio (78.4.1-6.1) describes Caracalla engaging in a purge of illustrious men, while Herodian (4.5.7) 
claimed that he instilled fear among the senators in an angry speech, following the murder of Geta. 
While we should exercise caution in accepting Dio’s testimony as representative of the entire senatorial 
order, it remains clear that Caracalla was not a popular ruler among the senate. For more on Dio’s 
perspective, see Davenport (2012). 
216 In the aftermath of Caracalla’s speech to the senate, Herodian (4.5.7) claimed that the emperor made 
a point of fixing his gaze upon known associates of Geta among the assembled body. That the emperor 
might still have questioned many senators’ loyalty in the opening months of 212 is plausible. For a 
suggestion that some among the senate had already agitated against Caracalla, in the attempted coup 
d’état that was result in the execution of Plautianus, see Bingham and Imrie (2015) 76-91. 
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Re-writing the Narrative: Caracallan Self-Representation  
 The situation facing Caracalla at the opening of AD 212 was arguably even 
more complicated than the perilous combination of political and military obstacles that 
Septimius Severus had to overcome to secure his grip on imperial power. As noted 
above, Caracalla’s sole principate was founded on the unprecedented act of one 
incumbent emperor murdering another. It has been argued that this outbreak of 
violence at the end of 211 was a fatally destructive act, effectively ending any hope 
for the continued survival of the dynasty: ‘by killing his brother and his own wife, who 
had left him no heirs, Caracalla had personally ruined the Severan dynasty.’217 Mennen 
has argued that the emperor found himself in a situation in which he was compelled to 
do ‘everything in his power to forget the dynasty’, and create a new imperial image 
that was, in effect, anti-dynastic.218 This is an overly simplistic assessment of 
Caracalla’s principate, however, that misinterprets the extant evidence. 
 
 Given the act of fratricide that heralded Caracalla’s sole principate and the 
subsequent murders of individuals connected to the dynasty, such as Plautilla, it would 
clearly have been impossible for the emperor to adopt or continue the pre-existing 
familial propaganda emphasised through official media by his father.219 These themes 
would have drawn too much attention to the memory of Geta, a factor which might 
have undermined his own legitimacy as emperor, especially if the ancient writers are 
correct that Caracalla only won the support of groups like the Alban legion through 
large donatives.220 This does not equate, however, to a denial of the Severan dynasty 
                                                 
217 Mennen (2006) 260. Caracalla’s estranged wife, Plautilla, is included among a list of notable 
individuals murdered on Caracalla’s order in the period directly following Geta’s assassination; see Dio 
78.1.1. 
218 Mennen (2006) 260. 
219 In the aftermath of the Wars of Succession, Severus’ propaganda focused on the strength and unity 
of the wider Severan family. Themes such as Felicitas Saeculi were stressed on coins with 
accompanying imagery of Julia Domna and both Caracalla and Geta. See BMCRE V 225 for one such 
example. Furthermore, Severan unity was promoted through larger structures such as the Septizodium, 
and by the central roles played by each of the family members in state occasions such as the Ludi 
Saeculares. For more detail on this, see Gorrie (2004) 61-72; (2001) 653-70. 
220 Dio (78.3.1-2) wrote that Caracalla silenced the soldiery by promising great things. Herodian (4.4.8) 
alleged that the soldiers knew the facts of Geta’s murder, but hailed Caracalla as sole emperor 
nonetheless, after being promised vast sums. The most intriguing account of this moment, however, 
comes from the Historia Augusta. In this source, the author claimed that the legion at Alba initially 
refused Caracalla entrance to their camp, declaring that they had sworn allegiance to both the sons of 
Severus. Like the other accounts, the emperor secured their loyalty, though only after promising them 
large sums of money. For more detail, see HA Car. 2.7-8; HA Geta. 6.1-2. 
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at large, since Geta was never the individual from whom Caracalla derived his dynastic 
legitimacy. As the eldest son of Septimius Severus and Julia Domna, Caracalla had 
been a Severan emperor since AD 198, and remained so in 212, regardless of his 
struggle with his younger brother. While it is true that Geta’s demise and the lack of 
an obvious heir made the question of the eventual succession acute, as the only 
surviving male descendent of Severus, Caracalla was the Severan dynasty.221 I would 
argue that it was never Caracalla’s intention to renounce his connection to the 
dynasty.222 Instead, I would concur with Kemezis that the emperor was compelled to 
present a re-envisioned account of recent history: ‘Instead of two brothers peacefully 
continuing a dynasty stretching back to Nerva and forward to the infinite future, there 
was a story of crisis and triumph, in which the true emperor is preserved by the gods 
from the forces of evil represented by his brother.’223 It is into this propagandistic 
revolution that the Antonine Constitution fits, signifying a redefinition of the 
relationship between the emperor and his subjects.  
 
Before considering the role of the legislation in this process, however, is it 
worth noting briefly the other ways in which Caracalla reinvented the Severan dynasty 
in the aftermath of Geta’s demise. The first of these is the act of damnatio memoriae 
ordered by the emperor on his dead brother.224 Dio claimed that Caracalla’s wrath was 
so extreme that he even ordered the defacement of any foundation stones which had 
supported Geta’s statues, further commanding that any coinage bearing his image was 
to be melted down.225 The author also alleged that the emperor engaged in ‘unholy 
rites’ by ordering offerings to be made to the manes of his brother, thereby condemning 
him to the underworld for eternity and preventing him from being deified.226 Even 
accounting for the hyperbolic nature of Dio’s text in criticising Caracalla, the surviving 
                                                 
221 Levick (2007) 92. 
222 If it were Caracalla’s intention to distance himself from the Severi, as Mennen has claimed, then it 
is odd that the emperor opted to retain elements of obvious continuity, such as his Antonine 
nomenclature, for example. Furthermore, it is worth noting that Caracalla maintained a close association 
with his mother from the period of Geta’s murder to his own demise. For more detail on the relationship 
between Caracalla and Julia Domna, see Levick (2007) 90-93; Saavedra-Guerrero (2007) 120-31. 
223 Kemezis (2014) 32. 
224 In the aftermath of the murder, Caracalla had Geta declared a public enemy, see Hdn 4.8; HA Car. 
1.1; Eutrop. 8.19. 
225 Dio 78.12.6. 
226 Dio 78.12.6. 
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material evidence suggests that the damnatio was carried out with an unparalleled 
intensity. Getan statuary was destroyed, defaced or removed from public view and 
placed in warehouses, presumably to be re-carved and recycled.227 The number of 
surviving inscriptions which make reference to Geta is also understandably miniscule. 
Of the 174 extant inscriptions on which his name appears, only 37 have survived 
intact.228 This remarkable rate of attrition is testament to the thorough nature of the 
process, leading Murphy to comment that ‘in few cases has an order to efface a man’s 
name from the monuments been so effectively carried out’.229 Not even coinage 
appears to have escaped Caracalla’s wrath. The survival of Getan coins demonstrates 
that the melting of coinage ordered by Caracalla was only partially successful, but a 
high number of numismatic remains found across the empire do display evidence of 
defacement and vandalism.230 Whether this act was the result of a desire to cleanse the 
empire publically of the evil that Geta had come to represent or, rather, a simple 
reflection of Caracalla’s utter hatred of his dead brother, the evidence suggests that the 
process was considered by the emperor to be an important element in consolidating his 
rule in the opening months of 212. 
 
 In addition to the destruction of Geta’s legacy, Caracalla’s own self-image 
underwent considerable change. One of the most visible elements of this phenomenon 
is the change in the emperor’s official portraiture. While images of Caracalla produced 
during his adolescence are marked by an Antonine influence, the result of Septimius 
Severus’ attempts to forge a connection between the dynasty and his own, Caracallan 
portraiture from 212 onwards is characterised by a cropped, militaristic hairstyle and 
furrowed brow line.231 Rather than simply accepting the spurious claim offered by the 
                                                 
227 Varner (2004) 170-73, 256. Only one full length statue thought to represent Geta survives intact, 
now in the Villa del Poggio Imperiale. Even this has sustained a considerable degree of damage to the 
facial area. 
228 Varner (2004) 182. 
229 Murphy (1945) 105. For more recent works on the damnatio and its unusual intensity, see Krüpe 
(2011) and De Jong (2007) 95-111. 
230 There are a number of examples from cities such as Ephesus, Pergamum and Stratonikeia where 
either Getan portraiture or titles (sometimes a combination of both) have been scraped or erased from 
the flan, the spaces subsequently countermarked in some cases. For more detail on this numismatic 
phenomenon, see Varner (2004) 171-72. 
231 Mennen (2006) 257-58. Dio (76.7.4) remarked that Severus styled himself as the son of Marcus 
Aurelius and the brother of Commodus. This is an element of Dio’s text that can be also observed in the 
epigraphic record, with Severus tracing his self-styled family line back to the emperor Nerva. For an 
example of this, see CIL VI 954, and Hekster (2012) 243-46. 
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ancient writers that the emperor’s visage changed and became more severe as his 
character grew more savage – since it seems a ridiculous assumption that an emperor 
would knowingly promote a public image of cruelty in his statuary – it has been 
proposed that Caracalla might have been attempting to tap into another artistic 
tradition.232 Leander Touati has identified that it is possible to compare the later 
Caracallan portraiture with military figures found on the Great Trajanic Frieze which 
display similarly tense and stark expressions in many cases. Far from savagery, 
Leander Touati has argued that these portraits (and the Caracallan style, by extension) 
are probably an attempt to convey the concept of virtus through the portrait medium.233 
Considering Caracalla’s popularity with the army, it is understandable that he would 
seek to emphasise such a quality about his imperial character.234 In a similar vein, 
Zanker has suggested that the furrowed brow, intimidating on first sight, might be 
explained by the emperor emphasising a personal quality of stoicism.235  
 
 How, then, does the Antonine Constitution fit into this programme of 
reinvention? As I stated at the opening of this chapter, I would argue that, if the text 
of the constitutio is examined closely, it is possible to identify three ways in which the 
edict functioned as a powerful vehicle of imperial propaganda, in which Caracalla’s 
version of his struggle with Geta is defined. Firstly, he emphasised his personal 
religious devotion and piety, publicising the idea of divine providence supporting his 
reign and promoting an image of the emperor and populace striving together for 
religious consensus.236 Secondly, he sought to depict himself as the most generous 
princeps to date in an attempt to distance himself further from the image of a fratricide. 
Thirdly, Caracalla attempted to secure his sole position of imperial power by creating 
a global patron-client relationship between him and his populace, an initiative which 
also served to prompt a reconsideration of Roman identity.237 It is noteworthy, then, 
that, if the text of the constitutio is considered, all of these key elements become 
                                                 
232 For the ancient accounts of Caracalla’s allegedly savage nature, see Dio 78.6.1a, 78.10.2; Hdn 4.3.3-
4; HA Car. 2.1-3, 9.3, 11.5. 
233 Leander Touati (1991) 117-31. 
234 This can also be observed in the emperor’s attempts to draw parallels between himself and Alexander 
the Great. For more on this phenomenon, see Chapter Two. 
235 Zanker (1996) 93-97, 267. 
236 Ando (2000) 131-76, 336-405. 
237 Kemezis (2014) 32. 
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visible. In essence, the edict allowed Caracalla to promote each of his three 
propagandistic strands simultaneously and on a massive scale. This chapter will now 
examine the three different aspects of the constitutio: the edict as a religious offering, 
as an example of imperial indulgentia and, finally, the way in which the constitutio 
can be interpreted as a social contract forming a patron-client bond between emperor 
and subjects.  
 
The constitutio Antoniniana as a Religious Offering  
 The emperors of the Severan dynasty are renowned for their individual piety, 
on the whole. Caracalla himself was often linked with the god Sarapis, for example, 
while the fondness of Elagabalus for eastern deities and cult is infamous.238 The 
opening lines of the constitutio Antoniniana and the tone found throughout the edict 
reveal that Caracalla was eager to publicise his legislation as a religious act. In the 
section of the text prefiguring the actual grant of civitas, the emperor outlined both the 
context of the constitutio and the motivation underlying it. He claimed that the edict 
represented an act of thanksgiving to the gods, a way in which the emperor thought he 
could display his gratitude to them for what he refers to as divine protection against a 
secretive conspiracy – implying that Geta had been preparing to murder him.239 He 
continued by declaring that an appropriate way to thank the gods was to bring more of 
his people into their temples as fully enfranchised Romans. Indeed the text of the edict 
reads:  
 
Αὐτοκράτωρ Καῖσαρ Μᾶρκος Αὐρήλιος Σεουῆρος Ἀντωνῖνος Εὐσεβὴς λέγει 
πάντως εἰς τὸ θεῖον χρὴ μᾶλλον ἀναφέρειν καὶ τὰς αἰτίας καὶ λογισμοὺς 
δικαίως δ’ἄν κἀγὼ τοῖς θεοῖς τοῖς ἀθανατοις εὐχαριστήσαιμι ὅτι τὴς τοιαύτης 
ἐπιβουλῆς γενομένης σῷον ἐμὲ συνετήρησαν τοιγαροῦν νομιζω οὕτω 
μεγαλοπρεπῶς καὶ εὐσεβῶς δύνασθαι τῇ μεγαλειότητι αὐτῶν το ἱκανὸν ποιεῖν, 
εἰ τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ὁσάκις ἐὰν ὑπεισέλθωσιν εἰς τοὺς ἐμοὺς ἀνθρώπους ὡς 
Ῥωμαίους εὶς τὰ ἱερὰ τῶν θεῶν συνεισενέγκοιμι.  
 
  
                                                 
238 For an example of Caracalla being referred to as philosarapis, see IGRR I 1063. On the religious 
practice of Elagabalus, see Arrizabalaga y Prado (2010) 165-82. 
239 Herodian (4.5.3-4) claimed that, in the course of his speech to the senate following Geta’s murder, 
the emperor revealed a Getan plot to poison Caracalla which had been foiled. 
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The Emperor Caesar Marcus Aurelius Severus Antoninus Pius decrees: It is 
altogether necessary to attribute the causes and reasons [of recent events] to the 
divine. I, personally, would rightly thank the immortal gods, since although 
such a conspiracy [as that of Geta] has occurred, they have watched over me 
and protected me. I think that I am able, both magnificently and piously, to do 
something fitting to the gods’ majesty, if I manage to bring [all] those in the 
empire, who constitute my people, to the temples of the gods as Romans.240 
 
 It seems incontrovertible, then, that the primary public motivation for the 
Antonine Constitution was a religiously inspired one. We should note, however, that 
the 212 edict was not the only way in which Caracalla can be observed engaging in 
religious devotion. In fact, the emperor seems to have been eager to associate himself 
with a number of gods throughout his sole reign. This aspect of Caracalla’s rule from 
212-17 will be considered with specific attention to his imperial coinage, since there 
is a wealth of iconographic evidence to be found in the numismatic corpus. It is likely, 
furthermore, that the emperor was concerned with the matter of consensus in state 
religion as described by Ando.241 The evidence suggests that there is more to 
Caracalla’s concept and presentation of religious belief than simply devotion, and that 
these elements of the emperor’s reign, including the tone of the constitutio, are better 
explained as part of the wider process of his refashioning the Severan dynasty and 
focusing it around himself from the outset of AD 212.  
 
A cursory examination of the numismatic evidence for Caracalla’s reign 
reveals the importance of the Roman religious pantheon to the period of his sole rule. 
In her analysis of Caracalla’s imperial coinage for 212-17, Manders has shown that 
themes promoting ‘divine association’, that is to say any themes connecting the 
emperor with the gods/divine or presenting him as sacerdos, form the largest 
iconographic group, some 66.9% of all imperial coin types struck.242 On one level, 
these coins might be seen as an extension of the religious thanksgiving that Caracalla 
proclaimed in the text of the constitutio. This hypothesis is supported when it is noted 
that providentia is a prominent theme in the imperial output of this period, usually 
                                                 
240 P. Giss. 40 I, ll. 1-7. 
241 Ando (2000) 73-276. The issue of consensus will be considered later in this chapter. 
242 Manders (2012) 232. Similarly, Rowan (2012: 112) has used hoard evidence to conclude that 
depictions of gods represented 59% of the total found. 
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carrying the legend PROVIDENTIAE DEORVM and depicting a personification of 
Providentia.243 Indeed, these coin types further support the theory that Caracalla 
publically promoted the notion that he had been saved from his brother’s machinations 
and thus that his sole rule was divinely sanctioned.  
 
More generally, it has been noted that, in the 212-17 period, Caracalla’s 
numismatic iconography is dominated by a ‘striking collection’ of gods, including 
Apollo, Diana, Isis, Pluto, Sarapis, Venus and Vesta.244 The number of healing deities 
included in his imperial and provincial coinage, such as Apollo, Aesculapius and 
Sarapis, has led to questions regarding how far we should accept Dio’s statement that 
the emperor was ill of mind and body.245 Considering the prominence of religious 
iconography during this period, it is unsurprising that there have been attempts in the 
past to identify a reference to the constitutio Antoniniana within this body of evidence. 
Euzennat has attempted to link the edict with Caracalla’s probable visit to the oracle 
of Apollo at Claros, for example.246 As Rowan has rightly argued, however, there is 
no evidence to support such a connection in the text of the edict; if the oracle of Apollo 
at Claros was a major influence on Caracalla and the constitutio, then we would expect 
there to be at least a passing mention of it in the body of the text.247 Furthermore, this 
hypothesis would rest on the constitutio being passed during Caracalla’s Germanic 
campaigns, a factor which does not fit with the 212 dating of the edict.248 
 
Another theory connects the constitutio with Pluto coin types struck during 
Caracalla’s sole reign. This hypothesis has more traction since it is noteworthy that 
Pluto reverses were extraordinary for this period and only appear on coins during 
                                                 
243 RIC 227; 309a-b; 511a-d; 514; 519; 535; 527a-b; 575a-576. Also see Manders (2012) 241, who lists 
these examples in connection with Caracalla’s coin types promoting ‘divine association’. For more on 
the attributes of Providentia, a virtue associated with the wellbeing of the populace but also, importantly, 
forming a guarantor of smooth imperial succession, see Noreña (2011) 92-99. 
244 For more detail, with examples of each of these types, see Manders (2012) 233-35. 
245 Dio 78.15.3. While it is impossible to disprove that Caracalla suffered from a number of ailments, I 
would argue that Rowan (2012: 113-31) is correct to suggest that there may be a more mundane reason 
behind the appearance of these deities, in that the emperor might simply have chosen to honour the local 
cults of the cities that he visited. Indeed, Pergamum was renowned for its Asclepieion, and Claros and 
Grannus are thought to have had healing sanctuaries to Apollo, to give two examples. 
246 Euzennat (1976) 68. 
247 Rowan (2012) 127. 
248 Barnes (2012) 51-52. 
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Caracalla’s sole reign.249 Manders has suggested that the sudden appearance of this 
deity on Roman coins from 212 might therefore make reference to the constitutio, 
using the agricultural element of the deity to promote a positive consequence of the 
edict in the form of an increased corn dole from Egypt resulting from the increased tax 
yield from the province.250 She has argued that this connection seems more likely when 
it is also noted that Sarapis also appeared in his own right as a deity on Roman coinage 
from 212.251 While this combination of evidence appears circumstantially persuasive, 
the fact remains that this would represent an incredibly subtle iconographic allusion to 
the edict, dependent on the intended audience understanding a new coin type (which 
contained no specific reference to the constitutio) and a rather precise connection to 
the Egyptian corn supply. Even if we accept that coin types were generally intelligible 
among ancient consumers, this hypothesis seems unconvincing.252   
 
 Rather than attempting to identify vague references among the specifics of 
Caracalla’s considerable religious output, Ando has argued that the constitutio fits 
better into a wider social and religious system in which the consensus of the populace 
was crucial.253 He argues that the Romans understood that divine favour was primarily 
achieved by the ‘universal piety’ of the populace, noting that when referring to 
religious matters, certain sources appear to adopt quasi-medical terminology ‘to 
express the “infection” of the Roman body politic by some foreign “poison”.’254 It is 
in this context, then, that Ando believes the constitutio should be interpreted, as an 
attempt to achieve a powerful consensus universorum and secure the lasting favour of 
the gods:  
 
Wishing to lead the people of the empire in a unanimous display of consensual 
piety, and believing that the populus of the empire was most properly 
constituted by its citizen body, Caracalla granted citizenship to all its residents. 
In other words, the consensus of the empire’s population would speak more 
loudly if all were citizens.255  
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This explanation seems to be the strongest in relation to the religious aims of 
Caracalla in promulgating the constitutio Antoniniana, but more needs to be said here. 
The emperor’s attempt to achieve a nearly universal consensus across the empire can 
be seen to form a component part of the Caracallan worldview promoted following the 
murder of Geta, a more dangerous one in which the emperor was challenged to triumph 
over adversity with divine assistance; the participation of his new citizens in securing 
heavenly favour was therefore essential.256 By invoking the gods, and referring to his 
survival and continued prosperity as a matter of divine providence, Caracalla had 
utilised the Antonine Constitution and associated media to provide himself with a solid 
ideological foundation on which to legitimise his position. 
 
 It is important to note, however, that this was not the only way in which 
Caracalla characterised the transition from the shared principate to his sole rule. 
Returning to the emperor’s numismatic output from 212 to 217, another feature that 
becomes apparent is the revolution in the different virtues that were emphasised in this 
period compared to that which preceded it. It is hardly surprising to discover that there 
is a decline in coin types promoting traditionally dynastic themes, ‘golden age’ types 
or that of aeternitas, for example.257 Of the types that fill this iconographic vacuum, 
the appearance of securitas and libertas are of particular note. Manders has depicted 
the emergence of the former as the successor to the aeternitas type, since the coins in 
question proclaim securitas perpetua.258 Even more illuminating is the sudden, and 
short-lived, appearance of libertas in the coinage of 213. It is not difficult to envisage 
this iconography being struck in reference to the murder of Geta, though I would argue 
that the time delay between the murder and the circulation of this type makes it more 
likely that these coins were struck in support of the constitutio Antoniniana, in which 
Caracalla made reference to a conspiracy against him.259 In either case, the appearance 
                                                 
256 Kemezis (2014) 32. 
257 Manders (2012) 247. The primary aeternitas type struck during the period 198-210 was that of 
Concordia aeterna, which would clearly be of limited value to Caracalla in the context of Geta’s murder. 
For more on this, see Manders (2012) 248. 
258 Manders (2012) 248. For examples of these coins, see RIC 309a; 536a-b, and 573 a-b. There are 
further examples which can only be dated 210-13 but, given this context, it seems more likely that they 
also derive from the beginning of 212 onwards. See RIC 229a-b; 512a-d; 515 and 520. 
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of libertas in this period following Geta’s demise might serve to depict the youngest 
son of Severus as a tyrannical conspirator against a legitimate emperor. With this in 
mind, it would seem that Rowan is correct to identify a new ‘ideology of power’ being 
emphasised in the opening period of Caracalla’s sole rule, a phenomenon which itself 
fits well with the idea that the emperor offered a re-envisaged version of recent history 
to consolidate his position.260  
 
Caracalla as the indulgentissimus princeps  
Another important component of this iconographic revolution is the emperor’s 
continued emphasis of his personal generosity (indulgentia). The promotion of 
indulgentia as an imperial quality was not unique to Caracalla. In fact, it appeared at 
many different points during the Principate, especially from the reign of Trajan 
onwards, forming one marker of a ‘good emperor’ and containing a paternalistic 
quality which reflected the princeps protecting and looking after his people.261 The 
virtue appears during the reign of Septimius Severus, struck on precious and base metal 
coinage, primarily with reference to the generosity shown by the emperor towards 
Carthage and Italy.262 With the change from shared rule to Caracalla’s sole reign, we 
can observe a significant increase in the number of coins struck bearing a 
representation of indulgentia. If coin types depicting personified virtues are examined 
in more detail, it becomes clear that Caracalla struck more than double the number of 
indulgentia types than his closest predecessor, devoting close to thirty percent of all 
such coins to the deity.263 Schmidt-Dick also noted this thematic concentration under 
Caracalla, identifying 214 varieties of denarii bearing the legend INDVLG 
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261 Buraselis (2007) 79-80, see also Noreña (2011) 276. 
262 Severus struck large numbers of coins bearing the reverse legend INDVLGENTIA AVGG IN CARTH, 
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FECVNDAE, with another 300 carrying the more general INDVLGENTIAE AVG.264 
An examination of the later Severan emperors’ coinage reveals that, while they contain 
a number of references to similar virtues, such as liberalitas, the number of indulgentia 
reverses is so meagre as to be arguably insignificant.265 This suggests, rather than 
forming a natural evolution in numismatic iconography prompted by a general increase 
in the importance of indulgentia to the Roman state, that the virtue of generosity was 
a singularly important one to Caracalla’s image of his new principate.  
 
A similar trend can also be found in the epigraphic corpus. In addition to an 
increase in the official use of the virtue through the numismatic medium, the period 
212-217 also represents a high-point for unofficial and dedicatory inscriptions 
associating indulgentia with Caracalla personally, referring to the emperor as 
indulgentissimus.266 In this matter, I concur with Noreña that the upsurge in 
inscriptions of this nature being produced is probably reflective of a public which is 
knowledgeable of, and sensitive to, the Caracallan regime’s official iconographic 
emphases.267 These inscriptions can be found in areas across the empire, both in Rome 
and in the provinces.268 In further support that this was an important ideological link 
between the emperor and the virtue, it should be noted that references to Caracalla’s 
indulgentia were made even in inscriptions not directly dedicated to him. Julia Domna 
                                                 
264 Schmidt-Dick (2002) 61-62. These types are in addition to the Carthage type described above which 
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displayed towards Carthage. 
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meaning that they were struck before Alexander Severus even ascended to the imperial throne. The final 
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before they had received any new directive from the new emperor. For more on the association between 
Spes and Indulgentia, see Buraselis (2007) 81. 
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reigns of Elagabalus and Alexander Severus. For inscriptions under Elagabalus, see CIL III 6900, VI 
1082, VIII 10304 and 10308; for those under Alexander Severus, see CIL III 8359 and VIII 8781. 
Similar to the numismatic material, however, these inscriptions would appear to fit better with later 
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with Alexander the Great iconography. For more detail, see Buraselis (2007) 82-83. 
268 For examples in Rome, see CIL VI 1065-67; for Cosa, see CIL XI 2633; for Narbonese Gaul, see 
CIL XII 1851; for North Africa, see CIL VIII 7000, 7094-98, 21828, and IRT 429. 
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was hailed as the ‘mother of the most generous emperor’ in an inscription from 
Germania Superior, for example.269   
 
It is worth stressing here that, similar to the numismatic evidence, this 
explosion in indulgentia iconography between 212 and 217 is unlikely to have been 
the result of a natural increase in the deity’s status, or simple coincidence.270 It is far 
more likely that this virtue was of considerable importance to Caracalla in relation to 
the image that he wanted to construct of his sole principate.271 With this in mind, it is 
furthermore important to note that on numerous inscriptions where the emperor is 
hailed as indulgentissimus, the epithet often appears on reworked sections of stone 
which had borne the name and titulature of Geta, prior to damnatio memoriae being 
carried out.272 The localised nature of this evidence (these inscriptions all derive from 
Numidia and North Africa) means that it might be a coincidence of the surviving 
evidence. It is interesting to note, nonetheless, that in a variety of cases, the emperor’s 
indulgentia actively overwrites the memory of his murdered brother and thus 
contributes to the process of damnatio employed by Caracalla in the wider process of 
refashioning his principate.273 
 
How can this important theme, then, be linked to the constitutio Antoniniana? 
The role of the edict as an example of imperial indulgentia is not so much in the precise 
wording of its text, as was the case regarding its religious significance, rather in its 
scale and effects. As the imperial period progressed, there does appear to have been an 
increasing link between imperial indulgentia and the bestowal of Roman citizenship. 
In his letter to Trajan requesting civitas for Harpocras, for example, Pliny the Younger 
claimed that he could not properly reward his medical therapist without the emperor’s 
generosity.274 The underlying association here between indulgentia and citizenship is 
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arguably more significant than the act itself in the Trajanic case. The fact that there 
was such a connection between enfranchisement and indulgentia has led Noreña to 
argue that promoting indulgentia would have been the logical choice for Caracalla 
when publicising the edict of 212: ‘The frequent association of this term … with 
imperial grants of citizenship in particular suggests that indulgentia would have been 
the most appropriate imperial virtue through which to communicate and publicise the 
grant of universal citizenship.’275 
 
 In effect, even if the constitutio was not wholly motivated by a sense of 
euergetistic generosity on the part of Caracalla, the emperor emphasised the image of 
his personal generosity and publically associated it with his act of mass 
enfranchisement.276 The extensive promotion of the emperor’s indulgentia served as 
an indirect or symbolic reference to the edict, a ‘systematic effort by the regime to 
communicate the emperor’s spectacular generosity in granting citizenship to all free 
inhabitants of the empire – an effort, that is, to attach a specific meaning to the edict 
that announced this extraordinary decision, and then to disseminate that meaning as 
broadly as possible.’277 We must exercise caution, however, not to view the Antonine 
Constitution solely in terms only of publicising a religious or euergetistic agenda on 
the part of the emperor. I would argue that the connection forged between Caracalla 
and his citizens through the constitutio Antoniniana was, in fact, something altogether 
more binding. 
 
The constitutio Antoniniana as a Social Contract  
 The literary evidence for the aftermath of Geta’s murder suggests that support 
for Caracalla’s new regime was polarised between the army, who had been won over 
by the promise of massive donatives, and the more hesitant senate.278 It is against this 
backdrop that we must view the emperor’s attempt to engage with the wider populace 
through the Antonine Constitution. It has been argued recently that the edict 
functioned, at least partly, as a redefinition of Roman identity, inasmuch as the vast 
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majority of the populace would owe their franchise to the emperor and would therefore 
play a tacit role in accepting the version of events offered by Caracalla, namely that 
the legislation was a response to the treachery of Geta.279 While I concur that the 
constitutio did, in one sense, compel the populace to become active participants in the 
emperor’s revised history, I also consider it plausible that Caracalla was determined to 
secure a more tangible form of loyalty from the citizenry by extending the franchise. 
With this in mind, I would argue that it is appropriate to view the Antonine 
Constitution as an act of patronage on an imperial scale, a piece of legislation designed 
to establish a personal link and relationship between the emperor and every one of his 
new citizens.  
 
The system of patronage found during the Principate remained relatively 
unchanged from that of the Republic, with three fundamental elements: that there must 
be a reciprocal exchange of goods or services, there must be some degree of personal 
contact to distinguish the arrangement from a standard business contract, and the 
parties in the relationship must be of different social backgrounds.280  One obvious 
change, however, was the role of the emperor as a patron.  The princeps was seen as 
‘the supreme benefactor, whose gifts were intended as a display of regal splendour and 
generosity, and also as a ‘super patron’ whose subjects lived under his protection and 
looked to him for benefactions.’281 Under the Principate, therefore, the role of the 
emperor in bestowing civic patronage became increasingly important.282  
 
In this context, the gift of citizenship was a special grant inasmuch as it 
bestowed honour upon both parties in the arrangement, the patron as much as the 
newly enfranchised protégé. A mass act of enfranchisement and social promotion such 
as the constitutio Antoniniana might, then, be said to form a logical endpoint in this 
area of imperial benefaction. On initial examination, this association might appear 
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irreconcilable with Saller’s specification that the relation between the patron and client 
ought to be a personal one, that is to say based upon ‘particularistic rather than 
universalistic criteria’, but it is important to remember that while the constitutio might 
form the end of an evolutionary process in patronage, as with the gradual expansion of 
the franchise, it was nevertheless a revolutionary action.283  It cannot be expected, 
therefore, that the Antonine Constitution would conform to all of the strictest of 
modern parameters of imperial benefaction.  In fact, I would argue that it is wholly 
appropriate to discuss the edict in terms relevant to Roman patronage and thus to view 
the constitutio as an example of an imperial beneficium, a term which Seneca defined 
as a grant which someone gives when there is no legal compulsion for them to do so.284 
The bestowal of a beneficium might be considered as an example of Caracalla’s 
indulgentia, but it must be noted that, in the context of patronage, it can also be viewed 
as part of a reciprocal exchange relationship, or an arrangement in which there was at 
least an expectation of some reciprocity.285 
 
 If the edict is studied closely, I would argue that there are two potential ways 
in which Caracalla expected some form of return benefit to be derived from the citizen 
body. The first of these appears to be a very practical one concerning tax revenue. 
Although severely damaged, the final lines of the Giessen text can be restored to make 
reference to tax obligations on the part of the newly enfranchised:  
 
Ἂπο δὲ τῶν προσόδων τῶν νῦν ὑπερχουσῶν συντελούντων, ἅπερ ἐκελεύσθη 
παρὰ Ῥωμαίων ἀπὸ τοῦ κα ἔτους, ὡς δίκαιον ἐκ τῶν διαταγμάτων καὶ 
ἐπιστολῶν, ἅ ἐξεδόθη ὑφ’ ἡμῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων προγόνων   Προετέθη… 
 
Referring to the taxes that exist at present, all are due to pay those that have 
been imposed upon the Romans from the beginning of their twenty-first year 
[of age], as it is the law, according to the edicts and rescripts issued by us and 
our ancestors.  Displayed publically…286 
 
                                                 
283 For the notion of the particularistic nature of patronage based upon a pre-existing personal 
connection, see Saller (1982) 1, 32-33. 
284 Sen. De. Ben. 3.19.1: beneficium enim id est quod quis dedit, cum illi liceret et non dare. 
285 Saller (1982) 19-20. 
286 P. Giss. 40 I, ll. 14-17. For more on the difficult nature of the Giessen text, see Chapter One and 
Appendix I. The fiscal importance of the constitutio will be considered further in Chapter Four. 
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 Examination of the constitutio Antoniniana can thus reveal at least one way in 
which Caracalla expected his great beneficium to be repaid. In return for being 
inducted into the citizen body, the emperor ordered that the newly enfranchised would 
be immediately liable to pay the taxes traditionally levied against the citizenry.287 The 
question of finances aside, however, I would argue that there was an even more 
fundamental expectation that accompanied the extension of civitas, one of personal 
loyalty and support. From the time of the late Republic and throughout the Principate, 
beneficia appear to have carried an expectation of goodwill towards the patron, an 
obligation which carried no legal compulsion but was nevertheless treated seriously.288 
For example, Velleius Paterculus recorded that during the civil war between Antony 
and Octavian, Asinius Pollio refused to join the latter’s cause on the basis that he had 
previously been the recipient of beneficia from Antony.289 Later, in the opening lines 
of the Histories, Tacitus emphasised his ability to write objectively regarding Galba, 
Otho and Vitellius because he had received neither beneficia nor iniuria from them.290 
Admittedly these examples are focused on favours and contracts between members of 
the elite classes but if the basic premise is accepted that the emperor was looked to by 
his subjects as a supreme patron and that ‘Emperor and subject alike believed that 
imperial beneficium, like any other, created a debt which could be repaid in gratitude 
and in more concrete forms’, then the importance of the constitutio Antoniniana to 
Caracalla’s consolidation of power in the aftermath of Geta’s murder adopts an even 
greater significance.291 By extending the franchise in the first half of AD 212, the 
emperor initiated a personal tie of loyalty between himself and millions of subjects at 
the very moment when his rule must have seemed at its most precarious.  
 
In summary then, Caracalla’s position as sole ruler was potentially 
compromised at the outset of AD 212, owing to his act of fratricide and the subsequent 
damnatio memoriae of a reputedly popular figure from within the imperial household. 
The constitutio Antoniniana therefore represented a perfect way in which to secure the 
                                                 
287 This is a factor which lends some credence to the argument of an economic rationale underlying the 
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288 Saller (1982) 19. 
289 Vell. Pater. 2.86.3. 
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favour of a vast number of individuals across the entire empire.  The grant of 
citizenship should not be seen as a superficial attempt by the emperor to divert 
attention away from his dead brother, but rather as something more binding. Caracalla 
attempted to secure the favour and loyalty of his hitherto peregrine subjects through a 
reciprocal contract in which, in return for taxation and goodwill, the emperor 
guaranteed them access to the framework of the Roman legal system.  With his pre-
existing popularity with the military and this new unspoken debt of gratitude among 
the majority of his people, Caracalla’s position would have been strengthened and his 
uneasy relations with the ordo senatorius would have presented less of an obstacle to 
his sole reign than might otherwise be the case.  
 
This chapter has shown how the constitutio Antoniniana worked as a powerful 
tool of propaganda through which Caracalla was able to stabilise his position following 
the murder of Geta by entirely re-envisaging the Severan dynasty around his own 
person and, furthermore, presenting an official version of the events which led to the 
act of fratricide. In this sense, the Antonine Constitution can be observed to function 
on simultaneously ideological and practical levels, carrying religious significance but 
designed to address a political requirement. One area that is yet to be explored in this 
thesis, however, relates to the only surviving explanation of the legislation in the 
ancient literary evidence. In the next chapter, then, I will examine the claim by Dio 
that the constitutio was triggered by Caracallan avarice, and that the franchise was 
extended solely to expand the emperor’s tax base in an attempt to seize every coin he 






The Economic Purpose of the constitutio Antoniniana 
 
 The evidence presented so far clearly supports the hypothesis that Caracalla’s 
rationale for introducing the Antonine Constitution was the result of combination of 
both ideological and practical considerations, none of which need be mutually 
exclusive. What links each of these is that they can be viewed as part of a deliberate 
agenda of propaganda designed to promote and legitimise Caracalla’s position as the 
sole emperor in AD 212. There is, however, a further potential rationale that must be 
considered, namely the fiscal explanation of the edict offered by Cassius Dio. In the 
midst of criticising Caracalla’s economic schemes, the senator remarked that the 
constitutio was a false honour, actually impoverishing the populace in an attempt to 
fund extravagant spending upon imperial favourites and the soldiery: 
 
Οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ Ῥωμαίους πάντας τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ αὐτοῦ, λόγῳ μὲν τιμῶν, ἔργῳ 
δὲ ὅπως πλείω αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου προσίῃ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ξένους τὰ πολλὰ 
αὐτῶν μὴ συντελεῖν, ἀπέδειξεν.  
 
This was the reason why he made everyone in his realm Romans, he was 
ostensibly honouring them, but his real purpose was to increase his revenues 
by this means, since peregrines were not required to pay the majority of these 
taxes.292 
 
As I noted in the first chapter, Dio’s financial explanation of the constitutio 
Antoniniana is the only rationale for the legislation offered by any of the contemporary 
sources.293 Despite such explicit testimony from a figure within the imperial court, 
however, the senator’s description of the edict has been largely rejected. Some remain 
convinced that fiscal concerns played a secondary or negligible role in moving the 
emperor to extend the franchise, and that Dio’s account reflects the author’s hatred of 
Caracalla more than the economic reality.294 Nevertheless, to dismiss the rationale 
offered by Dio on the basis of his animosity is to ignore other extant evidence relating 
to the Caracallan economy that we possess. In fact, if Dio’s account of the constitutio 
Antoniniana is set against a wider economic context, then it becomes possible to argue 
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that, while the senator’s rhetoric is clearly designed to denigrate the character of 
Caracalla, he was at least partly correct to conclude that the emperor was driven to 
introduce his legislation to augment the level of capital available to the fiscus. 
 
In this chapter, then, I will assess the fiscal account offered by Dio against a 
wider economic backdrop, combining the testimony of the literary sources with 
numismatic evidence relating to the quality of Caracallan coinage, and papyrological 
sources regarding the imposition of the tax on inheritances (vicesima hereditatum), 
one of the levies which Dio alleged was doubled by Caracalla, early in his sole reign. 
By examining this collection of sources, it is possible to observe that the emperor was, 
in fact, engaged in a process of manipulating the Roman monetary economy, and that 
he was concerned with rapidly increasing the physical stock of coinage across the 
empire. Given this environment, I will argue that it is appropriate to discuss the 
Antonine Constitution as form of monetary stimulus, though the rationale for such an 
initiative will also need to be considered further.  
 
 In approaching the constitutio from this economic perspective, we should be 
aware of the difficulties in studying ancient economic history, and must be careful not 
to present an image of the Roman economy under Caracalla that is devoid of context. 
This is especially important given the hostile nature of the surviving literary record of 
the period, in which our sources are consistent in accusing the emperor of excessive 
spending and financial profligacy.295 Similar to Roman law, the economy of the 
Principate presents us with a fluid entity, one that fluctuated as it developed. Before 
examining the situation under Caracalla specifically, then, it is necessary to consider 
briefly the development of the Roman economy from the early imperial period 
onwards. By setting Caracalla’s edict and other actions against the longer term 
economic picture, we are able to assess the emperor’s purpose (and that of the 
constitutio, by implication) more objectively.  
 
  
                                                 
295 The image of the Caracallan economy is considered in more detail, later in this chapter. 
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Early Imperial Economic Activity  
 Far from the apparently desperate financial situation facing Caracalla’s regime, 
the first century of the Empire is characterised by a number of elements which infer 
that there was both stability and growth.296 This appears to have been caused to a large 
extent by a contemporaneous growth in population, a development which created 
increased demand across the market.297 Such exigency is also shown by the nature of 
slave prices, indicating a high demand for servile labour.298 In addition, silver 
production appears to have peaked in the first century AD, at one stage rivalling 
production levels only later achieved in medieval Europe.299 Furthermore, in the area 
of seaborne commerce, high numbers of shipwrecks dating to this period suggest an 
increased level of trade across the Mediterranean basin.300  
 
 Finally, whilst the early economy was most likely a subsistence one, the 
evidence suggests that the inhabitants of Italy enjoyed a higher standard of living 
during this period than in previous decades.301 This has been hypothesised partly from 
a sharp increase in the incidence of animal bone finds across settlement sites both in 
Italy and in the provinces, as well as human osteological remains suggesting an 
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Jongman (2007b) 183-99. Despite this, however, the idea of a longue durée persists. For a more general, 




increased level of physiological health.302 The nature of the evidence means that it is 
only possible to theorise in fairly broad strokes, but the combination of these different 
sources does provide at least a general impression of economic development in the 
early imperial period.  
 
 The relative growth and productivity of the early Empire obviously presents a 
contrast to the reign of Caracalla, in which our authors complain about the exhaustion 
of the treasury, but it is clear that such a period of expansion could not be maintained 
indefinitely. In fact, if we continue this examination from this early period into that of 
the High Empire, there are undeniable symptoms of economic downturn and, as the 
Antonine era progressed, potentially even crisis. It is therefore imperative that the 
period from the arrival of the Flavians to the ascendancy of the Severans is considered, 
since it provides important contextual information in explaining and better 
understanding the later actions undertaken by Septimius Severus and Caracalla.  
 
Decline and Crisis in the High Empire  
 Despite the carnage wrought by the Year of the Four Emperors, through a 
combination of booty seized in the conflict, victory in the Jewish War and increased 
taxation, the beginning of the Flavian dynasty was marked by large-scale building 
projects spearheaded by Vespasian.303 Such increased public spending was to continue 
under Domitian, who raised the army wage in addition to funding his own building 
projects.304 The Domitianic initiatives, however, appear to have been far from popular 
                                                 
302 Scheidel (2008a) 37-40. For more on animal bone finds, see Jongman (2007a) 613-14; Kron (2002) 
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among the propertied classes.305 In contrast to Domitian’s alleged profligacy, the reign 
of Trajan stands out in this period as one in which the evidence suggests a genuine 
degree of economic vitality, in the form of building projects (his forum, for example), 
and the expansion of the alimenta.306 Similar to the case of Vespasian, the influx of 
war spoils and booty from Trajan’s Dacian campaign must also be factored into the 
equation.307  
 
 It was during the reign of Hadrian, however, that signs of economic downturn 
began to appear in earnest. That the imperial economy was in a relatively precarious 
state by the middle of the second century AD is attested by evidence suggesting that 
the emperor was compelled to legislate in order to prevent economic instability in the 
provinces and to preserve liquidity. This can be observed, for example, in Hadrian’s 
lex Hadriana de rudibus agris, designed to encourage agricultural expansion, 
particularly in North Africa.308 The best known of these initiatives, however, is his 
moratorium on taxation in Egypt in AD 136.309 While on one level this might appear 
to represent a great act of benevolence, the fact that it was prompted by the populace’s 
inability to pay the annual levy remains irrefutable.310 Moratoria were not an 
uncommon recourse in response to fiscal instability, but this ultimately suggests that 
Hadrian was required to forego the tax yield of the empire’s most productive province 
in order to prevent its economic collapse during his reign.311 
 
Despite these measures, however, the numismatic evidence suggests that 
Hadrian’s reign was more damaging than profitable. It is under his immediate 
successor, Antoninus Pius, that the first significant deterioration in silver coinage (the 
                                                 
305 The building programme is described by Dio (67.4.5-6) and also by Suetonius (Dom. 12.1), who 
criticised the emperor for resorting to ‘every type of robbery’ in his attempt to raise capital: nihil pensi 
habuit quin praedaretur omni modo. 
306 The alimenta is mentioned both by Dio (68.5.4) and the author of the HA (Hadr. 7.8). For more on 
the scheme, thought to have been originally instituted under Nerva, see Carlsen (1999) 273-88; Woolf 
(1990) 197-228; Garnsey (1968) 367-81; Duncan-Jones (1964) 123-46. 
307 For an account of Trajan’s campaigns, see Dio 68.8.1-14.5 (Dacia) and 68.17.1-33.3 (eastern 
provinces). 
308 CIL VIII 25943. Also see De Vos (2013) 146-50; Kehoe (2006) 58-61. 
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311 Hitchner (2009) 285-86, 286 n.7. Caracalla is also known to have similarly absolved the province of 
Mauretania Tingitana from taxation in AD 216, a measure considered later in this chapter. 
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primary trading coin of the empire) occurs, dropping from a 90.5% median fineness at 
the end of Hadrian’s reign to 86.5% by the end of Pius’.312 Although it is unlikely that 
this degradation prompted any fiduciary change in real terms, the fact remains that this 
process can hardly be interpreted as a sign of a vibrant economy.313 The situation was 
undoubtedly exacerbated by the considerable expenditure devoted to Hadrian’s 
imperial tour, not to mention the traditional gifts distributed upon the emperor’s 
accession. Dio, for example, claimed that he bestowed favour on nearly every city that 
he visited, devoting specific attention to the largesse and corn dole awarded to 
Athens.314 Similar acts of Hadrianic euergetism can be found throughout the emperor’s 
biography in the Historia Augusta, though with little accompanying detail.315  
 
While it is likely that the literary sources exaggerated his generosity, other 
extant evidence suggests that Hadrian did, in fact, dramatically increase imperial 
public spending, with the level of congiaria nearly doubling from the level observed 
under Trajan.316 This increase in public benefaction might seem relatively 
inconsequential against the wider backdrop of the High Empire, but it is important to 
consider that, in addition to the difficulties noted above, Hadrian faced a significantly 
different situation from predecessors such as Vespasian or Trajan, inasmuch as he 
could not rely on imperial revenues being augmented through a process of expansion. 
As a consequence, even a reduced level of public spending would likely have 
represented a considerable drain on the imperial coffers, let alone the increased 
expenditure associated with Hadrian’s reign.317 This trend, though considerably earlier 
                                                 
312 Duncan-Jones (1994) 231, Tables 15.7-8. 
313 For a larger analysis of silver coinage during this period, see Walker (1977). It should be noted, 
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and, therefore, might contain a margin of error of around ten percent, see Gitler and Ponting (2007) 377. 
It is worth noting that the later, and more significant, debasement undertaken by Septimius Severus does 
not appear to have upset the fiduciary relationship between coin types (see below). It is therefore 
unlikely that the initiative undertaken by Pius had such an effect. 
314 Dio 69.5.3; 69.16.2. 
315 The author mentions the gifts to Athens (Hadr. 13.6), but goes on to specify further awards to 
Campania (9.6), Gaul (10.1), Spain (12.3) and North Africa (13.4). 
316 Duncan-Jones (1994) 13, 41 (Table 3.6) has collated papyrological evidence attesting to such an 
increase. For an example of such a beneficence, see IGRR IV 1431. 
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than Caracalla’s reign, remains noteworthy. While the general image of the High 
Empire period is one of expansion, stability and prosperity, the evidence demonstrates 
that the economy remained potentially volatile, with problems appearing even at the 
zenith of the Principate. 
 
 Another factor which must be considered before assessing the Severan 
economy and the role of the constitutio therein is the severe decline observed during 
the Antonine era. The accession of Marcus Aurelius was a costly affair, with Dio 
claiming that the new emperor distributed gifts of 20,000 sestertii per person to the 
soldiery and men of the praetorian guard.318 His extended Germanic campaigns also 
served to deplete the imperial treasury.319 In addition, there is a suggestion that further 
economic damage may have been wrought by flooding of the Tiber occurring in AD 
162, disrupting agricultural production and infrastructure in the fertile Italian 
peninsula.320 More significant still was the Antonine Plague which, according to extant 
contemporary sources, caused utter devastation to the imperial state.321 It is important 
to include the Antonine Plague in any consideration of the economic recession of this 
period, since the sudden reduction in the population caused by the disease would have 
                                                 
(Pius. 7.11). While evidence from the HA is far from ideal, it makes sense that in the aftermath of the 
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321 Ael. Ar. Or. 48.38-44; Galen 19.17-18 (Kühn) recorded the flight of the emperors from Aquileia 
when the disease struck the Roman forces stationed there. For later sources on the pestilence, see Amm. 
Marc. 23.6.24; Eutrop. 8.12.2; Jerome 206 (Helm); Lucian, Alex. 36 and Oros. 7.15.5-7, 27.7. The 
outbreak of the plague is given a predictably fanciful treatment by the author of the HA, who claimed 
that the disease was released from a mysterious golden casket by Roman forces in the east, and thus 
unleashed on the entire world, see HA Ver. 8.1-2.  
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had a lasting effect on basic levels of economic activity such as production and revenue 
sourced through taxation. In order to assess its economic impact, however, it is first 
necessary to consider how severe the pestilence actually was.  
 
 The scale of the epidemic is still a matter of debate.322 It was previously 
believed, for example, that the disease represented a watershed moment in Roman 
history.323 More recently, however, there have been attempts to offer a more 
conservative image of the epidemic.324 Among these extreme positions, it is most 
likely that Littman and Littman are correct in their assessment of a mortality rate 
between seven and ten percent.325 This figure rests more comfortably with the sense 
of localised devastation observed in the non-literary evidence, noted below, while not 
inferring the cataclysmic scenario envisaged by earlier scholars.  
 
 The economic implications of this epidemic might initially seem difficult to 
identify, but if extant evidence from Roman Egypt is considered, then the disease can 
be shown to cause severe disruption to agricultural production and tax collection by 
causing a significant population decline in areas.326 Papyrological evidence suggests 
that there was a severe population contraction when the plague was virulent. In some 
areas, a decline of between thirty and ninety percent can be observed.327 It is possible 
that this shift was the result of anachoresis, but the numbers involved make it more 
                                                 
322 Gilliam (1961) 247. 
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from the plague. Duncan-Jones (1996: 121, Table 1) has also shown that the Delta region experienced 
a population decrease of up to 93% in some villages as the plague took hold. 
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likely that the plague was to blame for the rapid decline.328 In addition to the drop in 
population, it should also be noted that the production of Egyptian tetradrachms 
collapsed around AD 171 and did not recover for nearly six years.329 Again, while it 
is possible that this interruption was the result of other, more mundane factors, it is 
striking that the most significant disruption to the minting process in around two 
generations occurred precisely at the time when plague was prevalent across the 
empire. The economic damage wrought by the epidemic was not a fleeting 
phenomenon. In fact, some communities were still struggling to honour quotas for 
taxation in kind as long as twenty years after the outbreak.330 In order to assess the 
fiscal explanation for the Antonine Constitution, then, it is necessary to acknowledge 
that, rather than simple profligacy on the part of Caracalla, there were a number of 
factors, like the plague, that played a role in negatively shaping the Roman economy 
before the Severans had even seized power.  
 
A Severan Recovery?  
 The image of the economy in the immediate prelude to Caracalla’s sole reign 
is one of contradictory evidence. On the one hand, Commodus’ reign and the 
consequent civil wars following the death of Pertinax had been economically ruinous. 
Dio alleged that there was scarcely a million sestertii in the imperial coffers by the end 
of AD 192.331 While he was careful to state that Severus never murdered individuals 
for their estates, Dio also claimed that the emperor was required to raise money from 
                                                 
328 Referring to a process of flight or retreat, equivalent to the Latin recessus, the term anachoresis is 
often used in connection to individuals illegally fleeing from their homes and towns an attempt to avoid 
taxation or liturgical duties. This phenomenon will be considered in more detail in Chapter Six. Also 
see Kelly (2011) 204-8. For more role of the plague in this population decline, see Scheidel (2010a) 15; 
Duncan-Jones (1996) 121. In support of this hypothesis, similar evidence of death and population 
decline can be observed in other regions. In Dacia, for example, an inscription records the dissolution 
of a funerary club which may have been compromised by members fleeing from the spread of the 
disease, see ILS 7215a. Papyrological evidence shows that Athens was affected by the pestilence, to the 
extent that the emperor was required to extend the eligibility criteria for membership of the Council of 
the Areopagus to maintain consistent numbers, see Oliver 84, pp. 366-88. Further, more general 
disruption can be identified if the number of military diplomas and local government papyri issued in 
Egypt are compared for the plague period to the years on either side of the outbreak, see Duncan-Jones 
(1996) 124-25, Figs. 6 and 7. 
329 Duncan-Jones (1996) 124-25, Figs. 6 and 7. 
330 P. Oxy. LXV 4527; Van Minnen (2001) 175-77, contra Bagnall (2000) 288-92. 
331 Dio 74.5.4. While this precise figure is likely an exaggeration, the unpopular policy of economic 
austerity pursued by Pertinax’s short-lived regime supports the notion that the state’s position was 
hardly a favourable one. 
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every avenue in order to meet his financial obligations.332 This literary image is 
supported by evidence suggesting that the imperial currency was manipulated during 
the reign of Severus, the denarius being restored to its traditional weight, but with its 
silver content being simultaneously reduced by around one third.333 Indeed, the 
depreciation of the primary trading token of the empire can hardly be seen as anything 
other than a symptom of stress.334  
 
 On the other hand, however, there is also evidence to contradict the hypothesis 
of further economic downturn under Caracalla’s immediate predecessor. The early 
Severan period represents a high watermark in relation to public building projects in 
Rome and across the empire, for example. These ranged from the restoration of 
buildings destroyed by the fire of 191, such as the temples of Peace and Vesta, through 
to the construction of new edifices such as the camp of the equites singulares Augusti, 
the Arch of Severus and the Septizodium.335 Arguably the best known result of this 
programme was actually completed between 211-17, although probably commenced 
under Severus: the Baths of Caracalla (Thermae Antoninianae). This imposing 
structure was designed on an epic scale and carried a similarly massive construction 
cost. It is difficult to establish an exact figure for this building, but DeLaine has sought 
to offer a general impression through extrapolating a figure using the later Edict on 
Maximum Prices introduced by Diocletian in AD 301. DeLaine has estimated that the 
bath complex would have cost around 12 million kastrenses modii (KM), equating to 
a monetary figure in excess of 1.2 billion denarii.336 Even accounting for inflation 
between the Severan period and the beginning of the fourth century, the Baths of 
Caracalla would certainly have cost hundreds of millions of denarii – an astronomical 
                                                 
332 Dio 77.16.2. It was also into this context that Dio (77.10.1-7) described the campaign of robberies 
committed by Bulla Felix. While the character of Bulla is probably apocryphal, it is likely that the 
senator had constructed a literary archetype in response to a wider problem of banditry at the time, 
further suggesting economic instability and lack of imperial control. For more on this, see Fuhrmann 
(2012) 134-35; Reiss (2001) 170; Grünewald (1999) 157-95, and Shaw (1984) 43-52. 
333 Duncan-Jones (1994) 227, Table 15.6. Also see Bowman et al. (2005) 332-33. 
334 Greene (1986) 60-61. Also see Gitler and Ponting (2007) 375-97, who claim that this debasement 
represents a key step in pushing the Roman economy towards the monetary chaos observed in the course 
of the later third century AD. 
335 Dio 77.16.1-4; Lusnia (2014) 117-54, and (2004) 517-44; Gorrie (2002) 461-81; DeLaine (1997) 
197. 
336 DeLaine (1997) 207-20. The KM are a grain standard, employed here owing to the relative stability 
in the cost of wheat and labour during the tumultuous third century. 
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figure. The scale of this building alone, let alone the other construction and restoration 
projects, hardly creates the image of an emperor suffering from a lack of funds, or an 
empire gripped by economic desperation. 
 
 The emperor’s manipulation of the currency is also open to interpretation. 
Severus was the first Roman ruler to raise the army wage since Domitian.337 It is 
interesting to note, then, that a change in the nature of Roman silver coinage has also 
been recently identified to this period. In her analysis of numismatic find sites in the 
north-western provinces of the empire, Kemmers has shown that there is a significant 
rise in coin finds across sites of all natures, though predominantly in military ones. She 
has argued that this increase ultimately supports the hypothesis that Severus’ army pay 
rise required a vast amount of new coinage to be produced.338 Whilst debasement can 
never be interpreted as a financially positive economic initiative, the connection here 
between the process and the Roman army does not suggest a generalised economic 
decline. Rather, the monetary economy would not have been prepared for such a 
marked increase in demand for physical coinage and, as a consequence, the act of 
debasement is better interpreted as a measure dedicated to addressing an immediate 
problem of liquidity, rather than more general economic instability.  
 
 Further complicating the image of the pre-Caracallan economy is the 
impression of the sheer wealth left behind by Severus. Indeed, all of our main literary 
sources for the period claim that the emperor was able to leave the imperial treasury 
with a fortune far greater than any other, though it is impossible to test the veracity of 
such a claim.339 It is worth remembering, however, that, unlike his immediate 
predecessors, Severus was able to capture considerable sums through expropriations 
from his political rivals, as well as his lucrative campaign against Parthia.340 It seems 
clear that the image of the Roman economy on the eve of Caracalla’s sole reign is more 
complex than might initially be assumed. Even during the relative stability of the High 
                                                 
337 For a detailed breakdown of Severus’ military reforms, see Smith (1972) 481-500. 
338 Kemmers (2009) 143-58. 
339 Dio 77.16.4; Hdn 3.15.3; HA Sev. 12.3. 
340 For an account of the expropriations against Albinus’ supporters, see Dio 76.8.3-9.1. For more on 
the Parthian campaign, see Dio 75.9.4; Hdn 3.9.9-11. I am grateful to Dr Charmaine Gorrie for her 
assistance and advice on this subject. 
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Empire, the economy was affected by a variety of factors which represented a 
significant drain on the imperial treasury. The decades prior to Caracalla’s accession 
were characterised by warfare and disease, and yet the emperor’s own father appears 
to have stalled terminal decline, albeit temporarily. The quality and fineness of 
imperial silver coinage was significantly inferior compared to earlier periods, but it 
seems unlikely that this is indicative of any major financial or economic problem. 
Rather than basing an economic explanation of the constitutio Antoniniana on the 
emperor’s temperament and cronyism, as Dio does, we must view the initiatives 
introduced under Caracalla, including the edict, as a continuation of a longer process.  
 
The Economy under Caracalla  
 Dio claimed that Caracalla was responsible for raising a number of taxes. 
Among the levies described by Dio were doubling of tax on the emancipation of slaves 
and an increase in inheritance duties from five to ten percent.341 He explained that 
Caracalla changed the law regarding legacies and had abolished rights of succession, 
with their accompanying tax exemption, for close relatives of the deceased.342 Most 
galling to the senator, however, was the emperor’s repeated demands for the aurum 
coronarium, Dio accusing Caracalla of inventing a number of military victories in 
order to levy the charge.343 Even accounting for a degree of hyperbole in Dio’s 
testimony, since increased taxation would never be popular with any echelon of society 
let alone the ordo senatorius, it seems that the imperial government was engaged in a 
process of trying to augment levels of capital from the outset of Caracalla’s sole 
reign.344 
 
 Dio also accused Caracalla of debasing precious metal coinage in circulation 
within the empire, alleging that the emperor bought peace with tribes on the frontiers 
using high quality gold coinage, while circulating devalued currency among his actual 
                                                 
341 Dio 78.9.4. 
342 Dio 78.9.4-5. 
343 Dio 79.92-3. For more on the history of the aurum coronarium, originally a levy in connection with 
triumphs or anniversaries during the Principate, see Klauser 1944 (1948) 129-53. 
344 Marasco (1994: 508-11) has argued that Caracalla’s exploitation of the aurum coronarium was one 
of his most damaging policies, with regards to the propertied class. 
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citizenry.345 While it is tempting to dismiss Dio’s account here as little more than 
speculative melodrama, numismatic data suggests that Caracalla was, in fact, 
manipulating imperial coinage at the time. Three general trends can be observed: a 
decline in the fineness of silver coinage, a reduction in the weight of coin output 
(resulting in a higher number of coins struck per pound of metal) and, finally, a 
fiduciary pricing of coin types over their intrinsic value. If this data is considered, I 
would argue that Dio was correct to identify a process of numismatic debasement, even 
if he does so in a facetious and factually inaccurate manner. The evidence suggests 
that the emperor was anxious to rapidly increase the number of coins in circulation 
across the empire, even if this meant devaluing his precious metal coinage to achieve 
the goal.346 Metallurgical analysis of denarii from Augustus to Alexander Severus 
clearly demonstrates that the Severan period formed a nadir in relation to the overall 
fineness of Roman silver coinage.347 
 
 
Fig. 3: Graph illustrating the decline in median fineness of denarii.348 
 
                                                 
345 Dio 78.14.4. 
346 Langenegger (2010) 171-76. 
347 Duncan-Jones (1994) 225, 232, Tables 15.5 and 15.9. Under Augustus, the median silver fineness of 
denarii was 98% but, by Caracalla’s reign, that figure had dropped to 50.5%. For more on the fluctuation 
in quality of silver coinage for the later period, from Severus to Aemilianus, see Langenegger (2010) 
179-81. 
348 Data based on analysis from Duncan-Jones (1994) 225. 
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 Diminution in precious metal fineness was accompanied by a simultaneous 
reduction in the weight of both gold and silver coinage. The target weight of aurei 
under Caracalla appears to have been c. 6.46 grams, equating to fifty coins per pound 
of gold. The target weight of denarii, by contrast, was c. 3.23 grams, resulting in an 
average of 192 coins per pound of silver.349 This represents an increase of over twenty 
coins per pound from coins of the same denomination struck under Septimius Severus, 
and nearly forty more than even the disastrous closing period of Commodus’ reign, 
AD 187-92.350  
 
 
Fig. 4: Graph illustrating fluctuation in the weight of aurei and denarii.351 
 
 Caracalla’s most famous numismatic innovation, however, was the 
introduction of the antoninianus coin type in AD 215. Characterised by a radiate 
obverse bust of the emperor, the circulation of this denomination is widely regarded to 
have been a terrible economic move on Caracalla’s part.352 The primary problem with 
                                                 
349 Duncan-Jones (1994) 217, 225, Tables 15.3 and 15.5. 
350 Although it should be noted that the weight of Commodian coinage was slightly lower than Severan 
issues. See Fig. 4, below. 
351 Data adapted from Duncan-Jones (1994) 215, 225. 
352 Sutherland (1974: 218) considers its circulation to be ‘the first great overt act of depreciation in the 
currency of the Roman empire.’ Similarly Greene (1986: 61) claimed that the new coin only worsened 
a deepening economic crisis, while Harl (1996: 128) argued that its introduction was a disastrous policy 
which undermined the system of price and exchange across the empire, and that Elagabalus’ decision 
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this coin type is the relationship between its precious metal content and the face value 
at which it was tariffed. While metallurgical analysis confirms that they contained a 
silver content roughly equivalent to 1.5 denarii, there is no explicit evidence for the 
fiduciary value placed upon antoniniani by the emperor.353 If, for example, the coin 
was valued at 1.25 denarii, this would represent a positive revaluation of the silver 
currency, though such a hypothesis contrasts with Caracalla’s wider policy of 
debasement, rendering it ultimately unpersuasive.354 It is more likely that the 
antoninianus was tariffed at two denarii.  
 
 
Fig. 5: Caracalla, AR Antoninianus. Rome, AD 215 (RIC 273b).355 
 
 This hypothesis is further supported by the coins’ obverse iconography. The 
radiate crown depicted on the emperor’s bust is a feature usually associated with the 
dupondius, tariffed at double the face value of an as, even if not containing double the 
weight of orichalcum.356 The creation of an underweighted double-denarius represents 
a significant change to the Roman monetary economy of the period, devaluing the 
regular denarius by twenty-five percent.357 It must be stressed, however, that even this 
                                                 
353 Depeyrot and Hollard (1987) 57-85. 
354 Lo Cascio (1984) 133-201. 
355 ANTONINVS PIVS AVG GERM, radiate and cuirassed bust right / PM TR P XVIII COS IIII PP, lion, radiate, 
advancing left. 4.56g, 25mm. Image courtesy of Roma Numismatics Ltd. 
356 Duncan-Jones (1994) 138, 222 n.39. Also see BMCRE V, p. xviii. For an example of this type, see 
Fig. 5. 
357 Greene (1986) 60-61; Bowman et al. (2005) 339-40. 
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seemingly destructive initiative did not destabilise the economy until the later crisis of 
the third century.358 
 
The Economic Function of the constitutio Antoniniana 
Given the context of rising taxes and monetary debasement, I would argue that 
it is appropriate to consider further Dio’s testimony regarding the nature of the 
Antonine Constitution. As I noted earlier, Dio’s hostility towards Caracalla is well-
known, and there can be little question that the author perceived the introduction of 
the constitutio as another opportunity to criticise the emperor, but this does not mean 
that we ought to dismiss the senator’s account entirely.359 Rather than focusing solely 
on the credibility of Dio as a source, however, it is necessary to return to the Giessen 
papyrus and to consider the legislation itself. Indeed, if the text of P. Giss. 40 is 
examined closely, it can be shown that the evidence supports the hypothesis that 
economic factors did play a role in motivating Caracalla to introduce his edict.  
 
 Examination of the Giessen text reveals that there are two areas where possible 
allusions to edict’s economic purpose can be identified. The first is based upon a 
reconstruction of the severely damaged final lines of the decree. Of the many attempts 
to study and restore the constitutio, only Heichelheim has offered any substantial 
edition of these lines.360 
 
Ἂπο δὲ τῶν] π[ρ]οσ[όδων τῶν νῦν] | [ὑπερχουσῶν συντελούντων, ἅπερ 
ἐκελεύσ]θη [παρὰ Ῥωμαίων ἀπὸ τοῦ κα ἔτους,] | [ὡς δίκαιον ἐκ τῶν 
διαταγμάτων καὶ ἐπιστολ]ῶ[ν, ἅ ἐξεδόθη ὑφ’ ἡμῶν τε] | [καὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων 
προγόνων   Προετέθη . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .] 
 
Referring to the taxes that exist at present, all are due to pay those that have 
been imposed upon the Romans from the beginning of their twenty-first year 
[of age], as it is the law, according to the edicts and rescripts issued by us and 
our ancestors.  Displayed publically…361 
                                                 
358 Langenegger (2010) 176-81. During the reign of Elagabalus, production of antoniniani was halted, 
and only resumed in AD 238, under Balbinus and Pupienus. The denomination was further debased by 
Gordian III, a process which contributed to a destabilisation of the currency and monetary economy at 
large. 
359 See Chapter One. 
360 For an apparatus and commentary of the text, see Appendix I.  
361 P. Giss. 40 I, ll. 14-17. Originally, Heichelheim was unable to conclude how the mention of a ‘twenty 




 When restored in this manner, these lines form an explicit directive that all of 
the newly enfranchised Romans were immediately liable to pay all taxes levied against 
the citizen body.362 If it is accepted that the final detail of the constitutio text was to 
remind new cives of the fiscal obligations accompanying their new status, this would 
certainly lend credence to Dio’s claim that Caracalla’s primary intention in 
promulgating the Antonine Constitution was to raise capital through direct taxation. 
The heavily damaged nature of the papyrus means, however, that the reconstruction 
offered by Heichelheim is ultimately conjectural, and hence cannot be accepted in 
isolation as a confirmation of a Caracallan fiscal motive underlying the edict. This is 
not the only potential reference to fiscal matters in the course of P. Giss. 40, though.  
 
 The second area in which it is possible to identify an economic rationale is 
better preserved but even more controversial, since it surrounds the ninth line of the 
text, in which the terms of the constitutio were outlined. As noted in Chapter One, this 
section proves problematic owing to a lacuna in the papyrus obscuring a key word in 
the construction:363  
 
Δίδω[μ]ι τοί[ν]υν ἅπα– | [σι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ῥωμαϊκ]ὴν οἰκουμένην π[ολειτ]είαν 
Ῥωμ[αί]ων [μ]ένοντος | [τοῦ δικαίου τῶν πολιτευμ]άτων χωρ[ὶς] τῶν 
[…]ειτικίων.  
 
I therefore give everyone in the Roman world the Roman citizenship: 
respecting customary law, except/without …364 
 
 Traditionally, the exclusionary clause contained in the ninth line was thought 
to make reference to the dediticii, with the lacuna being restored to read as 
δεδειτκίων.365 With this reconstruction, the edict is thus assumed to make reference to 
one of two potential groups. The first were freedmen found guilty of crimes during 
                                                 
citizens’ age of eligibility, an issue separate from the question of one’s age of majority in Roman Egypt. 
For more on the age of majority, see Hagedorn (1996) 224-26; Lewis (1979) 117-20. 
362 Heichelheim (1941) 12. 
363 See pgs. 31-33. 
364 P. Giss. 40 I, ll. 7-9. 
365 Meyer (1920); Bickermann (1926), Schönbauer (1931) 277-335; Stroux (1933) 272-95; Wilhelm 
(1934) 178-80; Heichelheim (1941) 10-22. An alternative spelling of δηδειτικίων was proposed later, 
see Weissert (1963) 239-50. For a recent defence of the restoration, see Rocco (2010) 131-32.  
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their servitude, with the result that they could never attain the rights of the franchise, 
despite their free status.366 Alternatively, the term could be used in reference to newly 
conquered barbarians who, following their surrender (deditio), experienced a period 
of complete subjugation to Rome before being slowly inducted into the empire and 
being able to attain greater status. In either case, if the restoration of δεδειτικίων was 
correct, the clause was designed to prevent at least one socially undesirable group from 
enjoying the emperor’s otherwise universal grant.367  
 
The dediticii hypothesis is far from assured, however, despite such historical 
support. In fact, the restoration has been completely rejected in the most recent studies 
of the text.368 Analysis of the Giessen papyrus has shown that the inclusion of dediticii 
is syntactically and semantically problematic and awkward.369 Furthermore, the clause 
has always been historically challenging, owing to the fact that none of the other 
sources who mention the constitutio in the course of their works, such as Dio or Ulpian, 
ever refer to any exceptions to the wide-reaching nature of Caracalla’s edict.370 Such 
an omission is troubling. It would seem uncharacteristically careless of a jurist of 
Ulpian’s character, an individual hailed by Honoré as one of the most influential 
writers of the Severan age, to neglect such a crucial detail in the course of his legal 
texts.371 Indeed, whilst it is possible that Ulpian’s original text was adapted and altered 
in the course of inclusion in the Digest, this argument does not explain the silence of 
other sources, contemporary or secondary, on the matter. This has led to further 
scepticism regarding any connection between the constitutio and the dediticii.372  
 
Owing to the well-established process of assimilating communities into the 
empire by this point in imperial history, I would argue that the number of dediticii 
living in Caracalla’s realm must have represented a statistically insignificant portion 
                                                 
366 Gaius, Inst. 1.13-15. 
367 Lukaszewicz (1990a) 93-101; Rocco (2010) 145-55.  
368 Kuhlmann (2012) 47, (1994) 236. Kuhlmann’s own opinion regarding the lacuna will be considered 
later in this chapter. 
369 Kuhlmann (1994) 236. 
370 Dio 77.9.5-6; Dig. 1.5.17. 
371 Honoré (2002) 1. 
372 Benario (1954) 188. 
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of the empire’s total population.373 Furthermore, if Gaius was correct that the dediticii 
were a class of people who had lost all political identity and could never hope of 
attaining the rights of Roman citizenship under any circumstance, then there would 
have been no need to stipulate or emphasise their ineligibility.374 It is logical to 
conclude that if the dediticii were indeed social pariahs, then their exclusion from the 
terms of the constitutio would be automatically assumed and entirely non-negotiable. 
In fact, there would have been as little requirement to specify their ineligibility as there 
would have been for slaves. This conclusion renders any attempt to restore the lacuna 
in P. Giss. 40 to read as δεδειτικίων completely untenable.  
 
How, then, ought we reconstruct the controversial gap in the Giessen text? The 
publication of materials relating to the Antonine tabula Banasitana has fundamentally 
altered the nature of this debate. The tabula is a record of a grant of citizenship being 
bestowed to a member of the Mauretanian provincial elite, Julianus, and his 
descendants, during the reign of Marcus Aurelius and Commodus.375 Whilst much of 
the grant is predictably formulaic, a pair of caveats at the end of the document forms 
the primary point of interest. Following the notice that citizenship was to be conferred 
upon Julianus and his family, the emperors declared that the grant was to be bestowed 
salvo iure gentis and sine diminutione tributorum et vectigalium populi et fisci.376 The 
first of these clauses was designed to ensure that the newly enfranchised individual 
could continue to function in the midst of a largely peregrine population, by clarifying 
that the grant of Roman civitas did not exclude the recipient from access to their 
customary legal framework, an arrangement which also protected any claim of the 
parent community over the services of the new citizen.377 The second clause served to 
clarify the fiscal responsibilities inherent on the individual in question. Unlike the 
citizens of the earliest years of the Principate who enjoyed the fiscal immunitas rerum 
                                                 
373 Sherwin-White (1973a: 272) refers to the process of including communities into the Roman body 
politic as taking on an increasingly mechanical character even by the end of the Flavian period. 
374 Gaius, Inst. 1.13-15. Also see Buraselis (2007) 7. 
375 IAM 2.1, 94 = AE 1961, 142. For an annotated edition of the tabula, see Oliver (1972) 336-40. For a 
brief discussion of how the grant fits into the general evolutionary process of the franchise, Chapter 
One. 
376 IAM 2.1, 94, ll. 11-12; 37-38. The salvo iure gentis clause features both in reference to Julianus 
himself and his descendants, whilst the sine clause is presented in connection with the extension of the 
franchise to his descendants later in the same text. 
377 Kuhlmann (1994) 231-32; Oliver (1989) 504. 
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omnium, the newly enfranchised would be liable to pay Roman taxation in addition to 
pre-existing local levies.378  
 
A similarity between the grammatical structure of the Latin tabula and the 
Greek edict on P. Giss. 40 was noted by Sasse, who observed that the papyrus appears 
to contain a comparably formulaic grammatical construction, despite the difference in 
language. In fact, the μένοντος participle is a relatively common one, in connection 
with Greek legal texts, and Sasse has identified forty seven other cases in which the 
construction is identical to the Giessen papyrus, employing a participle of μένειν 
followed by a genitive absolute.379 In the past, this led Sherwin-White to conclude that 
the dediticii were therefore not excluded from the franchise itself, but rather some 
other, unspoken subsidiary grant.380 This position is tenuous, however, both on 
linguistic grounds and for the reasons outlined above regarding the fundamental 
fragility of any connection between the dediticii and the constitutio Antoniniana.381 An 
alternative has to be found which is reminiscent of the tabula Banasitana, as per 
Sasse’s observations, but which also contains no reference to the erroneously included 
dediticii. With these considerations in mind, I would argue that it is preferable to 
restore the critical eighth and ninth lines of the constitutio text in the following manner: 
[μ]ένοντος [τοῦ δικαίου τῶν πολιτευμ]άτων χωρ[ὶς] τῶν [ἀδδ]ειτικίων.382 In this 
reconstruction, the Greek χωρίς is translated in its form meaning ‘without’ rather than 
the ‘except’ favoured when thought to make reference to the dediticii.383 The adjectival 
noun ἀδδειτικίων, transliterated from the Latin adjective additicius and meaning 
‘additional’, is becoming increasingly favoured as a more realistic alternative to the 
dediticii hypothesis, one which fits more comfortably with the ancient literary sources 
who make no reference to a disbarred population group.384  
                                                 
378 Sherwin-White (1973b) 86-98. 
379 Sasse (1958) 48-58. 
380 Sherwin-White (1973a) 381-83; (1973b) 95-97. 
381 Lukaszewicz (1990a) 98-99. 
382 P. Giss. 40 I, ll. 8-9. 
383 Indeed, the possibility that χωρίς might mean ‘without’ at this juncture has proven problematic to 
those desiring to maintain a link the dediticii, see Lukaszewicz (1990a) 99. 
384 Kuhlmann (2012) 48-50. It is true that the word is a hapax legomenon, but it must be remembered 
that δεδειτικίων (or any variant thereof) is also unique. In this sense, the revised wording is no more 
difficult to accept than a reference to the dediticii and, more importantly, forms a better fit in relation to 
the formulaic nature of Greek legal texts noted by Sasse, see above, and with its Latin counterpart, the 




 Rather than proclaiming a universal extension of the franchise, only then to 
specify the ineligibility of an insignificant population group, the μένοντος clause 
should be interpreted as a Greek equivalent to the formulaic Latin salvo iure gentis, 
safeguarding the pre-existing relationship between the recipient of the franchise and 
their parent community. It follows, then, that the χωρίς + genitive construction makes 
sense if interpreted as roughly equivalent to the Latin sine prepositional phrase found 
in the tabula Banasitana, making reference to privileges that the newly enfranchised 
might expect.385 The controversial seventh to ninth lines of the constitutio should 
therefore be translated to read: ‘I therefore give everyone in the Roman world the 
Roman citizenship, respecting customary law, without additional privileges.’386 This 
restoration and translation, whilst preferable to any mention of the dediticii, does not 
end the debate on how the wording of Caracalla’s edict should be understood, though. 
In his assessment of the Giessen text, Oliver concluded that the similarities between 
the constitutio and the tabula Banasitana were so pronounced that the two documents 
should be considered identical in terms of the conditions set upon the grants: 
 
Since the reference to citizenship in both and even the order is the same, the 
conclusion is inescapable that the reservations with no intervening conjunction 
are identical, even if a short phrase, namely “without the additicia” replaces 
the “sine diminutione tributorum et vectigalium populi Romani” of the Tabula 
Banasitana.387 
 
 Such a conclusion would strongly suggest that Caracalla’s edict was 
promulgated with a clearly economic or financial motive in mind. More recently, 
however, this absolute connection between the two documents has been questioned. 
While he agrees that the reconstruction of additicia has some palaeographical basis, 
since it features in a similar fashion in Latin sources, Kuhlmann disagrees that the 
χωρίς τῶν ἀδδειτικίων clause represents a direct transliteration of sine diminutione 
tributorum et vectigalium populi et fisci, inasmuch as he doubts that it refers to fiscal 
                                                 
385 Wolff (1977) 99-102. 
386 P. Giss. 40 I, ll. 7-9. 
387 Oliver (1989) 504. The precise language of the exclusionary clause clearly does not meld flawlessly 
with the Latin of the tabula Banasitana. Oliver is content, however, that this is owing to the difficulties 
in replicating the precise Latin terminology in Greek, rather than any other issue. 
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immunity alone, preferring a more general reference to assorted privileges.388 He 
questions how far the sentiment from the Latin construction can be inferred from one 
word alone, arguing that if Oliver was correct in his assumption regarding the focus of 
additicia, then it must represent a hitherto unrecognised Greek terminus technicus.389 
This clearly presents an issue since, in the event that additicia was a commonly used 
legal term, we would expect to find more examples of its usage.390  
 
 While Oliver has overstated the grammatical similarity between the constitutio 
and the tabula, this does not necessarily weaken the hypothesis that economic or 
financial concerns were high priorities for the emperor. In fact, I would argue that, 
among all of the innumerable benefits that the Giessen papyrus might theoretically 
make reference to in the controversial clause, the fiscal privileges were among the 
foremost concerns of both Caracalla and his newly enfranchised populace. To illustrate 
this, it is necessary to return to the account offered by Dio. Perhaps the question that 
should be asked is why Dio chose to criticise the emperor’s edict on the basis of 
economy specifically. The author’s account of Caracalla’s reign is filled with a variety 
of personal attacks and insults on a number of subjects, from the emperor’s adoration 
of Alexander the Great through to his fundamental personality and ethnicity.391 
Considering the visible thread of ‘hatred and mockery’ running through the senator’s 
prose, it seems unlikely that Dio would have neglected any opportunity to demolish 
the character of his bête-noir.392 As a member of the senatorial class, it would be 
arguably more logical for Dio to criticise Caracalla for diluting the prestige of the 
franchise, since this would form an obvious point of concern for a social group already 
in possession of the rights of Roman citizenship.393 He does nothing of the sort, though. 
                                                 
388 Kuhlmann (1994) 237. For examples of the term in the Latin corpus which Kuhlmann identifies, see 
Dig. 50.16.98.1 and Tert. Resurr. 52. 
389 Kuhlmann (1994) 236-37. 
390 Kuhlmann (1994) 237. 
391 Dio 78.6.1a; Millar (1964) 150-51; Davenport (2012) 797-98. 
392 Millar (1964) 151. A similar idea was espoused by Benario (1954: 188), for example, who argued 
that the dediticii could not have been mentioned in the course of the constitutio since Dio did not 
mention them: ‘if a significant portion of the population had been barred from the enjoyment of the 
emperor’s gift, Dio would, in all likelihood, not have failed to mention it, since he was a bitter enemy 
of the ruler.’ Whilst Benario overstates the case here and underestimates the level of self-interest 
ingrained in Dio’s work, he is fundamentally correct to highlight the level of criticism levelled at the 
emperor by the author. 




 On the one hand, this omission could be the result of Xiphilinus’ later 
epitomising of Dio’s original work at this juncture.394 On the other hand, however, it 
should be noted that despite Dio’s obvious hatred of the emperor, the author’s fierce 
criticism of Caracalla’s financial drives does appear to contain an accurate knowledge 
of the initiatives, once the hostile rhetoric has been stripped away.395 A similar logic 
can also be applied to the senator’s relationship with the constitutio Antoniniana. It is 
entirely understandable that Dio would attempt to underplay the majesty of the edict 
promoted by Caracalla. It would be imprudent to assume, however, that Dio had 
simply fictionalised its fiscal implications rather than choosing to exploit a genuine 
facet of the constitutio in the course of condemning the emperor’s unrestrained 
spending on his favourites.  
 
With this in mind, I would argue that Dio did not fabricate economic concerns 
or otherwise simply settle on this criticism from among a variety of potential slights; 
his account is certainly not an exercise in ‘extreme idiocy’, as Ando would claim.396 
Instead, Dio must have considered the fiscal implications of the constitutio to be a 
factor that was public knowledge and, furthermore, an aspect that would have impacted 
upon many of his intended audience. Whilst there is little firm evidence to suggest that 
Dio’s history was published in any meaningful way in antiquity, it is still possible to 
conclude that Dio believed that his attack of Caracalla’s edict on economic grounds 
would have carried the most resonance with his readers (or his intended readership).397  
 
The Role of the vicesima hereditatum  
This leads us to another objection to the fiscal hypothesis that must be 
challenged. In an attempt to undermine Dio’s credibility regarding the economic 
rationale for the edict, scholars have tried to argue that any desire on Caracalla’s part 
to reap an increased tax yield must have been a secondary concern, at best. To 
substantiate this argument, they point out that the majority of the wealthiest inhabitants 
                                                 
394 Millar (1964: 155), for example, has concluded that Xiphilinus’ work is ‘exceptionally poor’ in 
relation to Caracalla’s principate. 
395 Millar (1964) 154-55. 
396 Ando (2000) 395, n. 275. 
397 For more on the composition of Dio’s history, see Millar (1964) 28-72. 
94 
 
of the empire were most likely already citizens, and therefore subject to the emperor’s 
taxes, meaning that the increased yield resulting from the expanded franchise cannot 
have been considerable.398 This position, however, ignores other available financial 
evidence from the period which suggests that Caracalla was eager to exponentially 
increase his tax yield in a short period of time by raising money from estates across a 
variety of social strata. Returning to Dio’s text once more, it was noted earlier in this 
chapter that one of the taxes that Dio explicitly mentions in connection with 
Caracalla’s fiscal reform is that on inheritances and legacies, claiming that the emperor 
had doubled the rate from five to ten percent.399 I argue that the evidence supports the 
theory that this taxation was levied on estates far smaller than was once thought. In 
fact, the connection between this citizen tax and the expansion of the franchise by 
Caracalla further substantiates Dio’s fiscal explanation of the edict, demonstrating that 
the emperor was eager to raise capital from all corners of his realm, and shows that he 
did not focus merely on the social elite.  
 
 Introduced by Augustus in AD 6, the vicesima hereditatum was an inheritance 
duty levied upon estates over a certain value.400 While there appears to be good 
evidence for the collection of this tax, the lack of precise information offered by 
ancient authors means that the exact level of exemption from this tax remains 
unknown. Evidence gleaned from Pliny the Younger suggests that the charge could be 
raised against estates of varying sizes.401 The only other source to mention inheritance 
duty explicitly is Dio again, who claimed that only the smallest and most modest 
estates were exempt from the charge.402 Neither Dio nor Pliny ever provide any 
numerical figures in support of their claims. 
 
                                                 
398 Buraselis (2007) 8-9; Sherwin-White (1973a) 281. 
399 Dio 78.9.4. 
400 Gilliam (1952) 397; Perez (2009) 211-13. 
401 Plin. Pan. 39.5-40.1. In this source, Pliny commends Trajan for his generosity in alleviating the terms 
of the levy from those of the Flavian period, in which very few estates seem to have been exempt. Whilst 
it is frustrating that Pliny gives no precise figures, despite serving as a praefectus aerarii militaris 
(magistrate in charge of the military treasury, into which the funds from the vicesima were channelled) 
it must be remembered that he was writing to glorify the emperor rather than offer a detailed account of 
the tax itself, see Gilliam (1952) 398. The significance of the connection between the vicesima and the 
military treasury will be considered in the next chapter.  
402 Dio 55.25.5. 
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Despite the hints offered by ancient authors, however, there has been a trend 
among modern scholars to accept an exemption level for the vicesima of estates valued 
at 100,000 sestertii and above, obviously leading to a perception that it was a tax only 
levied against the propertied classes and the wealthy.403 It is difficult to establish from 
where this figure has actually derived, since its extrapolation seems to be founded less 
on examination of the extant evidence and more on baseless conjecture. I argue that it 
is the acceptance of this groundless figure that is clearly to blame for the outmoded 
scholarly consensus that a fiscal rationale could not have prompted the constitutio 
Antoniniana, since ‘the majority of the great fortunes of the empire were already in the 
fold’.404 Such a speculative position regarding the terms of the vicesima hereditatum 
can, however, be easily dismantled by examining material evidence available in the 
form of papyri. Contrary to the notion that the vicesima was a tax on the propertied 
classes alone, papyrological evidence can be found which suggests that the threshold 
for exemption from the levy was far lower than previously believed, and thus impacted 
upon the majority of the empire’s enfranchised inhabitants.  
 
Thought by some to form different parts of the same document, P. Mich. 435 
and 440 are military texts which record a number of inheritances and payments to the 
vicesima made by soldiers of the legions II Traiana and III Cyrenaica.405 The texts are 
poorly preserved and blighted by a number of lacunae, but it is still possible to identify 
that a number of troops of varying ranks seem to have paid their tax contributions on 
the same day.406 It is the varying size of the legacies involved in these soldiers’ 
transactions which is particularly striking when assessing the potential fiscal reach of 
the constitutio Antoniniana. In the third entry contained on P. Mich. 435, the estate 
was calculated at c. 5360 drachmae, with the vicesima deducting 265 of that amount. 
Even more surprising is the partially damaged second entry on the same papyrus, 
which recorded the contribution to the vicesima at 95 drachmae, a figure which would 
                                                 
403 Gilliam (1952) 398-99. Also see Sherwin-White (1973a) 221-22; Cagnat (1882) 226, n. 4. 
404 Sherwin-White (1973a) 221-22. 
405 The papyri are thought to have derived from the legionary camp at Nicopolis. The appearance of 
these two legions together suggests a possible date range of the papyri of AD 109-19, see Gilliam (1952) 
402; Arangio-Ruiz (1949) 257-59; Wallace (1938) 324. 
406 Three of the better preserved entries on P. Mich. 435 carry the date IV Nonas Iulias, as does the first 
readable entry on P. Mich. 440. 
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equate to an estate total of only around 1900 drachmae.407 This is clearly far below the 
100,000 sestertii figure so confidently mooted by scholars in the past. As Gilliam has 
observed, it would be patently ridiculous to assume that each of the soldiers stationed 
at Nicopolis could ever bequeath an estate approaching one hundred thousand sestertii, 
meaning that the previous assessment of the levy is incorrect and that a conclusion that 
the vicesima was collected from much smaller estates is incontrovertible.408  
 
Sherwin-White’s observation that the largest estates of the empire were 
probably all owned by individuals who had been enfranchised for some time by AD 
212 is technically correct, but it assumes that Caracalla was only interested in 
harvesting tax income from the largest estates in the wealthiest echelons of Roman 
society and, furthermore, that these prosperous individuals alone would have provided 
sufficient capital to bankroll the imperial administration.409 While there is no 
suggestion that the emperor was uninterested in the estates of the elite, the fact remains 
that the vast majority of the empire’s inhabitants did not possess estates in excess of 
100,000 sestertii. Even though the level of tax raised on an individual basis would 
undoubtedly be smaller, I see no reason to accept the claim of Buraselis that the 
cumulative taxation raised across the empire from smaller estates would have been 
insignificant or of little consequence.410 In fact, if the number of eligible tax payers 
was vastly multiplied through legislation such as the constitutio, the resulting increase 
in tax yield must have been considerable, even accounting for inefficiencies within the 
physical process of tax collection.411 Consequently, I would argue that this evidence, 
combined with that of Dio and the Giessen papyrus, ultimately supports the hypothesis 
that the constitutio Antoniniana had a fiscal purpose and that, among Caracalla’s 
different motivations for the edict, an economic agenda was prominent. Despite the 
many scholarly attempts to claim otherwise, I would argue that Millar was correct to 
                                                 
407 Gilliam (1952) 403-4. 
408 Gilliam (1952) 404. 
409 Sherwin-White (1973a) 221-22. 
410 Buraselis (2007) 8-9. Whilst it is difficult to assess the urban population, Kron (2008: 97-110) has 
argued that the agricultural peasants were often more productive has been assumed. This notion 
ultimately supports a hypothesis that the state could profit from extending a tax to encompass smaller 
scale estates. 
411 For the complexity of tax collection, see Duncan-Jones (1994) 56-63.  
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observe that by expanding the franchise as Caracalla did, the emperor ‘will have 
included most people who were worth taxing’.412  
 
The Purpose of Caracallan Fiscal Innovation 
 While I have shown that the evidence supports the notion that the Antonine 
Constitution contained a significant fiscal dimension, the question of its purpose 
remains open. If the ancient authors are correct that Septimius Severus was able to 
leave the imperial coffers with higher revenues than had been observed under any of 
his predecessors, a logical conclusion would be that Caracalla must have engaged in 
an unprecedented level of spending to result in a situation where he was compelled to 
raise capital on the scale suggested by Dio. It has been shown above that Dio accused 
the emperor of flagrant favouritism and cronyism, but this seems an unconvincing 
explanation. Two factors warrant consideration. Firstly, Davenport has shown that 
Dio’s criticism probably results more from his own bitterness at not being one of the 
emperor’s favoured senators.413 Secondly, even accounting for increases in congiaria 
and donatives to the military, these gifts would need to have been titanic in nature to 
exhaust the imperial finances and warrant such a far-reaching fiscal response. 
Furthermore, it should be remembered that financial profligacy is not a charge unique 
to Caracalla and is often a negative trait associated with allegedly bad rulers by hostile 
sources.414  
 
 An alternative explanation might be that, in recording the end of Severus’ 
reign, the ancient writers have presented an inaccurate or even false image regarding 
the level of wealth left behind by the dying emperor. Some evidence suggests that, 
rather than inheriting the empire in a healthy financial position, Caracalla was forced 
to respond to economic uncertainty during his period as sole ruler. An example of the 
emperor reacting to an economic depression can be observed in the epigraphic corpus, 
in which he publicised his imperial indulgentia towards the province of Mauretania 
Tingitana.  
                                                 
412 Millar (1964) 153. 
413 Davenport (2012) 797-803. 
414 Suetonius was particularly quick to level this type of accusation, for example. For instances of ‘bad’ 
emperors behaving in a financially extravagant manner, see his accounts of Caligula (Cal. 37), Nero 




1) ] Imp(erator) Caes(ar) divi Severi Pii Arab(ici) Adiab(enici) Parth(ici) 
Max(imi) Brit(annici) Max(imi) filius divi M(arci) Antonini Germ(anici) 
Sarm(atici) nepos divi Antonini Pii pronepos 
[divi H]adria[ni divi Traiani Parth(ici) et di]v[i] Nervae adnepos 
Marcus Aurelius Antoninus Pius Aug(ustus) Part(hicus) Max(imus) 
Brit(annicus) Max(imus) Germ(anicus) Max(imus) Pont(ifex) Max(imus) 
Trib(uniciae) potestatis 
5) XVIIII Imp(erator) III co(n)s(ul) IIII p(ater) p(atriae) proco(n)s(ul) dicit 
obsequium et fidem vestram remunerans omnia quaecumque sunt debita 
fis- 
calia frumentaria sive pecuniaria pendentium quoque causarum concedo 
vobis exceptis de quibus pronuntiatum est provocatione non secuta et hoc 
amplius eas quoq(ue) causas at beneficium meum profiteor ipse pertinere 
in qui- 
10) bus appellationem interpositam probatum fuerit etiam si non sit admissa 
certum habens quod indulgentiam meam obsequio sitis remuneraturi cum 
vicor(um) et provinciarum bene de re p(ublica) merentium non tantum 
viris fortibus 
in omni ordine spectatissimis castrensium adque civilium officiorum ve- 
rum etiam silvis quoque ipsis caelestium fertilibus animalium meritum 
15) aput me conlocaveritis hoc beneficio meo praesumo omnes de cetero an- 
nuas pensitationes sive in frumento seu in pecunia eo promptius datu- 
ros quo me reputabitis non expectasse quin ultro offerrem neque petenti- 
bus vobis neque sperantibus nova remedia et magnificam indulgentiam 
curantibus L(ucio) Ant(onio) Sosibiano et Aulo Pompeio Cassiano 
20) d(u)umviris 
 
Emperor Caesar Marcus Aurelius Antoninus Pius Augustus, Parthicus 
Maximus, Britannicus Maximus, Germanicus Maximus, pontifex maximus, 
holder of the tribunician power for the nineteenth time, imperator for the third 
time, consul for the fourth time, pater patriae, proconsul; son of the divine 
Severus Pius Arabicus, Adiabenicus, Parthicus Maximus, Britannicus 
Maximus; grandson of the divine Marcus Antoninus Germanicus, Sarmaticus; 
great-grandson of the divine Antoninus Pius; great-great grandson of the divine 
Hadrian; great-great-great grandson of the divine Trajan Parthicus; and great-
great-great-great grandson of the divine Nerva, proclaims: In rewarding your 
allegiance and loyalty, I remit any debts that you owe the fiscus in either grain 
or money, and also the claims in suits pending, except those where a judgment 
has been given and no appeal has been lodged. Furthermore, I proclaim that 
my generosity also extends to suits in which proof can be offered that an appeal 
has been lodged, even if it has not been yet granted, since I am confident that 
you will repay my indulgence with zeal when you have gained credit with me 
from this favour, not only by the service of the finest of brave men from the 
towns and countryside, who are highly regarded by all in civil and military 
positions, but also by contributing from your forests, which are known for their 
abundance of celestial beasts. As for the future, I expect that annual taxes in 
grain and money will be paid more promptly, when you remember that you 
never expected that I would voluntarily offer unprecedented relief and 
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unstinting indulgence without your request. This bronze was engraved under 
the order of the duumviri Lucius Antonius Sosibianus and Aulus Pompeius 
Cassianus.415 
 
 The inscription shows that the emperor released an order in AD 216 that 
remitted debt across the province, both in money and in kind. Caracalla’s desire to 
promote himself as indulgentissimus, noted in the previous chapter, means that it 
should come as no surprise to find him stressing this quality by drawing attention to 
the ‘great indulgence’ (magnificam indulgentiam) that he had bestowed upon the 
Mauretanian populace.416 What might seem unusual, in the context of Caracalla’s sole 
rule, is that the emperor should excuse the province of its debts at precisely the same 
time as he increased taxation across the rest of his empire, according to Dio.  
 
 It is tempting to draw a comparison between this proclamation and the earlier 
moratorium issued by Hadrian in Egypt.417 It might appear that the Caracallan 
document is, in real terms, nothing more than a temporary remission of taxes, a 
pragmatic response to economic stress in Mauretania and designed to allow the 
province time to recover whilst not destabilising the region at large.418 Indeed, 
Buraselis is correct to observe that, in genuine cases of economic distress, the 
generosity of the Augusti could be even more useful than in times of prosperity, and 
the text of the inscription makes it clear that the emperor expected the province to pay 
their tax contributions promptly, after the duration of the remission had expired.419 If 
interpreted in this manner, the Banasa tablet would appear to suggest that Caracalla 
faced the unenviable prospect of accepting a short term economic deficit in his tax 
yield in order to preserve the long term liquidity of the provinces, a conclusion that 
might lead one to consider that the constitutio Antoniniana was a reactive edict, 
designed to ensure some form of taxation reached the imperial coffers during an 
otherwise troubled time. This is not the entire picture, though.  
 
                                                 
415 AE 1946, 109. Translation adapted from Johnson et al. (2003). 
416 AE 1946, 109, l. 18. 
417 For consideration of the Hadrianic initiative, see above, pg. 77. 
418 Buraselis (2007) 67-68. 
419 Buraselis (2007) 69-70; AE 1946, 109, ll. 16-18. 
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Objections can be raised against the theory that economic depression was the 
primary motivation behind the promulgation of the constitutio. Firstly, it should be 
noted that economic difficulties such as those which prompted a provincial-scale 
remission were isolated in nature: there is no evidence to suggest that Caracalla was 
obliged to offer similar fiscal relief to any other provinces during his sole reign. This 
means that the Mauretanian case above ought to be viewed as unique during the 212-
17 period. Secondly, the intensive building programme undertaken by Severus and 
Caracalla should be remembered since, even though we cannot infer a modern sense 
of economic rationality in the emperors, it is very unlikely that they would have 
engaged in construction upon such a large scale if the economy of the empire at large 
was in the doldrums; the inactivity of their predecessors Commodus, Pertinax and 
Didius Julianus only serves to strengthen this hypothesis.420 While it remains possible 
that the ancient authors may have exaggerated the scale of the wealth left behind by 
Septimius Severus, it does not appear as if the empire was in economic decline or 
immediate peril during the sole reign of Caracalla. Another explanation is required, 
then, one which does not infer economic meltdown on an imperial scale, but which 
also required the emperor to mint an extraordinary number of new coins, to the extent 
that he debased the currency and introduced the over-valued antoninianus into 
circulation. 
 
Returning to Caracalla’s monetary reform of this period, the most striking 
feature of this phenomenon is the similarity that it bears to the currency manipulation 
carried out by Septimius Severus, noted above. In fact, given the period of shared rule 
between the men between 198 and 211, it is probably more appropriate to view the 
Caracallan programme as a direct continuation of that executed by his father, rather 
than an entirely separate initiative. This suggests that the problem remained one of 
liquidity, a trend which, as has already been shown, was prompted by a requirement 
to support a higher number of soldiers at an increased rate of pay. The extra demands 
placed upon the Mauretanians by Caracalla in the Banasa inscription thus merit 
additional attention. In the course of his proclamation, the emperor declared that he 
was certain that the province would repay his indulgence and generosity by furnishing 
                                                 
420 Gorrie (2002) 461-81. 
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him with men for both the Roman army and civil service, in addition to the enigmatic 
‘celestial beasts’ (caelestium animalium).421 While there is no suggestion that the 
Caracallan tabula of Banasa was specifically designed to guarantee manpower for the 
army and civilian administration, it is noteworthy that such a demand is issued in AD 
216, in the period leading to Caracalla’s planned offensive against the Parthian Empire.  
 
The similarity between Severan and Caracallan monetary reforms, combined 
with this appeal for manpower from the Mauretanians in 216, suggests that there 
should be a connection made between the emperor’s fiscal and military reforms and, 
therefore, between the Antonine Constitution and Caracallan military policy, by 
implication. Such a hypothesis offers a rational explanation regarding Caracalla’s 
decision to debase the silver coinage while, at the same time, raising a number of taxes 
and exponentially expanding the number of Roman citizens in his empire. With this in 
mind, then, it is now necessary to assess exactly how far a link between the constitutio 
Antoniniana and the Roman army can be identified, and to what extent the edict was 
motivated by an imperial need to support the military apparatus. 
  
                                                 
421 AE 1946, 109, ll. 11-15. There has been much debate on the nature of the animals requested. For 




The Military Application of the constitutio Antoniniana 
 
 Military expenditure was a pillar of Severan rule from the outset. Septimius 
Severus’ bid for power had rested on the size and strength of the forces at his disposal 
and, as noted in the previous chapter, the evidence suggests that emperor was keen to 
reinforce this powerbase through a programme of reforms and an increase in basic pay. 
In fact, imperial spending on the army was perceived to be such a keystone to the 
dynasty’s survival that Severus is reputed to have given his sons a final instruction as 
he lay on his deathbed: ‘be harmonious, enrich the troops, and scorn all other men.’422 
This advice was taken seriously by Severus’ eldest son, according to our main sources 
for the period. Herodian, for example, criticised Caracalla for allowing his soldiers 
free-rein in looting temples and treasuries, a move that effectively wiped out the mass 
of wealth accrued by Severus.423 Similar claims can be found in the Historia Augusta, 
in which the author described Caracalla buying the support of the army through 
massive donatives.424 Finally, Dio alleges that the emperor engaged in excessive 
spending on the military, going so far as to accuse Caracalla of seeking out war simply 
to maintain his soldiers’ favour:  
 
Οὗτος οὖν ὁ φιλαλεξανδρότατος Ἀντωνῖνος ἐς μὲν τοὺς στρατιώτας, οὓς πάνυ 
πολλοὺς ἀμφ’ αὑτὸν εἶχε, προφάσεις ἐκ προφάσεων καὶ πολέμους ἐκ πολέμων 
σκηπτόμενος, φιλαναλωτὴς ἦν. 
 
Now this great admirer of Alexander, Antoninus, was fond of spending money 
upon the soldiers, great numbers of whom he kept in attendance upon him, 
offering excuse after excuse and one war after another.425  
 
 At the close of the previous chapter, I noted that there is some evidence to 
suggest that a link should be made between the economic and military reforms 
                                                 
422 Dio 77.15.2: ὁμονοεῖτε, τοὺς στρατιώτας πλουτίζετε, τῶν ἄλλων πάντων καταφρονεῖτε (emphasis 
added). 
423 Hdn 4.4.7-5.1. 
424 HA Car. 2.7-8. In this account, the author alleged that the emperor was required to offer considerable 
sums to the troops of the legio II Parthica, in particular, owing to the soldiers’ initially displayed loyalty 
to the murdered Geta in the aftermath of the assassination. The author further claimed that the 
legionaries actually prevented Caracalla from entering their camp at Albanum until they had been won 
over by the promise of payment.  
425 Dio 78.9.1. 
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undertaken by Caracalla. If Dio’s account on the matter is accepted, the connection 
would appear to be one of simple cronyism, in which the emperor lavished money on 
his troops in order to ensure their continued loyalty and support. While it is evident 
that the image of the soldier-emperor was a central facet of Caracalla’s self-
representation as an emperor, the notion that he sought to rapidly increase his tax 
revenue and coin stock for the sole reason of indulging his favourites is clearly the 
result of Dio’s desire to depict Caracalla as a tyrant and is, therefore, unconvincing.426  
 
 I would argue that, similar to engaging with Dio’s assessment of the fiscal 
significance underlying the Antonine Constitution, it is necessary to look beyond the 
inflammatory rhetoric employed by the senator, and investigate whether the military 
application of Caracalla’s edict contained another purpose that is not elucidated by any 
of our hostile extant sources. In recent years, an attempt has been made to examine the 
military significance of the constitutio, in which Rocco placed martial concerns at the 
heart of the emperor’s decision to extend the franchise, arguing that the edict was 
designed to address a perennial shortage of legionary recruits across the empire.427 
While his argument is problematic in areas, approaching the legislation solely through 
the lens of the military and, furthermore, accepting the indefensible inclusion of the 
dediticii in P. Giss. 40, it highlights an important potential facet of the constitutio 
Antoniniana, nonetheless. This chapter will therefore build on the research undertaken 
by Rocco in assessing the military application of Caracalla’s edict.  
 
As with the investigation of the economic importance of the constitutio, it is 
important to recognise that the military application of the edict was not a reaction to 
an unexpected or sudden turn of events. In fact, it can be argued that Caracalla was 
responding to a trend of inadequate recruitment that had been a problem for the 
imperial administration from the early years of the Principate. At the outset of this 
chapter, then, I will consider the factors that resulted in a low level of legionary 
volunteers, specifically the restrictive nature of selection criteria for service, combined 
with the socially and financially unappealing nature of service in the legions compared 
                                                 
426 For more on Caracalla’s self-representation, see Chapter Three. 
427 Rocco (2010) 131-55. 
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to other branches of auxiliary forces. By setting Caracalla’s reign against this wider 
context, I will demonstrate that the Antonine Constitution addressed the emperor’s 
military agenda in two distinct ways. In one respect, it overcame one of the most 
significant obstacles to recruiting men for the legions, namely that they had to be fully 
enfranchised. Moreover, the fiscal consequences of the constitutio Antoniniana also 
ensured that there was increased revenue for the military treasury, meaning that 
Caracalla could reform the army pay scale in a similar fashion to his father and also 
plan expenditure on offensives the northern and eastern frontiers.  
 
Obstacles to Legionary Recruitment  
 The Roman army was a vast organisation. Although forming less than one 
percent of the empire’s population, it has been calculated that around 400,000 men 
were serving within its ranks by the reign of Severus and, by AD 215, that the 
organisation cost the Roman state c. 1130-1190 million sestertii, a financial drain 
representing around three quarters of the imperial government’s total annual 
expenditure.428 Despite its prominence, however, it appears that there were simply too 
few men enrolling in the legions by the time of Caracalla’s principate. Assessing the 
number of recruits needed by the army on an annual basis is a challenging exercise. 
Scholars have been conservative in the past, with Le Bohec, for example, claiming that 
manpower levels could have been maintained with an intake of around 18,000 men.429 
Haynes was similarly cautious in his study of the auxilia, suggesting that auxiliary 
branches would only have needed around 10,500 men annually to maintain their levels 
at c. 215,000 during the first two centuries of the Principate.430 While it is fair to 
conclude that the army would not have required hundreds of thousands of recruits to 
sustain an acceptable fighting strength, I would argue that the figures postulated by Le 
Bohec and Haynes are artificially low. The issue with these conservative estimates is 
that they are based upon absolutely consistent numbers of men enlisting and 
demobilising in every year, and thus do not reflect the realities of military service, such 
                                                 
428 Erdkamp (2002) 5-7. 
429 Le Bohec (2000) 71. Also see Forni (1953: 30), who arrives at a similarly low figure by calculating 
an annual requirement of only 240 men per legion (6000 in total), and estimating a similar number to 
fill the auxiliary levy. 
430 Haynes (2001) 62-63. 
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as operational losses.431 Whatever the reality of this requirement, the literary evidence 
suggests that Roman government was often unable to fill the legions completely, even 
during the Julio-Claudian period. Tiberius, for example, is alleged by Tacitus to have 
complained about the shortage of men volunteering:  
 
Multitudinem veteranorum praetexebat imperator et dilectibus supplendos 
exercitus: nam voluntarium militem deesse, ac si suppeditet, non eadem virtute 
ac modestia agree, quia plerumque inopes ac vagi sponte militiam sumant. 
 
The emperor referred to the number of veterans [who had completed their term 
of service and were waiting to be finally discharged] and the need of fresh 
levies to maintain the strength of the armies. He said there was a shortage of 
volunteers and, even when they were forthcoming, they failed to display the 
same courage and discipline, since it was often the penniless and vagrant who 
enlisted willingly.432  
 
 It is of interest that Tacitus refers to the levies as dilecti, a description which, 
as Mann notes, is open to interpretation.433 Surviving evidence suggests that dilectus 
was employed in reference to both voluntary enlistment and reassignment, as well as 
conscription. Tacitus offers two examples of willing enrolment, for example, using 
dilectus in connection with Vitellius’ reassignment of legionary soldiers to urban and 
praetorian cohorts, and also in reference to the inhabitants of Rome begging the same 
emperor to be armed against the advancing armies of Vespasian.434 On the contrary, 
however, Tacitus also employs the term when describing a levy conducted by means 
of conscription.435 In fact, it seems that mandatory service was a key component of the 
dilectus during the imperial period. Further evidence to this effect can be found in legal 
writing, which suggests there was a traditional liability on the part of the citizen body 
to undertake military service.436 This is a significant point, since it demonstrates that, 
                                                 
431 It is, however, admittedly impossible to recreate a truly reflective model but, in failing to offer even 
an estimate of such attrition, these figures remain improbably low.  
432 Tac. Ann. 4.4 (tr. adapted from Jackson). 
433 Mann (1983) 49-50. 
434 Tac. Hist. 2.93-94; 3.58. Also see Mann (1983) 49. 
435 In describing the prosecution of Paedius Blaesus and his subsequent expulsion from the senate, 
Tacitus notes that part of the alleged offence committed by the senator was to accept bribes in exchange 
for finding reasons to excuse men from service. In the passage, Blaesus is explicitly accused of 
interfering with the dilectus through bribery and corruption. See Tac. Ann. 14.18.1. 
436 Dig. 49.16.4.10. In the legal treatise On Military Matters, Arrius Menander noted the traditional 
punishments, including reduction to servitude and even execution, levelled at ‘traitors to liberty’ who 
were found to have avoided such service. 
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while the emperors appear to have been reluctant to introduce an extensive programme 
of conscription, the state was unable to meet the manpower requirement of the legions 
through voluntary enlistment alone, and was often required to resort to a compulsory 
draft.437 In fact, the severity of this problem was so pronounced at times that a dilectus 
was required across a large geographical expanse, occurring, for example, in Africa 
and Asia, in addition to Italy and Narbonese Gaul, when raising men for the Illyrian 
legions created by Nero.438 In times of military crisis, there is even evidence to suggest 
that the army resorted to enrolling individuals usually ineligible for legionary service, 
such as sailors or even freedmen, leading to a distinction being made between the 
traditionally levied iustae legiones, and those raised from men of other branches of 
service.439  
 
 The extant evidence relating to recruitment demonstrates that the legions were 
often understrength and depended on unorthodox or irregular sources of manpower to 
bolster their numbers.440 Even at the height of imperial expansion under Trajan and 
Hadrian, the emperors were required to deploy vexillations from one legion to another, 
in order to address acute shortages.441 Given the nearly continual warfare on the 
northern frontier during the Antonine period, paired with the civil wars following the 
death of Commodus, this phenomenon has significant implications for the military 
situation that Caracalla faced as the sole emperor in AD 212. As a ruler who presented 
himself as a soldier-emperor, it is unsurprising that Caracalla would devote substantial 
sums to the maintenance of his army. The almost perennial difficulty experienced by 
the Augusti in filling legionary levies, however, means that we must hesitate before 
accepting Dio’s suggestion that the emperor’s military spending was the result of 
simple favouritism. Instead, we are faced with the possibility that Caracalla’s 
                                                 
437 Forni (1953) 19-20. 
438 Tac. Ann. 16.13. 
439 Forni (1953) 103. For examples of freedmen being enlisted during the early imperial period, see Dio 
55.31.1-2; 56.23.1-3. Also see Forni (1953) 105-7, 115, and Mann (1983: 53) who discusses the 
composition of the legio I Adiutrix levied under Nero, which included a high number of men previously 
serving in the Roman navy. This practice is also seen around the same time, with Vitellius and Vespasian 
drafting men from the fleets to fight in their legions during the Year of the Four Emperors. For more on 
this, see Tac. Hist. 3.55. For epigraphic and papyrological evidence recording sailors or auxiliaries being 
employed to augment legionary strength, see ILS 9095; P. Mich. VII 432; PSI 1026. 
440 Veg. 1.2-7; Mann (1983) 50-55; Forni (1953) 103. 
441 Mann (1983) 55, Tables 1 and 25a. Also see Eck (1999) 76-89. For an example of one such 
vexillations being deployed during the Bar Kokhba revolt, see CIL VI 3505. 
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expenditure and reforms (including the constitutio Antoniniana) were designed to 
improve the state of the Roman army that he had inherited from his father.  
 
 It is first necessary to consider briefly the question of why the imperial state 
was unable to ensure a satisfactory level of manpower within the legions. While 
external conflict represents an obvious drain, the pattern of insufficient recruitment is 
more significant and appears to have been largely a problem of the government’s own 
making. According to Vegetius, entrance criteria for legionary soldiers were severe.442 
The author claimed, for example, that there were a selection of moralistic standards 
required of legionaries, further arguing that a variety of professions, from fishermen 
to textile workers, should be disbarred from service.443 This sanctimonious position 
was not unique to Vegetius, with similar prohibitions preserved in the Digest and the 
Theodosian Code.444 These conditions appear to have been largely inflexible, even in 
the aftermath of military disaster, such as the catastrophic Roman defeat at Adrianople 
in AD 378.445 In fact, the penalties for anyone caught enlisting under false pretence 
were draconian; Pliny the Younger even mentions capital punishment being employed 
in some cases.446  
 
 Even more basic requirements served to further reduce the pool of available 
manpower. There was a minimum height restriction, for example, with no one under 
1.72 metres tall being classed as eligible for service.447 Arguably the best known 
obstacle to prospective legionaries, however, was that every soldier had to be a fully 
enfranchised citizen.448 This criterion has obvious implications for the available 
recruitment pool. Firstly, it reduced the potential number of recruits considerably since 
it has been established that cives represented a clear minority of the empire’s 
                                                 
442 It should be noted that, although Vegetius was writing significantly after the High Empire period and 
the Severi, he borrowed heavily from a variety of earlier treatises on the military. He thus created a 
‘scissors and paste mosaic’ of such writing and expanded sections to fit his own literary design. For 
more on this, see Milner (1993) xvi-xvii.  
443 Veg. 1.2-7. 
444 Dig. 49.16.2.1; 49.16.6; CTh. 7.13.8 (AD 380).  
445 Speidel (2012) 177-78. 
446 Plin. Ep. 10.29-30. 
447 Junkelmann (1986) 106-7. Also see Speidel (2012) 177-78; Rocco (2010) 139, and Forni (1953) 25-
26. 
448 Forni (1953) 103. 
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population, even in the immediate prelude to the Antonine Constitution.449 
Furthermore, a reliance on the already enfranchised populace would have resulted in 
the burden of legionary service being unevenly distributed across the empire, with the 
more heavily Romanised provinces experiencing the brunt of the dilectus.450   
 
 Another factor in the military situation pre-212 is that the evidence suggests 
that the very prospect of legionary service became increasingly unpopular among the 
minority of individuals eligible to enlist therein. At the heart of the problem appears 
to have been the fact that the basic conditions of service were progressively more 
unpalatable to the citizen population: ‘service was long, pay became more and more 
insufficient, and the meagre grants made to veterans were no recompense for these 
sacrifices.’451 The average length of legionary engagement was between twenty five 
and twenty six years.452 While this was the same as the lesser branches of service, the 
duties appear to have been more arduous, and the meagre wages of little 
recompense.453 Further to the practical considerations, it is also worth noting the social 
impact of legionary enlistment which, although arguably even more significant to the 
recruits (since the army wage was at least regular, if meagre), is more difficult to 
define. Recruits enlisting from the Romanised heartlands of the empire could be posted 
anywhere among the provinces, meaning that there was a significant chance that they 
would never see their families and relatives again. It is unsurprising, then, that 
individuals were prepared to bribe officials in order to escape the dilectus.  
 
 This problem was compounded by the fact that there were other routes to 
military careers also open to fully enfranchised citizens. They could apply to enlist, for 
example, within the urban cohorts of Rome, Lyons and Carthage. Unlike their 
legionary counterparts, the men of these formations enjoyed both shorter lengths of 
service and a better pay scale and grant structure for veterans.454 In addition, service 
                                                 
449 Garnsey (2004) 135. 
450 Haynes (2001) 63. 
451 Mann (1983) 49. 
452 Aug. Res gest. 16; Dio 54.2.6, 55.23, 57.6.5; Tac. Ann. 1.17.2, also see Forni (1953) 142-44; Le 
Roux (1982) 263. 
453 For more on legionary pay and benefits, see Tac. Ann. 1.17, 78.2; Suet. Nero. 32.1. How legionary 
service differed from that of the auxilia, in particular, will be discussed below. 
454 Le Bohec (2000) 20-21, 100; Mann (1983) 49. 
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in the urban cohorts was usually restricted to the locale of the formation in question. 
As a result, this option proved a more popular choice for cives, particularly from the 
Italian peninsula, and the urbaniciani never encountered a shortage of volunteers from 
which to fill its ranks.455 Service in the auxilia also presented a potentially more 
attractive alternative to the legions. In late antiquity, Vegetius noted that ever 
increasing numbers of men were enrolling within the auxilia, writing with some scorn 
that he believed those who enlisted in this fashion were actively seeking a softer and 
more comfortable alternative to service in the legions: 
 
Est et alia causa, cur adtenuatae sint legiones: magnus in illis labor est 
militandi, graviora arma, plura munera, severior disciplina. Quod vitantes 
plerique in auxiliis festinant militiae sacramenta praecipere, ubi et minor 
sudor et maturiora sunt praemia. 
 
There is also another reason why the legions have become diminished, the 
labour of serving in them is great, the arms heavier, the duties more frequent, 
the discipline more severe. To avoid this, many flock the auxilia to take their 
oaths of service, where the sweat is less and the rewards come sooner.456 
 
 Far from empty hyperbole on the part of Vegetius, the arduous nature of the 
plura munera found in the legions is also noted by Ammianus Marcellinus.457 More 
compelling evidence for a shift in the backgrounds of auxiliary recruits can be found 
in the epigraphic corpus. In his study of epitaphs belonging to named infantrymen and 
cavalrymen of the auxilia found in the Rhine region, Kraft has shown a visible change 
in the nature of the troops from the time of the Julio-Claudians to the end of the second 
century, with high numbers of fully enfranchised citizens found in both the auxiliary 
cohorts and alae.458   
  
                                                 
455 Mann (1983) 49. 
456 Veg. 2.3 (tr. adapted from Milner). It has been suggested by some that Vegetius might have been 
referring to the later formation of the auxilia palatina, see Formisano and Petrocelli (2003) 131; Milner 
(1993) 33. It has been acknowledged by these same scholars, however, that Vegetius’ source in this 
case was an older one, making reference to the traditional auxiliary organisation found under the Early-
High Empire period.   
457 Amm. Marc. 18.2.6. 
458 Kraft (1951) 79-81, 140-99. The cavalry alae had their own physical entrance criteria, namely a 
minimum height requirement. Those ineligible for service in these squadrons could still join the equites 
cohortis, who do not appear to have been regarded differently from the alae, except in terms of their 
armament. For more on the distinction between the two formations, see Ureche (2009) 331.  
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     Alae   Cohortes 
      Peregrini Cives   Peregrini Cives 
Julio-Claudian   48 7   44 0 
Flavian-Trajan   32 19   27 17 
Hadrian-c.AD 170   13 10   13 17 
2nd-3rd Century   0 38   3 43 
Fig. 6: Table illustrating the changing legal status among auxiliaries.459  
 
Haynes has suggested that this trend might be explained by the growth in 
military families, with sons following their fathers into the ranks.460 I would argue that 
it is equally possible that this data also reflects the natural expansion of the franchise 
observed during the Principate. Even with the potential impact of these two elements, 
the shift in the legal status of the soldiery from the start of the imperial era to the third 
century remains striking. In fact, this process appears to have prompted a change in 
the auxilia as a whole, with auxiliary and legionary units increasingly resembling one 
another in terms of basic equipment and tactical deployment.461  
 
The relative appeal of joining a static auxiliary unit is understandable in that 
the recruit would be enlisting in a formation whose members were likely already 
known locally and, like the urban cohorts, the location in which the troops would pass 
their engagement would be predictable. Furthermore, the difference in the pay scale 
between the legionaries and auxiliaries, a source of academic contention for decades, 
is now thought to have been almost negligible, with soldiers in the auxiliary infantry 
earning 5/6 of the legionary wage.462 It seems an insignificant difference considering 
the socially preferable terms of service demanded by the auxilia.463 Indeed the 
differential must have seemed increasingly negligible during the second century, with 
                                                 
459 Le Bohec (2000) 98, after Kraft (1951) 140-99. This pattern of increasing citizen enlistment is not 
unique to the Rhine, and can also be seen in other areas, such as the auxiliary cohorts of Dura Europos, 
for example. For more on this, see Gilliam (1965) 82-84. 
460 Haynes (2001) 67-68. 
461 Rocco (2010) 140; Strobel (2007) 267-78; Speidel (2009a) 283-304. For more on arms and general 
deployment, see Gascarino (2008). 
462 Speidel 1992 (2009) 349-80, particularly 370-78. Also see Jahn (1984) 53-74 and Speidel 2000 
(2009) 407-37, contra Alston (1994) 113-23, who argued that there was, in fact, no real distinction at 
all between the pay scales of the auxilia and the legions. Auxiliary cavalrymen similarly enjoyed a wage 
commensurate with their legionary counterparts. For more on this, see Speidel 1992 (2009) 357-58, 
(1994) 45, 56-59; Rocco (2010) 142-43. 
463 Le Bohec (2000) 25-29. 
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the legionary rate of pay set under Domitian remaining static in the face of increasing 
inflation.464  
 
A final point worth noting here is Vegetius’ observation that the rewards of 
service in the auxilia were more rapid and forthcoming than for those in legionary 
units.465 Although legionaries could theoretically be advanced to the staff of provincial 
governors and even the emperor, it appears that the membership of the singulares was 
primarily composed of men from among the auxiliary cohorts and alae.466 In a similar 
fashion to the praetorian guard, the soldiers of the singulares enjoyed a close proximity 
to the officials (including the emperor himself, in the case of the equites singulares 
Augusti) and were responsible for his safety; the importance of these units is clear.467 
Even more so than regular mounted divisions, the evidence suggests that the 
designation of singularis carried a level of social prestige simply unattainable in 
standard legionary service.468 In fact, soldiers in the singulares could achieve 
promotion to the position of centurion or decurion after only three years of service, 
compared to around fifteen years for a legionary soldier that did not possess equestrian 
status.469 
 
 The evidence relating to military enlistment in the pre-212 era demonstrates 
that legionary service was an unpopular choice among the citizen body. The 
availability of more attractive alternatives means that the hypothesis that many would 
opt against becoming a miles legionis is persuasive. Indeed, this has led Rocco to the 
conclusion that there were ‘recurring crises in the recruitment of native-born citizens 
joining the legions’.470 While I would argue that he has overstated the problem, 
inasmuch as there is no evidence to suggest that the legions lost their fighting capacity 
completely, Rocco is correct to identify that the trend was both persistent and would 
                                                 
464 For more on the financial uncertainty of the second century, see pgs. 74-79. 
465 Veg. 2.3. 
466 Speidel (1978) 6-11, also see Speidel (1994) 61-78.  
467 Speidel (1994) 61-63, also see Bingham (2013) 40-41. 
468 Rocco (2010) 144; Speidel (1994) 63-64; Speidel (1978) 36. The pride which accompanied service 
in the singulares can be observed in the wealth of epigraphic evidence commissioned by these soldiers 
(or their families) upon which the designation appears. For selected examples, see AE 2003, 1221; AE 
2004, 319; CIL III 1160; CIL III 3472, and CIL III 14693. 
469 Speidel (1978) 36; Forni (1953) 47-48.  
470 Rocco (2010) 144. 
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have been problematic for an emperor with any military ambitions like Caracalla. This 
is the context that must be borne in mind when evaluating the military significance of 
the constitutio Antoniniana.  
 
The Reforms of Septimius Severus  
 I argued in the previous chapter that in order to understand the actions of 
Caracalla better, it was necessary to consider those of his father. Similar to the 
impression of an economic recovery, the military situation appears to improve under 
Severus who, in addition to securing his dynasty’s grip on power by armed force, was 
able to raise three new legions, the I, II and III Parthicae, and wage two extended 
campaigns, in Parthia and Britain, the former of which was such a success that 
Mesopotamia was added to the empire.471 The reality behind these well-known 
victories, however, was that Severus was required to introduce a variety of reforms to 
the army, and to devote a vast amount of revenue to incentivising service in the legions 
and restoring an army that had been wracked by civil war.472  
 
 As I have already shown, there is evidence to suggest that the debasement of 
silver coinage that occurred under Severus should be associated with his augmentation 
of the army wage rather than an economic malaise.473 As the first emperor to raise the 
soldiers’ pay since Domitian, Severus increased the military wage by 100%.474 The 
hostile nature of the ancient writers towards the army is well-known and, consequently, 
caution must be exercised when assessing the underlying rationale of the emperor’s 
initiative. On the one hand, it seems unfair to swiftly condemn the policy as a reward 
for loyalty in the civil war, or as an obsequious bribe to ensure the army’s support of 
the family’s claim to power. On the other hand, it also seems unlikely that the pay 
increase was a wholly selfless or compensatory act, designed to correct a historical 
injustice regarding the stagnation of the legionary wage. In the context of an ongoing 
                                                 
471 For more on Severus’ new legions, see Mann (1983) 63 and Balty (1988) 91-104. For accounts of 
Severus’ military exploits, see Dio 75.9.4, 76.9-12; Hdn 3.9.1-12; HA Sev. 15.1-16.3. 
472 De Blois (2002) 95; Develin (1971) 687-95. 
473 See pgs. 79-82. 
474 Alston (1994) 115, has suggested that the wage reform only constituted a 50% pay rise, but the 
consensus supports the notion that Severus in fact doubled the Domitianic rate, see Speidel 1992 (2009) 
349-50, 366-71; De Blois (2002) 95-96.  
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struggle to recruit legionary volunteers, it seems likely that the Severan pay increase 
should be interpreted as an incentive to make the prospect of legionary service more 
appealing than it had previously been. This hypothesis is strengthened by the marked 
increase in silver coinage dating to the period and onwards found in military sites 
identified by Kemmers.475 As De Blois has noted, however, despite the large amount 
of capital seized in the aftermath of the Wars of Succession and Parthian campaign, 
the pay rise was not an initiative that the emperor could afford within the pre-existing 
monetary system: he lacked the plate but also, more importantly, the tax income to 
fund the wage increase without devaluing the denarius.476 It is doubly noteworthy, 
then, that we can observe an intensification in the annona militaris, since such payment 
in kind represented a convenient way to both ensure that the soldiery was well 
provisioned without exacerbating the issue of liquidity facing the imperial 
government.477  
 
 The army was a key factor in assuring the success of Severan rule, during the 
Wars of Succession and beyond. It is therefore unsurprising that Septimius Severus 
engaged in a programme of reforms designed to ameliorate conditions of service and 
thereby encourage greater numbers to enlist from the outset of his reign. These 
initiatives do not represent a successful end in themselves, though, and should rather 
be considered the beginning of a process of strengthening the Severan military 
apparatus. This was a particularly important requirement for Caracalla during the 
period of his sole reign, considering the significance of militaristic imagery in the 
emperor’s self-representation and the emphasis he placed on the army to the security 
of his rule in the aftermath of Geta’s assassination.478 
 
  
                                                 
475 Kemmers (2009) 148-49, especially Fig. 1. From a survey of 3827 coins discovered as site finds in 
a military context, 93% of this figure is comprised of precious metal coinage. This has led the author to 
remark that it seems likely that Severus’ wage reform probably altered the way in which the soldiery 
was paid, their salaries being distributed nearly exclusively in silver coinage. 
476 De Blois (2002) 95.  
477 For more on the annona, see Strobel (2007) 280; Lo Cascio (2005a) 153; Corbier (2005) 381; Speidel 
1992 (2009); Develin (1971) 693-95. 
478 For more on Caracalla’s actions following Geta’s murder, see Chapter Three. 
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The Military Application of the constitutio Antoniniana  
 The evidence suggests, then, that Caracalla inherited a military apparatus that 
had been somewhat stabilised by his father, but was hardly a dynamic organisation. 
While the programme of reform undertaken by Severus was partly effective in 
improving legionary enlistment, its success was far from complete. Papyrological 
evidence confirms that Caracalla chose to raise the basic rate of pay for the legions by 
a further fifty percent beyond the level set by his predecessor.479 Owing to the rapid 
nature of the army wage increase, one-hundred and fifty percent in less than twenty 
years, it is unsurprising that we find Dio depicting Caracalla as ruler obsessed with 
lavishing gifts on the military, alleging that the emperor declared that the continued 
security of Severan rule depended on the army, and that he intended to enrich the 
soldiery at the expense of all others: ‘Nobody in the world should have money but me; 
and I want to bestow it upon the soldiers.’480 It should also be noted, however, that 
there is evidence to suggest that the emperor was not alone in perceiving the army to 
be a crucial element in ensuring the continued survival of the imperial state. Ironically, 
some of the best material on this subject can be found in the midst of Dio’s highly 
critical work.  
 
Set in the context of the end of the Republic, Dio constructs a lengthy debate 
between Maecenas and Agrippa, ostensibly to inform Octavian regarding the mode of 
government that Rome should adopt.481 Rather than a faithful, or even simply 
hypothetical, rendition of a historical discussion between Agrippa and Maecenas, the 
debate is thought to outline many of the author’s own political views and attitudes, 
carefully positioned in the Augustan period to avoid making overt comments regarding 
his own political milieu.482 In the course of the dialogue, Dio emphasises the 
                                                 
479 Speidel 1992 (2009) 367-68. Speidel has employed papyrological evidence to demonstrate that, 
during the Severan period and its aftermath, pay rises took place under Septimius Severus, Caracalla 
and Maximinus Thrax. For selected examples, see ChLA 446, 495, and P. Panop. 292. If the pay records 
for this period are analysed and divided into individual soldiers’ wages, it can be shown that Severus 
raised the Domitianic rate by one-hundred percent, Caracalla raised the Severan rate by fifty percent, 
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480 Dio 78.10.4: οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων πλὴν ἐμοῦ ἀργύριον ἔχειν δεῖ, ἵνα αὐτὸ τοῖς στρατιώταις χαρίζωμαι. 
In this same passage, Dio claimed that Julia Domna reproached her son for such extravagant spending, 
to which Caracalla replied by inferring that the dynasty would never run short of money when the army 
was loyal to it. 
481 Dio 52.1-41. 
482 Adler (2012) 477-520; Hose (2007) 461-67. 
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importance of the army to the survival of the Roman state and the need for money to 
keep the soldiery in place:  
 
Πόθεν οὖν χρήματα καὶ ἐς τούτους καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα τὰ ἀναγκαίως 
ἀναλωθησόμενα ἔσται; ἐγὼ καὶ τοῦτο διδάξω, σμικρὸν ἐκεῖνο ὑπειπών, ὅτι κἂν 
δημοκρατηθῶμεν, πάντως που χρημάτων δεησόμεθα· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε οὔτ’ ἄνευ 
στρατιωτῶν ἡμᾶς σώζεσθαι οὔτ’ ἀμισθί τινας στρατεύεσθαι.  
 
From where, then, is the money to be provided for these soldiers and for the 
other expenses that will be incurred by virtue of necessity? I will explain this 
point also, prefacing it with a brief reminder that even if we have democracy, 
we shall in any case need money, of course. For we cannot survive without the 
soldiers, and men will not serve as soldiers without payment.483 
 
Two points should be noted here. The first relates to the assertion that the 
Empire could not survive without the army. While Dio also had the characters discuss 
potential reforms of the military, and despite his vehement dislike of the soldiery, the 
author conceded that they were nevertheless a necessity of the state.484 The second 
point relates to the observation that the army would not be able to function without 
sufficient pay.485 The concepts of the military apparatus, finances and state survival 
are inextricably linked.486 While he was openly critical of Caracalla’s spending on the 
army, even Dio reluctantly realised that a significant level of expenditure was 
necessary to ensure its loyalty, and to encourage men to enlist at all. Later in his work, 
Dio described a letter to the senate written by Macrinus, in which the usurper emperor 
bemoaned the predicament he faced of being unable to pay the troops the wages and 
donatives pledged to them by his predecessors, but realising that it was politically 
impossible to refuse the soldiery the sums that they expected.487  
 
Dio’s hostile account of Caracallan spending, then, masks the military reality 
that existed in AD 212. State expenditure on the army was regarded to form a necessary 
investment to maintain the security of the empire, and yet was becoming an 
                                                 
483 Dio 52.28.1 (tr. adapted from Cary). 
484 De Blois (2002) 91-92. For the section on the proposed restructuring of the army, see Dio 52.27. 
485 In fact, in the following section (52.29), Dio had Maecenas and Agrippa progress to discuss finances 
more generally. 
486 Hose (2007) 466. 
487 Dio 79.17-18. 
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increasingly severe drain on the economy. The troops’ wages may have been 
improved, but the resulting shortage of coinage had prompted a process of currency 
debasement.488 Moreover, the restrictive nature of the selection criteria based on the 
possession of the Roman franchise remained in effect, limiting the areas from which 
legionaries could be recruited. In this context, I would argue that the constitutio 
Antoniniana can be interpreted as an imperial response to the continuing dilemmas 
associated with the military apparatus. In fact, if the primary consequences of the edict 
are considered, it can be shown to address the problems outlined above in two distinct 
ways. Firstly, it circumnavigated the fundamental impediment to increasing the 
manpower pool from which to draw legionaries, namely that they had to be cives prior 
to their enlistment. While it is clear that a number of minor prerequisites for service 
still remained, the military application of the Antonine Constitution here seems an 
uncomplicated one; as Rocco concludes:  
 
The constitutio Antoniniana eliminated, de facto, with one single sweep, 
whatever legal obstacles (except the requirement of ingenuitas) that could 
jeopardize legionary service and practically abolished the need to recur to 
expedients such as the ad hoc concession of citizenship to peregrine every time 
that there was a scarcity of recruits.489 
 
 While it is true that the process of conceding citizenship on an individual basis 
cannot have been an overly arduous process, since no emperor prior to Caracalla seems 
to have been motivated to reform the system, the value of the constitutio in achieving 
greater efficiency, as well as exponentially increasing the available number of potential 
recruits, is irrefutable. The social aspect of this legislation must also be considered at 
this juncture. Another valuable dimension to the constitutio here is that, in expanding 
the franchise across the entire empire, the Roman state would not be reliant on the 
heartland provinces for their levies.490 Extant evidence relating to the origo of 
legionaries in the subsequent period suggests that the newly enfranchised population 
were not as sensitive to the perceived hardships of legionary service as communities 
that had enjoyed the rights of civitas for a considerable time, and were thus more 
                                                 
488 The debasement of coinage that occurred under Severus and Caracalla has been noted above in 
Chapter Four. 
489 Rocco (2010) 145. 
490 Rocco (2010) 144. 
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inclined to enlist in the legions rather than seeking alternatives or trying to evade 
conscription.491 This phenomenon is supported, for example, in the marked increase 
of provincials from the Thracian and Pannonian areas found serving in the Danubian 
legions during the course of the third century.492  
 
 The other potential military application of the Antonine Constitution is linked 
to the fiscal significance of the edict considered in the previous chapter, in which I 
noted that the vicesima hereditatum was doubled from five to ten percent and, 
furthermore, that it was levied against estates of varying sizes, even very modest 
ones.493 While a connection between this taxation and the army reforms of Caracalla 
might seem obscure initially, when the traditional purpose of the vicesima is taken into 
account, the significance of the levy to the emperor’s military apparatus quickly 
becomes clear. Indeed, the evidence suggests that the tax on inheritances was 
originally designed to support the requirements of the military treasury, the aerarium 
militare.494  
 
From the surviving literary record, it is clear that one of the key functions of 
this reserve was to fund the payment of discharge bonuses due to army veterans.495 
The extent to which the treasury was used to fund basic army pay, however, is a more 
controversial subject. I would argue that there is a difference here between modern 
assumptions regarding the purpose of the military treasury and what the ancient 
evidence actually suggests. It has been claimed, for example, that salaries were not 
paid from the assets of the aerarium militare, and that this treasury was only used to 
fund discharge bounties once the soldiers had completed their required period of 
service.496 The ancient writers, however, are far more open in their description of the 
connection between the vicesima, the military treasury and the Roman army pay 
structure. Suetonius claimed that Augustus introduced the taxation so that he would 
                                                 
491 Rocco (2010) 145. 
492 Forni (1953) 187-212. 
493 See pgs. 94-97. 
494 Rocco (2010) 136; Corbier (1977) 197-234; De Martino (1975) 897. 
495 It is mentioned in connection with this purpose in a number of ancient sources, see Aug. Res gest. 
17.2; Tac. Ann. 1.78.2; Suet. Aug. 49.4; Dio 55.25.2. For a modern association between the payment of 
bonuses and the vicesima, see Hassall (1987) 165-84. 
496 Corbier (1977) 198-99. 
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have ‘funds ready at all times without difficulty for maintaining the soldiers and paying 
the rewards due to them.’497 Dio also recorded that the levy was brought forth in order 
to assure the maintenance of troops, as well as their bonuses.498 Contrary to the modern 
notion that the aerarium militare was only utilised for discharge payments, the clear 
suggestion by both of these ancient writers is that the military treasury was also 
employed in the payment of the basic army stipendia.  
 
This combination of evidence has significant implications when considering 
the factors that prompted the emperor to introduce the Antonine Constitution. In 
addition to overcoming the primary legal obstacle preventing greater recruitment into 
the legions, the military purpose of the edict also explains Caracalla’s apparent desire 
to vastly increase his taxation revenue, a phenomenon that, until now, has lacked an 
explanation beyond the hostile allegations of financial irresponsibility and favouritism 
espoused by Cassius Dio. The simultaneous increase in the number of citizen tax-
payers and the doubling of a levy associated with the military treasury suggests that, 
in introducing the constitutio Antoniniana, Caracalla was not only encouraging greater 
recruitment into the legions, but was also legislating so that the government would 
have the necessary capital to maintain and pay the newly enlarged soldiery. In this 
sense, the constitutio represents an unexpectedly elegant solution to the military-
economic dilemma that had become more apparent as the Empire progressed. It is the 
inextricably linked nature of the military and fiscal elements of Caracalla’s legislation 
that has led Rocco to the conclusion that the edict ‘probably disguised aims primarily 
connected to the needs of the empire’s defence system.’499 While this position is 
generally correct, I would argue that even it understates the emperor’s intentions in 
passing the constitutio, since it largely neglects Caracalla’s evident military ambitions 
to extend the empire in the north and wage an offensive campaign against the Parthian 
Empire.500  
                                                 
497 Suet. Aug. 49.2: Utque perpetuo ac sine difficultate sumptus ad tuendos eos prosequendosque 
suppeteret, aerarium militare cum vectigalibus novis constituit (emphasis added). 
498 Dio 55.24.9. 
499 Rocco (2010) 135. 
500 A campaign that appears to have been inextricably linked to Caracalla’s self-association with 
Alexander the Great. For more on the emperor’s Alexander-mania, including its potential bearing on 




In summary, then, if the martial concerns facing Caracalla in AD 212 are paired 
with the economic implications of the edict considered in the previous chapter, the 
hypothesis that reforming the pre-existing military apparatus was a motivating factor 
in the emperor’s decision to promulgate the constitutio in AD 212 becomes 
convincing. As an emperor for whom identification and popularity with the army was 
a key foundation of his reign, it is entirely logical that Caracalla should continue the 
programme of reforms undertaken by his father and should attempt to address 
problems in the military apparatus that had become perennial by the time of his 
accession. There is no suggestion that the emperor was able to remedy completely the 
persistent issues facing the Roman army of the Principate. In fact, the eventual success 
or failure of Caracalla’s initiative here is beyond the scope of this study and arguably 
beside the point. The evidence supports the hypothesis that the emperor had his 
military apparatus in mind when promulgating the constitutio Antoniniana.501   
 
I have so far shown that Caracalla was prompted by a number of complex and 
interlocking influences when he introduced his edict in the first year of his sole reign. 
Far from any notion that it was the result of simple caprice on the part of the emperor, 
I have demonstrated that it is possible to identify both ideological and practical 
pressures that motivated him, ranging from a necessity to legitimise his position as 
sole emperor publically, following the murder of his younger brother, through to his 
desire to reform the army in order to bolster the legions and wage wars of expansion. 
It must still be remembered, however, that the constitutio remained a radical act, 
despite having a wholly rational basis. With this in mind, it is unsurprising that the 
promulgation and enforcement of the edict’s terms were not achieved without 
problems. These can be seen particularly vividly in the case of Alexandria in Egypt, a 
city visited by Caracalla at the end of AD 215, an episode synonymous with Caracallan 
brutality in our main literary sources. The following chapter will consider the events 
of this controversial visit in detail and will demonstrate that it is possible to identify 
the effects of the emperor’s constitutio in the atmosphere of tension and violence. 
  
                                                 




The constitutio Antoniniana and the Alexandrian Incident 
 
Following the promulgation of the constitutio in the latter half of AD 212, 
Caracalla left Rome, spurred, according to Herodian, by a guilty conscience arising 
from the murder of Geta and his followers as well as a number of other private 
citizens.502 Like his predecessors, Hadrian, Marcus Aurelius and Septimius Severus, 
Caracalla was to spend the majority of his sole principate in the provinces, either 
engaged in military operations or simply touring. After waging campaigns against the 
Alamanni and tribes on the Danube frontier, Caracalla travelled eastward through 
Thrace into Asia Minor, ostensibly following the route taken by Alexander the Great 
during his invasion of the Persian Empire.503 The emperor’s course of travel 
culminated in a visit to the city of Alexandria, the resting place of Caracalla’s idol.504 
Rather than forming the pinnacle of the emperor’s travels through the provinces of the 
eastern empire, though, the visit was to turn sour and eventually result in a slaughter 
beyond measure, according to the ancient sources.505  
 
While many scholars have written about the violence, the actual events of 
Caracalla’s visit to Alexandria and the subsequent carnage recorded in the surviving 
literature remain ‘elusive’.506 The precise details are so shrouded by uncertainty and 
controversy that, on one hand, Rodriguez has suggested that the fundamental veracity 
of a Caracallan attack and repression of the city may be questioned.507 At the opposite 
extreme, Rostovtzeff claimed that the incident was a ‘work of extermination’ in which 
Caracalla ‘treacherously and secretly killed off the young generation of Alexandrian 
citizens.’508 The fundamental problem regarding this apparent atrocity is that the 
majority of the extant evidence for it derives from an overwhelmingly negative literary 
                                                 
502 Hdn 4.6.1-7.1. 
503 For a discussion of the emperor’s route through Asia Minor and the problems with its reconstruction, 
see Johnston (1983) 58-76, contra Levick (1969) 426-57. 
504 For more on Caracalla’s fascination with Alexander the Great, see Chapter Two. 
505 Dio 78.22.2-3; Hdn 4.9.8. 
506 Fuhrmann (2012) 159, n.44. For some of the more recent works on Caracalla’s visit, see: Rowan 
(2012) 147-49; Rodriguez (2012) 229-72; Berenger-Badel (2005) 121-39; Favussi (1998) 251-56; 
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problems surrounding the episode, see Lukaszewicz (1993), particularly pp. 88-116. 
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tradition, characteristic of Caracalla’s reign in general. This has been further 
compounded by the apparent readiness of modern writers to accept passively what is 
clearly an imperfect source tradition and to label the disorder a ‘massacre’, tacitly 
implying that an offensive action was ordered by the emperor and executed by his 
soldiery.509 This acceptance of the status quo provided by hostile ancient sources 
seems indefensible since the very chronology of the events of AD 215-16 is in doubt. 
Although we are becoming better acquainted with the general circumstances of 
Caracalla’s visit, the likely sequence of events and their root causes remain more of a 
mystery.510  
 
I would argue that the so-called Alexandrian massacre narrative glosses over a 
far more complex and volatile social situation that may have been caused, at least 
partly, by the promulgation of the constitutio Antoniniana. Before any investigation to 
this effect can take place, however, the fundamental nature of the events and the basic 
chronology of Caracalla’s imperial visit must first be analysed. This is necessary both 
to distance the disorder completely from the traditional narrative based on Caracalla’s 
temperament and to offer a clearer view of the entire episode. Building on the recent 
work of scholars such as Rodriguez and Harker, this chapter will attempt to offer a 
new interpretation of Caracalla’s visit to Alexandria. Not only were the actions 
undertaken by the emperor reactive rather than pre-meditated, the evidence suggests 
that, whilst the killings might seem excessive with hindsight, the emperor was mindful 
of, and acted in accordance with, Roman law. The Alexandrians, for their part, were 
not simply victims or passive participants either. It will be argued that they engaged in 
rioting which posed a severe problem for the Roman provincial administration. 
 
Once the revised chronology has been outlined, some of the immediate 
consequences of the constitutio will be analysed in order to highlight the fundamental 
incompatibility of the edict with the rigid social and ethnic hierarchy present in Roman 
Egypt during the imperial period. It will be argued that the great levelling effect which 
lay at the centre of the constitutio Antoniniana served to fracture the pre-existing social 
                                                 
509 Harker (2008) 57, 131-33; Potter (2004) 143-44; Haas (1997) 13. 
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class structure and was not a popular initiative among the Alexandrian Greek 
population, whose privileged position within Egyptian society and exclusive access to 
the Roman franchise had been eradicated in one move by the emperor. It will further 
be argued that the non-elite classes would have suffered as a result of the fiscal 
demands inherent in the constitutio.  
 
Finally, specific attention will be paid to the imperial letter, preserved in P. 
Giss. 40, in which Caracalla ordered the expulsion of nearly all ethnic Egyptians from 
Alexandria. The traditional association of this document with the final repression of 
the city recorded in Dio is incorrect, based upon a flawed reading of the text contained 
in P. Giss. 40, III. Instead, it is possible to interpret this legislation in a similar fashion 
to other imperial orders issued during the course of the Principate, which demanded 
that individuals registered to different nomes within the Egyptian chora should return 
to their idia. This analysis offers a further link between the bloodshed observed in the 
early half of AD 216 and the constitutio Antoniniana, suggesting that Caracalla 
attempted to combat tax evasion among the rural peasantry and sought to enforce the 
fiscal terms of his edict during the course of his visit to Alexandria.  
 
The Massacre Narrative in the Literary Sources  
As with numerous other episodes from the history of the Severan period, much 
of the modern understanding of the events of Caracalla’s visit to Alexandria derives 
from the works of Cassius Dio, Herodian and the Historia Augusta. While all of the 
sources in question allege that the emperor ordered his troops to engage in a mass 
killing of the Alexandrian populace, they are all detached from the actual events, 
chronologically and geographically, and contain as many contradictions as similarities 
in the course of their descriptions of the violence and bloodshed.511 The fullest ancient 
account of Caracalla’s visit can be found in the work of Dio, who prefaces his version 
of events by stating that, despite Caracalla’s professed admiration for the place, the 
emperor ‘all but completely annihilated the entire population of Alexander’s city.’512 
In this account, even before his arrival in Alexandria, Caracalla had been made aware 
                                                 
511 Rodriguez (2012) 238. 
512 Dio 78.22.1: τοὺς ἐκείνου πολίτας μικροῦ δεῖν πάντας ἄρδην ἀπώλεσεν. 
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by an unidentified party that many among the Alexandrian populace commonly 
ridiculed him and publically implicated him in the murder of Geta. As a result, by the 
time of Caracalla’s arrival, Dio claimed that the emperor was merely feigning a desire 
to see and meet the city’s inhabitants, in reality seething, and only temporarily 
concealing his murderous wrath. 
 
Ὁ δὲ Ἀντωνῖνος, καίτοι τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ὑπεραγαπᾶν φάσκων, τοὺς ἐκείνου 
πολίτας μικροῦ δεῖν πάντας ἄρδην ἀπώλεσεν. ἀκούων γὰρ ὅτι διαβάλλοιτο καὶ 
σκώπτοιτο παρ’ αὐτῶν ἐπί τε τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα τῇ ἀδελφοκτονίᾳ, 
ὥρμησεν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρειαν, ἐπικρυπτόμενος τὴν ὀργὴν καὶ ποθεῖν αὐτοὺς 
προσποιούμενος. 
 
Now Antoninus, despite the great affection which he claimed to have for 
Alexander, all but completely destroyed the population of Alexander’s city. 
After hearing that he was ill-spoken of and ridiculed by them for a variety of 
reasons, not least of which was the murder of his brother, he set out for 
Alexandria, concealing his wrath and pretending that he wanted to see them.513   
 
Dio’s account of the subsequent massacre can be divided into two stages.514 
The first concerns the emperor’s dealings with a delegation sent to welcome him 
outside the city gates. Upon his arrival at Alexandria, Caracalla was greeted by some 
of the city’s leading citizens, apparently in the form of a Dionysiac thiasos, carrying 
‘certain mystical and sacred symbols’.515 As part of his deception, the emperor is said 
to have cordially received the men and feasted them, only to later turn on them and 
slaughter them all in his camp.516  
 
The second stage of Dio’s account begins immediately after the murder of the 
protoi, with Caracalla issuing an order for all inhabitants to remain indoors before 
sending his troops into Alexandria. Once inside the city walls, Caracalla is said to have 
engaged in a massacre of such magnitude that even he could not begin to quantify the 
figure of those killed.517 Dio claimed that trenches were dug for mass graves, in order 
                                                 
513 Dio 78.22.1 (tr. adapted from Cary). 
514 Rodriguez (2012) 235; Boissevain (1901) 400-401. 
515 Dio 78.22.2: μεθ’ ἱερῶν τινῶν ἀπορρήτων. 
516 Dio 78.22.2. 
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ἐν αὐταῖς ἐν αἷς τά τε βοσκήματα ἅμα τῷ θεῷ καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἑαυτῷ ἔθυεν. For more on this 
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to obscure the precise number of victims.518 In addition to the details of the bloodshed, 
Dio also gives the most thorough account of Caracalla’s subsequent punishment and 
repression of the devastated city, recording that all foreigners, with the exception of 
merchants, were expelled from Alexandria and their property was seized by the 
state.519 Other sanctions followed, namely the abolition of all public spectacles and 
messes (syssitia), and a further command that a cross-wall should be constructed in 
order to restrict the movements of the Alexandrian populace.520 Dio’s account of the 
violence concludes at this point, with the author claiming that Caracalla subsequently 
rewarded soldiers and praetorians for their participation in the engagement.521 
 
 Herodian’s account of the Alexandrian incident, similar to that of Dio, is 
described as a pre-meditated attack on the city in revenge for a number of slurs made 
by the population against Caracalla and his mother, Julia Domna. Herodian claimed 
that, among the numerous slights directed at the imperial family, the Alexandrians 
referred to Julia as Jocasta.522 This particular insult would have been cutting on two 
levels. Firstly, it cast Caracalla and Geta as Eteocles and Polynices, questioning 
Caracalla’s very claim to power. In addition, there was also an inference of an 
incestuous relationship between mother and son. Whilst most likely groundless, this 
accusation is commonly mentioned in late antique sources, at different intervals 
throughout the Historia Augusta, for example.523  
 
                                                 
controversial accusation, see Burns (1997) 6-17. Even if this is the correct wording of Dio and is free 
from any textual problems, it is more likely that this section is a rhetorical device, with the author 
employing θύω to form a negative contrast between the public piety shown by the emperor in sacrificing 
to Sarapis and the image of his forces engaging in significant violence and bloodshed across the city. 
518 Dio 78.23.1. 
519 Dio 78.23.2. 
520 Dio 78.23.2-3. It has been suggested by Buraselis (1995: 176-79) that the banning of the syssitia may 
have made reference to a number of guilds or collegia rather than public messes. Whilst this has been 
disputed by Favussi (1998: 251-56), I would argue that Buraselis is correct, in this case, since the term 
does seem to have been applied in reference to professional associations in antiquity. For an example, 
see IGRR I. 1122; Harker (2000) 152-53. 
521 Dio 78.24.1. 
522 Hdn 4.9.3. 
523 HA Sev. 21.7, Car. 10.1-4. The influence of the enigmatic Kaisergeschichte might explain the 
persistent repetition of this allegation, since it might represent a common source from which the later 
writers draw. For more detail, see Rohrbacher (2013) 149-52. It is interesting to note that Caracalla and 
Julia were not unique in being the subject of this type of jibe, a similar rumour being directed at Nero 
and Agrippina, for example. For more on this, see: Tac. Ann. 14.1-2; Whittaker (1969) 423, n.3. 
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Similar to Dio’s version, the Herodianic account of the visit can be roughly 
divided into two phases. The first stage of Caracalla’s visit recorded in Herodian 
appears to be wholly positive. After making public the excuse that his visit was simply 
to view the city founded by Alexander and to offer worship to Sarapis, the emperor 
appears to have been given a rapturous welcome to Alexandria on an unprecedented 
scale: Herodian mentions all manner of musical instruments being played, clouds of 
incense filling the air and the streets thronging with a number of grand processions to 
greet the emperor.524 Contrary to Dio, though, there is no mention of any delegation 
of the local protoi assembling to meet Caracalla prior to his entrance.  
 
 The emperor is said to have maintained his cordiality throughout the 
Alexandrians’ festivities until he noticed that the city was being crowded by a 
significant number of individuals from the surrounding countryside districts.525 It was 
this realisation, according to Herodian, that consequently prompted Caracalla to order 
an assembly of young men on an unnamed piece of open ground, another aspect of the 
visit not mentioned by Dio.  
 
συμπανηγυρίσας τοίνυν αὐτοῖς καὶ συνεορτάσας, ὡς εἶδε πᾶσαν τὴν πόλιν 
πλήθους μεγίστου πεπληρωμένην τῶν ἀπὸ πάσης περὶ αὐτὴν χώρας ἐκεῖ 
συνελθόντων, διὰ προγράμματος πᾶσαν τὴν νεολαίαν ἔς τι πεδίον κελεύει 
συνελθεῖν, φήσας ἐς τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου τιμὴν φάλαγγα βούλεσθαι συστήσασθαι, 
ὥσπερ Μακεδονικὴν καὶ Σπαρτιᾶτιν, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ἥρωος ἐπωνύμους. 
 
So he celebrated the occasion with them and participated in their festivities but, 
when he saw that that whole city was heaving with a vast number of people as 
the result of an influx from all over the surrounding district, he issued an order 
that all the young men should assemble on an open piece of ground, claiming 
that he intended to enrol a phalanx in the honour of Alexander which would be 
called after the hero, just as he had given a name to the Macedonian and Spartan 
phalanx.526  
 
                                                 
524 Hdn 4.8.8. 
525 Hdn 4.9.4 (tr. adapted from Whittaker). This element of the account may be linked in some way to 
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After assembling these men under the pretence that he wished to raise another 
phalangite formation similar to those he had already levied earlier in his imperial tour, 
Caracalla is said to have left the area and given his troops an order to strike, killing the 
men where they stood and the various family members accompanying them while 
other soldiers dug mass grave pits nearby.527 Unlike Dio, Herodian’s account is 
noteworthy for its mention of a number of Roman casualties in the course of the 
desperate close-quarters combat.528 With this picture of slaughter on a large scale, 
Herodian’s version of the Alexandrian incident ends abruptly. The author concludes 
his description of the visit with a standard rhetorical device, conjuring an image of the 
waters of the Nile running red with blood, before simply stating that the emperor 
returned to Antioch before commencing his Parthian expedition.529  
 
 Even Herodian’s often rhetorical account, however, offers more than the third 
ancient source: the biography of Caracalla contained in the Historia Augusta. The 
version of events offered by the fourth century biographer is positioned in the midst of 
the larger narrative of the emperor’s Parthian war, but is furnished with no other details 
to explain why Caracalla decided to make the trip to Alexandria. The brief account 
only concerns the massacre itself. It does incorporate some of the elements included 
by Dio and Herodian, namely the assembly of the youths (although the author depicts 
Caracalla haranguing those present) and the emperor’s declaration that he wanted to 
enrol all of those who were eligible for military service.530 Unfortunately, however, 
these elements are extremely condensed, giving the impression that the violence was 
all that characterised the emperor’s visit, rather than something which occurred only 
after Caracalla had spent some time in Alexandria. This aspect of the text can be 
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interpreted as an attempt by the author to forge a parallel between Caracalla and 
Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II (Physcon).531 It is highly unlikely, however, that this parallel 
is an original one, drawn by the author of the Historia Augusta.532 In general terms, 
then, it is clear that this source, like Herodian, offers insufficient evidence when 
attempting any analysis of the violence observed in Alexandria in AD 215/16.  
 
While Dio’s account represents the most detailed extant version of events for 
Caracalla’s Alexandrian visit, it is not without its own significant difficulties. The 
same issues which prevent a general acceptance of Dio’s account in other areas are 
immediately perceptible in connection with these events. The hand of Xiphilinus 
(among others), in epitomising Dio’s narrative, is highly visible throughout the 
account of the Alexandrian incident, to the extent that Rodriguez has expressed 
frustration regarding how utterly reliant we are on the monk for any substantial 
information deriving from this later period of Caracalla’s reign.533 This has led to 
significant confusion and controversy regarding the reliability of Dio’s narrative of the 
visit.534  
 
One such controversy surrounds Dio’s account of the imperial freedman, 
Theocritus, who is alleged to have provoked tension within Alexandria, prior to 
Caracalla’s arrival. Dio claims that in the course of a mission to make preparations for 
                                                 
531 HA Car. 6.3. For more on Ptolemy, see: Polyb. 34.14.6; Strabo 17.1.12; Rodriguez (2012) 237; 
Green (1990) 538-40. 
532 Here I follow Harker (2000) 148-49, (2008) 74-79. The potential influence of local, Alexandrian 
sources upon the extant accounts will be discussed in the following section below. 
533 Rodriguez (2012) 235.  
534 The epitomising of Dio’s work here has resulted in an internal confusion between different sections 
of Dio’s work. A good example of this is the reference made to Caracalla as the ‘Ausonian beast’. This 
nickname is noted at the end of Dio’s account of the Alexandrian violence, as recorded by Xiphilinus, 
after the emperor had consulted with an oracle: Dio 78.23.4 (= Xiph. 337). Earlier in Dio’s narrative, 
however, in a portion epitomised by Petrus Patricius, the same nickname is employed, in almost 
identical circumstances, only in reference to Pergamum: Dio 78.16.8 (= Petr. Patr. Exc. Vat. 147). It 
seems clear that this is the result of confusion among the Byzantine scholars rather than a genuine 
duplication of the oracular message. For more on Byzantine historiography, see Scott (2010) 251-62. In 
addition, Rodriguez (2012: 250-51) has noted the similarly problematic issue surrounding the absence 
of the slaughter of the youths from Dio’s account. In analysing Dio’s text, Bang (1906: 623-29) posited 
the theory that the author did make reference to the killings, only for it to be confused with Caracalla’s 
earlier campaign against the Alamanni, see Dio 78.16.5. This hypothesis was questioned by Roos (1915: 
195-202), who suggested that Herodian and the Historia Augusta author might have been inspired to 
write their accounts of Caracalla’s Alexandrian massacre by Dio’s account of the emperor’s repression 
of the Alamanni. Owing to the evidence provided by the Acta Heracliti (see below), however, I would 
argue that it is Bang’s hypothesis which is more likely, rather than that of Roos. 
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the imperial visit, Theocritus had many individuals put to death, including a procurator 
of the city (epitropos) named Flavius Titianus.535 Lukaszewicz has argued that the 
controversy prompted by the freedman’s actions had managed to sour the relationship 
between Caracalla and the Alexandrian elite, even prior to the emperor’s entrance into 
the city, and has attempted to establish a link between this episode and the ill-fated 
embassy to Caracalla referred to in the Acta Heracliti.536 This is an intriguing 
interpretation of the evidence, but it does not fit well with the accounts of Dio and 
Herodian, who were keen to stress the goodwill exhibited by the Alexandrians upon 
the arrival of Caracalla to the city.537 In fact, the inclusion of Theocritus, at this 
juncture, makes more sense if viewed as another tool for Dio to criticise the emperor 
by association.538  
 
The senator’s ever-present loathing of the emperor is obvious throughout the 
passage. In fact, the negative depiction of Caracalla during the visit to Alexandria is 
the only element that bears consistent similarity to the versions offered by Herodian 
and the Historia Augusta, summarised by Rodriguez as ‘crazed, bloodthirsty, and 
acting in a fit of rage verging on the irrational’, a deranged image that would not be 
out of place in connection with other ‘bad’ emperors such as Nero or Caligula, for 
example.539 It is exactly this polemical depiction of the princeps, approaching a 
caricature, which makes the accounts offered by Dio, Herodian and the Historia 
Augusta fundamentally difficult to accept. Furthermore, while these authors are 
                                                 
535 Dio 78.21.2-4. Although Thomas and Davies (1977: 61) have suggested that he may have been the 
Idiologos, the vague nature of the Greek term epitropos does not allow a confident conclusion regarding 
the precise office held by Titianus in Alexandria. 
536 The embassy is referred to as ἀπόρρητον: SB VI 9123, ll. 30-31. A connection between this and Dio’s 
account of the protoi is attractive, owing to the author’s use of the same word, referring to the quasi-
religious nature of the delegation, see Dio 78.22.2. On the other hand, the Greek at this juncture could 
mean that the embassy was not permitted by the emperor, or was otherwise unauthorised. Quite why 
this petition should be considered unspeakable or prohibited, though, remains unclear. It is possible that, 
if Dio is correct that the embassy was originally presented as a Dionysiac, religious group, that it was 
censured for attempting to petition the emperor about other, civic matters. In the Digest (50.7.16(15)), 
it is noted that ‘someone who is undertaking an embassy cannot present a petition about other affairs of 
his without the permission of the emperor.’ For more discussion regarding this embassy, see 
Lukaszewicz (1994a) 568; Rodriguez (2012) 239; Harker (2000) 148. Also see Lukaszewicz (1994b) 
87-95. 
537 Dio 78.22.2; Hdn 4.8.8. 
538 Dio (78.21.2) makes much of Theocritus’ lowly beginnings and his former profession as a dancer 
and theatrical performer. 
539 Rodriguez (2012) 237-38: ‘fou, sanguinaire, agissant sur un coup de colère presque irrationnel’. 
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generally damning in their portrayal of Caracalla, there seems to be something else 
occurring in relation to the events of 215-16, namely that the major literary sources 
appear to have drawn upon local, Alexandrian writers for much of their detail 
regarding the emperor’s visit to the city. I would argue that this factor is responsible 
for much of the negative depiction of Caracalla in connection with this episode.  
 
The Impact of Local Source Tradition on the Narrative  
While it cannot be argued that the city was entirely peaceful upon the 
emperor’s arrival in 215, it is possible that the warmth of Alexandria’s welcome 
towards Caracalla was exaggerated to make the subsequent bloodshed seem all the 
more horrific.540 With this in mind, it is also probable that much of the animosity 
supposedly felt by the Alexandrians towards Caracalla specifically was inserted into 
the different narratives of the imperial visit for dramatic effect. In the case of the 
literary evidence, it seems clear that the major sources for the violence have borrowed 
from a questionable chronology that was conflated and amended by local writers to 
forge historical comparisons that would blacken the image of Caracalla in the 
aftermath of fierce and bloody clashes between the local populace and Roman 
forces.541 Furthermore, the influence of the local literary phenomenon known as the 
Acta Alexandrinorum must also be considered, not only because the genre was 
especially popular during the Severan period, in general, but also because one of the 
trial scenes included in this collection concerns M. Aurelius Septimius Heraclitus 
Leontius, the prefect of Egypt in late 215.   
 
One example demonstrating the way in which local sources might have 
substantially impacted upon the major sources’ coverage of Caracalla’s visit to 
Alexandria can be observed in the emperor’s alleged desire to form a phalanx recruited 
from the Alexandrian populace.542 This is not the only phalangite formation which 
Caracalla is accused of levying; in the same passage of Herodian in which the 
Alexandrian unit is mentioned, the author claimed that similar formations had been 
                                                 
540 The extant evidence suggests that there was an outbreak of unrest either around the time of 
Caracalla’s arrival or early in his visit, see below. 
541 Harker (2000) 148. 
542 Hdn 4.9.4. 
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raised in both Macedonia and Sparta. Neither Herodian nor the author of the Historia 
Augusta (who mentions Caracalla enrolling Alexandrians) give any further detail on 
the process. The leap, therefore, from the assembly ordered by Caracalla to select men 
for an Alexandrian phalanx, to the widespread massacre claimed of the emperor is 
ultimately an unsatisfying one in all of the sources that include it. With this in mind, it 
seems probable that there was, in fact, some degree of historicity to Caracalla’s 
intended levy, but it is an event that has been deliberately confused with and connected 
to the massacre narrative in the Alexandrian source traditions by writers who were 
keen to blame the emperor for an unjust slaughter.543 
 
Part of this wilful distortion and confusion of the events seems to have been 
prompted by a desire on the part of the Alexandrians to compare Caracalla to the 
unpopular historical figure of Ptolemy VIII (Physcon), a comparison made reference 
to in the course of the brief narrative offered in the Historia Augusta.544 Harker has 
argued that the literary parallel was, in reality, drawn by Alexandrians themselves in 
response to the bloodshed of 215/16, rather than a connection made later by the author 
of the Historia Augusta.545 This distinction is of considerable importance, since it 
ultimately suggests that all of the major, extant works on the violence may have been 
affected by local sources that were understandably anti-Caracallan in nature. 
 
In a passage reminiscent of Caracalla’s alleged extermination of the 
Alexandrian youth, for example, Valerius Maximus claimed that in the course of his 
earlier repression, Physcon had ‘surrounded the gymnasium crowded with youths, 
killing all those inside, some with weapons, others with fire.’546 Similarly, if 
Caracalla’s repression of the syssitia recorded by Dio makes reference to professional 
associations rather than public messes, another parallel can be drawn with Ptolemy’s 
measures against associations such as the gymnasia and the politeumata.547 The 
comparison between the two rulers can be yet further emphasised, since Physcon is 
                                                 
543 Harker (2000) 154. 
544 HA Car. 6.3. 
545 Harker (2000) 103, 149. 
546 Val. Max. 9.2.5. 
547 P. Tebt. III.700. The king ordered the leaders of these associations to surrender their rights to selected 
properties on pain of death. Also see Harker (2000) 152-53. 
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claimed to have murdered a rival to the throne, an act that would allow an obvious 
parallel to be drawn with Caracalla’s later assassination of Geta.548 
 
This would not be the first time that the Alexandrian populace had forged such 
unfavourable historical comparisons between Roman emperors and past kings. In his 
description of Vespasian’s relations with the city, for example, Suetonius claimed that 
the Alexandrians compared the emperor to the unpopular Ptolemy X, nicknamed 
Kybiosactes – ‘salt-fish dealer’ – on account of his avaricious nature when Vespasian 
raised a number of  taxes in Egypt during his visit to the province.549 Indeed, although 
they make no explicit references, the Graeco-Roman authors appear to have been quite 
familiar with Alexandrian attitudes towards the emperors and have depended on them, 
to an extent, owing to their own distance from the events. In basic terms, they have 
allowed this local tradition to influence their own accounts relating to the city, a factor 
which helps to explain the way in which the imperial visit of Caracalla is described in 
the major literary sources. 
 
The influence of the Acta Alexandrinorum must also be considered here. 
Discovered at the end of the nineteenth century at Oxyrhynchus and in towns of the 
Fayum, the Acta papyri were primarily written from the latter half of the second 
century AD, reaching a peak in production in the Severan era, before declining sharply 
in the following years.550 Despite the poor state of their preservation from antiquity 
(none of the Acta have survived in complete form), there are sufficient remains to 
reconstruct the structure of the works. The extant texts are written in the form of 
minutes from legal proceedings, examples of a quasi-Stoic literary topos summarised 
by Fuhrmann as a series of ‘audacious denunciations of emperors by heroic men who 
would rather die than live dishonestly under tyranny.’551  
 
 In the Acta, Alexandrian characters are found depicted both among the 
prosecutors and in the role of the defendant; the trials usually result in more than one 
                                                 
548 The rival, in this case, was Physcon’s own son, Ptolemy Memphites, see Val. Max 9.2.5. 
549 Suet. Vesp. 19.2; Dio 66.8.2-9.2. 
550 Tcherikover and Fuks (1960) 55; Harker (2008) 139-41. 
551 Fuhrmann (2012) 140. 
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execution.552 Owing to their inflammatory rhetoric, it is important to understand 
exactly what role these works played in Romano-Egyptian society during the 
Principate. Until recently, it was supposed that the Acta were evidence of a subversive, 
anti-Roman movement among the Hellenic population of Egypt.553 A more likely 
theory, however, is simply that they were satirical pieces, designed to entertain and to 
depict Alexandria as a centre of culture and stoic honour.554 
 
 While the primary aim of the Acta was to glorify the city of Alexandria, it is 
important to remember that they are still an important part of the wider, local literary 
milieu, and are of value in analysing the interests and prejudices of the local citizenry. 
In the same way that the Acta are used as evidence of anti-Semitism, the fictionalising 
of certain specific cases might suggest the interest that the Alexandrian populace had 
for those trials in particular. On the other hand, however, caution is needed when 
analysing these texts, since the satirist’s work can obviously produce a markedly 
different impression of events from a more mundane source.  
 
This can be observed in the case of the Acta Isidori. Comparison of 
papyrological evidence following an embassy to Claudius, shortly after his accession, 
reveals two very different impressions of the emperor and the dialogue that took place. 
In the official letter from Claudius to the Alexandrians following the deputation, the 
tone of the emperor is even-handed. In response to the recent unrest between the 
Hellenic Alexandrians and the Jewish population, Claudius cautions both sides from 
engaging in further violence.555 This bears no resemblance whatsoever to the 
apoplectic tyrant observed in the course of the Acta, in which Claudius insults the 
                                                 
552 One of the most famous examples of this is the group of papyri referred to as the Acta Isidori, in 
which the emperor Claudius ordered the execution of Alexandrian defendants after a farcical trial, in 
which the Alexandrians argued vociferously with the emperor in the role as judge, see BGU 511; P. 
Cairo Inv. 10448; P. Lond. Inv. 2785 and P. Berol. 8877. 
553 Musurillo (1954) 273-76. This is a flawed hypothesis. Firstly, similar to the sporadic anti-Semitism 
which characterises some of the Acta, anti-Roman sentiment is often only a minor feature among these 
works. Secondly, the notion of a Hellenic subversion and resistance to the Roman government would 
infer that the readership of this literature was restricted to a Greek audience; it is clear from evidence 
such as P. Mich. 4800 that ethnic Egyptians owned and consumed works from the Acta genre. For more 
on this, see Harker (2008) 117-19.  
554 Alexandrian characters in the Acta often make reference to the honour and nobility of their families 
and city, throughout, see Harker (2008) 91-97. 
555 P. Lond. 1912, ll. 73-108. 
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Alexandrian delegation by, among other things, labelling Isidorus the son of a dancer 
before eventually condemning him and Lampon to death.556 In fact, a negative and 
tyrannical depiction of the emperors forms a typical element of the Acta dialogues.557 
 
 Owing to the fact that the Acta Heracliti, considered in more detail below, 
details a trial scene in the midst of Caracalla’s visit to the city, the prominence of the 
Acta literature must be considered when examining the problematic source traditions 
underlying the Caracallan massacre narrative.558 Although fragmentary, the fury of the 
emperor is evident, in a similar fashion to others portrayed in the course of the Acta. 
Indeed, this depiction of imperial anger may have partly fuelled the tyrannical image 
of Caracalla observed in the major contemporary sources who, it has been established, 
were reliant on second-hand information for much of their testimony regarding the 
events of 215-16.559  
 
With these factors in mind, it would seem that Harker is correct in asserting 
that Caracalla’s visit to Alexandria led to the creation of ‘numerous, conflicting local 
traditions, traditions that became incorporated into the equally conflicting accounts of 
the mainstream ancient historians.’560 From these divergent authors, it is difficult to 
form a coherent, let alone credible, narrative. Fortunately, however, the sources 
mentioned above are not the only ones to recount the emperor’s actions in the city. By 
examining other evidence connected to the violence, it is possible to reconsider the 
very nature of the incident, reassessing Caracalla’s actions in more general terms of an 
imperial response to rioting and widespread civil disobedience rather than a pre-
meditated and merciless slaughter.561 
 
  
                                                 
556 CPJ II. 156a and 156d. 
557 Commodus, for example, is described as being tyrannical, dishonest and crude in comparison to 
Marcus Aurelius, see CPJ II 159b, ii. 7-13. Also see Tcherikover and Fuks (1960) 99-100. Even ‘good’ 
emperors, such as Trajan are subject to such criticism, the optimus princeps being accused of favouring 
the Alexandrian Jews at the expense of the Hellenic population, see CPJ II 157, ii. 27-35.  
558 SB VI 9213; P. Bon. 15. Also see Shelton (1980) 179-82. 
559 The interrogation of the prefect Heraclitus by Caracalla found in the Acta will be considered below. 
560 Harker (2000) 156. 
561 Fuhrmann (2012) 158-59. 
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Evidence for Civil Disobedience and Disorder  
Although a much later source, it is possible to identify another perspective on 
the violence of AD 215/16 in the work of Eusebius, whose writing undermines the 
image of Caracalla as a bloodthirsty mass-murderer.562 In the course of relating key 
moments in the life of Origen (c.184-253), the ecclesiastical historian made reference 
to a ‘considerable war’ occurring in Alexandria, prompting the early church father to 
flee the city and head to Palestine.563 While Eusebius’ pro-Christian perspective must 
be taken into account, in addition to his distance from the events, the historian’s choice 
of language during this passage is of interest.564 Rather than criticising Caracalla or 
characterising the violence as a pre-meditated and barely provoked assault by the 
emperor, Eusebius instead refers to the unrest as a ‘war’ (polemos). Such a word choice 
might appear to be an idiosyncrasy, since the violence in Alexandria was neither the 
result of a civil war nor of any aggression from a foreign power, but this choice is 
arguably more important than it would initially seem. If other sources from the period 
are compared, it becomes clear that the Latin equivalent, bellum, was used by authors 
to describe significant clashes between riotous crowds and Roman soldiers.565  
 
Eusebius was hardly a pro-Severan author or generally uncritical of the 
dynasty. At the beginning of the sixth book of his Ecclesiastical History, for example, 
he includes a critical account of the persecution of Christians undertaken by Septimius 
Severus at the opening of the third century. With this fact in mind, it is telling that 
Eusebius chose not to describe the unrest in Alexandria under Caracalla in similarly 
hostile terms. It could be argued that the use of polemos in reference to the violence of 
AD 215/16 was the result of a critical choice on the part of the author, referring to a 
particularly intense period in which there were running clashes between rioters and 
Roman troops, rather than simply a consequence of an overly hasty description of the 
events which prompted the flight of Origen from Egypt. 
                                                 
562 Rodriguez (2012) 238-39.  
563 Euseb. Hist. Eccl. 6.19.16: οὐ σμικροῦ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ἀναρριπισθέντος πολέμου. 
564 For more on Eusebius’ own context, see Irshai (2011) 25-38; Chesnut (1986) 1-31. It should be noted 
here that while Eusebius was himself far removed from the events of the early third century, it has been 
shown that portions of the Ecclesiastical History are based upon contemporary sources; he had access 
to the letters of Origen, for example. For further details, see Carriker (2003) 37-74. 




 The idea that the supposed massacre ordered by Caracalla took place within 
the context of a wider civil revolt would also appear to be accepted by another later 
author, the Byzantine chronicler George Syncellus. In the course of his Corpus 
Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae, Syncellus records Caracalla’s visit to Alexandria. 
Similar to Eusebius, the violence is not characterised as a pre-meditated attack, but 
rather as a response to widespread civil unrest, labelled a stasis by the chronicler.566 
While it would be easy to dismiss these descriptions owing to the sheer amount of time 
that had elapsed between the Late Antique or Byzantine texts and those written closer 
to the events, it is important to note that it is unlikely that these later sources were 
entirely disconnected from the earlier literature. Even Dio’s account of the violence 
may not have been quite as sweeping as the epitome offered by Xiphilinus suggests. 
If the versions of Xiphilinus and Patricius are compared, it becomes clear that Dio may 
have actually specified those whom Caracalla claimed to have killed in the course of 
his letter reporting the violence to the senate. It is well-known that in the Dio account 
epitomised by Xiphilinus, the emperor made no attempt to detail how many individuals 
had been slaughtered, since every one of them had deserved to suffer the same fate.567 
If the epitome offered by Petrus Patricius is consulted, however, there is one obvious 
difference in the account of Caracalla’s report to the senators. In the latter version, the 
emperor shows a similar lack of sympathy for the number killed during the course of 
his action, but the author claims that it was not the population at large that were killed; 
rather a large number of contract-workers (ergolaboi) present in the city were put to 
death.568 
 
                                                 
566 Syncellus CSHB 19 (Niebuhr p.672): διὰ στάσιν δημοτικήν. The similarity between Syncellus and 
Eusebius in this case could be explained, to some extent, by the fact that Syncellus appears to have 
consulted Eusebius’ text for much of his own chronography. It should be noted, though, that while he 
utilises the same Graeco-Roman literary sources as Eusebius, Syncellus often engages with them in a 
more detailed and critical manner. Furthermore, he employs Jewish and early Christian writers in his 
corpus that are entirely absent from Eusebius’ work. For more detail on the question of Syncellus’ 
sources, see Adler and Tuffin (2002) lxi-lxix. With this in mind, Syncellus’ description of the unrest in 
Alexandria, although far removed from the events, should be considered as a separate account rather 
than a mere copy of the text of Eusebius.  
567 Dio 78.22.3. 
568 Petr. Patr. Exc. Vat. 149. Also see Rodriguez (2012) 241-43; Harker (2000) 151-52. 
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 The historicity of the supposed massacre found in the literary sources can be 
further questioned if other forms of evidence are consulted.569 A dedicatory votive 
inscription was found at Alba, commissioned by an officer in the legio II Parthica, C. 
Cassius Severianus, upon his return to his garrison, and probably produced during the 
reign of Elagabalus.570 Among the more formulaic portions of the dedication to Jupiter 
Optimus Maximus, the soldier thanks the genius of the emperor for their divine 
protection during his recent tour of duty.  
 
[Iovi] O[ptimo Maximo] (vel sim.)  
[Pr]o s[alute et reditu] 
Imp. Cae[s. [[M. Aureli Anto-]] ] 
[ [[nini Pii Felicis Aug.]] ] 
5) [ [[et M. Aureli Alexandri]] ] 
      nobilis[si]mi [Caesar.] 
 C. Cassiu[s S]ever[ianus (vel sim.)] 
 Praep(ositus) Militum [--]  
 Leg(ionis) II Parthicae [[Antoniniae]]  
10) p(iae) f(elicis) f(idelis) aet(ernae), eiusdemq. [leg.]  
 princeps et primuspil(us)  
 et quod Alexandriae  
 cum 7 (centurio) ageret in pericu- 
 lis constitutus numi- 
15) ne eius adiuvante libera- 
 tus sit ex voto posuit.571 
 
  
                                                 
569 One piece of evidence that must be dismissed from this discussion before an examination can begin 
is the numismatic evidence claimed by Burns (1997: 6-17) to form a Caracallan justification of the 
massacre (RIC 257a and 257b). Whilst the choice of a crocodile motif to represent Egypt had become 
unusual by the third century AD, it is unlikely that this coin makes subtle reference to the violence. The 
appearance of TR P XVIII in the reverse inscription means that the coin must have been struck during 
215 rather than later. As a result, it is more likely that this coin type marked the emperor’s arrival in the 
province, in a similar style to Hadrian’s series of adventus coinage. For the dates of Caracalla’s 
tribunician powers, see Kienast (2004) 163. 
570 AE 1993, 422. For more on the discovery and publication of the inscription, see Bruun (1995) 9-27; 
Tofini and Chiarucci (1994) 37-48. 
571 AE 1993, 422. This edition follows that of Bruun (1995: 26-27) in which the emperors whose names 
were inscribed before being subsequently erased were Elagabalus and Alexander Severus, contra Tofini 
and Chiarucci (1994: 37-48) who claimed that the inscription bore the names of Severus, Caracalla and 
Geta. The later dating seems the more likely owing to the fact that the restoration of three emperors’ 
names and titulature here does not fit with the probable number of letter spaces in each lacuna and 
erased portion. The salutation of Elagabalus is made further likely by the appearance in the tenth line 
of the epithets pia fidelis felix aeterna, bestowed onto the Alban legion by the emperor from AD 220; 
for other examples of these epithets appearing in the epigraphic corpus, see CIL VI 3734, VI 31058, 
XIV 2257; Bruun (1995) 20. 
137 
 
To Jupiter Optimus Maximus, for the salvation and [safe] return of Emperor 
Caesar Marcus Aurelius Antoninus Augustus and Marcus Aurelius Alexander, 
the most noble Caesar. Gaius Cassius Severianus, commander of the soldiers 
and chief centurion of the dutiful, blessed and ever-loyal Legion II Parthica 
Antoniniana, who, when he was acting as a centurion in Alexandria and 
experienced danger, was delivered by the help of the emperor’s genius, set this 
up in fulfilment of a vow. 
 
Owing to the dating of the inscription between June 221 and March 222, it 
seems incontrovertible that the great danger being described by the centurion is in 
reference to the events of Caracalla’s visit to the city in 215/16.572 While the actual act 
of commissioning a pro salute imperatoris inscription is hardly noteworthy in itself, 
since the vast majority of them are brief and lack information other than the name and 
position of the dedicant, the level of detail present in this example is more striking. In 
addition to the thanks given to the gods for the health and safety of Elagabalus and 
Alexander Severus, Servianus chose to publically display his gratitude for divine 
protection against danger during his time as a centurion in the Alban legion, serving 
in Alexandria.573 This can only suggest that Severianus perceived the events of 215-
16 to be among the most significant engagements of his tour in the eastern provinces, 
including the war against Parthia and the civil conflict between Severan forces and 
those of Macrinus. Furthermore, the officer’s impression of the violence would seem 
to fit with other papyrological evidence relating to the unrest, in which troop 
movements around the city are recorded.574 The evidence provided from the Roman 
perspective, then, from individuals who were actively involved in the events which 
                                                 
572 Bruun (1995) 12-13; Rodriguez (2012) 245. The length of time between the events in Alexandria 
and the erection of the pro salute might prompt question regarding the delay in offering the fulfilment 
of a vow, but it seems incontrovertible that the legio II Parthica did not return to Rome until after the 
civil war between Macrinus and Elagabalus, and reached Albanum at the same time as Elagabalus’ 
entrance to Rome in 219 at the very earliest, see Bruun (1995) 26. In support of this theory, is it 
important to note that the centurion from the legio II Parthica is not an isolated case; a soldier from the 
cohors X praetoria similarly erected a pro salute under Elagabalus and Severus Alexander around 220-
21 after initially departing Rome in 214, see CIL VI 323, ll. 2-3:  pro salute dd(ominorum) nn(ostrorum) 
Imp(eratoris) Caes(aris) M(arci) Aur(eli) Antonini P(ii) F(elicis) Aug(usti) et / M(arci) Aur(eli) 
Alexandri nobilissimi Caes(aris). It would appear, then, that Bruun (1995: 26) is correct to assert that 
this phenomenon is indicative of the units in question fulfilling their vows at their first convenience 
upon returning to Italy following service overseas. 
573 AE 1993, 422, ll. 12-14: et quod Alexandriae cum (centurio) ageret in periculis. 
574 P. Brooklyn Museum 24. In the course of this document, there are mentions of troops being killed or 
wounded in action, and a record of an order by the prefect, Heraclitus, to move men between different 
units in the city, possibly in response to the losses and subsequent manpower shortages. For more on 
this, see Thomas (1977) 50-61. 
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unfolded in Alexandria, suggests that the accepted massacre narrative is unreliable. 
Rather than the Roman forces descending upon Alexandria and slaughtering the 
defenceless population, as Rostovtzeff claimed, I would argue that Alexandrians were 
active participants in the confrontation; the clashes between them and the legionaries 
were fiercely fought by all, and resulted in a substantial loss of life on both sides.575  
 
Evidence from the Downfall of Heraclitus  
It is into the context of a significant level of rioting and public disorder that 
two items of papyrological evidence can be set. Both of these texts support the 
hypothesis that there was an outbreak of violence either around the time of Caracalla’s 
arrival in Alexandria or during the early period of his visit. Also referred to as the Acta 
Heracliti, SB VI 9213 derives from the early half of the third century, and appears to 
make reference to Caracalla leading a cognitio extra ordinem in response to a recent 
riot observed in Alexandria. The papyrus originates from Hermopolis Magna and 
ostensibly records the minutes of a trial of the prefect of Egypt, M. Aurelius Septimius 
Heraclitus Leontius (referred to henceforth as Heraclitus), focusing on his poor 
management of the early outbreak of disorder.576 Although the papyrus has suffered 
severe damage to both columns of text, it is still possible to identify mentions of a fire, 
of individuals sustaining injury, reports of temple robberies, and the destruction of a 
number of statues.577 The role that slaves played in the disorder is also discussed in the 
course of the text.578 The exchanges between the emperor and Heraclitus become more 
heated, likely culminating in the execution of the prefect.579  Although the text is 
heavily damaged, it does suggest some form of quick-fire exchange between the men, 
Heraclitus compelled to respond to an aggressive interrogation by Caracalla:  
 
  
                                                 
575 Rostovtzeff (1957) 417. 
576 There is an emendation included in the margin of the recto of the papyrus, suggesting that the title 
ought to read Κ⟨αῖσαρ⟩ πρὸς [Ἡρά]κλειτου, see Harker (2000) 101; Musurillo (1954) 79. 
577 SB VI 9213, col.i, ll. 5-8. For a transcription of the papyrus, see Benoit and Schwartz (1948) 18-20; 
see too Lukaszewicz (1990b) 129. 
578 Col. ii, ll. 1-10. Also see Harker (2000) 102. 
579 Col. i, ll. 9-18 (particularly ll. 9-11). 
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Ἀντωνῖνος Σεβαστὸς εἶπεν·] ἐκέλευσας οὖν [. . . . . . . . . . .]. . .ναι ἢ οὔ; Ἡράκλει- 
τος εἶπεν· οὐκ ἐκέλευσα     ]ναι, ἀλλὰ μετε[                      τ]οῖς ἐντοτέροις . .  
                Ἀντωνῖνος Σεβας]τὸς εἷπεν· ἀπεκ[ c. 10            Ἡράκλειτος ε]ἶπεν· οὐκ ε .  
   
[Antoninus Augustus said:] ‘So you have ordered [….] to be […?…]?’ 
Heracli[tus said: ‘I did not order…] to be […?…], but […?…]’  
 
[Antoninus Augus]tus said: ‘You have killed(?) […?…]’ 
[Heraclitus sa]id: ‘I did not […?…]580  
 
 Similarly, P. Bon 15, probably deriving from Alexandria, appears to record an 
imperial edict of Caracalla referring to the recent unrest.581 The papyrus itself survives 
only as a narrow strip, preserving a fraction of the text of a central column of the 
edict.582 Despite the extensive damage to the artefact, it is still possible to identify 
elements of the edict which seem to make reference to the violence in Alexandria 
during Caracalla’s visit. There are references to statues (εἰκό[να]ς: l.4), the setting of 
a fire (πυρὶ κα[τέκα]υσαν: l.10) and possibly a large number of outsiders being 
implicated (πάντων ξ[ένοι(?)]: l.6). All of these elements appear to have aroused fury 
in the emperor (ἀγανάκτω: l.4).  
 
These sources are not without their own controversy. P. Bon 15, for example, 
despite attempting to appear contemporary to Caracalla’s reign, was likely written in 
the period following his death, a factor which inevitably casts doubt on the likelihood 
of its forming a verbatim copy of an authentic Caracallan document.583 The Acta 
Heracliti are even more controversial since, despite Musurillo’s fervent claim that the 
papyrus represents nothing more than ‘a copy of an official protocol’, it seems clear 
that there are demonstrable, thematic similarities between SB VI 9213 and other texts 
comprising the Acta Alexandrinorum, leading Harker to the conclusion that the Acta 
Heracliti were, in significant part, a work of fiction and should be included as part of 
                                                 
580 SB VI 9213 I, ll. 9-11, tr. adapted from Harker (2008) 77. 
581 Harker (2000: 103) has also noted that the possibility that it may also record some form of trial scene 
similar to SB VI 9123. There is a problem with this conclusion, though, since the opening lines of this 
document are not reminiscent of a trial scene. Instead, they are a formulaic presentation of Caracalla’s 
titles. 
582 Montevecchi (1953) 58-59, also see Rodriguez (2012) 243-44. 
583 The inclusion of the title Adiabenicus Maximus is problematic. It was never used during the 
emperor’s lifetime, but was employed in reference to him, posthumously, by Elagabalus, see Harker 
(2000) 104; Bureth (1964) 102-104. 
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the general Acta literature.584 This conclusion evidently limits the extent to which the 
reader can to accept the precise text extant in both of these items as evidence of the 
trial. 
 
Despite this controversy, however, it would appear that the fundamental facts 
contained within these works are based upon historical events.585 Of particular interest 
here is the brief tenure of Heraclitus in the role of Prefect of Egypt. The earliest 
surviving attestation of Heraclitus in office dates to around March 215.586 By the end 
of the same year, however, it is clear from the papyrological record that Heraclitus had 
been removed from office. This appears to have been done in considerable haste, as 
his subordinate, Aurelius Antinous (formerly a iuridicus), was installed as acting 
prefect until a permanent replacement could be found in the form of L. Valerius 
Datus.587 In the context of Caracalla’s arrival in Alexandria at the end of 215 and the 
suggestion of rioting found in the papyri, it seems most likely that there was some 
manner of trial examining the prefect’s response to the unrest and that he was removed 
from office, probably executed, as a direct result of the proceedings later dramatized 
by the author of the Acta Heracliti. In fact, this enquiry might have seen the emperor 
react to the prefect’s ineptitude or inability to respond to the recent unrest by 
condemning Heraclitus for a dereliction of his duties and imperium under the terms of 
the lex Iulia de maiestate.588 The evidence relating to the trial and dismissal of 
                                                 
584 Musurillo (1954) 232; Harker (2008) 77-79, (2000) 102-103. The Acta Heracliti seem to form a 
fairly standard text in this respect. The role of the prosecutor being occupied by Alexandrian characters 
is a common feature; the heated verbal exchanges between the participants in the trial is also typical (in 
CPJ 158a, for example in the Acta Pauli et Antonini); slaves and tradesmen agitating on behalf of their 
masters or patrons was a common feature especially among the Acta literature of the first century AD 
(see P. Oxy XXII 2339; P. Mil. Vogl. II 47, and CPJ II 158a and b for selected examples). Harker has 
even linked the centrality of Sarapis to this trial to the more generally aretological literature about the 
deity which features in other Acta literature, although this point is less explicit. 
585 Rodriguez (2012) 244. Rodriguez argues that the inclusion of this episode in the Acta suggests that 
the trial generated considerable level of local interest at the time. Whilst this is clearly not sufficient 
evidence to prove the historicity of the trial, other evidence can be employed to support the hypothesis 
that the fundamental events prompting the trial were genuine, see below. 
586 BGU 362, also see Harker (2000) 153; Brunt (1975) 147; Reinmuth (1967) 111. 
587 For an attestation of Antinous, see P. Reinach 49.6 (= W. Chr. 209), for that of Datus, see BGU 159; 
Reinmuth (1967) 111. 
588 There is a the section of the Digest which outlines the conditions under which a Roman magistrate 
could technically fall foul of the law on treason, see Dig. 48.4.3 (Marcian). The law condemned any 
official ‘who has abandoned his imperium or an army of the Roman people’ (quiue imperium 




Heraclitus as Prefect of Egypt at the close of AD 215 lends credence, then, to the 
hypothesis that, rather than Caracalla massacring the population without warning, 
there was a significant outbreak of civil violence during the course of the emperor’s 
visit to Alexandria.   
 
While the trial of Heraclitus begins to allow us to alter the overall image of the 
Alexandrian incident from a merciless slaughter to something more mundane, albeit 
still costly in lives, there is another issue which becomes immediately apparent upon 
closer examination. It has already been established that the violence prefiguring the 
downfall of the prefect has a terminus ante quem of the final month of AD 215. The 
massacre which Caracalla is alleged to have ordered and for which he is criticised in 
the ancient sources, however, appears not to have taken place before April 216. It is 
highly unlikely that the emperor arrived in Alexandria itself before December 215, 
since papyrological evidence confirms his presence at Pelusium as late as 25th 
November of that year.589 
 
 In addition to Caracalla’s late arrival, it has also been suggested that the 
appellation of the emperor as kosmokrator and philosarapis found in a papyrus dating 
to 11th March 216 (SB I 4275) is an indication of a continuing goodwill between 
Caracalla and his subjects.590 Rodriguez has argued that it is unlikely that such cordial 
epithets would have been employed in the aftermath of a massacre.591 This is a tenuous 
case, since I would suggest that the local populace could have felt an added impetus to 
soothe the emperor’s wrath with such platitudes, in the aftermath of the violence. On 
the other hand, however, it does seem likely that Caracalla remained in Alexandria to 
celebrate the Serapeia on 25th April.592 The logical conclusion from this evidence is 
that the violence recorded as a massacre by Dio and others must have taken place in 
the final week of April 216, the emperor leaving the city swiftly after the bloodshed 
and his subsequent punishment of the populace.  
 
                                                 
589 P. Oxy. LI 3602, particularly l.9. 
590 Lukaszewicz (1989) 495-96. 
591 Rodriguez (2012) 231-32. 
592 SEG XVII 759. 
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The evidence suggests, then, that there has been a further compression of the 
events surrounding Caracalla’s visit to Alexandria by the ancient writers. Rather than 
a single, pre-meditated slaughter, it is more likely that there were two outbreaks of 
violence during this short period and that Caracalla’s time in the city can be divided 
into two distinct phases.593 In the first phase, it appears that, although the emperor 
received a cordial welcome from the Alexandrian citizenry, the city was either already 
troubled by civil disorder or witnessed an outbreak of violence shortly after Caracalla’s 
arrival, prompted by an unknown cause.594 While this was eventually suppressed, it 
was significant enough to prompt an official enquiry and the execution of the prefect 
Heraclitus as a consequence. The second phase is characterised by a sudden flare of 
violence, possibly related to an attempt by Caracalla to levy troops from the populace. 
Whatever the precise cause of the unrest, this second outbreak of violence appears to 
have been more intense than the first, resulting in the emperor ordering his troops to 
engage and suppress the rioters, with the ensuing bloodshed prompting Caracalla to 
leave the city and return to Antioch prior to launching his Parthian offensive.  
 
The Legality of Caracalla’s Actions in Alexandria   
If a two-phase hypothesis in connection with the violence of 215-16 is 
accepted, the fundamental legality of the emperor’s deeds in Alexandria can be re-
examined.595 Rather than Caracalla succumbing to a mindless rage, Rodriguez has 
argued that the actions undertaken by the emperor in response to the rioting were 
extreme, but were ultimately faithful to the pre-existing Roman legal code regarding 
civil disobedience.596 On one hand, evidence from the literary sources suggests that 
imperial composure and clemency in response to rioting was a quality to be lauded. 
Constantius II, for example, was commended for his mercy towards the population of 
                                                 
593 Rodriguez (2012) 247-48. Indeed, it may well have been this two-stage unravelling of events which 
inspired Dio’s division of his narrative into two sections. 
594 It has been alleged that during the course of his visit to Alexandria, the emperor consecrated the 
dagger used to murder Geta (Dio 78.23.3). Whilst it is tempting to identify a correlation here with the 
early violence, owing to the supposed levels of popularity enjoyed by Geta in the city, evidence for the 
act of consecration itself is scant. It is likely that there were pre-existing tensions within the city, 
momentarily distracted by the occasion of Caracalla’s arrival, only to manifest itself once more shortly 
afterwards. 
595 What follows builds upon the recent research of Rodriguez (2012), who was kind enough to allow 
me access to an advance copy of his article. 
596 Rodriguez (2012) 254-62. 
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Edessa following an uprising.597 Closer to the Severi, Dio made note of Hadrian’s 
ability to quell a riot in Alexandria by virtue of a letter alone: ‘so true is it that an 
emperor’s word will have more force than arms.’598 On the other hand, however, 
evidence preserved in the literary and legal sources also serves to demonstrate that 
Caracalla was not unique or atypical in responding to provincial unrest with violent 
suppression. 
 
In AD 387, the emperor Theodosius I encountered a case of unrest in Antioch. 
Similar to the events of 215-16, statues of the emperor and the imperial family were 
destroyed in the course of the rioting.599 The response to this unrest was swift and 
decisive, with the ringleaders of the rioting arrested and executed, and a number of 
public institutions banned by the emperor.600 Whilst one might expect Libanius, as an 
Antiochene, to criticise the severity of Theodosius’ repression, this is not the case. In 
fact, in his oration describing the unrest, the author is clear regarding the necessity for 
a robust display of power and authority in response to such public outrages.601 The 
reason for Libanius’ vocal support, however, might be that, in destroying images of 
the emperor and his family, the rioters of Antioch had opened themselves to a charge 
of treason, in which the law was clear regarding the defacement of imperial imagery: 
‘Persons are liable under the lex Iulia on treason who melt down statues or likenesses 
of the emperor which are already consecrated, or who commit anything of the same 
kind.’602 As a result, it would be unthinkable for the emperor to respond in a moderate 
fashion.603 Such a conclusion regarding the necessity of the emperor to act in a severe 
manner following the destruction of his imagery is important to remember when 
considering the Caracallan case, since the papyrological evidence has confirmed that 
statuary was destroyed during the unrest of 215-16.604  
                                                 
597 For the clemency of Constantius II, see Libanius Or. 19.48 and Rodriguez (2012) 258. Jones (2013: 
864-65) has argued that the rioting took place in Emesa rather than Edessa, but the account of 
Constantius’ mercy remains unchanged. 
598 Dio 69.8.1a; HA Hadr. 12.1.  
599 For the events of the Antiochene riot, see Libanius Or. 19-23; Browning (1952) 13-20; French (1998) 
468-84. Also see Rodriguez (2012) 257-59. 
600 Libanius Or. 19.37; French (1998) 168-69. 
601 Libanius Or. 19.24, 19.31. Also see Rodriguez (2012) 258-59. 
602 Dig. 48.4.6, (tr. Watson). 
603 For more on treason, see MacMullen (1966); Rogers (1959) 90-94; Chilton (1955) 73-81. 
604 Rodrigeuz (2012: 254) has identified another possible parallel, originally suggested by Legras (2001: 




Further examination of the legal evidence preserved in the Digest regarding 
punishments can also assist in influencing our perception of the Alexandrian incident. 
In the course of his Judicial Examinations (de ognitionibus), Callistratus referred 
specifically to the role of the youth in civil disorder, and outlined appropriate 
punishments for unrest exacerbated by them:  
 
Solent quidam, qui volgo se iuvenes appellant, in quibusdam civitatibus 
turbulentis se adclamationibus popularium accommodare. qui si amplius nihil 
admiserint nec ante sint a praeside admoniti, fustibus caesi dimittuntur aut 
etiam spectaculis eis interdicitur. quod si ita correcti in eisdem 
deprehendantur, exilio puniendi sunt, nonnumquam capite plectendi, scilicet 
cum saepius seditiose et turbulente se gesserint et aliquotiens adprehensi 
tractati clementius in eadem temeritate propositi perseveraverint. 
 
Certain persons, who commonly refer to themselves as ‘the youths’, in certain 
towns where there is unrest play to the gallery for the applause of the mob. If 
they do no more than this and have not been previously admonished by the 
governor, they are beaten with rods and dismissed, or also forbidden to attend 
public entertainments. But if after such correction they are caught doing the 
same again, they should be punished with exile; or sometimes capital 
punishment may be imposed, for example, when they too often have been 
guilty of seditious and riotous behaviour and after repeated arrests and over-
lenient treatment persist in the same rash attitude.605 
 
 The key detail relates to the different types of punishment that were applicable 
to gatherings of youths in this context. Callistratus was clear that the punishment of a 
first offence could be moderate, while the penalty for any subsequent unrest, or for 
openly seditious activity, was to be far more severe. While this portion of the Digest 
explicitly singles out the iuvenes, the general approach to riotous behaviour displayed 
in this legal source arguably sheds light on Caracalla’s actions during the Alexandrian 
unrest. It has already been shown that, in the aftermath of the first outbreak of rioting, 
                                                 
Thrax. A comparison between the events of 238 with the Alexandrian violence is attractive, owing to 
the specific mention of youths being involved and ultimately killed, but the former events are so closely 
tied to the accession of Gordian I, that a direct comparison is impossible. For ancient evidence of the 
Libyan mob, see Hdn 7.4.3-5.6; HA The Three Gordians 9.3.  
605 Dig. 48.19.28.3. (tr. Watson). 
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the emperor only punished those who he believed were negligent in allowing the unrest 
to spread, namely the Alexandrian notables and the prefect Heraclitus. There is no real 
attention paid to any punishment of the non-elite, but it would be unlikely that all of 
the rioters escaped at least some form of reprimand or corporal punishment. 
 
The second outbreak of violence was evidently more intense. The involvement 
of substantial numbers among the youths can be deduced from the apparent 
compression of the events with Caracalla’s assembly of the youth in some accounts.606 
Whether the emperor’s actions were prompted by perceiving the unrest as a repeat 
offence, or simply because the rioting became an act of lèse-majesté, with the 
destruction of imperial statuary, Caracalla clearly felt able to exert a far greater force 
against the entire city than he had done previously. Considering the resulting 
bloodshed, it is easy to see why a negative local tradition formed around the emperor’s 
reprisals, depicting them as an unwarranted massacre. The fact remains, however, that 
the extant evidence contradicts the notion of Caracalla engaging in cold-blooded 
murder of the Alexandrian population. If the laws regarding treason and the 
punishment of civil discord are considered, it is clear contend that Rodriguez is correct 
to argue for the legality of Caracalla’s response to the Alexandrian violence. This is 
another aspect of the episode which further distances the emperor from the alleged 
massacre narrative.  
 
Implications of the constitutio Antoniniana for Roman Alexandria  
With an alternative chronology established, it is now possible to analyse the 
Alexandrian incident in a new way, removed from the clichéd notion that the violence 
was prompted by nothing more than uncontrollable rage on the part of Caracalla. In 
order to evaluate the emperor’s visit to Alexandria more effectively, it is necessary to 
find an explanation for the atmosphere of tension that appears to have been prevalent 
in the city during Caracalla’s time there. Rather than a simple literary creation of the 
ancient writers, designed to prefigure the physical violence that was to follow, I will 
argue that it was Caracalla himself who was responsible for creating an atmosphere of 
discord in Alexandria, albeit inadvertently. This was not by virtue of his temper or the 
                                                 
606 Most notably by the author of the Historia Augusta, see HA Car. 6.2-3. 
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confrontational nature of his subordinates, if the anecdote regarding Theocritus’ 
transgressions is believed, but rather by his promulgation of the constitutio 
Antoniniana around three years previously.607 
  
 In his assessment of the edict, Honoré stated that while he believed that the 
constitutio fitted the zeitgeist, it could not have been popular with ‘those whose 
privileges were diluted as a result.’608 Similarly, Garnsey referred to a general decline 
in the value of the franchise as a direct result of the edict.609 It is my contention that 
this process of dilution was of critical importance to the emperor’s relationship with 
the city, and that the situation in Alexandria around the time of Caracalla’s arrival in 
late 215 ought to be viewed through the lens of a decline in the honours experienced 
by the previously privileged groups in the aftermath of the constitutio’s introduction 
in 212. Indeed it is this waning prestige that would have unfavourably predisposed the 
Alexandrian citizenry to the emperor, exacerbating pre-existing social tensions that 
had the potential to flare into physical violence and unrest, as they had done in the 
past. 
 
From the beginning of Rome’s occupation, Romano-Egyptian relations were 
complex and often volatile; Alexandria was regarded as a particularly unruly and 
volatile city by our main Graeco-Roman writers.610 Roman annexation had 
simultaneously resulted in a transformation of the pre-existing provincial 
administration to suit Roman requirements on the one hand, and in an effective 
consolidation of the inflexible class structure which had characterised the preceding 
Ptolemaic regime on the other.611 This rigid social stratification was most notably seen 
in the treatment of Alexandria. Even a cursory glance at the ancient evidence reveals 
that the city was regarded as possessing the highest and most privileged status of any 
community in Egypt. This prestige is immediately visible even in the way that 
                                                 
607 For the poor behaviour of Theocritus, see pgs 131-32. 
608 Honoré (2004) 114. 
609 Garnsey (1970) 270-71. 
610 For a selection of negative depictions of the Egyptians and Alexandrian population, see Dio Chr. 
32.1; HA Hadr. 12.1; HA Quad. Tyr. 7.4, 8.5; Hdn 4.8.7; Juv. 15.1-2, 15.12-13; Tac. Ann. 1.11. See 
also Haas (1997) 10-11; Fuhrmann (2012) 159. 
611 Bowman and Rathbone (1992) 108; Lewis (1983) 19-28; Rowlandson (2010) 238-45. 
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Alexandria was referred to. Rather than being addressed as a city in the province of 
Egypt (in Aegypto), it is not uncommon to find Alexandria labelled ad Aegyptum, 
literally by Egypt.612 This has led Rowlandson and Harker to conclude that the city 
was demarcated by an ‘ambivalent’ status within Roman Egypt, more reminiscent of 
an adjunct to the province rather than a constituent part.613 
 
 Mirroring the ambivalent status of Alexandria in relation to neighbouring 
communities, the inhabitants of the city also enjoyed an elevated level of social 
prestige. Until the second century, they were the only individuals considered by the 
Roman authorities for key offices within the provincial administration such as that of 
the strategos and the basilikogrammateus.614 Alexandrians were also the only social 
group in Egypt to be afforded exemptions from the payment of the laographia (poll-
tax) and other liturgical duties, a factor that distinguished them even from the other 
Hellenised elite communities of the metropoleis and the chora. This can be visibly 
observed in one of the papyri comprising the Acta, in which a Hellenic character refers 
to the ‘poll-tax payers’ in a derogatory fashion.615 While this is undoubtedly 
exaggerated for dramatic effect, it is still possible to conclude that Alexandrian citizens 
did perceive a gulf in status between themselves and those ineligible for tax 
exemptions.  
 
Arguably more important than their inclusion within the Roman governmental 
system or their tax breaks, however, is the fact that under the Roman administration, 
the concept of Alexandrian citizenship was maintained and reinforced.616 What had 
previously been a marker of Alexandrian prestige under the Ptolemies had become the 
only route through which an inhabitant of Egypt might hope to achieve the full Roman 
franchise. The uncompromising nature of this system can be easily observed in the 
                                                 
612 For an example of this in the epigraphic corpus, see AE 1935, 157. For a general survey of the ways 
in which Alexandria is referred to, see Calderini (1935) 56-58. 
613 Rowlandson and Harker (2004) 82. Whilst there has been an attempt to demonstrate the importance 
of traditional Egyptian culture to the city during the Ptolemaic and Roman periods, Alexandria’s 
privileged status when compared to the cities of the chora remains incontrovertible. For more on the 
role of Egyptian culture in the Ptolemaic and Roman periods, see Savvopoulos (2011). 
614 Rowlandson (2010) 245. Also see Kelly (2011) xiv-xvi. 
615 CPJ II. 156c.  
616 Harker (2008) 5; Rowlandson and Harker (2004) 82. 
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letters of Pliny the Younger. In the course of a correspondence between Pliny and the 
emperor Trajan, the former is successful in a request to have his medical therapist 
awarded Roman civitas in return for effective treatment when Pliny was seriously 
ill.617 The franchise was granted, but not without a problem, since Pliny admitted to 
Trajan that he had later discovered that Harpocras was not in possession of 
Alexandrian citizenship at the time of the bestowal of the Roman franchise.618 As a 
result, Trajan was compelled to bestow Alexandrian citizenship upon Harpocras 
retrospectively, a move that he was vocally reluctant to do. 
 
Civitatem Alexandrinam secundum institutionem princpum non temere dare 
proposui. Sed cum Arpocrati, iatraliptae tuo, iam civitatem Romanam 
impetraveris, huic quoque petitioni tuae negare non sustineo.  
 
Following the rule of my predecessors, I do not intend to grant Alexandrian 
citizenship except in special cases, but as you have already obtained Roman 
citizenship for your medical therapist Harpocras, I cannot refuse this further 
request.619 
 
 Aside from imperial reluctance to bestow citizenship on a wide scale, it is clear 
that the exclusivity of the Alexandrian franchise was guarded zealously during the 
imperial period before AD 212. Evidence from the Gnomon of the Idios Logos (§42) 
suggests that there was a system of penalties for those who illegitimately claimed 
Alexandrian status, a crime for which perpetrators could be fined one quarter of their 
total wealth.620 While this can be interpreted as a general rule, not concerning any one 
area within the province specifically, other entries in the Gnomon suggest that the 
preservation of the Alexandrian franchise was a matter of considerable importance. 
Any Egyptian that falsely tried to register his son as an ephebe (a status which inferred 
eligibility for Alexandrian citizenship), for example, could be fined one sixth of their 
estate.621 
                                                 
617 Pliny Ep. 10.5-6. 
618 Pliny Ep. 10.6.1: Sed cum annos eius et censum sicut praeceperas ederem, admonitus sum a 
peritioribus debuisse me ante ei Alexandrinam civitatem impetrare, deinde Romanam, quoniam esset 
Aegyptius. 
619 Pliny Ep. 10.7, tr. Radice. 
620 For a survey of the different classes and penalties outlined in the Gnomon, see Sherman (1928) 37-
40. 
621 Gnomon §44. Also see Rowlandson and Harker (2004) 83. Despite the severity of the law, there does 




 In addition to fines for the usurpation of social class, the Gnomon legislated 
strictly in relation to the law regarding marriage between persons of different status, 
particularly when individuals holding the Alexandrian franchise were involved. 
Marriage between freedmen of Alexandrian citizens and Egyptian women was 
forbidden, a prohibition which ultimately suggests that a similar law was in place 
regarding fully enfranchised Alexandrian men.622 Alexandrian women, on the other 
hand, were permitted to marry Egyptian men (§38), but the children of the union, 
whilst able to inherit from both parents, would be considered Egyptian under the law 
rather than Alexandrian. Rowlandson and Harker have noted that whilst brother-sister 
marriage was prohibited to Romans in Egypt, it appears that it was freely practised by 
Alexandrian citizens; endogamy formed a guaranteed, if extreme, preservation of the 
relative social boundaries.623 While the vast size and cosmopolitan composition of 
Alexandria meant that this rigid system of class delineation became increasingly 
difficult to police and enforce, this does not mean that the principle behind the class 
structure was any less important to the Alexandrian citizenry; the extant evidence 
suggests quite the opposite, and that Alexandria enjoyed a set of privileges to be 
‘jealously guarded against aspiring interlopers’.624   
 
It is this sense of pride in their traditionally privileged position that is of 
importance to the way in which Caracalla’s dealings with the Alexandrian populace 
are analysed. Alexandria’s unparalleled position at the pinnacle of Egyptian society 
had already been somewhat diminished during the earlier visit of Caracalla, with 
Septimius Severus, in AD 200. Whilst the emperors passed legislation to the benefit 
of Alexandria and finally granted the city a boulé, the latter gift was bittersweet, since 
the emperors also simultaneously bestowed the honour onto all of the other 
                                                 
(§46) in which Roman men or astoi (Alexandrian men) could be excused from liability, and their 
children able to follow their paternal status, if the men married Egyptian women in ignorance.  
622 Gnomon §49; Rowlandson and Harker (2004) 83-84. 
623 Rowlandson and Harker (2004) 83. In support of this claim, they offer papyrological evidence from 
P. Oxy. III, 477, in which an Alexandrian brother and sister applied to have their son registered as an 
ephebe. 
624 Rowlandson and Harker (2004) 81. The problem of the rural population flocking to Alexandria in 
avoidance of taxation will be discussed in the next section, below. 
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metropoleis in Egypt.625 It is uncertain whether this policy was followed deliberately 
to reduce Alexandria’s prestige within Egypt following the civil war with Pescennius 
Niger, in a similar fashion to the reduction of Antioch’s status following the Wars of 
Succession, but it remains clear that, rather than a city above and separate from the 
metropoleis, Alexandria had become something more akin to prima inter pares even 
before the introduction of the constitutio Antoniniana in 212.626 
 
 In terms of Alexandria’s standing, then, I would argue that the eventual 
promulgation of Caracalla’s edict can only be regarded as the fatal next step in the 
city’s gradual decline within the region. In his study on the relationship between the 
constitutio and the Gnomon, Sherman concluded that ‘the first group of provisions in 
the Γνώμων to be eliminated by the universal grant of citizenship comprises the 
sections regarding the false usurpation of class.’627 This point must be taken further, 
though. The extension of the franchise across the empire did not merely make this 
example of local law obsolete, it completely eradicated any necessity for it at all. No 
longer was Alexandria the gateway to Roman civitas, no longer was the Alexandrian 
franchise a mark of social prestige. Every free person in Egypt, whether Roman, Greek 
or Egyptian, now enjoyed the same basic status under Roman law. 
 
 Evidence for the immediate Alexandrian reaction to this legislation is non-
existent, but if the fervent attempts to protect the prestige of the franchise mentioned 
above are any indication of their civic pride, then it is easy to imagine that the 
Alexandrian citizenry would have been dismayed at the elimination of their prized 
status with both Egyptians and the Alexandrian Jews being elevated to the same legal 
level as them.628 This position has led some to hypothesise that the local elite of the 
                                                 
625 See Dio 51.17.3-4, who simply states that Severus was the first emperor to refuse the Alexandrians 
a civic senate. The council is thought to have been formally convened for the first time between May 
200 and June 201, see SB V 7817.  
626 Harker (2008) 132; Bowman (1971) 15-19. 
627 Sherman (1928) 38. 
628 Harker (2008: 132-33) has posited the theory that the earlier Severan legislation (Dig. 50.2.3.3) 
allowing Jews to hold public office without any penalty for their superstitio might have resulted in a 
resurfacing of tensions between the Alexandrian and Jewish communities. This is difficult to identify 
in the ancient evidence, apart from the Acta Alexandrinorum, but it is not inconceivable. Furthermore, 




city, feeling aggrieved at their loss of prestige, and perhaps even fearing a further drop 
in status in the event of Caracalla succeeding in his Parthian campaign, actually exerted 
influence in stirring sedition and unrest across the city. Marasco, for example, has 
linked this hypothesis to the murder of the notables found in Dio’s account of the 
violence.629 Benoit and Schwartz, however, envisage the local elite engaging in 
sedition, influencing the ergolaboi to riot for more general, but unspecified, economic 
and political reasons.630  
 
Hypotheses implicating the Alexandrian notables as the architects of the rioting 
which Caracalla witnessed shortly after his arrival in the city might initially seem 
compelling since, of all the city’s inhabitants, the elites were those who appear to have 
lost the most in terms of status and privileges as mentioned above. These theories are 
problematic, however, primarily owing to their reliance on the murder of the protoi (a 
move which would likely have set the surviving elite and the emperor on a direct 
collision course) taking place exactly as Dio described and, furthermore, on there being 
a solid link between the notables and the entrepreneurs/contract workers. The link 
between the Alexandrian elite and the ergolaboi is tenuous; it is difficult to conceive 
of a situation in which contract-workers of the entrepreneurial class could be persuaded 
to take part in a revolt conceived wholly by the social elite.631 
 
 I would argue that, rather than leading or orchestrating an insurrection, it seems 
more likely that while the elite might have felt aggrieved by the emperor, their primary 
concern was to avoid Roman intervention in their city, particularly military 
intervention. Such an anxiety was not uncommon in the eastern empire, where there 
appears to have been a desire to govern and address issues of public order without 
                                                 
629 Marasco (1994) 506; Dio 78.22.2. 
630 Benoit and Schwartz (1948) 30-31. 
631 Rodriguez (2012) 248-49, n.88. Buraselis (1995: 169-70, 182-83) has claimed that trade guilds such 
as weavers, for example, were coming under increasing pressure from the Roman government to meet 
production goals for the army in advance of Caracalla’s Parthian campaign. Whilst earlier papyrological 
evidence suggests that such workers did struggle to meet the demands of the imperial state on occasion 
(see BGU VII 1564 and 1572, dating to AD 139 from Philadelphia), the connection between this 
pressure and the outbreak of intense violence still remains difficult to envisage. Regardless of the 
veracity of Buraselis’ hypothesis, though, it should be noted that the non-elite echelons in Alexandria 
might have had their own motives for taking part in unrest, examined in the following section below. 
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interference from the imperial government.632 The desire to maintain such control in 
the eastern provinces can be observed in the statement of Aelius Aristides that 
enfranchising the provincial elites would serve the Roman state best since ‘there is no 
need for garrisons to hold their citadels, but the men of the highest standing and 
influence in every city will guard their homelands for you’.633 If taken at face value, 
this claim would appear ironic when it is remembered that Aristides himself hailed 
from Alexandria, one of the cities in the east that was actively garrisoned. If the 
statement is viewed, however, as a figurative one, then Kelly is correct to suggest that 
Aristides’ decision to offer such an obviously disingenuous image of provincial 
relations with the imperial government is indicative of the strength of feeling behind 
the local elites’ preference to deal as much as possible with their own issues of public 
order.634 I would argue that a similar strength of feeling can be observed in the case of 
the Alexandrian protoi, specifically in their deputation to Caracalla upon his arrival in 
their city. 
 
It is therefore possible to interpret the role of the notables in the violence of 
215-16 in a different way. Rather than simply leaving the city to greet the emperor 
before being murdered, as in Dio’s account, or alternatively orchestrating a local 
insurrection among the ergolaboi during his time in the city, the embassy to Caracalla 
which was declared to have been condemned in the course of the Acta Heracliti can 
be better placed as an appeal to the emperor in the aftermath of the first outbreak of 
violence. Despite the failure of Heraclitus to suppress the unrest, the idea that the 
Alexandrian elite would have petitioned the emperor to allow them continued latitude 
in quelling local trouble is convincing. Owing precisely to the local notables’ 
traditional role in maintaining domestic order, however, it stands to reason that the 
emperor would have deemed them equally culpable for allowing the escalation of the 
recent rioting and would have been nearly impossible to persuade otherwise. I would 
argue that, rather than affording the local elite any further opportunity to maintain 
                                                 
632 A similar preference for local solutions to public order can be seen in the case of Judaea, where 
Josephus (BJ 2.490-98) reported that before sending in troops to quell disorder, the serving prefect Ti. 
Julius Alexander dispatched a delegation of local notables in an attempt to defuse the situation. For 
more on the role of the local elite in public order in the east, see Kelly (2007) 166-67. 
633 Ael. Arist. Or. 26.64. 
634 Kelly (2007) 167. 
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public order, Caracalla was unmoved by their plea and executed the protoi not out of 
some unquantifiable rage, but instead because he deemed them as responsible as 
Heraclitus for underestimating the scale of the disturbance and for failing to prevent 
violence and destruction of property from occurring.  
 
Implications of the constitutio Antoniniana for the Non-Elite  
In addition to the diminishment in status felt by the social elite in Alexandria, 
the inevitable effects of the constitutio upon the non-elite strata of Romano-Egyptian 
society must also be taken into account. On initial examination, it might appear that 
the non-elite echelons of Romano-Egyptian society stood to gain much. Rather than 
forming a second class, inferior to the Hellenised populations of Alexandria and the 
other metropoleis, even Egyptians of the chora could now enjoy the legal benefits and 
protection of the Roman franchise.635 This was a new status that many sought to 
publically accept through the adoption of the imperial name Aurelius into their new 
Romanised nomenclature.636 The implications of Caracalla’s edict were not, however, 
wholly positive for the non-elite population of Egypt, particularly on an economic 
level.  
 
In Chapter Four, the fiscal-economic rationale fundamental to the constitutio 
Antoniniana was discussed, noting that, regardless of why the finances were needed, 
the emperor appears to have been keen to increase the capital at his disposal. With the 
gift of the franchise came the expectation that the new citizens would contribute to the 
series of taxes levied on the enfranchised population, including levies such as the 
vicesima hereditatum, for example.  While taxation cannot have been popular in any 
province of the empire, there is evidence to suggest that the levying and collecting 
taxes in Roman Egypt, especially from the population of the chora, could be 
                                                 
635 It should be remembered, though, that this was not a complete parity, since social distinctions such 
as the Honestiores-Humiliores divide were always visible; see Rilinger (1988). 
636 Evidence for such a development occurring across the empire has been controversial in the past, with 
Mullen (2007: 47) highlighting that there is no evidence for duo or tria nomina being employed in the 
area around Bath in Roman Britain. New statistical analysis of papyrological evidence has shown, 
however, that the phenomenon was widely practiced in Roman Egypt, and that it can be dated with 
confidence to the aftermath of the constitutio Antoniniana, suggesting that Aurelius became a popular 
name there as a result of the universal enfranchisement. For more on this data and the analytical 
methodology employed, see Van Beek and Depauw (2013) 101-14, particularly p.110. 
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particularly traumatic. Philo, for example, complained of the violence perpetrated by 
tax collectors:  
 
τοιγάρτοι πάντα φύρουσι καὶ συγχέουσιν ἀργυρολογοῦντες, ὡς μὴ μόνον ἐκ 
τῶν οὐσιῶν ἀναπράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν σωμάτων, ὕβρεσιν, αἰκίαις, πρὸς 
ἀποτομίαν κεκαινουργημέναις βασάνοις·  
 
And therefore in carrying out their collection, they throw everything into 
disorder, applying their collections not only to the possessions of their victims 
but also their persons, with insults, violence, and forms of torture 
unprecedented in their savagery.637 
 
In addition to the accounts of brutality and abuse on the part of tax collectors 
in Egypt recorded in the ancient literature and papyri, the strain of paying taxes and 
honouring liturgical duties in the imperial period appears to have led to another 
phenomenon in which debtors fled from their place of residence in an effort to avoid 
payment: anachoresis.638 The practice is described by Philo as individuals retreating 
from their homes out of a fear of extreme punishments awaiting them on their failure 
to pay tax duties.639 The phenomenon is not restricted to the writings of Philo, 
however, and is found in the papyrological record from the perspective of both the 
relatives (or nearest concerned party) of the fugitive and the magistrates reporting the 
absences to their superiors. P. Oxy. XXXIII 2669, for example, is a first century AD 
papyrus in which the two brothers report on the flight of an individual known only as 
Orsenouphis, son of Menches.640 In the course of their correspondence with the village 
and district clerks, they claimed that, to the best of their knowledge, Orsenouphis had 
fled his place of residence and, although he had not joined the army, had left none of 
his property behind.641   
 
                                                 
637 Philo, Spec. leg. 2.94 (tr. adapted from Colson). 
638 From ἀναχώρησις, literally meaning flight or retreat. For more on the process of anachoresis, see 
Link (1993) 306-20. 
639 Philo, Spec. leg. 3.30. He devotes particular attention to the alleged cruelty of the tax collector and 
his use of torture to locate the fugitives but this is hardly surprising, given Philo’s intention to group a 
disparate series of laws under the Ten Commandments. For more on Philo’s methodology, see Royse 
(2009) 48-49. 
640 P. Oxy. XXXIII 2669, l.7. 
641 P. Oxy. XXXIII 2669, ll. 10-15: καὶ ὀμνύομεν [Τ]ιβέριον [Κ]λαύδιον καίσαρα σεβασ[τ]ὸν 
Γερμανικὸν αὐτοκράτορα ἀνακ[ε]χωρηκέναι τὸν Ὀρσενοῦφιν κ[αὶ] μὴ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ πόρο̣[ν. 
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The legal process surrounding the practice of anachoresis is complex and 
remains uncertain in areas. For example, it is unclear if there was a legal obligation for 
family members or neighbours to lodge a deposition with the local magistrates in the 
aftermath of an individual’s flight.642 In addition, it seems clear that the process of 
anachoresis was not simply the last resort of the rural populace in response to over-
taxation, and that the prospect of fleeing one’s contributions could be exploited by 
some for personal advantage. In fact, the threat of anachoresis could be a powerful 
weapon in the context of a private petition or lawsuit. This is seen, for example, in 
some petitions regarding cases of assault.643 In these complaints, the warning regarding 
flight follows the request for assistance. The reason for this, as Kelly has outlined, for 
the complainant to emphasise the severity of their opponent’s wrongdoing, by inferring 
that the public purse might suffer as a result of the injured party’s inability to continue 
their work or agricultural production.644 From this evidence, it is a logical conclusion 
that the petitioners clearly felt that the implications of anachoresis were serious 
enough that to threaten it in private lawsuits would prompt the arbitrator to rule in their 
favour. 
 
On the other side, the practice of anachoresis also prompted problems for those 
responsible for collecting taxes. In the course of their reports, collectors noted the 
number of ‘untraceable’ tax delinquents (ἀπόρων ἀνευρέτων), and those simply 
classed as ἀναχωρήσι.645 In extreme cases, this would prompt the local magistrates to 
petition the prefect to intervene and compel the strategos (the chief financial officer of 
the nome) to delay any action until the prefect had himself been given a chance to 
make a decision at the next assize.646 While much of the papyrological evidence for 
                                                 
642 Such a process would seem to be in the best interests of the declarant, to avoid repeated actions by 
tax collectors to locate and seize the fugitive’s estate, see Llewelyn (1998) 100-101. The case of 
Orsenouphis recorded in P. Oxy. XXXIII 2669 is not a unique case. SB XIV 11974, for example, records 
a father reporting the anachoresis of his own son, claiming that the latter had ‘run off to foreign parts’ 
(ἀνεχώρησεν εἰς τὴν ξένην). Clearly such a declaration would theoretically serve to protect the father’s 
estate from being seized in payment of his son’s debt. Also see P. Oxy. II 251-53 and P. Mich. X 580. 
643 BL VII 176; P. Sakaon 36, ll.31-32; P. Sakaon 37, ll. 15-16. Also see Kelly (2011) 158. 
644 Kelly (2011) 158. This claim is seen, for example, in P. Athen. 38 (dating to c. AD 141). In the course 
of this petition, the complainant claimed that only with assistance could he maintain his tax payments 
to the state (ἵνα δυνηθῶ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα εἰς τὸ δημόσι[ο]ν ἐκφόρια ἀποδοῦναι), see P. Athen. 38, ll. 11-
13. 
645 For examples of the tax collectors noting absences, see SB XIV 12015 and P. Ryl. IV 595 (with an 
accompanying list of fugitives found in P. Corn. 24). 
646 SB IV 7462. Also see Llewelyn (1998) 99-100. 
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the practice of anachoresis derives from the first century AD, the problems underlying 
the phenomenon were clearly more persistent. The continued existence of issues 
relating to the levying of tax and the flight of individuals to avoid payment can be 
observed in the decrees of Severus and Caracalla made in the course of their visit to 
Alexandria in 199/200, comprising part of the Severan apokrimata. Similar to 
Hadrian’s earlier moratorium on tax in Egypt to preserve long-term liquidity, Severus 
appears to have responded to the problems surrounding the levying and collection of 
tax in a moderate fashion. In response to a petition from an individual referred to as 
Ulpius Heraclanus, for example, the emperors reported that they had temporarily 
suspended the traditional penalties associated with tax payment in arrears:  
 
Οὐλπίῳ Ἡρακλάνῳ τῷ καὶ Καλλινείκῳ τὰς ἐπιβληθείσας Ἀλεξανδρεῦσι ἢ 
Αἰγυπτίοις ζημίας τῇ δωρεᾷ χρόνον προσαγα[γό]ντες ἀνήκαμεν.  
 
To Ulpius Heraclanus, also called Kallinikos: We remitted the penalties which 
had been imposed upon Alexandrians or Egyptians but added a time limit to 
the benefaction.647 
 
 This measure was accompanied by other beneficial initiatives, such as the 
cancellation of old claims by the fiscus, and an amnesty for tax fugitives to return to 
their idia.648 The determination of the Severi to encourage the return of tax fugitives 
to their idia can also be observed in a more aggressive decree, in which punishments 
were outlined for any individuals who offered shelter to tax evaders.649 During the 
course of the imperial visit to Alexandria in 200, the Severan Augusti were passing 
legislation designed to improve the pre-existing system of taxation across the chora. 
This can be viewed as an attempt to offer a period of more lenient payment whilst 
                                                 
647 P. Col. VI 123, ll. 6-8. This is similar in tone to the earlier edict of the prefect M. Sempronius 
Liberalis, issued c. AD 154, who published an incentive for tax delinquents to return to their idia by 
guaranteeing that any property that had been previously sequestrated following the discovery of 
anachoresis would be returned to its original owner without judicial enquiry, see BGU II 372: Ἵνα δὲ 
τοῦτο προθυμότερον καὶ ἥδιον ποίησωσιν, ἴστωσαν μὲν τὸν πόρον τὸν ἐκ ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας ἔτι 
κατεχόμενον ἀπολυθήσεσθαι τῆς τοῦ μεγίστου Αὐτοκράτος εὐμενείας καὶ χρηστότητος ἐπιτρεπούσης 
καὶ μηδεμίαν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ζήτησιν ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐξ ἧς δήποτε αἰτίας ὑπὸ 
τῶν στρατηγῶν προγραφέντας· For more on the edict of Sempronius Liberalis, see Cowey (1995) 195-
99. 
648 For these measures and grants, see SB I 4284; IV 7366; P. Mich. IX 529; P. Oxy. XLVII 3364 and 
P. Westminster Coll. 3. For more on the Severan visit to Alexandria and the apokrimata, see Harker 
(2008) 131-33. 
649 Oxyrhynchus B34/H5, in the collection of the Egypt Exploration Society. 
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simultaneously trying to prevent individuals being compelled to undertake liturgical 
duties when it was clear that they could not realistically bear the associated costs.650 
 
It is easy to see how the fiscal element of the constitutio Antoniniana might jar 
with this apparently fragile system. Contrary to the more moderate policies enacted by 
Severus and Caracalla in 200, the terms of Caracalla’s edict stressed the fiscal 
responsibility inherent on every new citizen.651 Evidence for the speed at which the 
terms of the constitutio were enforced is difficult to find, but if the rapid and vast 
increase in the number of Aurelii registered in Egypt is any marker of the edict’s spread 
to the province, we can safely conclude that the legislation had reached Egypt 
reasonably swiftly after its original promulgation and that the provincial 
administration was effectively disseminating its content.  
 
 With the enforcement of Caracalla’s edict taking place in the aftermath of AD 
212, it is unsurprising to note that the process of anachoresis appears to continue 
unabated. During the period of Caracalla’s sole reign, this is arguably best seen in the 
decree released by the prefect of Egypt in 216, L. Valerius Datus, ordering people once 
more to return to their individual idia.652 While it would be an exaggeration of the 
available evidence to suggest that the constitutio Antoniniana was the sole factor in 
the continuing phenomenon of tax evasion, the fiscal demands expected of Caracalla’s 
new citizens appear to have affected all but the smallest of private estates.653 
 
 I would argue that the constitutio Antoniniana can therefore be observed to 
intensify the fiscal pressures facing individuals of the Egyptian chora and even citizens 
of the metropoleis. Flight from one’s idia to another region or city must have been an 
attractive alternative to paying the Roman and local systems of tax. Of the cities 
targeted by these fugitives, Alexandria appears to have been among the foremost. 
                                                 
650 Aside from addressing the problem of the physical payment of tax, Severus and Caracalla appear to 
have been concerned with the link between the potentially ruinous costs involved with undertaking 
liturgical duties and anachoresis, showing reluctance to press any villagers into the liturgies of the 
metropoleis, see P. Oxy. XLII 3019. 
651 For the importance of the fiscal importance to the terms of the constitutio, see Chapter Four. Of key 
importance is the clause in the edict resembling the Latin sine diminutione tributorum et vectigalium. 
652 See below, pgs. 173-75. 
653 For the far reaching nature of the vicesima hereditatum, for example, see above pgs. 97-99. 
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Papyrological evidence suggests that the provincial authorities did attempt to maintain 
a record of non-citizen residents but, again, the sheer size of Alexandria would have 
made this understandably difficult.654 As a central trading hub and a city in which non-
citizens commonly mixed with the local citizenry, traded and often stayed for periods 
of time, Alexandria was a perfect place to afford anonymity to any who might have 
sought to avoid the exactions of the fiscus.655  
 
 While Caracalla’s constitutio can be observed to have been enthusiastically 
accepted by the inhabitants of rural Egypt, keen to exert their new citizenship and 
display their Roman nomenclature, it can also be shown to have aggravated a number 
of tensions within the province. On one level, the hitherto unparalleled elite of the 
Alexandrian citizenry would have observed their position and prestige being eroded, 
their city reduced to one of a number of important hubs in the eastern half of the 
empire. Conversely, the fiscal implications of the edict could not have been borne 
easily by the population of the chora and the metropoleis, for whom anachoresis was 
a commonly employed tactic to evade payment of taxation. In summary, then, the 
constitutio was clearly an edict planned on an imperial scale, but in the case of Egypt, 
this planning can be shown to have neglected the regional tensions and instabilities 
that it might intensify. It is into this context that we must consider an edict, apparently 
ordered by Caracalla, expelling significant numbers of people from the city. 
Discovered on the same papyrus as the text of the constitutio itself, the Caracallan 
expulsion order forms the third decree preserved on P. Giss. 40 although, unlike the 
constitutio text, it is relatively well preserved. 
 
Positioning the Expulsion Order  
The expulsion decree (sometimes referred to as an epistle) begins with the 
order that all Egyptians living in the city, especially those of the rural peasantry, should 
leave Alexandria.656 It was argued in the past that this order should be viewed as an 
official copy of an epistle from Caracalla to the serving prefect, Aurelius Antinous. 
                                                 
654 P. Oxy. XXXVI 2756, for example, records a declaration from AD 78-79, in which it is clarified that 
an Oxyrhynchite weaver was still registered for taxation in Oxyrhynchus despite his temporary 
residence in Alexandria.  
655 Rowlandson and Harker (2004) 81-84. 
656 P. Giss. 40, III, l.17: Αἰγύπτιοι πάντες, οἵ εἰσιν ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ, καὶ μάλιστα ἄγροικοι. 
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Williams interprets the direct order to expel people as representing a second person 
command contained in the course of a correspondence between the emperor and 
prefect.657 This hypothesis seems less likely, however, if the rest of the piece is taken 
into account, apparently forming an extract from a longer text and containing a level 
of detail that is far beyond what one might expect in a letter from the emperor to his 
incumbent magistrate. Regardless if this was originally a letter between Caracalla and 
Antinous, or a more general edict, this can at least be taken as evidence that the text 
was ultimately intended for publication.658  
 
After opening his decree in such a general manner, Caracalla lists certain 
exceptions to the edict, exempting a number of occupations including pig-dealers and 
the river boatmen.659 Following these exemptions, he declared that the others present 
in Alexandria contributed nothing to the functional life of the city and were, in fact, 
undermining it by disrupting good order.660 After briefly qualifying that even these 
individuals were to be permitted to enter the city for the purposes of temporary 
business or for religious devotion and sacrifice, the emperor appears to suggest the 
way in which this order was to be enforced. The order ends by noting that it was 
possible to identify ineligible persons on the basis of appearance, dress and 
language.661 Two primary issues must be addressed regarding the role of this order in 
the Alexandrian incident. Firstly, the question of how it fits into the chronology of the 
imperial visit and, secondly, the arguably more important issue of how much personal 
input Caracalla had in the extant version of the text. 
 
Regarding its position in the chronology of Caracalla’s time in Alexandria, the 
expulsion order is commonly associated with the account of the emperor’s final 
punishment of the city in the aftermath of the fatal violence described by Dio, in which 
                                                 
657 Williams (1979) 81-82. 
658 Oliver (1989) 509-10. 
659 Heichelheim (1941: 21) suggested that certain trades may have been exempted from the expulsion 
since they were under government control at the time. 
660 P. Giss. 40, III, ll. 20-21: καὶ οὐχὶ χρήσει ταράσσουσι τὴν πόλιν. A comparison might be drawn here 
between the wording of the text and the account of Herodian (4.9.4) who claimed that the emperor 
became aware of a vast number of outsiders participating in the festivities of the Alexandrians. In the 
latter source, however, this account is conflated with the later assembly of the youths, a chronology that 
is difficult to accept, see below. 
661 P. Giss. 40, III, ll. 27-30. Also see Heichelheim (1941) 21. 
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the expulsion of foreigners took place against the backdrop of other punitive measures, 
such as the cessation of all public messes and the construction of cross-walls to restrict 
the movements of the local population.662 Whilst the appearance of exemptions to the 
expulsion might seem to mirror Dio’s claim that merchants were spared, the 
connection is nonetheless problematic. Firstly, the tone of the edict requires attention. 
The list of exceptions to the ejection order is far more detailed than the nebulous 
‘merchants’, emporoi, described by Dio. Pork merchants are mentioned, as are river 
boatmen, reed gatherers (for the heating of the baths), and more short-term residents 
who came to Alexandria for religious reasons or simply as tourists. The city itself is 
still spoken of in very positive terms, with Caracalla referring to it as ‘the most radiant 
city of the Alexandrians’663 By removing those Egyptians who did not work in the 
aforementioned professions regardless of their contribution to civic life, Caracalla can 
be understood to have passed an edict to the advantage of the Alexandrian citizenry, 
who were well-known to have despised the ‘poll-tax payers’ as an inferior, uncultured 
group.664 This form of legislation hardly seems congruent with the image of Caracalla 
enforcing a harsh, punitive action across the entirety of Alexandria after engaging in a 
bloody conflict to pacify the city.665  
 
In addition to the relatively affable tone regarding Alexandria found in P. Giss. 
40 III, the dating of this edict might also weaken its connection to the traditional 
massacre narrative. In the course of referring to Egyptians coming to Alexandria to 
undertake sacrifices, Caracalla refers to the city with the adverb ἐνθάδε, suggesting 
that the original edict was issued during the period of the emperor’s visit to 
Alexandria.666 This means that, if it was released in the aftermath of the violence 
preceding Caracalla’s departure from the city, it would need to have been written in 
considerable haste. Whilst this factor in itself might not prompt any significant revision 
                                                 
662 Harker (2000) 154; Oliver (1989) 509; Dio 78.23.2-3.  
663 P. Giss. 40, III, ll.24-25: τὴν πόλιν τὴν Ἀλεξανδρέων τὴν λαμπροτάτην. 
664 The disdain felt for the ethnic Egyptians by the Alexandrians is clear in the comparison between the 
former and the Jews in the course of the Acta Isidori, see CPJ II. 156c, ii. 9, in which Isidorus asks ‘are 
they not on a level with those who pay the poll-tax?’ (οὔκ εἰσι ἴσοι τοῖς φόρον τελοῦσι;). Also see 
Tcherikover and Fuks (1960) 78-80; Lukaszewicz (1990b) 131. 
665 Even the way in which the unrest is referred to serves to weaken the connection with the violence 
prompting Caracalla’s exit of the city. The term ταράσσουσι in the twenty-first line infers more of a 
disturbance than a large scale uprising, see Lukaszewicz (1990b) 131. 
666 P. Giss. 40, III, l. 26. Also see Lukaszewicz (1990b) 129-30. 
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of the basic chronology, further information can be gleaned from the papyrus which 
serves to distance his expulsion order from the climactic violence described in the 
ancient sources.   
 
During the course of this text, Caracalla makes reference to the celebration of 
the Serapeia. The emperor states: ‘I understand that on the day of the Serapeia and on 
some other festivals, or even some other days, Egyptians are accustomed to bring bulls 
and other animals to sacrifice. They are not to be prohibited from doing this.’667 It has 
already been noted, however, that Caracalla is thought to have been present at the 
celebration of the Serapeia on 25th April 216.668 With this in mind, the very general 
terms employed by Caracalla and the use of μανθάνω would be an irregular way for 
the emperor to refer to the festival. By the time of his departure, Caracalla would 
already have attended the celebration in person and likely observed the Egyptian 
custom for himself. The tone of the edict, on the other hand, suggests that he was 
unfamiliar with the local practice. Rather than an oddly worded edict, hastily written 
at the end of April 216, it makes more sense to conclude that the expulsion order must 
have been issued earlier. If the reference to disruption made in the twentieth line of the 
text was linked to a specific outbreak of disorder among the Alexandrian populace, 
then it is far more likely that it made reference to the earlier unrest observed shortly 
after Caracalla’s arrival in the city: the violence that was to result in the removal of 
Heraclitus as the prefect.  
 
The question of authorship must now be addressed. In the past, it has been 
argued that the tone of the source appears to betray a strong sense of personal emotion, 
concluding that the observations on how ethnic Egyptians could be identified were the 
result of a personal reflection on the part of Caracalla.669 This argument was developed 
by Williams, who included the expulsion order in the course of his stylistic analysis of 
                                                 
667 P. Giss. 40, III, ll. 20-22: Σαραπείοις καὶ τισὶν ἑορτασίμοις ἡμέραις Αἰγυπτίους μανθάνω. Διὰ τοῦτο 
οὔκ εἰσι κωλυτέοι. 
668 Rodriguez (2012) 233-34. 
669 Oliver (1989) 510. Williams (1979: 81-86) also agreed that the distinction between the Alexandrian 




Caracallan edicts and epistles.670 He concluded that, owing to a number of different 
stylistic features common with other documents produced under the emperor, it was 
extremely likely that the author of the expulsion order was Caracalla himself, leaving 
a ‘clear mark of his own personality’ on the text.671 
 
 The stylistic elements that Williams alluded to in reference to the expulsion 
order are what he classes as ‘the use of “all”, the elaborate explanation, the repetitive 
and clumsy structure, and the evidence of autopsy and personal initiative’.672 It is 
correct that the expulsion order appears to bear Caracalla’s penchant for stressing the 
universal scale of his initiatives. The opening line of the order contains a proclamation 
that every Egyptian in Alexandria was to be removed.673 This is in keeping with other 
Caracallan documents, the recall of the exiles and the constitutio in particular, in which 
the universality of the edict is a crucial factor. The expulsion order is unusual, 
however, in that after the initial claim of universality, the author proceeds by 
specifying a number of groups and trades to be exempted from the process. This has 
prompted Williams to suggest that the emperor was forming the order before 
considering any comprehensive categories for exemption; he claims that the numerous 
small exemptions tempering the universal grandiosity of the edict, and the attempt to 
outline the principles behind the expulsion in the first place, are characterised by 
‘syntactical incoherence’ and give the impression that Caracalla was ‘making it up as 
he went along’.674  
 
While Williams is correct to point out that the expulsion order bears certain 
stylistic similarities to other imperial edicts released during the reign of Caracalla, his 
conclusions about this document are significantly flawed. To accept that the emperor 
constructed this document on an impulse and formally introduced it in a similar fashion 
assumes both that the air of spontaneity that is suggested in Caracallan documents is 
genuine rather than a construct designed to emphasise the majesty of his principate 
and, more importantly, that Caracalla wrote this edict alone and released it without 
                                                 
670 Williams (1979) 67-89, particularly pgs. 81-86. 
671 Williams (1979) 89.  
672 Williams (1979) 86. 
673 P. Giss. 40, III, l.17: Αἰγύπτιοι πάντες. 
674 Williams (1979) 85. 
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consultation from any of his jurists and civil servants.675 This also contrasts with the 
more measured tone often present in Caracallan edicts such as the Tabula Banasitana 
as well as the constitutio Antoniniana itself.676 
 
 Instead of concluding that the extant version of the expulsion order is written 
completely in the hand of the emperor, I would argue that, whilst Caracalla did release 
an order removing individuals from Alexandria, the edict preserved on the Papyrus 
Gissensis is the result of later adaptation and elaboration by the hand of a copyist.677 
The way in which the ethnic Egyptians are referred to in the course of the expulsion 
order is problematic owing to its contradictory nature. The most damning assessment 
of the Egyptians can be found at the end of the document when the author claims how 
easily these individuals can be identified among the masses in Alexandria:  
  
Ἐπιγεινώσκεσθαι γὰρ εἰς τοὺς λινούφους οἱ ἀληθινοὶ Αἰγύπτιοι δύνανται 
εὐμαρῶς φωνὴν ἄλλων αὐτοὶ ἔχειν ὄψεις τε καὶ σχῆμα. Ἔτι τε καὶ ζωῇ δεικνύει 
ἐναντία ἤθη ἀπὸ ἀναστροφῆς πολειτικῆς εἶναι ἀγροίκους Αἰγυπτίους.  
 
The true Egyptians can be easily recognised among the linen weavers by their 
accent, or by their foreign appearance and mode of dress. Furthermore, by their 
uncivilised manners, the way in which they live reveals them to be Egyptian 
peasants.678 
 
 What is immediately noticeable is that the tone of this order is one of 
condemnation and disdain, characterising rural Egyptian appearance and culture as 
inferior and uncivilised. This is an unusual level of contempt for the population of the 
chora for an official document. Whilst the Roman authorities did periodically expel 
numerous people from Alexandria, they made no distinction between individuals of 
either Egyptian or Hellenistic descent, and often took steps to allow outsiders and 
                                                 
675 This contradicts other evidence which suggests that the Severan period in general formed a high-
point for court intellectuals and jurists in particular, making it likely that the influence of these men 
would affect the way documents such as this and even the constitutio Antoniniana itself were worded, 
see Buraselis (2007) 58-59. 
676 The value of the Tabula Banasitana in preserving the economic stability of Mauretania Tingitana 
was discussed in Chapter Four. 
677 I follow the arguments outlined by Harker in this matter, see n. 682. 
678 P. Giss. 40, III, ll. 27-30. 
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foreigners to remain in the city, providing they could prove a legitimate reason for the 
stay.679   
 
Far from the very official tone of the expulsion orders released by the prefects, 
the Caracallan edict preserved on the Papyrus Gissensis appears to have more in 
common with the sensationalist literature of the Acta Alexandrinorum than documents 
of the provincial administration.680 It has also been noted that the author’s view of the 
Egyptians in this order is a contradictory one. While the edict ends with a highly 
condemnatory tone, earlier in the document the author conceded that some among the 
Egyptians provided services of considerable importance to Alexandria and ought to be 
allowed to stay, along with any who frequent the city for religious rites.681  
 
The author is eager to draw a clear distinction between those Egyptians that he 
considers beneficial to the Alexandria, and a mass of useless rural peasants who, he 
claims, add nothing to the life of the city, a factor that has led Harker to suggest that 
the extant order is the result of a later copyist rather than the original order of 
Caracalla.682 If the unusual tone was not sufficient evidence for the influence of a later 
copyist on the Caracallan original, Harker has shown that the language and 
terminology at the beginning and the end of the edict bears an uncanny similarity, an 
element which could suggest that the edict has been adapted and that a second author 
was mimicking the style of the original.683  
                                                 
679 Sel. Pap. II 220 (= P. Lond. III 904), for example, is such an order from AD 104 released by the 
prefect Vibius Maximus. It ordered people to return to their own nomes and residences for a census, but 
finished by offering provision to those who wished to stay in Alexandria, provided they could explain 
why. This order, and those like it, appear to have been more concerned with issues relating to the census 
and the fiscus than the individuals’ ethnic background. This distinction will be considered further, later 
in this chapter. 
680 Harker (2008) 57-58. 
681 Buraselis (1995: 170) has argued that there may have been multiple groups described as restless in 
the text, now lost. 
682 Harker (2008: 58) has argued that the tone of the expulsion order suggests that the author of this 
version was a socially aspiring Egyptian, eager to display their own immersion in Hellenic culture. 
Harker has argued that displaying access to elements of Hellenic culture such as the acta would have 
been an important factor in garnering local prestige and influence for such socially aspiring individuals 
of the chora, for more on this, see Harker (2008) 112-19. 
683 Harker (2008) 58. The edict begins by stating that all Egyptians were ordered to leave Alexandria, 
in particular peasants who had fled to Alexandria from other areas who could be easily recognised: 
εὐμαρῶς εὑρισκεσθαι δύνανται. This corresponds closely with the notion that Egyptian peasants could 




 The potential influence of a second writer on the text of this order is of 
fundamental importance. Rather than an unusual outburst in which Caracalla was 
uncharacteristically snobbish regarding one group of his provincial subjects, from 
examination of the edict alone it is only possible to conclude that during the course of 
his visit to Alexandria, most likely after the first outbreak of civil unrest late in AD 
215, the emperor released an order expelling large numbers of people from the city.684 
It is highly unlikely that Caracalla was the figure responsible for the precise content of 
the extant text, though, since the influence of a later copyist, keen to identify 
themselves as an upwardly mobile and useful member of Romano-Egyptian society, 
seems plausible. With Caracalla distanced from the more peculiar elements of the 
expulsion order, it is now possible to reinterpret why the emperor introduced such a 
directive. Rather than an attempt to rid Alexandria of Egyptians based solely on 
snobbery and prejudice regarding ethnicity, it is possible that the rationale behind this 
command was far more mundane, practical and, importantly, affected to some extent 
by the emperor attempting to enforce the terms of his recent constitutio.  
 
A Connection between the Expulsion and the constitutio Antoniniana  
The revision of the order’s position within the wider chronology of Caracalla’s 
imperial visit effectively destroys any possibility that it should be associated with the 
final sanctions imposed upon the city before the emperor’s departure as described by 
Dio.685 The question of why Caracalla ordered this expulsion at all, however, has still 
not been fully addressed. As noted above, the influence of a secondary writer upon the 
extant text means that we cannot assume that the emperor necessarily shared the 
sentiments publicised in the source. Despite Garnsey’s idea that Caracalla was an 
impetuous ruler who passed legislation on a whim, it is impossible to accept that he 
ordered such a clearance of Alexandria without some rational prompt.686 Even if the 
peculiarities of the extant text are accounted for, it is possible that Caracalla genuinely 
considered the rural inhabitants of Alexandria to be an overly numerous and disruptive 
                                                 
684 It should be noted that it does not necessarily need to have been released in the direct aftermath of 
the first outbreak of violence in the city. The order has been dated, for example, to March 216 in order 
to link it to an order by the prefect Valerius Datus, discussed below. See Lukaszewicz (1990b) 129-32. 
685 Dio 78.23.2-3. 
686 For the notion of Caracallan impetuosity, see Garnsey (2004) 137. 
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population group. This explanation would fit with the account of Herodian in which 
the emperor was depicted as being alarmed at observing the number of non-
Alexandrians living within the city.687 It should be noted, though, that the source 
tradition is questionable here, since Herodian is guilty of clumsily compressing this 
sentiment with the emperor’s intention to levy a phalangite regiment from the city prior 
to his departure.688  
 
If it is unlikely that Caracalla expelled large numbers of rural peasants from 
the city, on the basis of their ethnicity, it is necessary to divest the order of the 
inflammatory elements added by the Egyptian copyist, and to outline the fundamental 
aspects of the edict. In essence, the emperor appears to have ordered that any 
inhabitants of Alexandria who were not registered to the city were to leave and return 
to their homes. The directive itself was not absolute, with Caracalla exempting a 
number of occupations from the process in addition to making provisions for any who 
desired to enter the city for certain, primarily religious, reasons. Were it not for the 
tone of snobbery that permeates the text, and the erroneous connection of the edict 
with Caracalla’s final, severe punishment of the city in the aftermath of the climactic 
violence, this order might not be seen as anything more than a routine piece of 
legislation in which the emperor attempted to control the populace of Alexandria and 
more general population movement.  
 
Caracalla was not the only individual to eject inhabitants of the chora from 
Alexandria and direct them back to their original nomes. The expulsion of early 216 
did not happen in a vacuum, and this attempt by the Roman authorities to control the 
population of Alexandria has clear precedent throughout the imperial period. If 
divested of the questionable ethnic slur, the directive ordered by Caracalla can be seen 
to bear considerable similarities to other evictions executed by the prefects of Egypt 
earlier in the Principate. Rather than punitive, these expulsion orders carried out under 
previous reigns were designed to address quantifiably practical concerns such as that 
of the census or matters surrounding tax collection. One example of this process which 
                                                 
687 Hdn 4.9.4. 
688 See pgs. 125-26. 
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melds nearly perfectly with Caracalla’s expulsion directive can be found in the edict 
of the prefect Vibius Maximus, released in AD 104, in which the inhabitants of Egypt 
were ordered to return to their homes both to be registered for the customary census 
but also, interestingly, to attend to any agricultural work that was outstanding:  
 
τῆς κατʼ οἰ[κίαν ἀπογραφῆς ἐ]νεστώ[σης] ἀναγκαῖόν [ἐστιν πᾶσιν τοῖ]ς καθʼ 
ἥ[ντινα] δήποτε αἰτ[ίαν ἀποδημοῦσιν ἀπὸ τῶν] νομῶν προσα[γγέλλε]σθαι 
ἐπα[νελ]θεῖν εἰς τὰ ἑαυ[τῶν ἐ]φέστια ἵν[α] καὶ τὴν συνήθη [οἰ]κονομίαν τῆ[ς 
ἀπο]γραφῆς πληρώσωσιν καὶ τῇ προσ[ηκού]σῃ αὐτοῖς γεωργίαι 
προσκαρτερήσω[σιν]. 
 
Since the census has commenced, it is necessary that all those who are absent 
from their nomes are summoned to return to their homes so that they can 
perform the business of registration and attend to the farming which concerns 
them.689 
  
 By wording the edict in this manner, it seems clear that Maximus had two clear 
goals: firstly to move the rural population quickly, in order to complete the census 
efficiently, and secondly to have the inhabitants of the chora apply themselves to 
farming and agricultural production. Far from being grounded in a question of 
ethnicity, the edict is arguably linked more with the process of anachoresis, the prefect 
keen to address both the downturn in agricultural production and payment of taxes that 
the large-scale flight of rural peasants to cities like Alexandria must have prompted.690 
Similar to Caracalla’s later expulsion order, Maximus was explicit that the eviction 
was not a complete one, acknowledging that certain professions were important to the 
effective running of the city. As a consequence, the prefect offered any who had a 
legitimate reason to remain in the city the chance to register themselves:  
 
εἰδὼς μέντο[ι ὅ]τι ἐνίων τῶν [ἀπὸ] τῆς χώρας ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν ἔχει χρε[ίαν] 
βούλομ[αι] πάντα[ς τ]οὺς εὔ[λ]ο̣γ̣ον δο[κοῦν]τα[ς] ἔχειν τοῦ ἐνθάδε ἐπιμένιν 
[αἰ]τίαν ἀπογράφεσ[θ]αι παρὰ Βουλ  ̣  ̣  ̣[  ̣  ̣  ̣] 
 
As I know that our city requires some of the people from the chora, I wish any 
who believes that they have a satisfactory reason for remaining here to register 
themselves before…691  
                                                 
689 P. Lond. III 904, ll. 20-27. 
690 For more on the connection between the census and the exaction of the laographia, see pg. 147. 




 In terms of the basic structure, then, the similarity between the Caracallan 
expulsion and the earlier directive of Vibius Maximus is striking.692 Both authors 
sought to remove the vast majority of outsiders from Alexandria, though they were 
careful to recognise that some elements among the rural peasantry were important to 
the daily life of the city, Caracalla outlining specific exemptions, while Maximus 
offered a chance of securing an immunity from the eviction to any who applied with a 
legitimate reason.  
 
Rather than Caracalla becoming anxious about Alexandria’s population level 
on the grounds of race and ethnicity, it is far more likely that the emperor was 
concerned regarding the inevitable consequences that a sizeable outside population in 
Alexandria had on the rest of the province at large, both in terms of farming output 
and taxation. The concern of the early Severan emperors to address the issue of 
anachoresis and the negative fiscal conditions which resulted from it was already 
visible from the legislation introduced in the course of the Severan apokrimata of 200-
201, in which the Augusti cancelled arrears and offered amnesties for tax fugitives to 
return to their places of registration.693 I would argue that this policy was also 
deliberately moderate in order to avert any possible unrest arising from the return of 
population groups to their nomes.  
 
In the aftermath of the constitutio Antoniniana, Caracalla must have been eager 
to ensure that the fiscal terms of his edict were being adhered to, particularly in a 
province as important to the empire as Egypt. This is not to assume that the sole 
purpose of Caracalla’s visit to Egypt in 215-16 was to inspect how far his constitutio 
was being adhered to and enforce its terms but, given the significant fiscal element 
underlying the edict, it seems an uncontroversial conclusion that the emperor would 
have been unimpressed at the number of rural peasants evading taxes in the 
cosmopolitan hub of Alexandria.  
 
                                                 
692 Lukaszewicz (1990b) 131. 
693 See above, pgs. 160-61. 
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In support of the hypothesis that Caracalla’s order was originally far more 
routine in nature than is often assumed, it is possible to link the emperor’s eviction 
notice to a document released by the serving prefect, Valerius Datus, in the opening 
months of AD 216. In his attempt to establish a date for Caracalla’s expulsion order of 
March 216, Lukaszewicz has sought to connect the decree with an edict introduced by 
Datus, ordering that individuals should return to their respective idia.694 Owing to the 
apparently short time lapse between the orders of the emperor and the prefect, the edict 
released by Datus warrants further discussion.  
 
Unfortunately, the original text of Datus’ order is now lost. It is possible to 
identify that the prefect introduced such an order, though, owing to the survival of 
papyri which show people responding to the call to return to one’s idia. One potential 
example of this papyrological reaction can be observed in the texts of BGU I 321 and 
322, two papyri which record complaints regarding a case of theft from an individual 
named Aurelius Pakysis, a priest at Soknopaiou Nesos. The details of the theft of wheat 
are irrelevant, but Lukaszewicz has identified that this case might carry some 
significance owing to the complainant’s account of his whereabouts.695  
 
In the ninth and tenth line of BGU I 321, the priest claimed that the robbery 
was only very recently discovered by his relatives while he was away from his 
home.696 The reason Pakysis gave for his absence was that he had been in 
Alexandria.697 The date of the petitions recorded in BGU I 321 and 322 is 7th April 
216. The close proximity between the date of these documents and the approximate 
dating of Datus’ edict means that it is tempting to conclude that the priest was 
responding to an order to return home from Alexandria.698 No mention of Datus’ edict 
is made in the course of the extant texts, however, and so it might be the case, as 
Lukaszewicz himself concedes, that the priest was only temporarily in Alexandria to 
                                                 
694 Lukaszewicz (1990b) 129-32. 
695 Lukaszewicz (1990b) 132. 
696 BGU I 321, l. 9. The term employed is πρώην, i.e. ‘lately’. Also see Lukaszewicz (1990b) 132; 
(1983) 117. 
697 BGU I 321, l. 10: διὰ τὸ ἐμὲ ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ εἶναι.  
698 Lukaszewicz (1990b) 132. 
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witness Caracalla’s visit or to take part in the religious rites carried out during the 
course of the emperor’s stay.699  
 
The most compelling evidence for an order being released by Datus can be 
found in another of the Berlin papyri, BGU I 159 (= W. Chr. 408). Dated to 11 Pauni 
in the twenty-fourth year of Antoninus Caracalla, c. 5th June 216, this papyrus contains 
the text of a complaint and accusation of extortion directed at an exegete of an 
unknown polis named Aurelius Soterichus and his father; the complainant is recorded 
as being called Aurelius Pakysis.700 Placing the details of the accusation to one side, 
the context of this petition is of the most interest. In the course of the text, Pakysis 
claimed that he had come back to his hometown following an order by Valerius Datus 
for people to return to their idia:  
 
Οὐαλερίου Δάτου κελεύσ[αν]το[ς] ἅπαντας τοὺς ἐπὶ ξένης διατρείβοντας εἰς 
τὰς ἰδίας κατεισέρχεσθαι. 
 
Since Valerius Datus had ordered that everyone who was wasting their time in 
foreign parts should return to their idia.701 
 
 The context given by Pakysis for his return home and his subsequent problems 
with the local exegete is explicit evidence that in the early months of 216, Valerius 
Datus issued a piece of legislation that commanded that everyone should return to their 
place of registration. It is further important to note that although the prefect’s order 
might have been released in the course of a census year (215-16), this reintegration 
demand is quite distinct from the demands of the census, similar to the way in which 
the census and reintegration demands are presented as separate concerns in the course 
of the earlier edict issued by Vibius Maximus at the opening of the second century.702  
 
                                                 
699 Lukaszewicz (1990b) 132, also see Harker (2008) 57; (2000) 155. 
700 Not to be confused with the priest by the same name recorded in BGU I 321 and 322. 
701 BGU I 159, ll. 6-7. 
702 Llewelyn (1992: 117-18) has noted that although the census and reintegration demands were 
presented in the same document in the case of Vibius Maximus (P. Lond. III 904), this is not indicative 
of a habitual connection between the two types of keleusis. In support of this distinction, Llewelyn has 
observed that the edict released by Datus recorded in BGU I 159 would likely have been released in 
around the tenth month of the census year, hardly making for a smooth connection between that and 
any order connected to the census.   
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How, then, does the edict of Datus link to the expulsion ordered by Caracalla 
preserved on the Giessen papyrus? If the papyrological evidence is taken into account, 
it is possible to conclude that Caracalla had a general statement drafted in which he 
criticised the high number of individuals residing in Alexandria when they were 
registered to other nomes. The disruption alluded to in the course of this text can be 
confidently associated with the civil unrest witnessed by the emperor in the closing 
weeks of 215. The precise nature of the original Caracallan text is unfortunately lost 
now, however, owing to the obvious influence of a later copyist and the apparently 
cursory manner in which the order is recorded on the Papyrus Gissensis.703  
 
 It is unfortunately impossible to conclude without any doubt whether the order 
of Caracalla was intended to form an independent mandatum or rather one element in 
a set of instructions to the new prefect which was later published or otherwise 
recorded. I would argue, however, the close temporal link between the two documents 
makes it likely that there would have been some connection between two such 
apparently similar orders and that the order of the prefect might form the result of a 
degree of prompting on the part of the emperor. If the documents are removed from 
the traditional demands of the census, then their focus appears to be a uniformly 
economic one, concerned with agricultural production and the payment of tax as in the 
case of the order released by Vibius Maximus in 104. This element would further 
explain the interest which Caracalla took in the matter during the course of his visit to 
Alexandria.  
 
I have argued that the emperor was concerned with raising a significant level 
of capital for the imperial treasuries as swiftly as possible, and indeed this was one of 
the fundamental aspects underlying the promulgation of the constitutio Antoniniana. 
While there is no suggestion that the sole reason of Caracalla’s visit to Alexandria was 
to ensure that the terms of his great edict were being adhered to, it is likely that the 
earlier promulgation of the edict had a significant bearing on the emperor and the way 
in which he responded to the disruption in the city. Upon arriving in Alexandria, 
                                                 
703 The text of the order simply begins with the adverb ἄλλο, inferring that it is an excerpt from a larger 
text, or that it omits the customary salutation lines from an epistle. 
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witnessing civil unrest and disruption and observing large numbers of individuals 
residing in the city whilst evading taxation in their own nomes, Caracalla could hardly 
have been convinced that the demands of the fiscus were being met. As a result, it is a 
logical conclusion that, in the aftermath of executing one prefect and installing another, 
the emperor was swift to instruct his subordinate to release a general reintegration 
order. Far from an unusual initiative, this a piece of legislation that has demonstrable 
precedent throughout the imperial period, when prefects of the province sought to 
control the movement of the populace and ensure compliance with tax collection.  
 
The constitutio Antoniniana and Violence in Egypt, AD 216  
In summary, the traditionally accepted image of Caracalla’s visit to Alexandria 
and the violence which was to characterise it are based upon both a hostile and 
problematic tradition, itself probably coloured to some extent by the negative local 
sources. The fundamental chronology of the events of 215-16 has been severely 
foreshortened, compressing a complex social situation and a gradual escalation in 
tensions into a clichéd and awkward urban legend centred on the alleged rage that 
Caracalla could not control in the face of slights and personal insults. If the accounts 
of the ancient authors are critically re-examined and analysed with other bodies of 
evidence, I would argue that it is possible to identify two distinct phases to the 
emperor’s visit, inferring that Caracalla’s actions against the Alexandrian populace, 
although extremely violent in the end, were primarily reactive and show little evidence 
of malice or pre-meditation. In the aftermath of disruption shortly after the emperor’s 
arrival, instead of ordering a massacre, Caracalla is observed punishing those whom 
he held responsible for a slow and inefficient suppression of the unrest, namely the 
prefect Heraclitus and, potentially, a number of Alexandrian notables. There appears 
to have followed a time of relative peace and stability before something occurred at 
the end of April 216.  
 
 The precise nature of the catalyst remains a mystery but, regardless of the exact 
prompt, violence seems to have spread rapidly across Alexandria. The scale of the 
unrest was sufficient to prompt the emperor to order troops into the city. Contrary to 
the authors’ eagerness to depict this episode as a massacre in which Roman legionaries 
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dug grave ditches pre-emptively, epigraphic evidence suggests that the second 
outbreak of unrest across the city was far more violent and involved close quarter 
fighting through the city streets. This point is of importance not only with regards to 
how we view Caracalla during this episode, but also the Alexandrians themselves. To 
accept the massacre narrative is to deny the local population any sense of agency in 
their actions during the events in question. The traditional narrative casts them as 
passive participants in the violence, helplessly defenceless against Caracallan 
aggression. This is an image of the Alexandrians which the ancient evidence, when 
read as a whole, simply does not support. From a combination of epigraphic, 
papyrological and literary sources, it is clear that a significant number of Alexandrians 
actively challenged Roman authority in the city and, furthermore, fought ferociously. 
Indeed, whether or not the punitive sanctions outlined by Dio were enforced following 
the suppression of this rioting, the violence appears to have prompted the emperor’s 
departure from the city.  
 
 The events of Caracalla’s visit to Alexandria did not happen in a vacuum. It is 
of crucial importance to note that the earlier promulgation of the constitutio 
Antoniniana contributed to a general atmosphere of dissatisfaction across both the elite 
and non-elite populations of Roman Egypt. The Alexandrian citizenry, until then the 
most socially prestigious group in the province, and arguably the region at large, 
witnessed their treasured franchise and status being eroded by the extension of Roman 
civitas, relegating them to primi inter pares in the region at best. While the non-elite 
appear to have been keen to exercise their newly acquired Roman status, adopting 
Roman nomenclature for example, the fiscal-economic implications of the constitutio 
cannot have been welcome. The perennial problem of anachoresis continued in the 
years after 212, and Alexandria remained an attractive haven for tax fugitives.  
 
Tensions between the different social groups in Alexandria, paired with 
resentment of the imperial regime and an understandable reluctance on the part of tax 
evaders to return to their homes, resulted in a strained atmosphere with the potential 
for civil unrest. Into this atmosphere, Caracalla, perhaps not fully appreciating the 
severity of the situation, was keen to ensure that the demands of the fiscus were met 
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(an eagerness that is in keeping with the fiscal impetus underlying the promulgation of 
the constitutio). He did this by ordering that all inhabitants of the chora should leave 
the city and return to their places of registration. It seems unlikely that either the 
emperor or the new prefect Datus, who released his reintegration directive in spring 
216, had any significant success in enforcing this order. Instead, the tensions within 
the city boiled over into violence, the assembly of men for an Alexandrian phalanx 
forming a potential flashpoint. In promulgating the constitutio Antoniniana, Caracalla 
was evidently attempting to legislate on an imperial scale. This approach, however, 
inevitably ignored the issues and problems that it might produce on a provincial and 
regional level. The result of this oversight in Egypt’s case appears to have been the 






Caracalla took an unprecedented legal step in AD 212, by extending the rights 
of citizenship to all corners of his realm. In one move, the emperor altered the Roman 
Empire irrevocably, changing not only the mechanisms through which the majority of 
imperial subjects related to the state, but also the fundamental nature of Roman 
identity. It is no understatement that the ramifications of this single piece of legislation 
were immense. Yet, for all of its significance, the constitutio Antoniniana remains one 
of the most controversial documents to survive from antiquity. There is surprisingly 
little direct evidence for the legislation, and what does survive is characterised either 
by its fragmentary nature or the hostility of the source from which it derives. 
 
There is no way that any one study could possibly address every aspect of the 
edict: its language, scope, legal and social implications and its rationale. This has 
prompted scholars to engage with the legislation in very particular ways, questioning 
the precise text of the Giessen papyrus, assessing potential motivating factors on an 
individual basis, or studying the longer term consequences of the edict in periods for 
which there is better evidence. All of these studies have been valuable, and have 
illuminated important aspects of the troublesome document, but they also present 
problems of their own, in turn. The difficulty with these individual approaches has 
been that they risk either implying an inflated sense of importance on the element in 
question or removing the document from its original environment. At its extreme, the 
constitutio is in danger of becoming abstract, and the connection to its own legal and 
cultural milieu being lost. The fundamental objective of this dissertation, then, in 
examining the rationale of the emperor in promulgating the Antonine Constitution, has 
been to return the focus to the third century AD. 
 
 This thesis has demonstrated that Caracalla’s decision to extend the franchise 
was the result of a combination of factors motivating the emperor to legislate in 212, 
and that the edict consequently reflects his contemporary concerns and ambitions. I 
have argued that it is impossible to assess the rationale underlying the constitutio 
Antoniniana without considering the dynastic crisis that had been prompted by the 
murder of Geta. Caracalla’s adolescence and early adult life had been defined, to a 
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large extent, by the fierce rivalry that he shared with his younger brother. While Dio 
is often a questionable source regarding the life of his bête-noir, his assessment that 
‘anybody could see that something terrible was bound to result’ from the enmity seems 
all too plausible.704 The shared principate between the brothers in 211 was a disaster, 
but Caracalla’s eventual success in eliminating Geta nevertheless left him in a delicate 
position.  
 
 Never before had an incumbent emperor been murdered by his colleague in 
office. If this were not enough to threaten Caracalla’s position, the act of fratricide also 
served to undermine the extensive programme of imperial propaganda engineered by 
his father, Septimius Severus, in which the brothers were repeatedly presented as a 
guarantee of imperial harmony and continuity following the bloody civil wars that had 
ensued from the assassinations of Commodus and Pertinax. The year 212 thus began 
with Caracalla facing the unenviable prospect of having to rule alone for the first time 
in his life, while being simultaneously compelled to consolidate and legitimise his 
precarious position publically. He attempted to achieve this by revolutionising the 
character of the Severan dynasty and offering an official version of the events that 
resulted in his murder of Geta. The familial imagery that had been the staple in 
Severus’ later political communication was discarded in favour of iconography that 
presented the surviving emperor as a protector of the state whose reign was divinely 
sanctioned. Where Geta had once served as a symbolic guarantor of concord, he now 
became emblematic of an evil that Caracalla was compelled to destroy and triumph 
over. By condemning his brother’s memory and reinventing his public image, the 
emperor had effectively re-written the history of the Severan dynasty and centred the 
regime around his persona alone.  
 
 It is within this context that the Antonine Constitution should be considered 
since, as I have shown, the edict can be seen to address Caracalla’s imperial anxieties 
in a number of ways. The opening lines of the constitutio make it unmistakeably clear 
that the emperor intended the document to be viewed as an act of piety, a religious 
thanksgiving for the gods’ protection against a plot on his life, concocted by his 
                                                 
704 Dio 78.1.5. 
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brother. I have shown, furthermore, that this forms one facet of a wider religious 
programme, complemented by a staggering array of divinely inspired numismatic 
iconography throughout his sole reign. The act of enfranchisement itself can also be 
seen to carry a religious dimension, since the grant of civitas appears to have been 
partially prompted by a Caracallan desire to achieve an effective consensus 
universorum, through which the favour of the gods would be ensured in perpetuity.  
 
 Further examination of the Giessen text reveals that the emperor also attempted 
to engage with his wider populace in different ways. The rhetoric employed by the 
emperor throughout the Antonine Constitution lends credence to the theory that 
Caracalla fostered a connection between himself and Alexander the Great. The 
resulting reaction among population groups in the eastern empire, manifesting in 
festivals and coinage connecting the emperor to the king, suggests that he was 
successful in laying claim to Alexander’s legacy and the imagery of military virtue 
that accompanied it. Evidence from the constitutio, however, demonstrates that the 
Alexander mythos formed only one facet of Caracalla’s attempt to connect with his 
populace. While he also can be seen to depict his great edict as an extreme example of 
imperial indulgentia, this thesis has shown that the Antonine Constitution heralded an 
even more binding connection between the emperor and his new cives. I have argued 
that it is appropriate to view the edict as an act of patronage carried out on an 
unprecedented scale. It is clear that, while the expression of patronage had changed 
slightly from the Republic into the Principate, the same expectation of loyalty and 
goodwill accompanied the gift of beneficia. By giving nearly every free person in the 
empire the rights of civitas, Caracalla had affected them on an individual level and had 
forged a personal connection with them at the very moment when the legitimacy of his 
sole reign might have been questioned. In this context, the Antonine Constitution 
represents a powerful and elegant solution to the threat posed to Caracalla by dynastic 
instability and cool relations with the senatorial order in 212.  
 
 While this interpretation of the constitutio Antoniniana has shown how it 
functioned in the volatile political environment, following the murder of Geta, it has 
also been necessary to consider the only surviving contemporary account of the 
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legislation, which offers a very different image of its purpose. Cassius Dio’s 
explanation of the edict, namely that it was introduced in order to reap a massive tax 
yield to fund the emperor’s financial profligacy, has been largely dismissed by modern 
scholars, owing to the unmistakeable hatred held by the author towards Caracalla. I 
have argued, however, that it is possible to identify a fiscal initiative to raise capital if 
the Giessen text is studied in conjunction with other extant media. Of crucial 
importance to this consideration is the way in which the fragmented Giessen papyrus 
is reconstructed. If the traditionally problematic reference to the dediticii being 
disbarred from the grant of civitas is rejected and replaced with an allusion to 
additional privileges (additicia) being forbidden alongside the rights of citizenship, it 
can be shown that Caracalla was eager to expand his available tax base.  
 
The numismatic evidence for the period further supports this hypothesis. It 
confirms, for example, that the emperor engaged in a policy of currency debasement. 
It would be a mistake, however, to interpret this as the result of a systemic economic 
crisis, especially since the evidence reveals that the early Severan period represented 
a high watermark in terms of building activity, funded by the capital raised through 
war booty and expropriations acquired by Septimius Severus. Rather than economic 
instability, I have argued that it is more likely that Caracalla needed large quantities of 
physical coinage to fund his military reforms, as well as those undertaken by his father. 
Since both emperors introduced army pay rises within their programmes of reform, it 
is appropriate to interpret the fiscal element of the constitutio Antoniniana as a 
response to a short-term problem of liquidity rather than economic collapse. This is 
even more convincing when it is noted that a key recipient of the capital raised from 
this augmented tax yield was the military treasury. 
 
 In addition to improving the financial lot of the soldiery, the Antonine 
Constitution can be seen as a response to the perennial problem of insufficient numbers 
enrolling for legionary service. By turning nearly every free individual across his 
empire into citizens, Caracalla had overcome the primary obstacle facing emperors in 
filling the levies, namely that the soldiers of the legions had to be fully enfranchised 
upon their enlistment. If this consequence of the constitutio is combined with the 
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economic implications of the edict, it strongly suggests that the emperor was eager to 
reform his military apparatus radically, and that extending the franchise was 
considered the way to realise that ambition. This aspect of Caracalla’s edict should 
come as little surprise, owing to his close identification with the soldiery and his 
imitation of Alexander the Great, not to mention his imperial ambitions against Parthia, 
but it is nevertheless a facet of the constitutio that, until recently, has been 
understudied.   
 
The cumulative weight of the evidence marshalled here has revealed that the 
Antonine Constitution was designed to address a range of the emperor’s most pressing 
short and medium term concerns, ensuring his political survival while allowing him to 
realise his military ambitions. The application of a nearly universal franchise was no 
easy task, though. Indeed, the implementation of Caracalla’s edict was not without its 
problems. This is confirmed by the populace’s response to Caracalla’s visit to 
Alexandria, one of the most controversial episodes of his sole reign. The events of the 
emperor’s time in the city have formed an important case study, in an attempt to 
identify some of the immediate repercussions of the constitutio. Owing to a 
contradictory and unreliable source tradition, it is little wonder that few attempts have 
been made to analyse the events and significance of the episode in any meaningful 
way. It is also clear that the tale of a Caracallan massacre offered by Dio, Herodian 
and the author of the Historia Augusta is based less on fact than on a hostile literary 
agenda, using the account of violence to vilify Caracalla. I have argued that, if these 
authors are studied in conjunction with papyrological and epigraphic evidence, a far 
more complex image of the unrest emerges, one in which the constitutio Antoniniana 
was a destabilising factor. For the Alexandrian elite, the enforcement of Caracalla’s 
edict meant a dilution in their prized social prestige, eroding a status which had marked 
the citizenry as the foremost population of the Egyptian region. For the non-elite, 
whilst they could enjoy their new social and legal status, the fiscal implications of the 
legislation can only have exacerbated the financial problems facing inhabitants of the 
chora. The result of this increasing tension and resentment was ultimately the 




The constitutio Antoniniana is one of the most studied documents pertaining 
to Roman imperial period, let alone the Severan dynasty. Much effort has been made 
to examine the value of the edict in the legal sphere, and to explore the legacy and long 
term effects of the document as the Principate progressed into the era of late antiquity. 
For too long, however, insufficient work has been done on the constitutio in its own 
historical milieu. And yet, it is only by studying the edict in a properly embedded 
context that we can ever come to a satisfactory understanding of Caracalla’s decision 
to introduce this revolutionary legislation. I have presented a variety of often 
interdependent factors and pressures that either inspired the emperor or compelled him 
to act in AD 212. That the constitutio was grounded in the volatile political 
environment of the Severan dynasty and was designed to address the emperor’s crisis 
of legitimacy is beyond question, but it also allowed him to pursue a longer term 
military-economic agenda. It is my hope that this contribution will prompt a more 
detailed discussion of Caracalla and his edict, removed from the stereotypical image 
of the ‘bad emperor’, but mindful of the fact that the Antonine Constitution was 





The constitutio Antoniniana: text, translation and commentary  
 
Reconstruction of P. Giss. 40 I  
1) [Αὐτοκράτωρ Καῖσαρ Μά]ρκο[ς Α]ὐρή[λιος Σεουῆρος Ἀ]ντωνῖνο[ς] Ε[ὐσεβὴ]ς λέγει 
[πάντως εἰς τὸ θεῖον χρὴ] μᾶλλον ἀν[αφέρειν καὶ τὰ]ς αἰτίας κ[α]ὶ [λογι]σμοὺς 
[δικαίως δ’ἄν κἀγὼ τοῖς θ]εοῖς τ[οῖ]ς ἀθ[αν]άτοις εὐχαριστήσα[ι]μι ὅτι τὴς τοιαύτη[ς] 
[ἐπιβουλῆς γενομένης σῷο]ν ἐμὲ συν[ετ]ήρησαν τοιγαροῦν νομίζω [ο]ὕτω με –  
5) [γαλοπρεπῶς καὶ εὐσεβ]ῶς δύ[να]σθαι τῇ μεγαλειότητι αὐτῶν το ἱκανὸν ποι – 
 [εῖν, εἰ τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ὁσ]άκις ἐὰν ὑ[πε]ισέλθ[ωσ]ιν εἰς τοὺς ἐμοὺς ἀν[θρ]ώπους 
 [ὡς Ῥωμαίους εὶς τὰ ἱερὰ τῶν] θεῶν συνει[σ]ενέγ[κοιμ]ι     Δίδω[μ]ι τοί[ν]υν ἅπα – 
 [σι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ῥωμαϊκ]ὴν οἰκουμένην π[ολειτ]είαν Ῥωμ[αί]ων [μ]ένοντος  
 [τοῦ δικαίου τῶν πολιτευμ]άτων χωρ[ὶς] τῶν [ἀδδ]ειτικίων     Ὀ[φ]είλει [γ]ὰρ τὸ  
10) [πλῆθος οὐ μόνον τἄλλα συνυπομέ]νειν πάντα ἀ[λλ]ὰ ἤδη κ[α]ὶ τῇ νίκῃ ἐνπεριει –  
 [λῆφθαι     Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ διάτ]αγμα ἐ[ξαπ]λώσει [τὴν] μεγαλειότητα [το]ῦ Ῥωμα[ί] 
 [ων δήμου συμβαίνει γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴ]ν περὶ τοῦς [ἄλλο]υς γεγενῆσθα[ι] ᾗπερ δ[ι]α – 
[πρέπουσιν ἀνέκαθεν Ῥωμαῖοι τιμῇ κα]ταλειφ[θέντων μηδέν]ων τῶ[ν] ἑκάστης 
[χώρας ἐν οἰκουμένῃ ἀπολιτεύτων ἢ ἀτιμ]ήτω[ν    Ἂπο δὲ τῶν] π[ρ]οσ[όδων τῶν νῦν] 
15) [ὑπερχουσῶν συντελούντων, ἅπερ ἐκελεύσ]θη [παρὰ Ῥωμαίων ἀπὸ τοῦ κα ἔτους,]705 
 [ὡς δίκαιον ἐκ τῶν διαταγμάτων καὶ ἐπιστολ]ῶ[ν, ἅ ἐξεδόθη ὑφ’ ἡμῶν τε] 
 [καὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων προγόνων   Προετέθη . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .] 
 
1 W3K: Σ[εβαστὸ]ς λέγει MBSS2WHW2  
2 WH: ἀν[αβαλόμενον τὰ]ς αἰτίας MS: ἀν[     τὰ]ς αἰτίας W3K: λ[ογι]σμοὺ[ς] S2WHW2W3K: 
λ[ιβ]έλλου[ς] MS  
3 WH: [ζητεῖν, ὅπως ἂν τοῖς θ]εοῖς MS: [τίνι ἄν τρόπῳ ἀξίως τοῖς θ]εοῖς S2W2   
4 SWHW2: [συμφορᾶς γενομένης] B: [ἐπιβουλῆς ἄφνω γενομένης] W3  
5 W2: [γάλως καὶ φιλανθρώπ]ως S: [γαλομερῶς καὶ θεοπρεπ]ῶς WH: [γαλομερῶς ἄν καὶ εὐσεβ]ῶς W3  
6 S: [εἰ τοσάκις μυρίους ὁσ]άκις S2WHW2: [εἰ τοὺς ξένους ὁσ]άκις M: [εἰ τοὺς βαρβάρους ὁσ]άκις B: 
[εἰ νῦν ἅπαντας, καὶ ὁσ]άκις W3  
7 WH: [ἰσοτίμους εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ τῶ]ν θεῶν SW2: [εἰς τὰς θρησκείας τῶ]ν θεῶν M: [εἰς θρησκείας τῶν 
ἡμετέρω]ν θεῶν W3: τοί[ν]υν ἅπα- MBSS2WHW2: τοῖ[ς σ]υνάπα- W3K 
8 H: [σιν ὅσοι ἐὰν ὦσι κατὰ τὴ]ν οἰκουμένην S2W2: [σιν ξένοις τοῖς κατὰ τὴ]ν οἰκουμένην M: [σιν 
ἐπηλύταις τοῖς κατὰ τ]ὴν οἰκουμένην B: [σιν τοῖς οὖσι κατὰ τ]ὴν οἰκουμένην S: [σιν τοῖς κατοικοῦσιν 
τὴ]ν οἰκουμένην W: [σιν ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ μου κατὰ τ]ὴν οἰκουμένην W3: [σιν      κατὰ τ]ὴν οἰκουμένην K: 
π[ολειτ]είαν HW3K: π[ολιτ]είαν MBSS2WW2  
9 W3K: [παντὸς γένους πολιτευμ]άτων M: [τῷ φίσκῳ τοῦ λόγου ἀπαραβ]άτως B: [πολιτικοῦ σφισιν 
ἀπαραβ]άτως S: [ξένου οὐδενὸς τῶν πολιτευμ]άτων S2: [οὐδενὸς ἐκτὸς τῶν πολιτευμ]άτων W: [δὲ 
ξενου οὐδενὸς τῶν ταγμ]άτων H: [οὐδενὸς τῶν πρὶν ἐλασσωμ]άτων W2: [ἀδδ]ειτικίων W3: 
[δε]δειτικίων MBSS2WH: [δη]δειτικίων W2: [     ]δειτικίων K  
10 WH: [οὐ μόνον συμπο]νεῖν S: [οὐ μόνον συνκινδυνε]ύειν S2  
11 MSS2: [τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἐμὸν διάτ]αγμα W: [τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἐμαυτοῦ διάτ]αγμα H: ἐ[ξαπ]λώσει WH: 
ἐ[κδ]ελώσει S: ἐ[ξο]λώσει S2  
12 WH: [κελεύω δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν χάρι]ν B: [ων δήμου διὰ τὸ τὴν αὐτὴν τάξι]ν S: [ων δήμου μετὰ τὸ τὴν 
ἴσην τιμὴ]ν S2  
13 WH: [τὴν εὐγένειαν Ῥωμαῖοι] S2: deest MBSW2W3K  
14 H: deest MBSS2WW2W3K  
15 H: deest MBSS2WW2W3K  
16 H: deest MBSS2WW2W3K  
17 H: deest MBSS2WW2W3K 
                                                 
705 The reconstruction of lines 15-17 relies heavily on the edition of Heichelheim (1941: 10-22).  
Although his suggestions to fill the lacunae are undoubtedly eloquent, they are ultimately conjecture, 
included here in the interests of completeness. 
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Translation  
The Emperor Caesar Marcus Aurelius Severus Antoninus Pius decrees: It is altogether 
necessary to attribute the causes and reasons [of recent events] to the divine. I, 
personally, would rightly thank the immortal gods, since although such a conspiracy 
[as that of Geta] has occurred, they have watched over me and protected me. I think 
that I am able, both magnificently and piously, to do something fitting to the gods’ 
majesty, if I manage to bring [all] those in the empire, who constitute my people, to 
the temples of the gods as Romans. I therefore give everyone in the Roman world the 
Roman citizenship: preserving customary law, without additional privileges. It is 
necessary for the masses not only to share in our burden, but also to be included in 
victory. This decree will spread the magnificence of the Roman people. For it now 
happens that the same greatness has occurred for everyone, by the honour in which the 
Romans have been preeminent since time immemorial, with no-one from any country 
in the world being left stateless or without honour. Referring to the taxes that exist at 
present, all are due to pay those that have been imposed upon the Romans from the 
beginning of their twenty-first year [of age], as it is the law, according to the edicts 
and rescripts issued by us and our ancestors.  Displayed publically… 
 
General observations and dating  
 Even a cursory glance at the document reveals that P. Giss. 40 has suffered 
extensive wear and damage, most notably on the left-hand side where the text of the 
constitutio is written. From comparison of the left and (largely complete) right sides 
of the papyrus, it can be estimated that around one third of the upper left side of the 
document is missing. The damage in this area is compounded by a large vertical tear 
in the middle of the surviving papyrus which has obliterated yet more script. The lower 
left-hand section of P. Giss. 40 is in an even more damaged state. The large tear that 
has destroyed some of the upper left side extends further into the papyrus and has left 
only around thirty characters of text remaining. Smaller localised tears and holes in 
areas suggest that the papyrus has suffered worm-damage, while areas where the top-
layer of the document is damaged (more visible on the right side of the papyrus) are 
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the result of damage sustained in the document’s afterlife when the museum attempted 
to glaze it.706  
 
The other visible form of damage on P. Giss. 40 is in the form of dark patches 
spread over the surface of the papyrus, especially in the upper-right quadrant. This is 
indicative of water damage sustained in February 1945, when the papyrus was being 
held in the safe of the Dresdner Bank.707 This has caused the felt back-layer, added to 
the artefact by the museum, to become fused to the papyrus. Considering the severely 
damaged nature of the Giessen papyrus, it is hardly surprising that much of the 
academic focus directed towards the document has concerned the necessary 
reconstruction of the Greek text. 
 
Despite the severe damage to the artefact, however, the availability of high-
resolution photographs of the papyrus from the Giessener Papyri- und Ostraka-
Datenbank has facilitated a far more detailed analysis of the text than was ever possible 
in the past. The text of P. Giss. 40 is presented in a legible, cursive script of Koine 
Greek. Meyer claimed that the text was of a ‘careful, clerical’ nature, while Kuhlmann 
has concluded that the papyrus is business-like in appearance and that the script is 
‘regular and aesthetic’.708 The characters are clear and of a regular size, 0.3-0.4cm 
wide in the majority of cases, often using capitalised versions of characters and lunate 
sigmas (c). In the course of the text, there are larger spaces between the different 
sections of the documents to allow ease of legibility.709 This feature permits a more 
confident estimate regarding the number of missing letters in the various lacunae. The 
script appears to be of a formal style found throughout the second and third centuries 
AD. It does not exhibit the elongated chancery stylisation of some official papyri of 
this period, particularly from the Alexandrian Chancery (P. Berol. inv. 11532, for 
example); the rather more rounded characters group this papyri with those of a 
bureaucratic context, the attractive calligraphic script reminiscent of literary papyri.710  
 
In spite of its aesthetic quality, there are minor irregularities.711 There are 
numerous ligatures throughout the papyrus. The appearance of iota varies from a small 
compact line to a larger, sweeping version that impacts on the line of script below. 
Epsilons are written sometimes as tall, narrow characters with three short but 
equidistant bars, while in other places they are written with an extended central bar, 
joining to other letters. Omicron is presented in a very small form, often higher in the 
line than other letters, and the letter π is notable for being considerably wider than the 
majority of the other characters.712   
 
                                                 
706 Kuhlmann (1994) 1. 
707 Kuhlmann (1994) 2. I am grateful to Dr Olaf Schneider and the staff of the Universitätsbibliothek 
Gießen Special Collections department for their assistance in arranging a visit for me to view the 
papyrus and sharing their knowledge regarding the storage and recent history of the artefact. This has 
proven invaluable to my appreciation of the problems inherent when studying this document. 
708 Meyer (1910) 25; Kuhlmann (1994) 8-9. 
709 P. Giss. 40, I.7 for example.  Also see Kuhlmann (1994) 216. 
710 Cavallo and Maehler (2008) 123. 
711 Kuhlmann (1994) 215. 
712 Kuhlmann (1994: 215-16) draws attention to these irregularities in more detail. 
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Some of the oddities, in particular that of the omicron being reduced in size, 
exhibit certain traits of the more simplistic style that was to evolve throughout the later 
third century and from the time of Diocletian into the ‘upright ogival majuscule’ style 
of writing that was common throughout late antiquity and the Byzantine era.713 This 
apparent combination of stylistic features allows us to assign a time period for this 
artefact with more confidence. The style of writing, when combined with the subject 
matter of the text, means that a dating of the early third century AD is convincing. 
 
Commentary  
Line 1: From the surviving script alone, it is relatively clear that this line is a formulaic 
list of imperial titles introducing the emperor making the decree. This edition has opted 
to restore the penultimate word in the line as Εὐσεβής rather than Σεβαστός. The 
damage to the papyrus around the initial letter of the word makes it difficult to decipher 
the character beyond all doubt. The shape does bear a close similarity to the larger 
scale lunate sigmas found throughout the text. Magnification of the high-resolution 
image of the papyrus, however, appears to reveal a trace of ink concurrent with the 
middle bar of a capitalised epsilon.714  
 
Line 2: The beginning of this line has prompted a variety of different wordings, 
although the sentiment remains roughly the same. The attribution of certain events to 
divine powers by Caracalla is repeated from Stroux onwards. This edition supports the 
version offered by Wilhelm and later Heichelheim, a good compromise between the 
earlier version of Stroux and the later one of Weissert. Owing to the visibility of –
σμους at the end of the line, it is palaeographically impossible to accept the earlier 
versions of Meyer, Bickermann and Schönbauer. The suggestion of λογισμούς by 
Stroux is far more acceptable.  This conjecture was supported by Schubart in addition 
to Wilhelm and Heichelheim, becoming the traditionally accepted reconstruction.715 
In this reconstruction, αἰτίας κ[α]ὶ [λογι]σμοὺς translates as the reasons and causes of 
recent events to which Caracalla was referring, thus making any attempt to restore 
λιβέλλους unwarranted.  
 
Line 3: Similar to the second line, there is an underlying sentiment that is brought out 
in all of the reconstructions. The feeling of gratitude expressed by Caracalla is shown 
by the nearly complete survival of εὐχαριστήσαιμι (‘I would thank’). Owing to the 
generally literary feel of the text, the slightly more eloquent version offered by 
Wilhelm and Heichelheim is, again, perhaps the closest to the spirit of the original. 
The genitive τὴς τοιαύτη[ς] is part of a genitive absolute construction, which refers to 
an unspecified incident that had taken place in the recent past. This event is most 
probably a conspiracy (ἐπιβουλῆς γενομένης), mentioned in the following line. 
                                                 
713 Cavallo & Maehler (2008) 131-2. 
714 A search of the PHI Greek Inscription Database reveals that Εὐσεβής (= Pius) was a title used in 
relation to Caracalla, usually positioned before Σεβαστός whenever the two titles were used together: 
see Apollonia Salbake 4 (= Robert, La Carie II. no.149), Magnesia 297 (= CIL III 13689) and 
Stratonikeia 91 (= IStratonikeia 811) for three such uses of the title.  Also see Bureth (1964) 102-4. 
Kuhlmann (1994: 222-3) has suggested that this usage of the title may explain why Caracallan 
documents are often confused with those of Antoninus Pius.  This confusion can be found even in late 
antiquity, when the edict was erroneously attributed to Antoninus Pius in Justinian’s Novellae (78.5) 
and to Marcus Aurelius by Aurelius Victor (Caes. 16.12).   




Line 4: Of all the editions cited above, Meyer is the only one not to stress the feeling 
of a struggle or misfortune that Caracalla has been saved from. This edition’s text is 
based upon the versions offered by Schönbauer and Wilhelm, beginning with 
ἐπιβουλῆς. The alternative version offered by Heichelheim in which the upsilon is 
omitted is not incorrect, since both essentially infer an attempt made against 
Caracalla’s life, but ἐπιβουλή conveys a more secretive and conspiratorial feeling that 
is better in keeping with Caracalla’s reputed statements in the aftermath of Geta’s 
murder. This version is closer to a passage in Dio where the author described Caracalla 
addressing the troops in an attempt to persuade them that he was, in fact, the victim of 
an attempted coup d’état.716 While we must be careful not to allow Dio’s text to 
influence our reconstruction excessively, it is tempting to imagine that he would have 
seen the original edict and allowed it to colour the language used in his later account 
of events.  
 
Line 5: In his commentary, Oliver concluded that it was not possible to confidently 
discern the two adverbs employed on the papyrus to describe the emperor’s great act 
of gratitude to the gods for saving him.717 While this edition concurs with Weissert’s 
use of the adverb εὐσεβώς in the second position, I have opted to agree with Meyer 
and Stroux that the adverb μεγαλοπρεπῶς is more appropriate for the word at the 
beginning of the line. Both μεγαλομερής and μεγαλοπρεπής have been used to mean 
‘magnificence’ but the latter appears to carry an added sense of an act befitting a great 
man, an added inference that may be attached to Caracalla’s position as emperor.718  
 
Line 6: This edition has opted not to accept the version preferred by Stroux, Wilhelm, 
Heichelheim and Weissert, since their reconstructions leave a vague impression of the 
people that the emperor intended to bring to the temples of the gods as Roman citizens 
(see line seven, below).719 The version by Schönbauer, however, maintains the idea of 
the vast scale of Caracalla’s plans while at the same time providing a more precise 
notion of their intended extent. Oliver has noted that the phrase ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ appearing 
in the line was again similarly used by Dio when describing the scale of the 
constitutio.720 
 
Line 7: All of the reconstructions of this line bear connotations of masses being 
brought together in religious devotion, further describing Caracalla’s debt of gratitude 
outlined in lines five and six. This edition favours the more pointed reconstruction of 
Wilhelm and Heichelheim, with its emphasis on the importance of bringing all those 
under the emperor’s authority to the temples as Romans rather than merely assorted 
subject peoples.721   
                                                 
716 Dio (77.3.1) employs the middle voice perfect participle of ἐπιβουλεύω: ὁ δ' Ἀντωνῖνος καίπερ 
ἑσπέρας οὔσης τὰ στρατόπεδα κατέλαβε, διὰ πάσης τῆς ὁδοῦ κεκραγὼς ὡς ἐπιβεβουλευμένος καὶ 
κινδυνεύων (emphasis added). 
717 Oliver (1989) 503. 
718 For the adverbial use of μεγαλοπρεπής, see: Hdt. 6.128; Xen. Anab. 1.4.17. 
719 It is true that one might expect the decree to avoid specifics, owing to the intended impression of 
grandeur that surrounded it, but this reconstruction is still, perhaps, a little overly complicated. 
720 Dio 78.9.5; Oliver (1989) 503. 
721 This reconstruction fits well with Ando’s claim that Caracalla sought consensus in religious worship. 




There is a minor disagreement regarding the nature of the final two words of 
the line, where Caracalla declares that the gift (that he has yet to disclose) will be given 
to all under his power. The traditionally accepted version only acknowledges one letter 
space in the lacuna near the end of the line, leaving a reconstruction τοί[ν]υν ἅπα | σιν. 
This has been challenged by both Wolff and Kuhlmann who have claimed that there 
is space for two letters in the lacuna, offering the alternative reconstruction τοί[ς 
σ]υνάπα | σιν. The space does appear to be large enough to fit two lunate sigmas, but 
it is also possible that the scribe simply left a slightly larger separation between the 
two words for ease of legibility.   
 
This edition has therefore opted for the more traditional restoration of τοίνυν. 
The appearance of an inferential particle is the better semantic choice since it refers 
back to the events that prompted Caracalla’s edict rather than leaving the great gift of 
citizenship entirely separate from its context. The causative link that τοίνυν creates 
between the two sentences at this juncture makes it the more naturally acceptable 
choice.  
 
Line 8: It is in this line that the grant of Roman citizenship is outlined. The 
reconstruction of the lacuna in the middle of the extant script as π[ολιτ]είαν is nearly 
universally accepted in the different reconstructions of this line.722 This is of crucial 
importance, as acceptance of this phrase equates to an agreement that this text is a 
record of the universal citizenship decree. This edition concurs with the restoration of 
Heichelheim who is consistent in his emphasis of the Romanitas of the grant.   
 
It should be noted that in maintaining the potential Romanitas of the edict 
through the wording τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ῥωμαϊκὴν οἰκουμένην, this text echoes the Latin 
description of the decree outlined by Ulpian, who may be safely assumed to have been 
familiar with the original.723 The jurist was explicit that the edict affected those in orbe 
Romano qui sunt.724 The reconstruction of the participle μένοντος at the end of the line 
is also universally accepted but will be discussed below in connection with line nine. 
 
Line 9: The text of line nine outlines the nature and scale of Caracalla’s mass 
enfranchisement. The majority of the controversy regarding this section of P. Giss. 40 
regards the prepositional phrase (χωρίς + genitive) contained at the end of the line, a 
small lacuna obscuring the pivotal word, currently reading only as [. . .]ειτικιων. In his 
original reconstruction of the text, Meyer concluded that this word ought to be restored 
as δεδιτικίων.725 This is a Hellenised version of the Latin dediticii, a term used by 
Gaius to describe population groups subjugated by Rome via an official act of 
surrender (deditio).726 Whilst the Greek spelling has been questioned, with δηδειτικίων 
                                                 
722 Oliver (1989) 504.  Wolff has read the first letter of this word as a mu, consequently producing a 
different restoration.  This would fit with his general thesis that P. Giss. 40 does not contain the text of 
the constitutio Antoniniana. 
723 Honoré (2002) 24.  Honoré claimed that Ulpian would have advocated the extension of citizenship 
affected by Caracalla. 
724 Dig. 1.5.17. 
725 Meyer (1910) 30-33. 
726 Gaius, Inst. 1.14. This group is sometimes referred to as the peregrini dediticii to distinguish them 
from a group of similar legal status found later, freedmen convicted of serious crimes during their 
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becoming the preferred option, this reconstruction represented the communis opinio 
for many years.727  
 
Despite the traditional academic support for a reconstruction including mention 
of the dediticii, however, it was far from a perfect answer. If the reconstruction of 
δηδειτικίων was palaeographically correct, it might appear to mean that Caracalla’s 
extension of the franchise was not universal. This immediately presents a dilemma, 
since the only extant contemporary source that actively described the scale of the 
constitutio, that of Ulpian, mentions no such exception or caveat to the edict.728 It 
would seem careless of a jurist of Ulpian’s character to omit such an important legal 
detail.729 
 
 The potential contradiction in the ancient evidence led some to question the 
nature of the exclusion inferred by the prepositional phrase χωρίς + genitive. One 
explanation offered in the past is that the text contained on P. Giss. 40 did not, in fact, 
make reference to the grant of civitas itself, but rather to some associated grant or 
supplement.730 The problem with this, however, is that, without any clear analogies 
that can be drawn from other texts, such a hypothesis relies upon imagination and 
speculation.731  
 
 The inescapably conjectural nature of these analyses has led others to doubt the 
very existence of any mention of dediticii in connection with the constitutio text. 
Benario, for example, has voiced his scepticism, pointing to the silence of Dio on the 
subject: ‘if a significant portion of the population had been barred from the enjoyment 
of the emperor’s gift, Dio would, in all likelihood, not have failed to mention it, since 
he was a bitter enemy of the ruler.’732 Whilst the ‘unabashed hatred’ of Dio for 
Caracalla is well-known, one must be careful not to exaggerate or assume the 
intentions of any ancient source.733  
 
It is safer simply to observe that if, in the course of the Institutes, Gaius was 
correct that the dediticii were completely bereft of political identity and could never, 
under any condition, hope to attain the rights of Roman citizenship, then there must 
have been as little requirement to stipulate their exclusion from the terms of the 
constitutio Antoniniana as there would have been for the slave population. The idea 
that Caracalla’s edict made specific mention of one population group, whose 
ineligibility would already likely have been automatically assumed, seems a rather 
                                                 
time in slavery under the terms of the lex Aelia Sentia (see: Gaius, Inst., 1.13). For more on these 
groups, see Rocco (2010) 134, n.16; Wirth (1997) 32-34.  
727 Weissert (1963) 239-50. This reconstruction has even been accepted in more recent years. For an 
example, see Rocco (2010) 134. 
728 Dig. 1.5.17, see above n.3. Similarly, there is no mention of any exceptions to Caracalla’s edict in 
the course of Dio’s hostile summary of the grant (Dio 78.9.5-6). 
729 Unless, of course, the compilers of the Digest later removed any mention of the dediticii instead.  
730 This hypothesis has been championed most famously by Sherwin-White (1973a: 380), but has also 
been taken up by Jones (1936: 223-235) and Préaux (1953: 218). 
731 Lukaszewicz (1990) 97-99. Also see Kuhlmann (2012) 49. 
732 Benario (1954) 188. 
733 For more on Dio’s fierce hatred of Caracalla, see: Millar (1964) 150. For further discussion of 
Dio’s assessment of the constitutio, see Chapter Four of this thesis. 
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tautological explanation of the status quo.734 Moreover, the fact remains that the 
fundamental existence of δηδειτικίων in the ninth line of P. Giss. 40 is far from 
assured; the hapax legomenon forms a problematic and unsatisfying suggestion for the 
complement of χωρίς.735 With this in mind, it is appropriate to seek an alternative 
explanation regarding this area of the text preserved on the Giessen papyrus.  
 
 The publication of materials relating to the Antonine document known as the 
tabula Banasitana has changed the nature of this debate and allows for an analysis of 
the constitutio Antoniniana removed from the difficulties presented by the dediticii.736 
The tabula is a bronze tablet containing three letters dating to the latter half of the 
second century AD, discovered near the ancient settlement of Banasa in Morocco in 
1957.737 The first document is a letter, dating to c. 168, which was addressed from the 
emperors Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus to the governor of Mauretania Tingitana 
and concerned the enfranchisement of a local notable known as Julian the Zegrensian 
(who had petitioned for a grant of citizenship despite not being the leader of his 
community) and his family. The second letter, dated early in 177 and from Marcus 
Aurelius and Commodus, was addressed to the provincial governor and concerned the 
citizenship of the family of the new chieftain of the Zegrensians, another Julian (who 
is sometimes assumed to be the son of the subject of the previous letter preserved in 
the inscription).738 The final document in the tablet is an extract from a commentarius, 
which recorded the grant of civitas to the younger Julian, and would have made the 
conferral valid. 
 
 Of particular importance to any analysis of the constitutio Antoniniana is the 
way in which certain qualifications were placed upon the grant of civitas to the 
Mauretanian and his descendants in the course of the Antonine tabula. The grant of 
citizenship in this case was applied both salvo iure gentis and sine diminutione 
tributorum et vectigalium populi et fisci.739 The first of these clauses states that the 
grant of civitas Romanorum would not exclude the recipient from the legal framework 
and obligations of their parent communities, thereby preserving customary law (ius 
gentium). The second of the clauses found in the tabula forms a clear statement that 
the newly enfranchised individual would not enjoy the fiscal immunity experienced by 
citizens under the early years of the Principate, and would be fully obligated to make 
tax payments.740  
 
 A similarity between the Latin of the Tabula Banasitana and the Greek of the 
constitutio Antoniniana texts can be identified when reconstructing the controversial 
eighth and ninth lines of Caracalla’s edict. The modern consensus on this portion of 
the text is that the clause immediately following the grant of civitas in the papyrus 
ought to read: μένοντος τοῦ δικαίου τῶν πολιτευμάτων.741 The underlying sentiment 
                                                 
734 Lukaszewicz (1990) 96-98. 
735 Lukaszewicz (1990) 95. 
736 For more on the tabula and its role in the expansion of the franchise, see Chapter One. 
737 IAM 2.1, 94 = AE 1961, 142.  For an annotated edition of the Tabula of Banasa, see: Oliver (1972) 
336-40. 
738 Oliver (1972) 338; Sherwin-White (1973b) 88. 
739 IAM 2.1, 94. l.37. 
740 Sherwin-White (1973b) 86-98. 
741 Kuhlmann (2012) 47; see above for translation. 
189 
 
here, that even the mass enfranchisement of 212 honoured the existence of local 
custom, seems to form an easily identifiable Greek equivalent of salvo iure gentis.742  
 
 The existence of these Latin formulae tempering the grant of citizenship allows 
for another interpretation to be made of the problematic ninth line of P. Giss. 40. If the 
μένοντος clause bridging lines eight and nine of P. Giss. 40 is agreed to form a 
Hellenised construction preserving the local ius gentium, then it is logical that the 
exclusionary clause which follows it should similarly mirror the Latin construction 
found in the Tabula Banasitana, which emphasised the newly enfranchised citizens’ 
liability to pay taxes. In every edition of the constitutio text that includes mention of 
the dediticii, the Greek χωρίς is always translated meaning ‘except’. An alternative 
translation for this term, however, would be ‘without’.743 This alternative translation 
would certainly seem to mirror the Antonine document, with χωρίς representing a 
Hellenised version of sine. 
 
 An objection to this translation of χωρίς, in connection to the dediticii, has been 
voiced by Lukaszewicz, since he believes that such a wording would infer a complete 
denial of the continued existence of the dediticii as a political class.744 This problem 
can easily be overcome, though, by removing the dediticii from the equation 
altogether. In the years since the discovery of the constitutio text, there have been 
attempts made to reconstruct the text of the Giessen papyrus without making any 
reference to the dediticii.745 Unfortunately, however, the majority of these attempts 
were made long before the discovery of the Antonine tabula and, as a result, are almost 
entirely conjectural, often plagued by their own grammatical and palaeographical 
problems.746  
 
 If χωρίς is understood to mean ‘without’ rather than ‘except’, an attempt can 
to be made to assess whether the end of the ninth line of P. Giss. 40 is equivalent to 
the Latin sine diminutione tributorum et vectigalium populi et fisci found in the Tabula 
of Banasa.747 Instead of δηδειτικίων, it has been suggested that the lacuna might be 
better reconstructed as αδδειτικίων.748 Whilst admittedly a hapax legomenon in its own 
right, it is no more controversial than δηδειτικίων.  
 
The adjectival noun, translating as ‘additional’, may be understood to make 
reference to the system of fiscal immunitas enjoyed historically by citizens under the 
earlier Principate. Kuhlmann disagrees that the χωρίς τῶν ἀδδειτικίων clause 
represents a direct transliteration of sine diminutione tributorum et vectigalium populi 
                                                 
742 Sasse (1958) 48-58, has shown that the genitive participle μένοντος, found in the eighth line of P. 
Giss. 40, is relatively common in Greek legal texts, and that in at least forty-seven cases, the 
construction is identical to that of the Giessen papyrus, with the participle employed in a genitive 
absolute construction. In this case, it can clearly be seen to mirror the Latin ablative absolute 
construction in the salvo clause of the Tabula Banasitana. 
743 Lukaszewicz (1990) 98. 
744 Lukaszewicz (1990) 98-99. 
745 Böhm (1963) 278-355; Heichelheim (1941) 10-22; Laqueur (1927) 15-28. 
746 For a detailed objection to some of the earlier attempts to remove the dediticii from the text of the 
edict, see Lukaszewicz (1990) 99. 
747 Wolff (1976) 99-102. 
748 Kuhlmann (2012) 48-50; Oliver (1989) 504.  
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et fisci, however, doubting that it makes specific reference to fiscal immunity alone.749 
He questions how far the sentiment from the Latin construction can be inferred from 
one word alone, arguing that if Oliver was correct in his assumption regarding the 
focus of additicia, then it must represent a hitherto unrecognised Greek terminus 
technicus.750  
 
This conclusion would ultimately infer that the χωρίς clause found in the 
constitutio text was, in fact, a very general one designed to facilitate and overcome any 
short term problems that the Roman authorities might encounter in the aftermath of 
such a mass act of enfranchisement. While I agree with Kuhlmann that the precise text 
of the edict must be read in this general sense, it is also my contention that, among all 
of the innumerable benefits that the Giessen papyrus might theoretically make 
reference to in the controversial clause, the fiscal privileges were among the foremost 
concerns of both Caracalla and his newly enfranchised populace.751 The sense of 
Caracalla’s edict thus moves away from the idea of a grant in which a specific 
population group was forbidden access to the benefits of Roman civitas. Instead, the 
constitutio text can be interpreted as a more formulaic piece of legislation, one in 
which the newly enfranchised were simultaneously assured that their new legal status 
would not preclude their engagement with local customary law in the provinces whilst 
being reminded that their enfranchisement would result in an obligation to pay taxes 
levied against the citizen population. 
 
 The revised wording obviously does not meld flawlessly with the Latin 
construction seen in the text of the tabula Banasitana, but this is hardly surprising 
owing to the nature of the transliteration process from Latin into Greek.752 Until the 
discovery of other materials relating to the constitutio, students of this document must 
accept that linguistic questions and arguments will persist.753 The removal of the 
troublesome dediticii from the wording of this document, however, would appear to 
fit more comfortably with the extant evidence, none of which makes any reference to 
a population group disbarred from Caracalla’s otherwise universal edict.754  
 
Line 10: Although far less controversial than the previous line, the appearance of νίκῃ 
in this line has prompted disagreement on what is being alluded to. Johnson disputed 
any notion that the ‘victory’ being referred to was in connection to the assassination 
of Geta in late AD 211. He advocated a theory linking it to the German campaign of 
AD 213, instead.755 Such a conclusion would, of course, have the resulting effect of 
questioning the date of the constitutio, inferring a promulgation date of AD 213 at the 
earliest, rather than the preceding year, as is most widely accepted. There is a 
fundamental problem with Johnson’s hypothesis, however, in that he has attempted to 
                                                 
749 Kuhlmann (1994) 237. For examples of the term in the Latin corpus which Kuhlmann identifies, see 
Dig. 50.16.98.1 and Tert. Resurr. 52. 
750 Kuhlmann (1994) 236-37. 
751 This hypothesis is considered in greater detail in Chapter Four. 
752 Oliver (1989) 500. 
753 Lukaszewicz (1990) 98-101. 
754 In addition to the contemporaneous legal evidence, the idea that the Constitutio Antoniniana was 
an entirely universal one is maintained in later literature. Sidonius Apollinaris, for example, claimed 
that: ‘none but the barbarian and slave is foreign’ (Ep. 1.6.2). 
755 Johnson (1961) 226, n.2.  Also see Oliver (1989) 501. 
191 
 
assign a particular event to an area of the edict which is clearly rhetorical. The 
appearance of ‘victory’ in this line is incontrovertible, but this edition favours a more 
general interpretation, in keeping with the literary tone of the text, rather than referring 
to any episode specifically. 
 
Lines 11-13: These lines have prompted little variation between the various scholars 
who reconstructed the papyrus. The general idea of a spread in the greatness or 
magnificence of the Romans is preserved through the survival of μεγαλειότητα 
(μεγαλειότης = majesty) in line eleven and γεγενῆσθαι in line twelve. Line thirteen 
signals the beginning of the worst areas of damage to the papyrus, with significantly 
fewer characters surviving in this and subsequent lines when compared to those above. 
The reconstruction assigning the spread of greatness to a timeless Roman honour is 
accepted both by Wilhelm and Heichelheim.756  
 
Lines 14-17: These lines are so damaged that only Heichelheim has attempted any 
significant reconstruction. In line fourteen, he continues the notion of the spread of 
Rome’s magnificence by suggesting that the decree stated that no one would be left 
stateless (ἀπολίτευτος) or dishonoured (ἀτίμητος). The latter would appear to be a fair 
reconstruction, fitting with the three extant letters in that section of the line, but lines 
15-17 are based on so few surviving characters that, although interesting and eloquent 
solutions to the lacunae have been proposed, we are faced with the inescapable 
conclusion that we cannot be certain regarding the content of this line or any 
subsequent in the first column of P. Giss. 40. 
  
                                                 




A Case of Mistaken Identity: Julia Domna as Concordia on RIC 380 and 381 
 
This article has been published in volume 160 of the Revue belge de Numismatique et 
de Sillographie (2014).757 This and the following article were written during the course 
of my doctoral studies and are included as appendices in accordance with submission 
guidelines. 
 
Abstract: The reverse figures on two coin types of Julia Domna (RIC 380 and 381) 
have been identified as either the empress herself or a personification of Pax. This 
article offers a third possibility. By examining numismatic evidence pertaining to the 
empress in the context of the fraught period of Caracalla and Geta’s joint rule of the 
empire, I will argue that the most likely identity of the personification depicted on RIC 
380 and 381 is that of Concordia. This identification fits more comfortably with the 
rest of the numismatic corpus for the period, and also makes greater sense when 
considered in the midst of the intense rivalry observed between the young Augusti in 
months preceding Geta’s eventual murder. 
 
 Of all of the Roman empresses and imperial consorts, Julia Domna stands out 
as one of the most famous and best studied in recent years. Much attention has been 
devoted to the subject of her life and many have attempted to assess her unusually 
prominent role within the Severan dynasty.758 Despite the differences in focus or 
purpose found in each of the many studies on the empress, there is a consensus that 
Julia represents one of the most honoured consorts of the imperial period. Although 
allusions to her prominence can be found in the ancient literature, the level of prestige 
afforded to Julia can be more easily observed in the sheer number and variety of coins 
struck in her honour, from the earliest years of her husband Septimius Severus’ reign 
(AD 193-211) through to the death of her eldest son Caracalla in 217, not to mention 
the commemorative issues struck in her honour during the reign of Alexander 
Severus.759 Among the many coins struck for Julia, there are two precious metal types 
produced in the aftermath of Septimius Severus’ death in 211, included in the Roman 
Imperial Coinage, that warrant further discussion owing to questions surrounding the 
identity of the figure depicted on the reverse.760 
 
 Struck in both aurei and denarii, these coins depict an obverse bust of Julia 
Domna draped and facing right, her hair presented in its distinctive wavy and 
undulating style but without either the diadem or crescent found on other coins of the 
same period. The obverse also carries the legend: IVLIA PIA FELIX AVG. The reverse 
depicts a female figure (standing in 380, seated in 381) facing left, holding a branch 
                                                 
757 A full reference to the article can be found in the bibliography accompanying this thesis. 
758 There are a number of publications on the subject of Julia herself as well as her position as one of 
the famous set of powerful Severan women. For a good selection, see the following: BAHARAL 1992, p. 
110-18; LEVICK 2007; MAGNANI 2007; SAAVEDRA-GUERRERO 2007, p. 120-31.  
759 The commemorative issues are struck on coinage produced for Julia Mamaea, during the reign of 
Alexander Severus, see RIC 715 and 716 Alexander Severus. For works on Julia’s numismatic legacy, 
see GORRIE 2004, p. 61-72; LUSNIA 1995, p. 119-40; ROWAN 2011, p. 241-73. 








Fig. 1. Denarius of Julia Domna depicting the empress as Concordia (RIC 381). NAC Auction 64 (17 
May 2012) lot 1217. (Image reproduced courtesy of Numismatica Ars Classica NAC AG.) 
 
 The first point of discussion regarding these coins concerns the nature of Julia’s 
titulature. The appearance of PIA FELIX on the obverse suggests that the coins were 
struck after the death of Septimius Severus, while the use of the plural construction 
mater augustorum (MAT AVGG) on the reverse indicates that they were also produced 
prior to the murder of Geta in late December of AD 211.761 This combination of 
information, therefore, allows a fairly confident dating of the coin types in question to 
the latter half of 211 but no later, significantly more specific than the general period 
211-15 offered in the RIC.762 
 
 Regarding the reverse image depicted on these coins, the general consensus 
states that the figure simply represents Julia herself, an image of the empress 
accompanying her prestigious titles.763 The appearance of a headdress on RIC 380 
makes a definitive identification difficult, but the hypothesis certainly appears to be 
strengthened when it is observed that the figure found on RIC 381 clearly exhibits 
features of a hairstyle synonymous with Julia: intricate waves flow from the scalp and 
down the side of the empress’ head, the tightly woven edging and bun gathered neatly 
at the back (see Fig. 1). The appearance of a hairstyle similar to that associated with 
the empress, however, is not sufficient evidence in itself to conclude that RIC 380 and 
381 represent depictions of Julia Domna without any additional inference or meaning 
to the iconography.  
 
 It has already been noted that the figure represented on these coins, whether 
standing or seated, carries both a branch and a sceptre. The appearance of the latter 
item in particular, a symbol of ultimate authority and power usually associated with 
emperors or deities, is of interest since it would be an extremely irregular accoutrement 
                                                 
761 For a chronological overview of the death of Geta and its aftermath, see BARNES 2012, p. 51-2. 
762 ROWAN 2011, p. 255. 
763 Ibid, p. 254-5. Julie Langford-Johnson has claimed that the figure is ‘iconographic shorthand’ 
representing Julia Domna’s role as genetrix to the Severan dynasty, accepting the fundamental 
identification of the female as Julia. For more on this, see LANGFORD-JOHNSON 2005, p.160. 
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to accompany a standard depiction of an empress, even one with such evident prestige 
as Julia Domna. It seems more likely that if these coins do indeed depict the empress, 
they do so by depicting her in the form of a deity, similar to the figure claimed to 
represent Julia as the goddess Cybele (RIC 562) struck at some point between the years 
209-11.764 
 
 It is perhaps owing to this potentially unusual depiction of Julia that the RIC 
also offers an alternative explanation regarding the reverse: rather than depicting the 
empress, the figure represents a personification of Pax instead. This alternative 
hypothesis would certainly better explain the appearance of the branch and sceptre 
accompanying the figure, since the numismatic representation of Peace is often 
depicted carrying both of these items.765 A potential objection to this theory, however, 
is that if this identification is indeed correct, then these types would form the only 
allusion to Pax found on the coinage of Julia Domna throughout both the reigns of 
Septimius Severus and Caracalla.766 Furthermore, it should be noted that rather than 
increasing, the number of reverse themes paired with obverses of Julia appears to have 
declined and shrunk in the aftermath of Septimius Severus’ death and during the reign 
of Caracalla.767 Given this context, it would seem highly unlikely that the types found 
on RIC 380 and 381 represent a hitherto unacknowledged depiction of Pax in 
connection with the empress.768 A third potential explanation is required. 
 
 Rather than depicting the empress in her own right or as a personification of 
Peace, the evidence can equally be interpreted to suggest that RIC 380 and 381 were 
                                                 
764 This is another example where the significance of the reverse inscription MATER AVGG has been 
overlooked. The abbreviation of augustorum can again be employed to provide a more specific dating 
of the coin between 209 and 211 rather than the rather nebulous 196-211 period offered in the Roman 
Imperial Coinage. The extent to which it can be confidently said to represent Julia in the guise of Cybele, 
rather than simply the goddess in her own right, is questionable though.    
765 This style of depiction can be observed across the imperial period. For some examples of this figure 
with an accompanying Pax legend, see (in chronological order): RIC 770 Vespasian, RIC 168 Alexander 
Severus, RIC 157 Volusian. It is also worth noting the precious metal coinage of Tiberius (RIC 29, for 
example) in which a similar figure appears, carrying the same accoutrements. This case might prima 
facie seem central to the later Severan case, since it has been claimed that this figure may represent 
Livia in the guise of Pax. The Tiberian coin is a more problematic case, however, since it has also been 
suggested that the female was supposed to represent Iustitia, or even that it is simply Livia on her own, 
the accompanying legend PONTIF MAXIM making reference to her position as the wife of the first pontifex 
maximus during the imperial period and/or her position as stepmother to the second. For more on the 
‘Livia’ type, see: GIARD 1983; SUTHERLAND and CARSON 1984, p. 87-88.  
766 In her survey of coin hoards across the Mediterranean, Langford-Johnson recorded the variety in 
numismatic themes struck on coins of Julia; there are no depictions of Peace: LANGFORD-JOHNSON 
2013, p. 130-33. There is one example listed in the RIC (601) which does appear to carry the deity on 
the reverse. The denarius depicts Pax standing left, holding a branch and sceptre, with the accompanying 
legend PACI VAETERNAE (sic). The incorrect nature of this legend, however, lends credence to the notion 
that this coin type is, in fact, either a barbaric imitation or simply an ancient forgery and therefore should 
not be counted alongside the other output produced for the empress. 
767 For the number of reverse themes struck on Julia’s coinage, see ROWAN 2011, p. 255, Fig. 4. 
768 Indeed, a conclusion of Pax, in this case, would lead to questions regarding what the imperial 
household hoped to achieve through such a miniscule output. Whilst coins could undoubtedly form an 
effective medium for official communications, Noreña is correct in observing that this would not have 
been achieved by individual types in the short term, see NOREÑA 2011, p. 197. For more on the question 
of numismatic authorship and agency, see below, n.32. 
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intended to present Julia Domna in the guise of another deity: Concordia. Similar to 
but distinct from Pax, the deification of harmony had a long association with Rome 
prior to the Severan era, with the first temple of Concord erected in the capital by 
Furius Camillus in 367 BC.769 Concordia appears to have featured on coinage for the 
first time in 62/1 BC and was later struck notably on coins produced for Mark Antony 
during the civil wars which marked the end of the Republic.770 During the Principate, 
the deity was used to promote a sense of concord established by the emperors, paired 
with the legend Concordia Augusta, especially in periods of unrest such as the Year 
of the Four Emperors.771 The theme also became increasingly linked with the figures 
of the empresses and the notion of an internal harmony within the imperial household, 
being observed for the first time with Domitia, struck between the years AD 81-84, 
and becoming more common under the later Antonine empresses.772 
 
 In the case of Julia Domna, Concordia is a type that can be found on the 
empress’ coinage during the reign of her husband from 193 until 211.773 From analysis 
of data gathered from an extensive hoard sample, Clare Rowan has identified that 
Concordia appears on two percent of the total silver coinage output for Julia during 
the reign of Severus. From the same evidence, she has demonstrated that the deity is 
also found in vastly increased quantities associated with the other women of the 
Severan dynasty, namely Plautilla (37%), Julia Paula (85%), Aquilia Severa (99%) 
and Orbiana (99%).774 The importance of this iconography to imperial wives, 
compared to mothers, is striking, but it need not change the identification of RIC 380 
and 381, struck under Caracalla and Geta for Julia, if the general premise is accepted 
that ‘the imagery on the empress’s coinage was utilized to extend the prevailing 
ideology of the emperor in power’.775 
 
 Concordia was a theme of general importance to the early Severan dynasty, 
and one which Septimius Severus employed in three distinct ways. In the earliest years 
of his reign, during the Wars of Succession against Pescennius Niger and later Clodius 
Albinus, the majority of this iconography was decidedly militaristic in nature, stressing 
                                                 
769 Plut. Camillus 42. 
770 For the 62/1 issues, see the coins struck by Paullus Lepidus: C.415.1 and C. 417.1b. For a good 
example of Civil War period coinage featuring Concordia, see: C. 529.4b, in which Mark Antony and 
Octavian stressed their harmony by depicting a bust of the personification on the obverse paired with 
two hands clasping around a caduceus on the reverse. I am grateful to Dr Sandra Bingham (University 
of Edinburgh) for allowing me to utilise her thorough database of Concordia coins during the writing 
of this note. 
771 For two examples, see BMC 57 Galba and BMC 48 Vitellius. These examples are also of interest to 
the later Julia Domna coins, since in both cases the figure of Concordia is depicted carrying both the 
branch and sceptre. Her identity is beyond question, owing to the reverse legend CONCORD AVG¦S-C in 
both cases.  
772 For the Domitia coin, bearing the legend CONCORD AVGVST and depicting a peacock standing right, 
see: RIC 212; BMC 61. For data concerning the Antonine empresses, see ROWAN 2011, p. 244-46. The 
earlier coin of Caligula (BMC 36; RIC 33) depicting his sisters as Securitas, Concordia and Fortuna on 
the reverse might seem to form an odd omission, but it must be remembered that this coin was struck in 
honour of the emperor rather than his sisters and carries his portrait on the obverse. 
773 RIC 547, for example, depicts Julia clasping hands with Severus, with the accompanying legend: 
CONCORDIA FELIX. 
774 ROWAN 2011, p. 257-70. 
775 Ibid, p.272. 
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the military power under Severus’ command by declaring the harmony that the 
emperor enjoyed with the Roman army.776 With the pretenders to the throne defeated, 
there was a visible shift in emphasis, the emperor’s family becoming the central focus 
of the Concordia imagery produced by the imperial government. The unity of the 
imperial family was stressed through a variety of visual media, as examples such as 
the Berlin Tondo, the family friezes on the Arch of the Argentarii and those found on 
the Severan Arch at Lepcis Magna testify.777 The overall strength and unity of the 
dynasty was also promoted intensively at the Secular Games of 204.778 
 
 In the numismatic corpus, certain familial relationships were emphasised more 
owing to their importance to the Severan dynasty’s long-term political survival. 
Severus made reference to the success of his marriage to Julia, mirroring earlier 
Antonine propaganda, through coinage bearing both Severus and Julia’s busts on the 
reverse, wearing radiate and lunate crowns respectively, with the legend CONCORDIAE 
AETERNAE.779 Similarly, a plethora of coins struck for Caracalla in the opening years 
of the third century publicise the harmony between the young Augustus and Plautilla, 
married in 202.780 
 
 The emphasis on the concord between the emperors themselves during this 
period also formed one of the most constitutionally important facets of imperial 
harmony prior to the death of Septimius Severus. The unity between Severus and 
Caracalla as co-Augusti was promoted through coinage declaring AETERNITAS 
IMPERII, with draped and laureate busts of the two emperors facing one another on the 
reverse.781 This message of internal harmony was extended later to include the 
tempestuous fraternal relationship between Caracalla and Geta upon the latter’s 
elevation to the position of Augustus in 209. In one type, for example, the brothers are 
depicted standing next to one another and holding a victory between them; the legend 
CONCORDIA AVGVSTORVM leaves little doubt regarding the message to be taken from 
the numismatic iconography.782  
 
 The desire of both Septimius Severus and Julia Domna to reconcile their 
warring children is well-attested in the ancient literature covering the period. Severus 
is reported to have warned his sons of the inevitable disaster that followed fraternal 
enmity in famous tales and legends and, according to Cassius Dio, used his final words 
                                                 
776 RIC 108, for example, derives from the early period and depicts the deity standing, holding a military 
standard in each hand, with the accompanying legend CONCORDIAE MILITVM.  
777 All of these examples were defaced to some extent during the process of the damnatio memoriae 
enacted following the murders of Plautianus in 205 and Geta in 211. For more on this, see FLOWER 
2008, p. 97-115. 
778 For more on the political use of the Secular Games, see GORRIE 2002, p. 461-81. 
779 RIC 522. 
780 BMC 306.272, for example, depicts the couple on the reverse clasping hands, with the accompanying 
legend CONCORDIA FELIX. The propagandistic nature of this coin type is clear when the disastrous nature 
of the marriage is analysed. Herodian (3.10.8) noted, for example, that Caracalla had only married her 
under compulsion from Severus. For more the marriage, see: Dio 77.1.1-4.5, 77.6.3 (Loeb numbering 
system); Hdn 3.10.5-8. 
781 RIC 250. 
782 See RIC 255 and 330a for two examples of this type. 
197 
 
imploring his sons to seek concord with one another in the aftermath of his imminent 
death.783 For her part, Julia is reported to have continued to seek a lasting reconciliation 
between her sons after the death of her husband. Herodian, for example, recounted 
how the empress reacted to her sons’ plans to divide the empire itself into two halves: 
‘She began weeping and crying out. Then she threw her arms around them both and 
drew them into an embrace, trying to reconcile them.’784 Indeed, in Dio’s account, it 
is specifically this desire to unite her sons which ultimately allowed Caracalla to 
construct a plot to strike at Geta while separated from his many bodyguards.785 
Langford-Johnson has raised the intriguing possibility that the senate may have opted 
to bestow the honorific mater senatus title on Julia in the aftermath of Septimius 
Severus’ death precisely because they perceived her to be a ‘champion of harmony’, 
perhaps the only figure left in the imperial court that might engineer a lasting 
settlement between Caracalla and Geta.786   
 
 It is in the context of this period of increasing tension between the brothers in 
the latter half of 211, then, that RIC 380 and 381 ought to be considered. It should 
come as no surprise to observe a continuation of Concordia iconography appearing in 
the numismatic record for the empress. As the widow of one emperor and the mother 
of two more, Julia’s coinage during these months appears to have continued to carry 
the message promoted extensively during the reign of Septimius Severus: that the 
imperial household was united and strong. It should also be noted that the ancient 
writers suggest that even the warring Caracalla and Geta did attempt to create a façade 
of harmony, albeit a very transparent one. Dio claimed that the emperors made public 
declarations of love and pride in each other despite being diametrically opposed.787 
This outward display of unity is also found in the numismatic record.788 It is all too 
easy to view the fraternal relationship from a position of hindsight, where the eventual 
violence seems to have been inevitable. If it is accepted instead that the young Augusti 
                                                 
783 For Severus’ warnings, see Herodian 3.13.3. The imperative used by Dio (77.15.2) in recording 
Severus’ supposed final words, ὁμονοεῖτε, is significant since the Greek concept of Homonoia is 
equivalent to the Latin Concordia. 
784 Hdn 4.3.9 (tr. Whittaker). 
785 Dio (78.2.2) claimed that Caracalla induced Julia to summon both sons to a meeting as an 
intermediary, probably so as not to arouse Geta’s suspicions regarding Caracalla’s motive behind the 
request. 
786 LANGFORD-JOHNSON 2013, p. 21; LANGFORD-JOHNSON 2005, p.185. It seems evident from the 
ancient literature that there was an atmosphere of tension in Rome following the return of the imperial 
family from Britain. Dio (78.1.4-5) claimed, for example, that the senate ordered a sacrifice to 
Concordia but that the officials could not locate each other to perform the rite. Whilst this has clearly 
been inserted into Dio’s prose to suggest both the irreparable state of Caracalla and Geta’s fraternal 
relationship and the inevitable violence that would come of it, it can be inferred, at least, that the senators 
were eager to promote harmony between the two young Augusti. 
787 Dio 78.1.4. Similarly, Herodian (4.1.4-5) claimed that the emperors lived completely separate lives 
within the palace walls and that they only came together when attending functions in public. 
788 It is important to note that Julia’s coins were not alone in declaring harmony within the imperial 
household during this time. Coinage struck for both Caracalla and Geta can also be shown to have 
promoted this message during the first decade of the third century across both precious and base metal 
denominations, a trend which continued after Severus’ death. For selected examples of this iconography 
struck for Caracalla, see: RIC 152, 459, 482, 508a-c and 537. For those of Geta, see: RIC 40, 73a-b, 85, 
86a-b, 134a-b, 164, 165 and 184.   
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at least attempted to project an outward image of harmony, then these coin types would 
make sense as an extension to the prevailing public message of the time.789  
 
 If examined in this manner, the coin types struck for Julia Domna seen in RIC 
380 and 381 are not a simple depiction of the empress in her own right as the mater 
augustorum, nor are they indicative of an innovation whereby the iconography of Pax 
became associated with her for a period of months only to disappear before the end of 
the same year. Instead, these coins make better sense if interpreted as depicting either 
Concordia or Julia in the guise of Concordia. As such, they can be viewed not only as 
a continuation of one strand of Severan propaganda that had been continually 
promoted since the turn of the third century, but also one which was publically (if not 
privately) promoted by the young emperors Caracalla and Geta in the aftermath of 
their father’s death. 
  
                                                 
789 This conclusion ultimately raises the issue of the agency behind this numismatic iconography. 
Noreña has persuasively argued that coinage could be an effective vehicle for political messages and 
propaganda, but the question of who chose the imagery remains more controversial, see NOREÑA 2010, 
p. 251-60. Despite Howgego’s insistence that the problem is irrelevant since, under an autocracy, the 
numismatic output inevitably would be favourable to the regime, evidence from sources such as 
Suetonius and De Rebus Bellicis suggests that the emperors sometimes took an active interest in their 
coinage, see HOWGEGO 2001, pg. 70-71; Suet. Aug. 94.12, Nero 25.2; De reb. bell. 1.3-4. Whilst routine 
type selection was probably undertaken by mint magistrates, it also seems probable that they would 
often act in response to directives from the imperial household. Unlike the later case of Julia Soaemias, 
who may have exerted a greater influence over her own coinage, owing to Elagabalus’ relative youth, 
Julia Domna’s coinage continually reflects and extends the iconography promoted by the incumbent 
emperors, both in the case of her husband and her sons. For more on the coinage of Julia Soaemias, see 




The Prefect and the Plot: a reassessment of the murder of Plautianus 
This article was co-written with Sandra Bingham and was accepted for publication 
with Journal of Ancient History in early 2015.790 
Abstract: In AD 205, the praetorian prefect Plautianus was murdered in the imperial 
palace. The ancient sources, Dio and Herodian, tell of a plot, though they offer 
different versions as to who was behind it and who the target. This article will consider 
both accounts as well as numismatic and epigraphic evidence in an attempt to provide 
a new interpretation for this event. 
Early in AD 205, the praetorian prefect Gaius Fulvius Plautianus was 
summoned to the imperial palace. After a brief interrogation, he was murdered in the 
presence of the emperors, Septimius Severus and Caracalla. Modern scholars are 
nearly universal in attributing a plot to destroy the prefect to the younger emperor, 
accepting the testimony of the senator Cassius Dio. A contrasting account of the events 
of that night, however, can be found in the works of Dio’s contemporary, Herodian, 
who presents us with a conspiracy devised by Plautianus to murder Severus and 
Caracalla and to seize the imperial throne for himself. Traditionally this report has 
been dismissed as an untrustworthy and confused retelling of the official version of 
events released by the imperial household in the aftermath of the prefect’s death.791 In 
this article, we intend to provide an alternative interpretation of this murder and the 
conspiracy which led to it. 
Plautianus is said by Herodian to be a kinsman of Severus, through the latter’s 
mother, Fulvia Pia.792 While his early career is not well documented, it is clear that the 
emperor had confidence in the future prefect from the start of his reign.793 Plautianus 
came to prominence during the civil wars that occurred in the first years of Severus’ 
rule; according to the Historia Augusta, he was delegated by the new emperor to 
capture the children of his rival, Pescennius Niger.794 He also accompanied the 
imperial family on their travels in the post-civil war period.795  That Plautianus was 
praetorian prefect by June 197 is confirmed by epigraphic evidence.796  It did not take 
long before he was sole prefect but whether he had removed rivals to ensure his 
                                                 
790 A full reference to this article can be found in the bibliography accompanying this thesis.  
791 For example, by Levick (2007), 79 and by Hohl (1975), 42.  
792 Hdn 3.10.6. The author also reports the rumour that the two men had been lovers by way of explaining 
Plautianus’ rise to prominence under Severus. On the kinship between the two men, see Chausson (1998), 395-400; 
Birley (1988), 216-17 provides a stemma. 
793 A possible reference to Plautianus’ early career is contained in a scholium about a “Fluvius” convicted by 
Pertinax when he was the proconsul of Africa. See Dio 74.15.4, with Birley (1988), Appendix 2, n. 32 (who accepts 
that this is Plautianus and provides a date of 188 or 189). The difficulty of establishing details about Plautianus’ 
career in general should not be underestimated since the removal of his name and image after his death was 
thorough. 
794 HA, Sev. 6.10. 
795 ILS 2186, dating to AD 200 and celebrating the safe return of the family and the victories of Severus, 
mentioned Plautianus though his name has been erased.  
796 Plautianus is listed as praetorian prefect in ILS 2185, dated to 9 June 197. He may have been prefect of the 
vigiles by 195; see CIL XIV S.4380. There is a possibility that he held the positions of praefectus vehiculorum and 




position is not clear.797 Dio suggests that Plautianus wielded considerable power, 
though this was not unusual for praetorian prefects: by this time, the prefecture allowed 
the office holder much influence.798 It is equally likely that Plautianus’ background, 
namely his close relationship with Severus, provided him with many prospects. In fact, 
he was granted the consularia ornamenta and his daughter, Plautilla, was married to 
Severus’ son, the young co-emperor, Caracalla in 202.799 In the following year, 
Plautianus held the consulship with Severus’ brother, Publius Septimius Geta, a 
singular honour for someone of his status.800 He was also made clarissimus vir.801 All 
of these honours were clearly driven by Severus’ desire to publicly acknowledge his 
close friend.  
 
Yet, in AD 204, Septimius Geta was said to have revealed on his deathbed “all 
the facts about Plautianus”, though there are no further details.802 Apparently he did 
this “for he hated the prefect and now no longer feared him.” That there might have 
been animosity between them is not surprising, if Severus had favoured Plautianus in 
his reign. In fact, the Historia Augusta suggests that the emperor had earlier attempted 
to dash any hopes that his brother might have had for power by making Caracalla 
Caesar.803  This message was made even clearer when Caracalla became Augustus 
three years later at the age of ten.804 The marriage between Plautilla and Caracalla 
would not have helped matters. It was obvious that Severus intended a closer 
relationship between his family and that of Plautianus; the deathbed revelation, then, 
was probably a final attempt by Septimius Geta to undermine the prefect. It seems to 
have had the desired effect: Dio mentions that the emperor “stripped Plautianus of 
most of his power”. But the reasons for this are not evident.805 
                                                 
797 On the removal of rivals, in particular, Aemilius Saturninus, see Dio 76.14.2. Howe (1966), 70 suggests, 
however, that there were other colleagues as well prior to 200. There was no rule regarding collegiality in the 
prefecture: in fact, there were more single prefects than double occupants in the long history of the post; see Absil 
(1997), 87-95. 
798 One might adduce Commodus’ prefect Perennis by way of example; see Dio 73.9.1; Howe (1966), 65-6. On 
Dio’s portrayal of Plautianus’ power, see, for example, 76.14.1: “Plautianus, who not only shared Severus’ power 
but also had the authority of prefect, and possessed the widest and greatest influence of all men, put to death many 
prominent men among his peers…”; 76.14.6: “…one might not improperly claim that Plautianus had power beyond 
all men, equalling even that of the emperors themselves.” All quotes are taken from the Loeb translation unless 
otherwise specified. 
799 Plautianus is styled cos II (“consul for the second time”) in ILS 9003 (see below); this use of the term is noted 
by Dio (46.46) as an anomaly. The date of his adlection is not certain but Whittaker (1969, 329, n. 4) puts it in 202, 
which would make sense, given the newly forged ties between the emperor and the prefect because of the marriage. 
On the marriage itself, see Dio 77.1.2; Hdn 3.10.5 and 7. 
800 To distinguish him from Severus’ son, also Geta, we refer to Severus’ brother as Septimius Geta throughout. 
801 ILS 9003. This inscription, which escaped the damnatio, shows the close relationship between the prefect and 
the imperial family:  
C. Fulvio C. f. Quir. Plautiano | pr. pr., c.v., cos II, ad | sumpto inter patr. | famil.,  
necessario | dd. nn. Augg. Seve | ri et Antonini di | cato numini aeor., | patri  
Plautillae | Aug., omnium prae | cedentium praef. | excellentissimo | d. d. p. 
 
To Gaius Fulvius Plautianus, son of Gaius, of the tribe Quirina, praetorian prefect, most illustrious man, 
consul for the second time, initiated among the patrician families, close companion of our lords the 
Augusti, Severus and Antoninus, dedicated to their divine will, father of Plautilla, most excellent of all 
the prefects before him, the people gave this monument. 
802 Dio 77.2.4. 
803 The date was 195; cf. ILS 8809; HA, Sev. 10.3; cf. also 8.10. 
804 Birley (1988) 215.  




It may have been this diminishing of power, however, that led to his demise. 
The two main sources provide full details of the event, though offer different accounts 
of what actually happened. The version given by Dio is generally accepted by scholars. 
Here, the death of Plautianus is concocted by Caracalla, who was known to despise 
the prefect. One of the main problems seems to have been the marriage to Plautilla, 
which was doomed from the start. Caracalla is said to have refused to eat or sleep with 
his wife and Plautilla to have reported to her father all the threats supposedly made by 
Caracalla towards her.806 In the years between 202 and 205, then, the relationship 
between the prefect and the young emperor must have deteriorated rapidly.  Once 
Severus had acted against Plautianus after Septimius Geta’s revelation, the animosity 
seems to have increased.  Dio suggested that the prefect regarded Caracalla with even 
greater antagonism, blaming his son-in-law for his diminished position.807 It is not 
clear why he held the son accountable for the actions of the father, but as co-emperor 
Caracalla may have had a say in whatever action Severus took. The young emperor 
then took matters into his own hands, plotting the removal of the prefect.808 Making 
use of his tutor, Euodus, and officers of the guard including a certain Saturninus, 
Caracalla reported to his father that Plautianus was planning to murder the two of them. 
The task was made easier, Dio says, because of a dream Severus had the night before 
that his former rival, Albinus, was still alive and plotting against him.809 Furthermore, 
Dio adds that Caracalla produced a note containing details of the plot. This convinced 
the author that the conspiracy was the work of the young emperor, “for Plautianus 
would never have dared to give such instructions either to ten centurions at once, or in 
Rome, or in the palace, or on that day, or at that hour, and especially not in writing.”810  
Severus, however, was taken in by Caracalla’s claim and summoned the prefect to the 
palace; when he offered Plautianus the opportunity to refute the charge, Caracalla 
disarmed the prefect, assaulted him and ordered an attendant to kill him after being 
stopped from doing so himself by his father.  
 
The destruction of the praetorian prefect is not the only murder of an imperial 
family member attributed to Caracalla. In the works of both Dio and Herodian, he also 
is implicated in the killing of his younger brother in late 211. The actual act of Geta’s 
murder in Herodian is lost owing to a lacuna in the text. Three interpolations, however, 
from the Codex Monacensis, Politian and John of Antioch, have traditionally been 
employed to fill this gap, all of which suggest that Caracalla killed his brother by his 
own hand.811 Dio, however, does not claim that the young Augustus personally 
undertook the act of fratricide. Instead, Caracalla delegated the task to officers, who 
had been previously briefed, before luring his brother into a trap under the guise of 
appealing for a lasting reconciliation.812 The process of entrapping his victim and 
                                                 
806 Hdn 3.10.8; the author notes that Caracalla had married only “under compulsion”. See also Dio 77.2.5. 
807 Dio 77.2.5. 
808 Dio 77.3-4. 
809 Dio 77.3.4. 
810 Dio 77.3.4. 
811 Hdn 4.1.3. See also Whittaker (1969) 391, n.2. 
812 Dio 73.2.3. Dio claims that Caracalla used their mother, Julia Domna, as an intermediary. It is likely that Geta 
and Julia were close, prompting Whittaker (1969, 367, n. 2) to suggest that it was her intervention that caused 
Severus to make his younger son Augustus in 209. 
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ordering his execution by subordinates bears considerable similarity to the earlier 
murder of Caracalla’s father-in-law recorded in the same source.813 The act of 
fratricide is understandably one of the most enduring and memorable aspects of 
Caracalla’s reign; it is an episode that has always drawn the attention of scholars. As 
a result, it is all too easy to let the events of 211 influence any analysis of what 
happened in 205, with Caracalla as the guilty party in both murders.   
 
Dio’s animosity towards Caracalla is well-known.814 As a result, his account 
of the murder of Geta might be explained by the author’s desire to blacken Caracalla’s 
image and to emphasise the traumatic nature of the younger brother’s assassination, 
presenting it as a final act of violence from the savage Caracalla towards a more 
submissive Geta.815 One of the most notable features of Dio’s history of the years 193-
205 is that the younger brother is presented as a “nonentity”.816 Before his murder, 
Geta only appears eleven times, is always mentioned in conjunction with either 
Severus or Caracalla and is rarely even referred to by name.817 Commenting on the 
joint rule of the empire between the brothers in the aftermath of Severus’ death, Dio 
claimed that Caracalla shared the government of the empire with his brother in name 
only, in reality enjoying a monopoly of the imperial power.818 The clear inference from 
this evidence is that Geta was only a minor figure in the imperial court and no match 
in either power or influence to his father and brother.819 
 
Additional evidence provided by both Dio and Herodian, however, suggests 
that, rather than one brother dominating the other, Caracalla and Geta were equally 
recalcitrant. In the aftermath of Plautianus’ murder, Dio was explicit in criticising both 
sons of Severus for living in a disgraceful fashion: “They outraged women and abused 
young boys; they embezzled money and made gladiators and charioteers their 
associates, emulating each other in the similarity of their deeds.”820 Contrary to the 
notion that Geta was a weak individual overshadowed by a vicious elder brother, 
evidence can be gleaned from the sources to suggest that Caracalla and Geta were both 
intensely competitive young men and shared a mutual enmity. 
 
Herodian claimed that the two brothers were antagonistic, quarrelling even as 
early as childhood.821 He added that the pair were complete opposites of one another: 
“whatever one liked, the other hated.”822 This fraternal discord is found again in Dio, 
who recorded that during their adolescence the young men were reckless in their 
                                                 
813 Birley (1988) 189. 
814 Millar (1964), 150-60.  
815 Kemmers (2011) 271-2; Millar (1964) 150. 
816 Kemmers (2011) 271. 
817 Dio 77.2.3; 77.7.1-2; 77.11.1; 77.14.1; 77.15.2; 77.15.3; 78.1.1; 78.1.3; 78.1.4; 78.2.1; 78.2.2-4. 
818 Dio 78.1.1. 
819 Kemmers (2011) 271. 
820 Dio 77.7.1, adapted from the Loeb translation. 
821 Hdn. 3.10.3. According to Herodian, the rivalry initially manifested as childhood arguments while attending 
quail fights, cock fights and wrestling bouts. 
822 Hdn. 3.10.4. 
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challenging of one another, Caracalla even breaking his leg in a chariot crash after one 
particularly heated encounter.823 By 208, the hostility had apparently escalated to such 
a degree that Severus’ British campaign was partly prompted by the emperor’s desire 
to return his sons to their senses.824 The conflict between the pair further worsened 
after their father’s death, with both Dio and Herodian agreeing that the brothers lived 
entirely separate lives. Herodian even adds that the Augusti partitioned the imperial 
palace and raised personal bodyguards.825 With this in mind, it appears that Herodian’s 
claim that “each brother tried every way to get rid of the other” might be more credible 
than Dio’s rather one-sided account.826 
 
Herodian’s narrative of Plautianus’ murder thus deserves consideration.827 In 
this account, the prefect did indeed plot against Severus and Caracalla after realising 
that his position had become precarious. Again, there is the involvement of Saturninus, 
said to be devoted to Plautianus and assigned the task of murdering the emperors 
because of his easy access to the palace as a tribune of the guard. He asked to have the 
instructions put into writing, to which Plautianus agreed.828 Instead of killing the 
emperors, however, Saturninus decided to reveal the plot – but only after realising a 
major logistical flaw in the plan, namely that the two emperors resided in separate 
areas of the palace. A confession was made to Severus and Plautianus was summoned, 
though not before the emperor also questioned Caracalla; he suspected his son of 
devising a plot to remove the prefect, in an echo of the version given by Dio. Herodian 
adds that Plautianus put on a breastplate under his clothes before heading to the palace 
“as a protection against an attack on his person.”829 The breastplate was to become 
central in determining his guilt when standing before Severus, who, as in Dio, was 
beginning to find the prefect’s defence plausible. Again Caracalla first challenged the 
prefect, in particular about the armour, then ordered his murder.830  
 
Herodian’s account has been considered by most scholars as “rhetorical, 
untrustworthy and represent[ing] a garbled account of the official story” put out after 
the death, hence the preference for Dio’s version.831 In fact, reading the plot as given, 
it is extremely ill-planned and short-sighted: of greatest significance is the fact that 
Plautianus’ equestrian status stood in the way of his successfully usurping the 
principate. Dio’s version of the events, though, given his attitude towards Caracalla 
noted above, should not necessarily be taken as more trustworthy. It is clear that Dio 
                                                 
823 Dio 77.7.2. 
824 Dio 77.11.1; Hdn. 3.14.2. 
825 Dio 78.1.4-5; Hdn. 4.1.4-5. Herodian (4.3.5-9) also claimed that there was a short-lived plan to divide the 
empire itself into two different realms. 
826 Hdn. 4.3.1. 
827 Hdn. 3.11-13. 
828 The existence of a note was what convinced Dio that the plot originated with Caracalla, since he did not believe 
Plautianus would have committed such things to writing. Yet in both Dio and Herodian, the note does not appear 
again – it is not used in condemning the prefect, an unusual omission since it seems to be the “smoking gun” in 
assessing the prefect’s guilt. It is possible, therefore, that the note is a fabrication designed to lend credibility to the 
plot in both accounts. 
829 Hdn. 3.12.7. 
830 Hdn 3.12.7-11. 
831 Whittaker’s description of Hohl’s criticism (1969, 332, n. 1). 
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had an interest in portraying the murder in such a way as to tarnish Caracalla and to 
convince his readers that the young emperor was an impetuous bully, much as he does 
in the rest of his work. Herodian therefore should not be so easily dismissed here. 
When the murder of the prefect is considered in the broader context, another scenario 
begins to emerge, one that suggests his account offers a more plausible picture of what 
might actually have happened.  
 
We must go back to the deathbed revelation of Severus’ brother, Septimius 
Geta, to set the scene. What was said was not disclosed by Dio, but it was enough, we 
are told, to make Severus take a careful look at his prefect. Plautianus already knew 
that his position was under threat: the animosity between Caracalla and himself had 
been intensifying in the years 202-205. Given his proximity to the imperial family and 
his command of the guard, word about Septimius Geta’s allegations would have 
quickly reached him. Furthermore, Severus himself was ill and no longer young; there 
is much made in the sources about his age and ailments.832 Plautianus can have had no 
doubt as to what would happen to him should Severus die suddenly.  
 
 In all of this escalating tension within the imperial household, the figure of 
Geta remains conspicuously absent. As noted earlier, the literary evidence suggests 
that he could be equally as antagonistic as his older brother and it is easy to imagine 
that, even as a young teenager, Geta may have harboured considerable resentment at 
only being elevated to the position of Caesar in 198, especially given that less than a 
year separated the brothers in age.833 This animosity would be aimed not only at 
Caracalla who had more official power than him, but also at Severus who had denied 
him promotion to the highest imperial level. Such bitterness may have been exploited 
by a senatorial faction who saw the youth as a way to regain their position. After all, 
several senators had supported Clodius Albinus in the civil war. Herodian notes that 
“many people…particularly the most distinguished senators were sending [Albinus] 
personal, private letters urging him to come to Rome while Severus was occupied away 
in the east. The nobles preferred to have him as emperor because he traced his noble 
birth back to a long line of ancestors and was said to be good-natured.”834 The new 
emperor took revenge on these men after Albinus’ defeat. Severus sent his head back 
to Rome to be displayed in public and attacked his friends in the senate, producing a 
selection of their letters discovered among Albinus’ papers. Furthermore he accused 
other senators of sending monetary support to Albinus, to assist in paying his troops.835 
Dio notes that Severus released thirty five prisoners who had supported Albinus 
because they were prominent senators, but put to death twenty nine others.836 
Furthermore Severus’ recent adoption into the Antonine family along with his 
honouring of Commodus caused concern, according to Dio.837 That some leading 
                                                 
832 Hdn 3.11.1; cf. also 2.15.4 (though Whittaker doubts the veracity of this account);  Dio 77.16.1 
833 Barnes (1967), 93 
834 Hdn 3.5.2. Dio, undoubtedly better placed to know such things, concurs that many senators chose sides in the 
conflict between Severus and Albinus. See 75.4.2. 
835 Hdn 3.8.2-7, passim. 
836 Dio 76.8.4. Among these men is singled out Sulpicianus, father-in-law of the murdered emperor Pertinax and 
implicated in the “auction” of the empire. Perhaps he had acted as Albinus’ agent in Rome during the civil wars. 
837 Dio 76.7.9. Gleason (2011) 52. 
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members of the senate might have been tempted to consider their options makes sense, 
given these circumstances.838  
 
But who might these adherents be? In the aftermath of the murder of Geta, the 
sources record that there was an indiscriminate slaughter of those who had supported 
him.839 Few names are provided, but among those listed by Dio are Valerius Patruinus 
(one of the praetorian prefects) and Lucius Valerius Messalla Thrasea Priscus (consul 
in 196). Herodian mentions Afer (the young men’s distant cousin and consul in 207), 
Tiberius Claudius Pompeianus (the grandson of Marcus Aurelius) and Helvius 
Pertinax (son of the former emperor and designated suffect consul for 212); he also 
includes ‘senators distinguished by birth and wealth.’840  
 
The individual of most interest is Aemilius Papinianus. A close companion of 
Severus, this man was a libellis to the emperor from autumn 197, at the latest, to 
February 202.841 He was praetorian prefect by the end of May 205 and had as his 
colleague Quintus Maecius Laetus.842 Papinian served in that post until dismissed by 
Caracalla in 211; the reason for the dismissal is not known.843 His murder, in 212, is 
closely associated in the sources with that of Geta.844 The removal of such a talented 
individual in 202 upon the family’s return to Rome makes it tempting to link Papinian 
to the senatorial faction supporting Geta.845 This is bolstered by Papinian’s absence 
from public life in the period of 202-205.846 But given the controversial nature of the 
position of procurator a libellis, the question of Papinian’s involvement in the Getan 
faction must remain open.847 Intriguingly, he next appears after the murder of 
Plautianus – and in the position of praetorian prefect. This appointment may have been 
the result of a decision to divide the responsibilities of the prefects, with Papinian 
handling administrative affairs while Laetus took care of military matters. Given 
                                                 
838 On the tense atmosphere in the capital at this time, see Daguet-Gagey (2006) 76. 
839 Dio 78.4.1; Hdn 4.6.1-4. The number given by Dio is 20,000, both men and women, and of every status. Yet 
this is clearly an exaggeration; see Sillar (2001b). 
840 Hdn. 4.6.2. Afer is also referred to as Lucius Septimius Aper; see Sillar (2001b) 415-17. The HA (Car. 3.8) 
provides other names but is of dubious authority.  
841 Honoré (19942) 190. Honoré suggests that Papinian may have been an assistant prior to his appointment in 
197. The dates are based on rescripts; see Honoré (19942) 77. The HA (Car. 8.2) records that Papinian was related 
to Severus, though the text is ambiguous (per secundam uxorem); this could refer either to Severus’ second wife, 
namely Julia Domna, or to Papinian’s second wife. 
842 ILS 2187 mentions both men and is dated to 28 May 205. 
843 It has been suggested that Patruinus became prefect when Papinian was dismissed, with the latter adlected to 
the senate at the same time; see Meckler (1994) 121. 
844 Although the HA records that Papinian’s son was also killed (Car. 4.2), there is no other evidence of this son     
and it is likely a creation of the author. See Sillar (2001a) 420-421. 
845 It is noteworthy that, also in 202, Severus appointed a stalwart, Lucius Fabius Cilo, to the post of urban prefect; 
see ILS 1142. The new prefect is attested by Dio to have enjoyed a close relationship with Caracalla (78.4.2). Cilo 
survived the purge of 212. 
846 It is not known what contact Papinian had with the court during those years.  
847 Evidence from the later third century suggests that the a libellis did not have to be with the emperor, as noted 
by Millar (1986) 278. In addition, we know of another individual performing the same task between 200 and 205 
in connection with the imperial court: Aelius Coeranus (IK Ephesus VI [1980] no. 2026). There is, therefore, the 
distinct possibility that Papinian performed his duties in Rome. 
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Papinian’s extensive experience and Severus’ magnanimity, his return to such a 
prominent position is pragmatic.848 
 
Yet the strongest evidence for a pro-Geta faction in Rome comes from the non-
literary material. The majority of the epigraphic evidence indicates an established 
hierarchy between Severus and his sons (the former as the senior Augustus, Caracalla 
as junior Augustus, Geta as Caesar and later most junior of the Augusti).849 The total 
number of inscriptions relating to Geta is inevitably small owing to the thorough nature 
of the damnatio memoriae enacted after his death. Of the 174 extant inscriptions on 
which his name features, only thirty-seven (c.21%) have survived intact.850 This 
extremely high attrition rate led Murphy to comment that “in few cases has an order 
to efface a man’s name from the monuments been so effectively carried out.”851  
 
Of interest here are a selection of inscriptions deriving from the eastern 
provinces, North Africa and the Pannonian/Danubian area that refer to Geta as 
Augustus prior to his elevation to the position in 209.852 These inscriptions perhaps 
can be explained by the fact that the areas in question were Severan power bases, 
leading them to be overly enthusiastic in their presentation of the Caesar in the 
expectation that he would eventually become one of the Augusti. On the other hand, 
following Geta’s death, Caracalla was eager to establish his own men in these regions, 
which may hint at pro-Getan sentiment in some of the provinces.853 Because of Geta’s 
damnatio, it is impossible to know to what extent the designation as Augustus occurred 
elsewhere in the empire before 209 or how widespread pro-Getan sentiment was 
among the provinces.854  
 
More striking evidence can be found in the numismatic corpus. It would be 
easy to assume that the relative frequency of numismatic output struck for the men of 
the imperial household would reflect the established hierarchy of the domus Caesaris 
during this period, in a similar fashion to that of the epigraphic data mentioned above. 
This is not the case, however, and it is the coinage for Geta that upsets the pattern. 
Between 200 and 202, the number of coins commissioned on Geta’s behalf far 
surpasses that of Caracalla. More surprisingly, in 202 itself, production of Getan 
coinage even exceeded the number struck for Severus, forming nearly half of all the 
                                                 
848 On Severus’ clemency, see Dio 76.8.4 (senators spared after the civil war). 
849 Kemmers (2011) 272. 
850 Varner (2004) 182. 
851 Murphy (1945) 105. 
852 CIL 3.1602; CIL 3.3615; CIL 3.7540; CIL 3.7602-4; CIL 8.006; CIL 8.2527-8; CIL 8.2557; CIL 8.8991; CIL 
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212; see 117-8. 
854 The Arch of the Silversmiths in Rome, dating to 204, is a well-known example of the thorough nature of 
damnatio visited upon Geta. The arch’s inscription has recently been reinterpreted; it is possible that Geta was 
singled out for specific honours as the patron of Regio XI (where the arch stands), though the reconstruction of the 
text is uncertain. See Flower (2008) 105-114. 
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imperial coinage created in Rome for the year.855 These findings are all the more 
noteworthy when it is considered that, as part of the process of damnatio memoriae, 
Caracalla is alleged to have ordered all coinage bearing his brother’s image to be 
melted down and re-struck.856 Whether or not this destruction was enacted (the extant 
numismatic evidence featuring Geta’s portraiture demonstrates the difficulty in 
enforcing any such order), the fact remains that the numismatic output for Geta in the 
opening years of the third century was entirely disproportionate to his relatively junior 
position within the imperial household. 
 
    It is unlikely that Geta himself lay behind this anomaly; after all, he was only 
11 in 200. The question of agency in coin selection is a controversial issue owing to a 
paucity of definitive evidence on the subject. While it seems clear that emperors, such 
as Augustus and Nero, had take an active interest in their coinage, Noreña has shown 
that a number of officials were involved in the organisation of the central mint and that 
the reality of imperial coin production was logistically complex.857 Administrative 
control of the mint rested with the procurator monetae, while the secretary a rationibus 
appears to have been the official who determined the level of output.858 In addition to 
these men were the triumviri monetales, attested into the Severan period, but with little 
information on their precise duties.859 Any one of these officials could have been 
responsible for overseeing the Roman coinage between 200 and 202, especially when 
it is noted that the imperial family was travelling in the eastern provinces during this 
period.  
 
The nature of the iconography on this unusually high output is also noteworthy. 
In terms of precious metal coinage struck at the central mint, around eighty percent of 
the Getan types between 200 and 202 is spread between only four different reverse 
themes, namely Felicitas Publica, Securitas Imperii, Nobilitas, and Princeps 
Iuventutis.860 It is important to note that the last of these themes, the Prince of the 
Youth, seems to have been a numismatic icon commonly associated with the Caesares 
in this period.861 The concentration of these reverse types for Geta differs markedly, 
however, from the more militaristic themes promulgated for Caracalla during the same 
period. If it is accepted that monetary propaganda was specifically tailored to the 
different figures within the imperial household, it would seem that Kemmers is correct 
to conclude that someone appeared to be promoting Geta's individual suitability to rule 
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858 Noreña (2011) 191. 
859 ILS 1181, dating to the Severan period. 
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the empire: “Geta is the hope of the empire, destined to rule and well qualified to do 
so.”862  
 
While it is possible this coinage is the result of an imperial directive by 
Severus, what is striking about the appearance of Princeps Iuventutis legends in the 
case of Geta is the brevity of the period in which this theme and the others mentioned 
above appear in any significant quantity. If this coinage was intended to form the basis 
of a propagandistic programme devoted to the young Caesar, the logical expectation 
is that the concentration of imagery would be continued and sustained across a period 
of years rather than being abruptly halted less than twenty-four months later.863 In fact, 
production of these coins was abruptly halted in the latter half of 202, coinciding with 
the return of the imperial family from the east. Furthermore, from 203 onwards, there 
is an identifiable shift in the iconographical emphasis of Getan coinage, with the 
Princeps Iuventutis and Securitas types completely disappearing from the precious 
metal output struck at the Roman mint.864 Interestingly, the presentation of Princeps 
Iuventutis appears to increase dramatically on his base metal coinage during the same 
period, but the iconography contained on this output further suggests a significant 
change in the presentation of Geta.  
 
The most visible characteristic of the Princeps Iuventutis reverses struck on 
precious metal between 200 and 202 is that the Caesar was presented on his own, 
usually carrying a combination of either a branch, spear or trophy. On the later 
examples found on aes, Geta is always accompanied by other figures, principally those 
of Severus and Caracalla.865 Far from emphasising Geta's individual quality, the 
coinage struck for him from 203 onwards was designed to promote his place within 
the imperial household but stressed the subordinate nature of his position compared to 
those of his father and older brother. This change in iconography can further be paired 
with a general reduction in the volume of Getan coins. By the end of 204, output of 
coinage struck in Geta's name had been reduced by over twenty percent, clearly 
relegating him to the least prominent of the Severan men.866  
 
The numismatic evidence, therefore, suggests that there was a concerted effort 
between 200 and 202 to promote Geta as an individual successor to the imperial throne. 
That this is evidence of a pro-Geta faction in Rome rather than the result of an imperial 
mandate is suggested by the rapid halt and reversal of this policy upon the return of 
the domus Caesaris to the capital from the eastern provinces, inferring that the output 
                                                 
862 Kemmers (2011) 279. For more on the tailoring of numismatic iconography to the members of the imperial 
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was not the result of a pre-existing directive by Severus.867 In support of this 
hypothesis, a similar epigraphic reaction can be identified, with an increase in the 
number of inscriptions honouring Caracalla, many proclaiming him Princeps 
Iuventutis, leading to a marginalisation of the Caesar.868  
 
This shift away from Geta would have been emphasised as well, of course, by 
the marriage between Caracalla and Plautilla. With this act, the future of the Severan 
dynasty clearly lay with Caracalla and the future heirs that might be born to him. Any 
hopes that Geta might have harboured to become an Augustus would have been 
crushed by the marriage, an action which, in the context of the increasingly fierce 
fraternal rivalry, handed political dominance to Geta’s loathed older brother. The 
marriage also would have checked the aspirations of any pro-Geta faction. By early in 
204, however, it was clear that things were not going according to plan: the marriage 
between Caracalla and Plautilla had been a failure and no offspring had been produced; 
Plautianus was becoming increasingly disaffected because of the deteriorating 
relationship between himself and his son-in-law; Geta was still only Caesar with no 
prospect of advancement in sight. In the same year, Severus celebrated the Secular 
Games through which he hoped to promote the strength and unity of the dynasty. The 
Games also allowed him to highlight a connection with Augustus and to “represent 
himself as a new Augustus, inaugurating a period of renewal after the turmoil of civil 
war.”869 Domestic discord was not to be tolerated on such an occasion: in fact, all 
members of the imperial family had a prominent role in the celebrations.870 One can 
only imagine their feelings as they took part. This forceful show of artificial unity 
would continue into the following year, when Caracalla and Geta were consuls 
together. Moreover, after the deathbed revelation of Severus’ brother, Plautianus must 
have realised he had few options left. Given the disaffection, then, of the prefect and 
the young Caesar, that they might have found common interest would not be 
surprising. 
 
The evidence taken as a whole, therefore, provides for the following 
interpretation. The senators perceived Geta as their way to toppling the unpopular 
Severus and Caracalla as early as 200; they may not have liked Plautianus but evidence 
gleaned from the aftermath of his murder and the subsequent inquiry suggests that a 
number were willing to work with him.871 Both Geta and Plautianus would have 
realised that their futures were limited under the regime as it stood in 204, with power 
concentrated on the figure of Severus and increasingly on Caracalla: both the Caesar 
and the prefect were in real danger if Caracalla were ever to become sole ruler in the 
event that Severus died unexpectedly. The disaffected senators’ animosity towards 
Severus owing to his Antonine pretentions and his persecution of Albinus’ supporters 
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attracted them to the younger son as a malleable figurehead. Geta, for his part, had 
little reason to oppose any approach. The fierce resentment between himself and 
Caracalla was public knowledge. It might also be expected that the Caesar harboured 
resentment against his father in being denied a full share of power despite being only 
eleven months younger than Caracalla. Until 202-204, however, the closeness of 
Plautianus to the regime meant that any real action was impossible, since in such a 
bold act, the assistance of the praetorian guard would prove vital. Once the prefect’s 
position began to decline, an approach could be made for his support. Herodian’s 
account, whether the official version or not, offers an intriguing alternative to Dio in 
distancing the figure of Caracalla from the murder plot of 205 and instead making 
Caracalla himself an object of the conspiracy. While the author may be wrong to depict 
Plautianus as the mastermind behind the plan, this is hardly surprising, since accusing 
a Caesar of high treason was unlikely to have resonated well with the imperial 
household. The fact remains, though, that many stood to gain from the deaths of 
Severus and Caracalla. Geta would succeed to the position of ultimate power, 
something denied him previously. The senate would rid themselves of unpopular 
autocrats. Rather than coveting the throne for himself, the best that Plautianus could 
have hoped for in 205 was to maintain his influential position in the imperial court: his 
life depended on it.  
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